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Law Office of Continuing Legal Education (UK/~LE) are designed to assist lawyers in maintain-
ing their professional competence. The Office of Continuing Legal Education and its volunteer
speakers and writers are not rendering legal or other professional services by their participation in
continuing legal education activities. Attorneys and others using information obtained from UK/
CLE publications or seminars must also fully research original and current sources of authority to
properly serve their or their client's legal interests. The forms and sample documents contained in
our continuing legal education publications are intended for use only in conjunction with the
professional services and advice of licensed attorneys. All parties must cautiously consider whether
a particular form or document is suited to specific needs. The legal research presented herein is
believed to be accurate, but is not warranted to be so. These written materials and the comments
of speakers in presentation of these materials may contain expressions of opinion which do not
necessarily reflect the views of the Office of Continuing Legal Education, the Univ'ersity of Ken-
tucky, the Commonwealth of Kentucky, or other go\'ernmental authorities. UK/CLE strives to
make its written materials and speaker presentations gender-neutral; however, gender-specific
references may remain where it would otherl.vise be a\\,k,vard or unclear. It should be understood
that in such references the female includes the male, and \rice-versa.
Copyright 2002 by the University of Kentucky College of Law,
Office of Continuing Legal Education.
All rights reser\'ed.
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CLE
The University of Kentucky College of Law, Office ofContinuing Legal Education (UKICLE) was organized in 1973
as the first permanently staffed, full-time continuing legal education program in the Commonwealth of Kentucky. It endures
with the threefold purpose to: 1) assist lawyers in keeping abreast of changes in the law; 2) develop and sustain practical
lawyering skills; and 3) maintain a high degree of professionalism in the practice of law. Revenues from seminar registrations
and publication sales allow the Office to operate as a separately budgeted, self-supporting program of the College. No tax
dollars, bar dues or public funds are budgeted in the Office's finances.
Courses
UKICLE provides a variety of workshops, conferences, and institutes to satisfy the continuing education needs of
lawyers and other professionals. Courses range from half-day programs in selected areas to in-depth programs extending over
several days. While most courses are conducted at the College of Law in Lexington, UKiCLE has a longstanding statewide
commitment. Since its first year ofoperation, beginning with a criminal law program in Madisonville, Kentucky, the Office has
continued to bring the highest quality continuing education to attorneys across Kentucky, the Midsouth, the Midwest, and the
nation.
Publications
Each course is accompanied by extensive speaker-prepared course materials. These bound materials are offered for
sale following courses and are consistently regarded as valuable, affordable references for lawyers. In 1987, UKICLE began
producing a series of publications which now consist of Practice Handbooks, Monographs, and Compendiums. Each Practice
Handbook is an extensively referenced, fully indexed practice guide consisting of separately authored chapters, sequenced for
the comprehensive coverage of a distinct body of law. Their format allows for updating through supplements and cumulative
indexes. Each Monograph is a concisely written practice guide, usually prepared by a single author. designed to cover a topic of
narrower scope than Practice Handbooks. Compendiums contain both official forms and sample documents. Designed to assist
the lawyer by suggesting specific structures and language to consider in drafting documents, these public~tions are beneficial in
the resolution of legal drafting concerns. The Compendiums are often used most effectively in conjunction with UKICLE
Practice Handbooks and Monographs.
Professionall\fanagement
UKICLE serves the needs of the bar from its offices on the University of Kentucky campus in Lexington. Its staff
manages course planning, publication content planning, course registrations. publications sales, course and publication market-
ing. publication composition and printing, as well as internal budgeting, accounting, and financial reponing. As an "income
based" program, UK/CLEfs course tuitions and publications sales are designed to generate sufficient revenues for self-support.
Commitment to Quality and Creativity
UKICLE is a member of the Association for Continuing Legal Education (ACLEA). As such, UKiCLE subscribes to
the Standards of Operation for Continuing Legal Education Organizations, and the Standards of Fair Conduct and Voluntary
Cooperation administered under the auspices of the American Law Institute-American Bar Association Committee on Continu-
ing Professional Education. Throughout its existence UKICLE has been actively involved in the activities of and discourse
sponsored by ACLEA. UK/CLEfs association with national and international CLE professionals has afforded it the opportunity
to continually reassess instructional methods, quality in publications, and effective means ofdelivering CLE services at consis-
tently high levels of quality.
An Integral Part of the Legal ProCession's Tradition of Service
An enonnous debt is owed to the practitioners, professors, judges and other professionals \vho generously donate their
time and talent to continuing legal education. Their knowledge and experience provide the fundamental components of our
seminars and publications. Without their motivation and freely given assistance in dedication to the legal profession, high
quality continuing legal education would not exist. As a non-profit organization, UKiCLE relies upon the traditional spirit of
service to the profession that attorneys have so long demonstrated. \Ve are constantly striving to increase attorney involvement
in the continuing legal education process. Ifyou would like to panicipate as a volunteer speaker or writer, please contact us and
indicate your areas of interest and experience.
UKICLE: A Self-Supporting Entity
The University of Kentucky Office of Continuing Legal
Education (UK/CLE) is an income-based office of the Uni-
versity of Kentucky College of Law. As such, it is separately
budgeted and financially self-supporting. UK/CLE opera-
tions are similar to not-far-profit organizations, paying all
direct expenses, salaries and overhead solely from re\'enues.
No public funds or tax dollars are allocated to its budget.
Revenues are obtained from registrant enrollment fees, and
the sale of publications. Our sole function is to provide
professional development services. In the event surplus
funds become available, they are utilized to offset deficits or
retained in our budget to improve the quality and variety of
services we provide.
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SECTION A
INTRODUCTION
The Environmental Defense Council devotes most of its website to the
"rollback" of environmental progress by the George W. Bush Administration and
has published a book entitled IIRewriting the Rules: The Bush Administration's
Assault on the Environment." While the Bush Administration has reversed a
number of the prior administration's environmental policies, its influence has yet
to be seen in court decisions.
LAND USE
• Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc., et al. v. Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency, et al., 535 U.S. __ (April 23, 2002)
The Tahoe Regional Planning Agency imposed a 32-month moratorium on
development in the Lake Tahoe Basin while formulating a comprehensive land-
use plan for the area. Real estate owners affected by the moratorium filed suit
claiming the agency's action constituted a taking without just compensation.
Overruling the district court, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that
because the moratorium had only a temporary impact on the property owners'
interest, no compensable taking had occurred. The U.S. Supreme Court
agreed, holding that the moratorium imposed by the planning agency was not a
per se taking of property requiring compensation under the Takings Clause of the
United States Constitution.
There are two types of takings - direct government appropriation of
property and government regulation that imposes such a severe restriction on
property usage that it produces nearly the same result as direct appropriation.
The moratoria placed on the Lake Tahoe Basin property were regulatory in
nature.
A regulation constitutes a taking when it either does not substantially
advance a legitimate state interest or it denies the owner economically viable use
of the property at issue. Because of potential damage to the lake, the district
court rejected the first alternative. However, as the regulation imposing the
moratoria did not contain an express termination date, the district court held the
affected property owners were entitled to compensation for the regulatory taking.
The appellate court reversed, holding that because the regulations had only a
temporary impact on the property owners' interest, a categorical taking had not
occurred.
According to the U.S. Supreme Court, whether a temporary moratorium
constitutes a taking depends on the particular circumstances of the case. The
Court distinguished acquisitions of property for public use and regulations
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prohibiting private uses. The Court noted that, under a prior case, Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, compensation is required only when a regulation
deprives a property owner of all economically beneficial uses of the property.
The Court also noted that if it were to rule in favor of the Lake Tahoe property
owners and create a categorical rule in the interest of fairness and justice, every
regulatory delay would become a taking. The Court ultimately held that a
temporary restriction that merely causes in diminution in value does not
constitute a compensable taking.
• Southwest Williamson County Community Association, Inc. v. Slater, et
al. 243 F.3d 270 (6th Cir. March 14, 2001)
Southwest Williamson County Community Association filed a motion for a
preliminary injunction to halt construction of a 77-mile length of highway designed
to bypass Nashville, Tennessee. The district court denied the motion after
finding that Southwest was not likely to succeed on the merits of the case. The
appellate court affirmed the denial. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held the
district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that construction of a highway
corridor was not a "major federal action" requiring the Federal Highway
Administration to respond to the state's environmental assessment with certain
documentation of environmental impact. Typically, a project is considered a
major federal action when it is funded with federal money. However, a state-
funded project may become a major federal action upon involvement of multiple
federal agencies. Major federal actions are bound by the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) to perform additional environmental reviews.
The appellate court held there are two alternative bases for finding that a
non-federal project constitutes a "major federal action" invoking NEPA
requirements: (1) when the non-federal project restricts or limits the statutorily
prescribed federal decision-maker's choice of reasonable alternatives; or (2)
when the federal decision-makers have authority to exercise sufficient control or
responsibility over the non-federal project so as to influence the outcome of the
project. The court concluded that the state's work on the highway did not restrict
the federal decision-makers' choice of reasonable alternatives. The court further
concluded the relevant decision-makers did not have authority to exercise
sufficient control or responsibility over the highway construction so as to
influence the outcome of the project. Construction of the highway did not involve
federal funding. Further, no federal agency had jurisdiction over the non-federal
project.
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• Ohio River Valley Environmental Coalition, Inc. v. Callaghan, 133 F.
Supp. 2d 442 (S.D. ~Va. March 8, 2001)
Plaintiff filed a motion for preliminary injunction to restrain issuance of a
surface-mining permit to mine a ridge top in the headwaters of a creek.
Defendant performed a cumulative hydrologic impact assessment (CHIA) and
concluded that the project was designed to prevent material damage to the
creek. Plaintiff alleged that in conducting the assessment and reaching its
conclusions (1) Defendant relied upon inadequate baseline sampling of the
streams; (2) the material damage limits of the CHIA were inadequate; (3) the
creek's placement on the Clean Water Act § 303(d) list of streams impaired by
pollution precluded a finding that the project was designed to prevent material
damage to the stream; and (4) the lack of baseline data rendered the plan
useless. The United States District Court for the Southern District of West
Virginia, Huntington Division, denied Plaintiff's motion holding Plaintiff was
unlikely to succeed on the merits of the case.
The district court considered several factors in ruling on Plaintiff's
preliminary injunction motion. The court found Plaintiff was unlikely to succeed
on the merits of the case. The court recognized Defendant's discretion to
determine baseline data, Defendant's discretion to determine a material damage
limit, the current relatively good condition of the creek since being placed on the
§ 303 list, and found that Defendant did not violate its duty with regard to its
monitoring plan which the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection
determined to be sufficient. Additionally, the court balanced the potential harm
to Plaintiff, Defendant, and the surface mine operation. The court held the
evidence did not support a finding that the activities at issue would cause or
contribute to water quality violations. Further, Plaintiff's right to pursue
administrative review mitigated any harm.
AIR
• Wall v. U.S. EPA, 265 F.3d 426 (6th Cir. Sept. 11, 2001)
Plaintiffs, residents of Ohio, challenged the US EPA's determination that
the metro Cincinnati Area State Implementation Plan (SIP) would comply with
ground level ozone level standards and provided the requisite commitments to
guarantee enforcement of air quality standards. Plaintiffs, who were joined by the
Sierra Club, contended that redesignation from moderate nonattainment to an
attainment area under the Clear Air Act (CAA) was precluded because the plans
submitted by Kentucky and Ohio failed to adopt rules relating to reasonably
available control technologies (RACT).
US EPA had reviewed the plans submitted in November 1993 by
Kentucky and Ohio and after finding various deficiencies never published a
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notice of disapproval as required by CAA because in November 1994 the states
submitted a request for redesignation. The requests were based on the fact that
the area had not violated the ozone standards over the previous 3-year period.
The requests were denied because the Cincinnati area experienced an ozone
violation in 1995. The US EPA granted two one-year extensions for the states to
show compliance with the standards.
In 1999 Ohio and Kentucky had again requested redesignation based on
three years of data. In January 2000 the US EPA published a notice that the
request would be approved. The agency acknowledged that Kentucky did not
have fully approved transportation conformity requirements in its SIP because
"areas are subject to the conformity requirements regardless of whether they are
designated attainment." The US EPA also acknowledged that Ohio had not fully
adopted the RACT rules. The agency proposed to depart from its policy of
requiring full adoption, submission and approval of RACT rules prior to approval
of a redesignation request.
The court vacated the US EPA's action to redesignate the Cincinnati
metropolitan area and remand for further proceedings consistent with the
opinion. The court held that the agency reasonably concluded that air quality
modeling was not required in evaluating the maintenance plans submitted by the
states, since the demonstration of attainment was not also required, and the data
used to develop a major transportation emissions program was not applicable to
the evaluation of maintenance plans. Further, there was no express requirement
that the plans contained current enforcement commitments. Also, the partial
failure to comply with transportation-conformity requirements did not preclude
redesignation. However, the Ohio plan's optional contingency measures could
not be substituted for the statutorily required adoption of the RACT rules, and the
redesignation without adoption of the rules would be invalid.
• Appalachian Power Company, et al. v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 251 F.3d 1026 (D.C. Cir. June 8, 2001) (related case 249 F.3d
1032 (D. C. Cir. May 15, 2001)
In October, 1998, EPA issued the "NOx SIP Call", a final rule under the
Clean Air Act requiring 22 states and the District of Columbia to revise their state
implementation plans (SIPs) to impose additional controls on nitrogen oxide
(NOx) emissions. Under the NOx SIP Call, each upwind state had to limit its
summertime NOx emissions to a statewide emission budget for the year 2007.
In setting the NOx budgets, EPA relied on emission inventory data collected by
the Ozone Transport Assessment Group and divided each state's NOx emissions
according to five source types. It then obtained source-specific utilization data
and applied growth factors derived from growth projections for the years 2001
through 2010. In the final NOx SIP Call rule, E'PA reopened public comment on
the accuracy of the data upon which it had based its emission inventories and
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budgets. Petitioners challenged the data used to create the state emission
budgets, particularly the budget determinations for electric generating units
(EGUs).
The court held that when EPA reopened comment on the emission
baselines, it also reopened comment on the growth-rate methodology used
because EPA's rulemaking notice was ambiguous. The court then noted that
"agency determinations based upon highly complex and technical matters are
entitled to great deference." However, the EPA must be able to fully explain the
basis upon which it makes its determinations. The court remanded the EPA's
EGU growth factor determinations for further reasoned decision making. The
court also remanded EPA's redefinition of EGUs for further consideration in light
of its insufficient notice and opportunity for comment. The court further vacated
and remanded the statewide budget specific to Missouri based on EPA's lack of
an analytical basis for its ozone standard calculations.
• Appalachian Power Company, et al. v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 249 F.3d 1032 (D.C. Cir. May 15, 2001) (related case 251 F.3d
1026 (D.C. Cir. June 8, 2001))
EPA promulgated a rule in response to petitions from several northeastern
states that nitrogen oxide (NOx) emitted in neighboring states was harming their
local air quality. The rule required several NOx-emitting facilities in midwestern
and southeastern states to conform to EPA set emission limits and participate in
an emissions trading program. Petitioners challenged the rule as inconsistent
with the Clean Air Act (CAA), arbitrary and capricious, and technically deficient.
In October 1998, EPA issued a request for 22 states and the District of
Columbia to revise their state implementation plans (SIPs). Prior to that, eight
states had petitioned EPA to find, under § 126 of the CAA, that certain sources in
specified states were contributing to their failure to meet air quality requirements
for ozone. EPA adopted an "automatic trigger mechanism" which provided that a
formal finding would be made under § 126 if by an EPA set deadline, EPA had
not approved a state's SIP revision to comply with the NOx SIP call or
promulgated implementation plan provisions under § 110 of the CAA.
Petitioner's argued that the CAA included an element of "cooperative federalism"
under which EPA determines requisite levels of air quality, but must defer to the
states on how to achieve those levels. The appellate court noted that it grants a
high level of deference to agency interpretation and opted to defer to the EPA's
timetable as it was not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with CAA regulations.
Other petitioners challenged the methodology by which EPA reached its
findings of significant contribution to nonattainment of ozone under CAA § 126
claiming that findings based on all emissions could not determine whether
stationary source emissions were sufficient. The appellate court again deferred
to EPA determinations. The court also deferred to EPA's refusal to reopen and
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reconsider its significant contribution findings with regard to the state of North
Carolina and a report submitted by the state, which EPA concluded was too
preliminary.
Additionally, to allocate NOx emission allowances to individual sources,
EPA made state-by-state emission projections for 2007. The projections were
based on projected 2007 heat input for electric generating units (EGUs) and non-
EGU industrial facilities. The projections were developed from computer models
working off baseline data from 1995 and 1996. Petitioners challenged EPA's
budget allocations as arbitrary and capricious. The appellate court noted that it
typically upholds EPA's authority to make emission projections and set
limitations. However, only in those situations where EPA has adequately
responded to comments and explained the basis for its decisions. The appellate
court ultimately upheld a portion of EPA's applications, but remanded EPA's
model-derived growth factors for further explanation. While agency
determinations on highly complex and technical matters are entitled to great
deference, EPA must be able to explain its determinations and provide a
complete analytical defense should its model be challenged. In this instance, the
appellate court determined the agency's growth factor determinations were
oversimplified and thus unreasonable. The appellate court similarly remanded
EPA's classification of cogenerators.
Petitioners also challenged EPA's authority to impose NOx cap limits on
future, un-proposed, stationary sources under CM § 126. The appellate court
employed a two-prong test in reviewing EPA's determination. First, the court
considered whether Congress had spoken directly to the issue. The court found
sufficient ambiguity in the statutory language to move to the second prong,
whether the agency's determination was reasonable. The appellate court held
EPA's determinations were reasonable with regard to the inclusion of future
sources. The 1990 amendments to the CM allowed EPA to make findings with
regard to "any major source or group of statio~arysources". Additionally, CM §
110 and § 126 confer, authority based on the type of activity without temporal
limits. The court held it was reasonable to include future sources in the group of
stationary sources it was attempting to regulate.
Finally, non-EGU petitioners demanded remand and reallocation of all
emission allowances because of alleged errors in the initial allocation. The
appellate court held petitioners waived their claims by failing to object with
reasonable specificity during the period for public comment. Petitioners had
failed to provide EPA with sufficient information during the comment period.
• Michigan Department of Environmental Quality v. Browner, 230 F.3d 181
(6th Cir. Aug. 24, 2000)
EPA disapproved Michigan's revisions to a state implementation plan
(SIP) which permitted an automatic exemption for a source that violated
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emissions standards if that violation resulted from startup, shutdown, or
malfunction and met certain other criteria. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the EPA's conclusion that the proposed SIP revision
did not meet Clean Air Act requirements. EPA's interpretation of the Clean Air
Act was not unreasonable as the proposed SIP revision provided no means for
the state to enforce attainment and maintenance of national ambient air quality
standards.
HAZARDOUS & SOLID WASTES/SUBSTANCES
• U.S. v. Commonwealth of Ky, 252 F.3d 816 (6th Cir. June 5, 2001); cert.
denied, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 9801 (2001)
The Kentucky Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet
(Cabinet) issued a permit to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for the
construction and operation of a contained solid waste landfill at the DOE's
Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant, an active uranium enrichment facility. The
operating permit restricted disposal of radioactive materials in the landfill. The
DOE challenged the permit on the grounds that (1) the Atomic Energy Act of
1954 preempted state regulations relating to the disposal of radioactive
materials; (2) the permit conditions violated federal sovereign immunity from
state regulation; and (3) the state failed to comply with its owns statutes and
regulations in imposing the permit conditions. The Cabinet filed a motion to
dismiss claiming that (1) the Declaratory Judgment Act and the Burford
abstention doctrine afforded the district court discretion to decline jurisdiction; (2)
the DOE failed to state a claim; and (3) the challenged permit conditions
complied with Kentucky law.
The district court concluded that the Cabinet's attempt to impose
conditions on the DOE's disposal of radioactive materials was preempted by
federal law. The appellate court affirmed holding the Atomic Energy Act
preempts the field of state regulation of radioactive materials. The appellate
court further noted that neither the Atomic Energy Act, nor any other federal law,
waives federal sovereign immunity from regulation of DOE facilities with respect
to materials governed by the Atomic Energy Act. Thus, the U.S. had not waived
it immunity with respect to the permit conditions at issue. Finally, the appellate
court held the district court properly found abstention to be inappropriate.
Determination of the questions at issue did not require a detailed analysis of
state law, which might have indicated a state court was better suited to consider
the case.
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• Maharg, Inc. v. Van Wert Solid Waste Management District, et al., 249
F.3d 544 (6th Cir. May 7, 2001); reh'g denied, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 16102
(6th Cir. July 12, 2001); cert. denied, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 234 (2002)
Plaintiff filed suit challenging the constitutionality of Ohio waste processing
restrictions. The Indiana landfill at which Plaintiff preferred to dispose waste
declined to meet the Van Wert Sold Waste Management District's conditions for
designation as an approved disposal site. Specifically, the landfill declined to
collect a per-ton surcharge and remit it to the district. Absent non-collection of
the surcharge, the landfill could have been approved as a designated landfill.
The district court held, and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, that
dismissal of Plaintiff's suit was proper. The surcharge restriction did not violate
Plaintiff's constitutional rights under the Commerce, Equal Protection, or Due
Process Clauses. The restriction was not territorially based - Plaintiff was not
forbidden to dispose of waste at its preferred landfill simply because it was
located in Indiana. No landfill was arbitrarily excluded. Further, the restriction
bore a relation to the defendant's police power.
• Franklin County Convention Facilities Authority v. American Premier
Underwriters, Inc., et al., 240 F.3d 534 (6th Cir. Feb. 13, 2001)
Plaintiff acquired property from several railroad companies who agreed to
remain responsible for any claims that might affect any portion of the premises.
While digging with a backhoe on the property, Plaintiff's contractor accidentally
uncovered and split open a box that had been buried at the site. Chemical
analyses revealed the box contained creosote mixed with benzene. None of the
parties were aware of the box prior to its unearthing. Defendant, the surviving
successor of the several railroad companies, declined to accept financial
responsibility for the resulting remediation. Plaintiff sued.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's
findings that the substance found in the box was a hazardous substance under
CERCLA and held that Plaintiff substantially complied with the National Oil and
Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan. The appellate court further
held the lower court did not err in determining that Defendant was an owner or
operator of the property at the time the hazardous substance was deposited. A
colored lithograph from 1853 showed the property was used as a pasture at that
time. As of 1864, tracts of the property were acquired for railroad use. Thus,
while there was no direct evidence as to ownership, the court did not err in its
reliance on circumstantial evidence.
However, the appellate court disagreed with the district court's
determination that Plaintiff was an innocent landowner. Plaintiff's contractor split
open the box. Further, the appellate court held Plaintiff did not take sufficient
action to prevent seepage from the box upon its discovery. Nevertheless, the
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appellate court refused to reverse the determination of the district court that
Defendant was liable for a 1000/0 contribution share of the recovery costs.
Equitable factors, such as Defendant's refusal to participate in cleanup efforts
and its contractual agreement to remain responsible for claims which might affect
the property justified allocation of total liability to Defendant.
Additionally, the appellate court affirmed the district court's award of
attorney fees as a necessary CERLCA response cost and held that the
retroactive application of CERCLA did not violate substantive due process or the
Takings Clause. Apportionment of response costs to Defendant fulfilled
Congress' goal of spreading costs to responsible parties. Further, Defendant
contractually retained liability for any claims related to the property.
• Carter-Jones Lumber Co. v. LTV Steel Co., et al., 237 F.3d 745 (6th Cir.
Jan. 23, 2001); reh'g denied, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 4079 (6th Cir. March
16, 2001); cert. denied, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 4358 (2001)
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's finding that
a defendant company and its sole shareholder were jointly liable under CERCLA
for clean-up of a contaminated site. The sole shareholder controlled transactions
that constituted CERCLA violations in which the company was involved. Equity
and CERCLA's broad legislative purpose directed the shareholder be held
responsible for the damage.
Defendant company engaged in both the legitimate business of selling
and purchasing motorcycle parts and machinery and an illegitimate business
involving used electrical transformers containing PCBs. While the sole
shareholder did not control every aspect of the company affairs, he clearly
controlled the particular PCB transactions for which the company was held liable
for CERCLA violations. Under Ohio law, a shareholder is liable for the
wrongdoing of the corporation of which he is an owner if (1) his control over the
corporation is so complete that the corporation has no separate existence; (2) his
control over the corporation was exercised in such a manner as to commit a
fraud or illegal act; and (3) injury results from the wrong doing. The court noted
there was no dispute that the defendant shareholder used his control over the
corporation to violate the law and that injury resulted. The court then looked to
several factors to determine whether the defendant corporation was the alter ego
of its shareholder and determined that the shareholder's control of the
corporation was sufficient to pierce the corporate veil. The appellate court
affirmed.
• Containerport Group, Inc. v. American Financial Group, Inc., 128 F.
Supp. 2d 470 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 16, 2001)
This was an action under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) to determine strict liability for
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past and future response costs of a prior owner/operator. Both parties moved for
summary judgment. The court denied both motions. There was no evidence to
indicate Defendant had engaged in any type of activity that would have produced
the hazardous materials found at the site, which resulted in denial of Plaintiffs
motion. Defendant's summary judgment motion was denied because Plaintiff
produced sufficient evidence to show it had incurred at least one recoverable
cost in response to the release, that being a Phase II site assessment. Plaintiff
was further limited to an action for contribution because it was unable to show it
was entitled to the innocent landowner defense.
Plaintiff purchased the property in 1985. Defendant did not notify Plaintiff
that it had placed hazardous substances on the property and Plaintiff did not
perform an environmental assessment. Plaintiff thereafter used the property to
store empty shipping containers. Contamination was discovered when Plaintiff
attempted to sell the property. The prospective purchaser decided not to
purchase the property and Plaintiff filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that
Defendant was strictly liable as a prior owner and operator of the site at the time
hazardous wastes were disposed of. Defendant counterclaimed alleging Plaintiff
was jointly and severally liable as the current property owner.
There are two ways for private parties to recover response costs. 42
U.S.C. § 9607(a) authorizes recovery from responsible parties, or in the
alternative, establishes joint and several liability. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) allows
responsible parties to seek contribution from other responsible parties. Liability
under either section rests on four elements. Although Plaintiff was able to show
there had been (1) a release, (2) at a facility covered under CERCLA, (3) that
caused Plaintiff to incur response costs, Plaintiff was unable to prove the fourth
element - that Defendant was among the classes of persons subject to liability.
There was no evidence presented to show the hazardous materials were placed
on the site when Defendant owned the property. Further, Plaintiff was not able
to recover under the innocent landowner defense because Plaintiff was unable to
show that it had made any attempt to remove the contamination once it was
discovered.
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INSURANCE
• Olin Corp. v. Insurance Co. ofNorth America, et al., 221 F.3d 307 (2"d Cir.
Aug 17, 2000)
Defendant insured plaintiff, Olin Corporation, under a comprehensive
general liability policy. Plaintiff filed suit for indemnification of certain
environmental cleanup costs. A pollution exclusion clause in the policy meant
Defendant was only responsible for liability resulting from accidental damage.
Following a jury trial, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York held the policy term "accident" applied to the matter. The court held
this term did not only apply to events that happened abruptly or quickly. Rather,
the term included unintended damage irrespective of the time period over which
the damage occurred. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed this
decision.
However, prior to the district court's bench trial, the jury had determined
that only a portion of the damages resulting in injury to the soil was caused by
accident. Olin thus had substantially greater coverage for injury to groundwater
than it did for injury to soil. Unfortunately, Olin had spent considerably more
money remediating soil contamination. The district court ultimately held that
coverage of costs for groundwater remediation did not include coverage of costs
for soil cleanup. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed this
decision as well.
The court further held, and the appellate court affirmed, that cleanup costs
should be apportioned pro-rata over all the years in which there was injury to the
property, and that the full policy deductible applied in each triggered policy year.
NATURAL RESOURCES
• Bragg v. West Virginia Coal Association, 248 F.3d 275 (4th Cir. April 24,
2001); cert. denied, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 526 (2002)
Citizens and an environmental group filed suit against the Director of the
West Virginia Division of Environmental Protection to challenge his issuance of
permits for mountaintop-removal coal mining in the state. The United States
District court for the Southern District of West Virginia at Charleston denied
motions to dismiss and found that West Virginia's approval of mountaintop mining
practices violated both state and federal law. The district court enjoined the state
from issuing further permits that authorized dumping of mountain rock within 100
feet of intermittent and perennial streams. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's injunction, holding that the
doctrine of sovereign immunity barred the citizen claims against a West Virginia
official in federal court. The appellate court did, however, affirm the district
court's entry of a consent decree of settlement.
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The West Virginia Coal Mining Act, which operates in lieu of the federal
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation" Act of 1977 (SMCRA), vests the
Director with authority to administer the Act and provides minimum performance
standards. Nevertheless, the Eleventh Amendment bars citizen suits against
state officials when the state itself is the real party in interest. Plaintiffs admitted
that the State of West Virginia was the real party in interest, but asserted as a
defense the Ex Parte Young exception to sovereign immunity. The Ex Parte
Young exception allows suits against a state officer for violation of federal law.
The appellate court held that the Ex Parte Young exception to Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity did not apply in this case. In this instance, since
the State of West Virginia had exclusive authority under the West Virginia Coal
Mining Act, as a result of approval of its program under SMCRA, the citizen suit
was in reality a suit under that Act and not under SMCRA. The appellate court
further held the State of West Virginia did not waive it sovereign immunity in
federal court by submitting its coal-mining program to the federal government for
approval under SMCRA.
WATER
• Jones v. City ofLakeland, Tennessee, 224 F.3d 518 (6th Cir. Aug. 9, 2000)
Plaintiffs were riparian landowners who filed suit against the city for its
ongoing practice of discharging contaminated sewage, sludge, and other toxic,
noxious, and hazardous substances into a creek in violation of the Water
Pollution Control Act and the Tennessee Water Control Act. The United States
District Court for the Western District of Tennessee at Memphis dismissed the
action for failure to state a claim. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held
Plaintiffs' action was not precluded and remanded the case to the trial court for
further proceedings.
The Clean Water Act contains a limiting provision, which prohibits a civil
enforcement action where the EPA or a state has already commenced and is
diligently prosecuting a compliance action in state or federal court. Plaintiffs
argued that the city's demonstrated lax enforcement of various compliance
orders did not constitute diligent prosecution as mandated by the Clean Water
Act. The appellate court ruled on other grounds and held that since neither the
state's Water Qu"ality Control Board nor the Tennessee Department of
Environment and Conservation rose to the level of a federal or state court, the
plaintiff's citizen suit was not precluded.
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Pending Kentucky Cases
Patton v. Sherman et al., Franklin County Circuit Court
In 2001, Governor Paul Patton filed suit against the legislature and the
Legislative Research Commission (LRC). At issue was the regulation governing
Confined Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs) promulgated by the Natural
Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet (NREPC).
On March 27, 2002 House Bill 728 became law without Governor Patton's
signature. This action created a new section of KRS Chapter 13A to provide that
administrative regulations that have expired or are scheduled to expire shall be
null, void, and unenforceable. The also prohibits administrative bodies from
promulgating regulations that are identical or substantially similar to the void
regulations until adjournment of the 2003 Regular Session.
NREPC will continue to permit CAFOs under the existing regulation 401 KAR
5:060 Section 10. However, setbacks and other provisions will not apply.
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ENVIRONMENTALLY-RELATED LAWS PASSED
DURING THE 2002 GENERAL ASSEMBLY
SB 13
This bill bans the use of methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE) in gasoline produced after
January 6, 2006. SB 13 also strongly encourages, but does not mandate, the use ofbio-diesel and
ethanol.
SB 193
This measure streamlines procedures for the Petroleum Storage Tank Environmental
Assurance Fund. The University ofKentucky is to update the study completed in 1995 concerning
'appropriate cleanup standards for petroleum contamination. The bill also contains unrelated
provisions concerning economic development, taxes, and private airstrips.
SB257
This bill regulates the siting ofmerchant power plants in Kentucky. The bill creates a new
state board for facilities not regulated by the Public Service Commission and establishes siting
standards, as well as new requirements for cumulative environmental impacts.
seR17
This bill creates the Kentucky Watershed Task Force and directs that they study the need for
managing the state's water on a watershed basis and consider the necessity ofworking with border
states on the management of shared watersheds.
HB174
This bill presents a comprehensive plan for cleaning up abandoned landfills and dealing with
roadside litter. The bill is funded through the assessment ofa $1.75 per ton fee to be imposed on all
waste disposed ofat a municipal solid waste landfill and waste going through a transfer station. The
bill authorizes the use ofbonds for cleanup activities and appropriates $5 million from the state road
fund to assist in cleaning up roadside litter.
HB243
This measure provides that unmined coal, oil and gas reserves, and other mineral or energy
resources are to be assessed as a distinct interest in real property unless they are owned in their
entirety by the surface owner and the surface owner is not engaged in the severance ofthe reserves.
The bill also requires the owner to use the land primarily for agricultural purposes.
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HB244
This bill renews the two-year sunset provisions on the hazardous waste assessment fund. The
tax will now sunset in July 2004 and, in the meantime, an audit is to be conducted to study the
sources and uses·ofthe fund.
HB270
This measure deals with the siting ofcell towers. It provides a comprehensive system taking
into account the different jurisdictions of the Public Service Commission and local planning and
zoning, or the lack thereof.
HB367
This measure grants confidentiality to certain documents submitted pursuant to the
Agriculture Water Quality Act.
HB405
This measure removes the requirement ofa mining permit ifcoal extraction activities related
to construction is under 5,000 tons and the coal or profits of a sale are donated to charity or the
government.
HB422
This measure extends the waste tire fee until July 31, 2006 and provides for a waste tire
amnesty program.
HB556
This bill establishes the Pine Mountain Trail State Park, a linear state park tracking over 100
miles on the ridge ofPine Mountain.
HB618
This bill requires Jefferson County to eliminate the vehicle emission testing (VET) program
by November 1, 2003 ifit is in attainment ofthe air quality standards. The bill requires the county
to re-assess the need for a VET program if the county returns to non-attainment.
HB705
This bill authorizes the Division ofOil and Gas to allow a drilling permit to be extended by
one year upon the payment of a fee and updating of the original application information.
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HB728
This measure provides that administrative regulations which have expired shall be null, void,
and unenforceable. This bill was filed in reaction to a court decision limiting the General
Assembly's authority on regulation oversight.
HB745
This bill deletes existing provisions related to owners that elect not to participate in the risk
and cost ofthe drilling, deepening, or reopening ofan oil or gas well. It sets forth procedures for the
pooling of interests.
HB809
This bill provides a mechanism for a surface mining permittee to enter property in order to
abate a violation where the permittee does not otherwise have a legal right of entry.
HCR13
This measure directs the Legislative Research Commission to study the effects oftax policies
on forest management practices and present those results to the 2003 General Assembly. The
measure also requires a study of the Kentucky Enterprise Zone Program.
HCR244
This measure requires a study of the competitiveness ofKentucky coal in the generation of
electricity. This measure also requires action against the federal government for failure to convert
and dispose of depleted uranium hexafluoride waste in Paducah, Kentucky.
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ENVIRONMENTALLY-RELATED PROPOSED
LEGISLATION THAT DID NOT PASS DURING
THE 2002 GENERAL ASSEMBLY
ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS
SB 1
Requires legislative oversight of executive orders and administrative regulations.
SB33
Requires an administrative body that is filing an emergency administrative regulation
replacing an ordinary administrative regulation to file both regulations at the same time.
SB200
Provides that administrative regulations which have expired or are scheduled to expire shall
be unenforceable and also prohibits any similar regulations to be filed. Companion bill to HB 728.
HB771
Requires an administrative body that is filing an emergency administrative regulation that
will be replaced by an ordinary administrative regulation to file the ordinary administrative
regulation and the emergency administrative regulation at the same time. Requires an administrative
body to provide a form to be completed and filed by a person who wishes to be notified that the
administrative body has filed an administrative regulation.
ENVIRONMENTAL MANDATES
HB40
Requires all diesel fuel sold in the Commonwealth to contain 2% biodiesel until July, 2007,
when the requirement increases to 5%.
HB708
Ban MTBE and require reformulated gas to replace MTBE with ethanol by January 1,2005.
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HJR24
Create the Subcommittee on Ethanol Production in Kentucky ofthe Interim Joint Committee
on Agriculture and Natural Resources.
HeR 113
Direct the Interim Joint Committee on Agriculture and Natural Resources to study the
benefits and risks associated with legislation encouraging the use ofbiodiesel fuel.
FEES/FUNDS/TAXES
HB173
Would establish the "Local Government Landfill Assistance Program" to assist local
governments in remediating out-of-service landfills that pose a threat to public health and the
environment.
HB798
Allows payments by a coal mine operator into a fund in lieu ofphysical mitigation when a
stream is impacted by a coal mine.
HB864
Imposes a tax, that shall be administered by the Revenue Cabinet, of0.2 cents per kilowatt
hour of electricity generated by peaking power plants located in Kentucky.
GENERAL ISSUES
HB496
Requires the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet to provide preliminary
notice of an alleged violation. Exempts environmental emergencies from the preliminary notice
requirement.
HJR 139
Direct the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet to suspend until
November 30, 2002, issuing new or modified permits for applicants in western Jefferson County.
Requires the cabinet to report to the LRC by November 30, 2002, on efforts undertaken by the
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cabinet to assess the risks to the citizens of western Jefferson County from the concentration of
industrial plants within that part of the county.
NITROGEN OXIDE ALLOCATION
HB275
Requires the Division ofAir Quality to promulgate regulations to implement a nitrogen oxide
budget trading program. Requires the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet to
establish an EGU source pool and an efficient energy reserve source pool for electric generating
units.
HB408
Original Intentions -- Requires the Division ofAir Quality to first allocate NOx credits from
the compliance supplement pool to those industrial sources that have made early reductions and then
sell any remaining credits to industrial sources that are unable to meet their compliance deadlines.
Permits the Division ofAir Quality to contract with a private entity for the sale ofallowance credits.
House Committee Substitute -- Deletes original provisions of the bill. Requires the Public
Service Commission to require all electric utilities to inform all Kentucky coal operators ofa utility's
request for bids on a purchase coal contract, and require the bidder to disclose the amount of coal
severance and unmined minerals tax to be remitted to the Commonwealth on the coal specified in
the bid. When conducting a review ofa utility's coal purchase contract for the purpose ofdisallowing
any portion ofthe contract price in the utility's rates, require the utility to submit the bids by suppliers
that remit tax to the Commonwealth. If the utility accepts a bid from a supplier that does not remit
a tax, require the commission to determine the amount ofcoal severance and unmined minerals tax
lost and apply the tax lost as an offset to be added to the contract price for the coal. Requires the
commission to compare the lowest bid by a supplier that remits tax to the Commonwealth to the
contract price for the coal after adding the prescribed offset.
OIL AND GAS
SB 194
Authorizes the Department ofMines and Minerals and the Division ofOil and Gas to allow
a drilling permit to be extended by one year upon the paymen.t of a fee and updating the original
permit application information. Companion bill to HB 705.
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SITING
HB540
Establishes the Kentucky State Board on Electricity Generation and Transmission Siting and
the Environment that is attached to the Public Service Commission. Establishes procedures and filing
requirements for merchant plant siting.
SMART GROWTH
SB72
Authorizes local governments to establish restoration zones and to administer a tax credit
program for residential rehabilitation projects in restoration zones.
HB465
Provides that a local planning commission must submit its plans to the regional planning
commission and then to the state planning committee for approval and changes, and provide
procedures for doing so, before it may adopt the elements, allow citizen to commence civil action
against a state, regional, or local comprehensive plan.
HB600
Requires all state agencies to promote, assist, and pursue the rehabilitation and revitalization
of infrastructure, structures, sites and previously developed areas that are still suitable for reuse.
HB797
Provides an income tax credit for taxpayers who convey land to an eligible conservation
agency for conservation or preservation purposes.
SOLID WASTE
SB34
Creates KY-CLEAN and the KY-CLEAN fund. Provides a check-off on the Kentucky
Income Tax Return to designate a portion of the return to be contributed to the fund.
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HB28
Requires each waste management district to propose a universal collection system. Provides
a method of collection for entities currently inaccessible to collection services.
HB323
Provides that a statewide program of deposit for the purchase ofbeverage containers to be
redeemed for deposit be voted on by the Commonwealth at the time of election for Governor and
Lieutenant Governor.
HB694
Provides enforcement power relating to litter laws for the solid waste coordinator in counties
that have solid waste coordinators.
VET
SB 102
Requires certain air pollution control district boards to develop plans to meet the
requirements of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards without the use of the VET program.
SB 169
Requires that government registered vehicles be VET tested biennially rather than yearly.
HB46
Exempts vehicles four years and newer from mandatory vehicle emission tests.
HB317
Exempts farm trucks from mandatory vehicle emissions tests.
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I. The Development of Modern Environmental Protection Programs1
A. Since the flowering of environmental activism during the 1960's and the first
Earth Day in 1970, programs designed to protect the environment have
proliferated. Environmental issues have increasingly come to share center stage
with other critical concerns confronting our society. Changing awareness and
perceptions regarding the interrelationship between varying types of activities
and their impact on the ecosystem which we inhabit have fostered broad political
support for environmental regulations.
B. Environmental programs and requirements now exist at federal, state and local
levels which broadly affect individuals, businesses and government. These
programs and requirements influence a wide array of disparate activities ranging
from the selection of raw materials and the management of wastes to the
provision of safe drinking water, the production of food supplies and the
recycling ofhousehold trash.
C. As the reach of environmental regulation has expanded and the sensitivity to
environmental concerns has increased, the potential costs of compliance have
multiplied. Employing sophisticated pollution control equipment, maintaining
detailed operational records, implementing enhanced monitoring procedures,
satisfying complex permitting requirements, developing emergency response
plans and compiling detailed information regarding chemical usage and handling
are common examples of the types of demands confronting the regulated
community. The costs of compliance, at least in the first instance, have fallen
most heavily on business and industry.
1. The costs of complying with environmental requirements relating to
discharges to surface waters and the air as well as the disposal of
hazardous and other types of wastes has influenced balance sheets,
profitability, and the ability of certain companies to remain in business.
2. Environmental requirements in certain instances have fundamentally
altered the way that in which businesses operate and the types of
activities in which businesses engage. Rather than complying with
environmental requirements that would otherwise be applicable to their
operations, businesses have chosen to recast their operations to avoid
compliance costs or have simply exited altogether certain sectors of the
market which are perceived to carry unacceptable costs or risks. Many
types of waste minimization and pollution prevention programs have
been based on such fundamental changes. These changes have had a
positive impact on environmental quality in many instances but have also
resulted in major shifts in the marketplace. For example, if a business
decides to use water-based solvents instead of chlorinated solvents due to
hazardous waste management requirements, it may be good for the
1 These materials are based on materials presented at the Sixth Annual Environmental Law Forum
sponsored by the Pennsylvania Bar Institute in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania on March 21 and 22, 2001, and
the 30th Annual Conference on Environmental Law sponsored by the Section of Environmental, Energy and
Resources of the American Bar Association in Keystone, Colorado on March 8 through 11, 2001.
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environment but have an adverse impact on the company that was
supplying the chlorinated solvents.
3. Compliance with environmental requirements (both governmentally
imposed and voluntary) may be spurred through market forces. For
example, intermediate consumers of goods and services may require their
suppliers to meet certain types of standards such as ISO 14001.
Environmental compliance in such contexts may be one of the predicates
to survival in the marketplace. In fact, a study commissioned by the
United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") found that
there is a "moderate positive correlation" between environmental
performance and financial performance. Nevertheless, the report
indicates that the cause of this correlation is unclear. See Office of
Cooperative Environmental Management, "Green Dividends? The
Relationship between Firms' Environmental Performance and Financial
Performance" (May 2000) (hereinafter, the "Green Dividends Report").
4. "Green" marketing is becoming increasingly common. Businesses may
use a positive environmental record to achieve a competitive advantage.
For example, with increasing deregulation of the distribution of
electricity, companies that use "green" technologies to generate
electricity have sought to capitalize on that fact even if such electricity
may cost more than electricity generated by other means.
5. Environmental compliance has become a factor in attracting and
retaining capital.
D. Separate and apart from the broad sweep of environmental regulatory programs
designed to prospectively minimize the environmental impact of ongoing
activities, a number of programs are also now in place to address environmental
threats posed by past activities associated with more than a century of industrial
activity. Undoubtedly the most familiar of these programs is the federal
Superfund program developed under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, as amended ("CERCLA"),
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 - 9675. The Superfund program is designed to facilitate the
cleanup of sites posing a threat to human health or the environment as a result of
the release or potential release of hazardous substances. Waste disposal sites,
landfills, recycling facilities, abandoned dumps, factories, lagoons, drum storage
areas, and a host of other types of facilities qualify as potential Superfund sites.
1. While the Superfund program may be the best known and most notorious
of the environmental cl~anup programs, it is by far not the only such
program. For example, many states have similar programs to supplement
cleanup efforts resulting under CERCLA. Facilities that store, treat or
dispose of hazardous wastes or have done so in the past may be
independently subject to cleanup requirements emanating under the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, as amended ("RCRA"), 42
U.S.C. §§ 6901 - 6992k. Contamination resulting from leaking
underground storage tanks must be addressed under the federal
underground storage tank program and a host of analogous state
programs.
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2. The costs as(sociated with cleanup activities can be staggering, often
reaching tens and hundreds of millions of dollars at specific locations.
For example, on February 1, 2002, EPA issued a Record of Decision
setting forth its selected remedy for addressing PCB contamination in the
sediments in the upper Hudson River in New York. The selected remedy
will require that sediments be removed by dredging the Hudson River at
an estimated cost of $460 million. General Electric Company is the only
responsible party that EPA has identified in connection with the PCB
contamination.
3. One estimate from the early 1990's of the costs associated with cleaning
up the nation's known waste disposal sites over a thirty year period
exceeded $750 billion. These costs are being spread to individuals,
businesses and governmental entities which in some instances may only
have a remote connection with the activities that created the wastes.
4. Along with remediation activities mandated by governmental directives,
certain contaminated properties are being voluntarily remediated.
During the last five years, a substantial number of states have developed
programs to facilitate the remediation and reuse of "brownfields" sites -
properties that have become contaminated through historical activities
and which are often abandoned or underutilized.
E. As environmental cleanup and compliance costs have grown, they have had a
profound influence on balance sheets, profits, cash flow, and even the very
ability of certain businesses to compete. The financial implications of
environmental cleanup and compliance costs thus have become an increasing
concern to investors, lenders, and other individuals and entities with a stake in
the financial health of a particular enterprise. In addition, environmental
considerations have become a significant aspect of many real estate and business
transactions.
II. Disclosure of Environmental Liabilities in the Financial Marketplace
A. With the growing financial impact of environmental cleanup and regulatory
programs, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") has increasingly
scrutinized the way and the degree to which information regarding environmental
liabilities and costs is being disclosed to potential investors by companies subject
to the SEC's jurisdiction. Certified Public Accountants ("CPAs"), investment
bankers, borrowers, attorneys, and corporate officers and managers are wrestling
with the thorny issues of how and when environmental liabilities and costs
should be reported.
B. Deep concerns have been raised over the apparent lack of disclosure by certain
companies, publicly held and otherwise. A provocative article appearing in the
Wall Street Journal in 1988 entitled "Can $100 Billion Have 'No Material
Effect' on Balance Sheets? Huge Toxic-Waste Cleanup Will Burden Many
Firms, SEC Questions Disclosure" highlighted the gulf between the projected
costs for environmental compliance and cleanup, and those that historically had
been disclosed in financial materials made available to potential investors.
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C. A report issued on October 13, 2000, by the World Resources Institute ("WRI")
entitled "Coming Clean: Corporate Disclosure of Financially Significant
Environmental Risks" reveals that few companies are adequately disclosing
material risks that may arise from environmental exposures and that this failure
to disclose does not arise from ignorance of such risks. The report studied
thirteen (13) U.S. pulp and paper companies' 10K, 10Q and 8K filings from 1998
and 1999. The report also indicates that SEC enforcement efforts in the area of
environmental disclosure have been "minimal" and recommends the issuance of
guidance to clarify existing regulations regarding environmental disclosure
obligations and the heightened enforcement of these existing regulations.
D. Among the difficulties in dealing with the disclosure of environmental liabilities
are the following:
1. The scope of environmental regulatory programs and environmental
liability has shifted dramatically over time and has generally expanded.
Businesses may face large expenditures simply to remain in compliance
with changing environmental regulatory requirements. The complex and
stringent requirements imposed by the 1990 amendments to the federal
Clean Air Act, many of which even now are being implemented for the
first time, are illustrative of this dynamic.
2. Deciphering what is necessary to achieve compliance may be difficult in
certain circumstances. Many environmental regulatory requirements are
quite complex and difficult to interpret, particularly in the context of the
tremendous diversity of activities that they are designed to cover. The
manner in which these issues are resolved can often have significant
financial impacts on the members of the regulated community which are
subject to such requirements.
3. Information concerning past waste disposal practices may be incomplete
or lacking entirely. Accordingly, companies may face significant
liabilities and yet be entirely unaware of the lurking danger to their
financial well-being until receiving a notice from EPA or a state
environmental regulatory agency.
4. Identifying with precision the magnitude ofenvironmental contamination
and associated cleanup costs is often difficult. Contamination is
frequently located in subsurface areas where it can only be characterized
through extensive testing. Many types of contamination are not
detectable except through sophisticated analytical methods. The way in
which contamination migrates from source areas can be influenced by a
wide variety of factors, some of which may not be recognized or well
understood.
5. The cleanup standards applicable to a particular site may be poorly
defined or subject to differing interpretation by regulatory agencies and
those conducting the remediation. Because cleanup standards typically
establish the stopping points for remediation activities, where such
standards are not well defined or understood, the ability to predict with
precision the costs associated with cleanup is impaired.
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6. Insurance coverage for environmental contamination caused by past
activities is fraught with uncertainties. Insurance policies contain
varying provisions which can influence the availability of coverage.
Moreover, courts in different jurisdictions have reached contradictory
results in interpreting identical provisions thereby making the availability
of coverage somewhat dependent on jurisdiction.
7. Environmental compliance and cleanup costs may have varying effects
on profits, cash flow and net worth. For example, mandatory
environmental expenditures may severely impact the cash flow of a
company over a short period of time without necessarily having the same
degree of impact on the overall net worth of the company. Determining
how to describe these disparate impacts thus may be difficult and hinder
disclosure.
8. Where a business has failed to comply with environmental requirements,
civil penalties and/or criminal sanctions generally may be imposed.
Penalties can often be extremely' large, with many of the environmental
statutes authorizing civil penalties of up to $25,000 per day per violation.
Such liability may accrue in addition to cleanup and compliance costs.
9. Environmental liabilities are often extremely hard to extinguish. For
example, under the Superfund liability scheme, a person who owned a
site at the time wastes were disposed thereon can be held liable for
cleanup costs even ifhe or she no longer owns the site or was even aware
of the disposal activities at the time of ownership. Superfund liability
has also been found to pass through to successor companies and
corporations. Accordingly, 'a company may have acquired or retained an
environmental liability in circumstances where other types of liability
may have been extinguished.
10. Activities impinging on the environment may give rise to third party
claims for property damage and/or personal injuries.
11. Those responsible for preparing disclosure statements may have little
familiarity with the intricacies of the environmental field. The technical
and legal complexity of many environmental issues may tend to impede
disclosure of environmental matters in comparison with issues that are
more commonly confronted in the financial arena.
12. There is a profound lack of standards that makes it difficult for investors
and corporate officers alike to effectively compare environmental
performance between companies. As reported by EPA's Office of
Cooperative Environmental Management in its Green Dividends Report,
"environmental and financial analysts do not have common analytic
frameworks or terminology and separate regulatory regimes have tended
to discourage their development."
E. The foregoing considerations do not excuse the failure to disclosure
environmental liabilities in circumstances where disclosure is warranted and
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required. However, they may inake disclosure more difficult in many instances
and they may increase the risk that whatever is disclosed will later tum out to be
inaccurate. At a minimum, matters of environmental disclosure are likely to
require the use of a team approach involving accountants, securities attorneys,
environmental consultants, and environmental attorneys to ensure that
appropriate information is provided.
F. At the heart of the matter is the perception that the numbers simply do not add
up. If the estimated costs of environmental cleanup and compliance are as
significant as many believe, then presumably many of those costs should be
reflected in the disclosure statements of publicly-held companies. However, this
has not always been the case. For example, in a 1993 report to the House Energy
and Commerce Committee, the General Accounting Office found that leading
insurance companies rarely disclosed ~he amount of their exposure for
environmental liabilities despite their claims that such liabilities could bankrupt
the industry. The report recommended that the SEC take steps to require
insurance companies routinely to disclose both the number and type of
environmental claims and the estimated costs associated with those claims.
G. In addition to issues relating specifically to disclosure of environmental costs and
liabilities to investors or others with a financial interest in the business in
question, certain environmental statutes and regulations require that information
relating to releases of potential contaminants be provided to environmental
regulatory agencies. Indeed, EPA has pressed for greater disclosure of
information relating to the use and management of a broad spectrum of
substances. The nexus between this body of information and what is disclosed to
investors may take on increasing importance.
H. Whatever the reasons for the apparent lack of disclosure, the SEC, the investment
community, and even the courts are sending strong signals that it is not a
situation which should be allowed to continue. Moreover, disappointed investors
and/or the SEC may seek to hold accountants, lawyers, and other professionals
responsible for inadequate disclosure ofenvironmental liabilities, thereby placing
additional burdens on the accounting and securities professions to perform due
diligence concerning the scope and magnitude of environmental liabilities. This
potentially could place professionals with expertise in the securities and financial
fields in the center of a vortex of liability involving highly technical issues
concerning environmental compliance, contamination and cleanup requirements.
With the financial collapse of Enron Corporation, auditing and disclosure
standards are under increasing scrutiny. This dynamic may well manifest itself
in the context of environmental disclosure.
III. Summary of Key Requirements Imposed by the SEC Relevant to the Disclosure of
Environmental Liabilities and Compliance Costs
A. In response to the stock market crash of 1929 and the financial turmoil of the
Great Depression that followed, Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933
("Securities Act"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb, and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 ("Exchange Act"), 15U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811. These two pieces of legislation
govern the registration of securities offered for sale to the public and the periodic
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disclosure of information by regulated companies relevant to investors and
potential investors.
B. The SEC has developed a complex body of regulations setting forth requirements
relating to the disclosure of information by companies subject to the SEC's
regulatory authority. These regulations help implement requirements of the
Securities Act and the Exchange Act.
C. The regulations promulgated by the SEC cover the content of both financial
statements and narrative disclosures.
D. Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. Part 210, governs the SEC accounting rules and
requirements pertinent to the form and content of financial statements. Under
Regulation S-X, financial statements are normally to be prepared in accordance
with generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP"). Specifically, 17
C.F.R. § 210.4-01(a)(I) provides that "[f]inancial statements filed with the
Commission which are not prepared in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles will be presumed to be misleading or inaccurate, despite
footnote or other disclosures, unless the Commission has otherwise provided."
As a result, the regulations promulgated by the SEC regarding financial
statements not only set forth specific requirements that must be followed but
essentially incorporate by reference GAAP. This is consistent with the SEC's
long-standing policy to look to the private sector for the promulgation ofGAAP.
The SEC initially issued this administrative policy in 1938 and updated it in 1973
to recognize the establishment of the Financial Accounting Standards Board
("FASB"). See 64 Fed. Reg. 1728 (Jan. 12, 1999).
E. Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. Part 229, contains requirements applicable to the non-
financial statement portions of the following categories of documents:
1. Registration statements under the Securities Act (to the extent provided
in the forms to be used for such registration statements). See 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.10(a)(I).
2. Documents and reports required pursuant to the Exchange Act (to the
extent provided in the forms and rules thereunder) including:
a. Registration statements pursuant to Section 12 of the Exchange
Act.
b. Annual or other reports pursuant to Sections 13 and 15(d) of the
Exchange Act (including Form 10-Q (quarterly), Form 10-K
(annual) and Form 8-K (episodic)).
c. Going private transaction statements under Section 13 of the
Exchange Act.
d. Tender offer statements under Sections 13 and 14 of the
Exchange Act.
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e. Annual reports to secUrity holders and proxy and information
statements pursuant to Section 14 of the Exchange Act.
f. Any other document required pursuant to the Exchange Act to
the extent provided in the forms and rules thereunder.
See 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(a)(2).
F. Three areas under Regulation S-K are most likely to involve the potential for
narrative disclosure of information related to environmental compliance and
environmental liabilities -- Item 101 (Description of Business), 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.101; Item 103 (Legal Proceedings), 17 C.F.R. § 229.103; and Item 303
(Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of
Operations), 17 C.F. R. § 229.303.
1. Item 101 includes a requirement that as part of a narrative description of
the business, the registrant discuss the material impacts of environmental
compliance, as follows:
Appropriate disclosure also shall be made as to the
material effects that compliance with Federal, State and
local provisions which have been enacted or adopted
regulating the discharge of materials into the
environment, or otherwise relating to the protection of
the ~nvironment, may have upon the capital
expenditures, earnings and competitive position of the
registrant and its subsidiaries. The registrant shall
disclose any material estimated capital expenditures for
environmental control facilities for the remainder of its
current fiscal year and its succeeding fiscal year and for
such further periods as the registrant may deem materials
[sic].
17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(I)(xii). Where material, the business segments to
which environmental compliance matters are significant must also be
identified. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c).
2. Item 103 requires registrants to "[d]escribe briefly any material pending
legal proceedings, other than ordinary routine litigation incidental to the
business, to which the registrant or any of its subsidiaries is a party or of
which any of their property is the subject." 17 C.F.R. § 229.103.
Instruction 5 to Item 103 amplifies on these requirements as they apply
to environmental proceedings, as follows:
[A]n administrative or judicial proceeding (including,
for purposes of A and B of this Instruction, proceedings
which present in large degree the same issues) arising
under any Federal, State or local provisions that have
been enacted or adopted regulating the discharge of
materials into the environment or primary [sic] for the
purpose of protecting the environment shall not be
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deemed "ordinary routine litigation incidental to the
business" and shall be described if:
A. Such proceeding is material to the
business or financial condition of the registrant;
B. Such proceeding involves primarily a
'claim for damages or involves potential
monetary sanctions, capital expenditures,
deferred charges or charges to income and the
amount involved, exclusive of interest and costs,
exceeds 10 percent of the current assets of the
registrant and its subsidiaries on a consolidated
basis; or
C. A governmental authority is a party to
such proceeding and such proceeding involves
potential monetary sanctions, unless the
registrant reasonably believes that such
proceeding will result in no monetary sanctions,
or in monetary sanctions, exclusive of interest
and costs, of less than $100,000; provided,
however, that such proceedings which are
similar in nature may be grouped and described
generically.
Instructions to Item 103, Section 5.
3. Item 303 requires discussion of prospective information as that
information relates to issues such as liquidity, capital resources, and
results of operations. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a). Item 303 also requires
discussion of such other information that the registrant believes is
necessary to an understanding of its financial condition, changes in
financial condition and results of operations. Instruction 2 to Item 303
clarifies that the "purpose of the discussion and analysis shall be to
provide to investors and other users information relevant to an
assessment of the financial condition and results of operations of the
registrant as determined by evaluating the amounts and certainty of cash
. flows from operations and from outside sources. The information
provided pursuant to this Item need only include that which is available
to the registrant without undue effort or expense and which does not
clearly appear in the registrant's financial statements."
G. While disclosure obligations are generally governed by Regulation S-K, Rule
10b-5 may also mandate disclosure of environmentally-related information in
certain instances. Rule 10b-5 provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,
by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
e-g
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or
artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a
material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course
of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
IV. The SEC's Historical Approach to Environmental Disclosure
A. The SEC has had a long history of involvement with disclosure of environmental
liabilities and compliance costs dating back to 1971. Under the spur of the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA"), the SEC reviewed its
existing disclosure requirements and issued an interpretive release entitled
"Disclosures Pertaining to Matters Involving the Environment and Civil Rights."
Release No. 33-5170 (July 19, 1971), 36 Fed. Reg. 13989 (July 29, 1971). In
that release, the SEC expressed its view that, under general materiality principles,
two existing disclosure items -- the description of the company's business and the
description of the company's legal proceedings -- called for the disclosure of (1)
circumstances, if material, in which compliance with environmental laws "may
necessitate significant capital outlays, may materially affect the earning power of
the business, or cause material changes in ... [the current or future] business;" and
(2) proceedings, ifmaterial, arising under environmental statutes and regulations.
B. In 1973, in response to pressure exerted by the Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. ("NRDC") and others, the SEC amended its existing disclosure
requirements to conform, in its view, with the requirements of NEPA. These
amendments directed that the material effects on future capital expenditures,
earnings and the competitive position of the company resulting from compliance
with environmental laws and regulations be disclosed. In addition, the
amendments described the extent to which litigation disclosures were required to
contain specific descriptions of environmental proceedings. Moreover, the
amendments foreclosed the possibility of disregarding environmental suits in
excess of the requisite 10 percent of current assets threshold as ordinary routine
litigation incidental to the business. See Release No. 33-5386 (April 20, 1973).
C. In early 1975, in the aftermath of NRDC v. SEC, 389 F.Supp. 889 (D.D.C.
1974), the SEC revisited the topic of environmental disclosure in Release No. 33-
5569 (February 11, 1975) and gave notice of public proceedings to determine
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whether its present disclosure rules were adequate in view of NEPA. The SEC
thereafter proposed substantial amendments to existing disclosures rules
requiring additional disclosure relating to (1) present and certain future estimated
capital expenditures for environmental control facilities and (2) environmental
compliance reports showing the failure to meet an applicable federal standard in
the preceding 12 months. The SEC also proposed to impose the obligation on
companies to provide copies of such compliance reports to the public upon
request. See Release No. 33-5627 (October 14, 1975).
D. In 1976, the SEC abandoned requiring the listing and provision of compliance
reports, finding the burdens "grossly disproportionate" to the benefits. The SEC,
however, adopted the proposed expanded disclosure requirements concerning
capital expenditures for environmental controls. See Release No. 33-5704 (May
6, 1976). The SEC also expressed its view that existing disclosure requirements
tended to adequately protect investors in connection with environmental
concerns.
E. In 1979, the SEC issued another interpretive release concerning environmental
disclosure requirements, both reviewing the scope of those requirements and
reiterating its interpretation of the requirements. See Release No. 33-6130
(September 27, 1979), 44 Fed. Reg. 56924 (Oct. 3, 1979). Among the significant
aspects of the Release were the following:
1. In the SEC's view, companies could be required to develop and disclose
estimates of future costs of environmental controls if future costs were
expected to be materially greater than current, reported costs. In
addition, the SEC indicated that disclosure was required of such
estimates ifnecessary to prevent reported costs from being misleading.
2. The SEC interpreted the term "proceedings" broadly so as to require
disclosure of a proceeding involving the government as a party, even if
the proceeding were initiated by a private party.
3. The SEC explained that "the obligation to disclose 'the relief sought' by
the government" required that "an estimate of the level of expenditures
required to install the pollution control equipment sought by the
governmental authority be provided if such expenditures are likely to be
material."
4. The SEC took the position that while there was no general requirement
that a company disclose its policies regarding environmental protection,
companies that chose to make such disclosures had to ensure that the
disclosures were accurate and not misleading.
5. The SEC noted that compliance with its specific environmental
disclosure rules did not necessarily ensure full compliance with the
disclosure requirements under the federal securities laws where
disclosure of additional material information was necessary to make the
required statements not misleading.
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F. In 1982, the SEC again revised the environmental proceedings requirement,
adopting materiality thresholds in order to address criticisms that the existing
requirement imposed excessive burdens on companies and resulted in preparation
of cluttered disclosure of questionable utility to investors. See Release No. 33-
6383 (March 3, 1982). In adopting the revised version of the requirement, the
SEC discussed the new "reasonable belief" standard, which limited disclosure of
environmental proceedings to which a governmental authority was a party,
provided the registrant reasonably believed that a proceeding would not result in
monetary sanctions of $100,000 or more.
v. The SEC's Response to the Growth in Superfund Liability
A. In 1980, Congress passed CERCLA to address the legacy of more than a century
of industrial waste disposal practices. To deal with the problem ofresponding to
abandoned waste sites, Congress crafted an extremely broad liability framework
which imposes strict and joint and several liability on generators and transporters
of hazardous substances as well as current and past owners and operators of sites
from which releases or threatened releases of hazardous substances have
occurred or are occurring. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
B. As the Superfund program slowly gained momentum during the early 1980's,
many publicly traded companies started to feel the financial impacts associated
with CERCLA's broad liability framework. By the second half of the 1980's,
many businesses were facing potentially huge liabilities for investigating and
remediating sites identified by EPA throughout the country. Because of the
imposition of strict liability and the availability of only extremely limited
defenses, the threshold for becoming ensnared in Superfund cases was extremely
low. Moreover, parties found to be liable generally faced the prospect ofjoint
and several liability with uncertain prospects ofb~ing able to recoup excess
response costs from third parties through contribution actions.
C. The financial ramifications associated with the Superfund program caused the
SEC take notice. Superfund liability both in terms of its nature and magnitude
presented different scenarios than the types of environmental regulatory
programs that EPA and the states had developed during the 1970's. By the
second half of the 1980's, the SEC was raising significant concerns regarding the
degree to which publicly-traded companies were disclosing environmental
liabilities.
D. On May 18, 1989, the SEC released a lengthy interpretive release regarding the
disclosure required by Section 303 of Regulation S-K, captioned "Management's
Discussion and Analysis ofFinancial Condition and Results of Operation"
("MD&A"). See Securities Act Release No. 33-6835; Exchange Act Release 34-
26831 (May 18, 1989), 54 Fed. Reg. 22427 (May 24, 1989). The Release set
forth the SEC's views regarding several disclosure matters that should be
considered by registrants in preparing MD&As. It also included as an illustrative
example of a situation requiring disclosure the designation of a registrant as a
potentially responsible party ("PRP") by EPA under CERCLA.
1. In connection with its example, the SEC assumed the following facts:
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a. The registrant had been correctly designated as a PRP by the
EPA with respect to the cleanup of hazardous wastes at three
sites.
b. No statutory defenses were available.
c. The registrant was in the process of conducting preliminary
investigations of the three sites in question to determine the
nature of its potential liability and the amount of cleanup costs
necessary to remediate the sites.
d. Other PRPs had been designated but the ability to bring an action
for contribution was unclear as was the extent of insurance
coverage, if any.
e. Management of the registrant was "unable to determine that a
material effect on future financial conditions or results of
operations is not reasonably likely to occur."
2. In light of these facts, the SEC expressed the view that disclosure in
MD&A was required as to the designation of the registrant as a PRP, the
effects ofwhich should be quantified to the extent reasonably practical.
3. The SEC also identified the following factors to be considered in
connection with determining the extent of disclosure in MD&A In
connection with the designation of the registrant as a PRP:
a. The aggregate potential cleanup costs in light of the joint and
several liability to which a PRP is subject.
b. Whether there is any insurance coverage and, if so, whether it
may contested.
c. The existence and extent of any potential sources of contribution
or indemnification (in determining whether there might be
reliable sources ofrecovery).
4. In a footnote to the Release, the SEC indicated that mere designation as a
PRP does not itself trigger a duty to disclose pursuant to Item 103 of
Regulation S-K regarding "Legal Proceedings." Moreover, the SEC
clarified that cleanup costs generally are not "sanctions" for purposes of
Instruction 5(B) or (C) of Item 103.
5. More generally, under the Release, MD&A requires management to
make a two-step assessment with respect to any known trend,
commitment, event or uncertainty.
a. If management determines that the known trend, demand,
commitment, event or uncertainty is not reasonably likely to
occur, no disclosure is required.
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b. If management cannot make such a determination, however,
management must objectively evaluate the consequences of the
known trend, demand, commitment, event or uncertainty, on the
assumption that it will come to fruition. Disclosure is then
required unless management determines that a material effect on
the registrant's financial condition or results of operations is not
reasonably likely to occur.
6. From an enforcement perspective, the SEC indicated in the Release that
where a material change in a registrant's financial condition (such as a
material increase or decrease in cash flows) or results of operations
appears during a reporting period and the likelihood of such a change
was not discussed in prior reports, the SEC will inquire into the
circumstances existing at the time of the earlier filings to determine
whether the registrant failed to discuss a known trend, demand,
commitment, event or uncertainty as required in MD&A.
E. In early 1990, EPA agreed to furnish SEC with environmental enforcement
action information regarding registrants and SEC agreed to consider SEC
enforcement in connection with those companies' environmental disclosure.
Computerization has enhanced the impact of this information exchange.
F. On June 8, 1993, the SEC issued a staff accounting bulletin (Release No. SAB
92) regarding accounting and disclosure rules relating to loss contingencies
involving, among other things, environmental liabilities. See 58 Fed. Reg. 32843
(June 14, 1993). The statements in staff accounting bulletins are not rules or
formal interpretations of the SEC. However, they represent interpretations and
practices followed by the SEC's Division of Corporation Finance and the Office
of Chief Accountant in administering the disclosure requirements of the federal
securities laws. According to the SEC, SAB 92 merely reflects the interpretation
of existing disclosure obligations and does not represent a change in accounting
requirements. SAB 92 includes a number of points relevant to accounting and
disclosure in the context of environmental liabilities, including the following.
1. In circumstances where a contingent liability is probable of occurring
(such as liability for environmental cleanup costs) but that liability may
be offset, in part or in whole, by a claim for recovery that is probable of
realization (such as recovery under applicable insurance policies), the
SEC staff nevertheless concluded that ordinarily the contingent loss and
the potential recovery should be reported separately on the balance sheet
rather than reported together as a single net amount. The SEC staff
pointed to the inherent uncertainties in shifting liabilities to third parties
and the fact that the uncertainties associated with contingent liabilities
tended to be distinct and independent from the uncertainties associated
with claims for recovery as militating in favor of separately reporting
gross liabilities and potential recoveries.
2. In circumstances where a registrant is jointly and severally liable for
environmental cleanup costs but those costs may be apportioned among a
number of potentially responsible parties, the SEC staff concluded that
the registrant need not recognize liability for those costs to be assigned to
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other potentially responsible parties unless it is probable that the other
parties will not fully pay such costs. The SEC staff cautioned, however,
that discussion of uncertainties with respect to the registrant's ultimate
obligation to pay might be required and that any additional losses that are
reasonably possible should be noted.
3. The SEC staff warned that notwithstanding the significant uncertainties
typical with respect to measuring environmental liability, delaying
recognition of a contingent liability until a single dollar amount can
reasonably be estimated is not permissible. If the amount of the liability
is likely to fall within a certain range and no single amount within the
range represents a best estimate, the registrant should recognize a loss
equal to the minimum amount of the range. Moreover, the SEC staff
indicated that cost estimates for environmental liabilities should be
refined as more information becomes available and that the revised
estimates should reported during the accounting period in which they
occur.
4. The SEC staff indicated that environmental liabilities typically are of
such significance that detailed disclosures regarding the judgments and
assumptions underlying the recognition and measurement of the
liabilities are necessary to prevent financial statements from being
misleading and to fully inform readers of such statements regarding the
range of reasonable possible outcomes that could have a material effect
on the registrant's financial condition, results of operations, or liquidity.
5. The SEC staff emphasized that disclosure and discussion of
environmental liabilities was crucial in documents outside of financial
statements (such as MD&A). The SEC staff stated that disclosures
should be sufficiently specific to enable a reader to understand the scope
of the contingencies affecting the registrant and noted that separate
discussion of issues such as the registrant's ongoing environmental
compliance costs, capital expenditures incurred to implement
environmental controls, and non-recurring cleanup costs might be
required.
6. The SEC staff indicated that material liabilities for environmental "exit"
costs associated with activities such as site restoration and cleanup,
closure and post-closure steps, and ongoing monitoring should be
disclosed in the notes to financial statements. The SEC staff also
indicated that it had no objection to accruing such costs over the useful
life of the asset.
7. The SEC staff also addressed issues relating to discounting the costs
associated with environmental liabilities to reflect the time value of
money and issues relating to disclosure rules for public utilities.
G. As the foregoing indicates, the growth of the Superfund program helped spur the
SEC to increase the consideration given to environmental liabilities and
compliance costs.
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1. ~ EPA and the SEC are cooperating in terms of sharing information with
the expected result that the SEC will cross-reference various filings and
disclosure statements for a company with information obtained from
EPA as to the company's potential environmental liabilities. EPA is also
helping to train the SEC staff as to what to look for with respect to
environmental disclosure.
2. During his tenure, former Securities and Exchange Commissioner
Richard Roberts repeatedly emphasized that publicly-held companies
must fully and fairly disclose their environmental liabilities. The SEC
generally has intensified its scrutiny of environmental disclosure,
particularly with respect to ensuring that environmental liabilities are
adequately addressed in MD&A and that such liabilities are reported in
accordance with SAB 92.
3. In a report in 1993 to the House Energy and Commerce Committee, the
General Accounting Office found that leading insurance companies
rarely disclosed the amount of their exposure for environmental
liabilities despite their claims that such liabilities could bankrupt the
industry. The report recommended that the SEC take steps to require
insurance companies routinely to disclose both the number and type of
environmental claims and the estimated costs associated with those
claims.
4. The SEC has suggested that in addition to scrutinizing environmental
liabilities associated with being classified as a PRP in connection with
Superfund sites, it intends to examine the manner in which disclosure of
cleanup costs associated with contaminated facilities and real estate
which are not being addressed through the formal Superfund process is
being handled.
H. With the growth in costs associated with environmental liabilities, the SEC has
recognized that environmental issues can have a very real and significant impact
on the financial viability of a company thereby giving increased attention to the
effect of environmental issues on the investing public. For example, in remarks
made in 1993, former Securities and Exchange Commissioner Roberts cited a
University of Tennessee study estimating the cost of cleaning up the nation's
hazardous waste sites at $752 billion over the next thirty years under then current
environmental policies. The SEC's heightened sensitivity to environmental
matters is in sharp contrast with the SEC's position in the early 1970's that
environmental issues were primarily of social rather than financial importance
and lacked direct and immediate economic significance. See generally Manko,
Environmental Disclosure--SEC v. NEPA, 31 Business Lawyer 1907 (July
1976).
VI. Recent Developments Concerning the Disclosure of Environmental Liabilities
A. The SEC has had a long-standing policy to recognize and rely on GAAP for
purposes of financial disclosure. This policy is embodied in Regulation S-X.
Accordingly, not only are the actions of the SEC important to issues relating to
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the disclosure of environmental liabilities but so (,are developments '.relating to
GAAP.
B. The Financial Accounting Standards Board ("FASB") is responsible for issuing
GAAP. Major pronouncements by FASB are known as Statements of Financial
Accounting Standards ("SFAS").
C. Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 5 ("FASB Statement No.5")
governs accounting for contingencies. Under FASB Statement No.5, a liability
must be accrued if (1) information available prior to issuance of the financial
statements indicates that it is probable that an asset has been impaired or a
liability has been incurred at the date of the financial statements and (2) the
amount of the loss can be reasonably estimated. Application of this standard in
the context of environmental liabilities has proved to be challenging.
D. On October 10, 1996, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
("AICPA") issued Statement of Position 96-1 ("SOP 96-1"). SOP 96-1 is
designed to provide guidance concerning the application of FASB Statement No.
5 with respect to environmental remediation liabilities that relate to pollution
arising from past activities. It offers authoritative guidance on the recognition,
measurement, display and disclosure of environmental remediation liabilities.
By contrast, SOP 96-1 does not provide guidance on accounting for pollution
control costs with respect to current operations or on accounting for costs of
future site restoration or closure activities that are required upon the cessation of
operations or sale of facilities. SOP 96-1 also does not cover accounting for
environmental remediation activities that are undertaken at the sole discretion of
management (i.e., voluntarily).
1. SOP 96-1 contains explicit guidance on the recognition of environmental
remediation liabilities (i.e., when liabilities should be reported in
financial statements). While recognizing that in the environmental
context, remediation obligations become determinable and the amount of
liability becomes estimable over a continuum of events and activities,
SOP 96-1 makes clear that reporting generally cannot be deferred until
all the facts have been gathered and an ultimate assessment of liability
has been made. Instead, SOP 96-1 provides that an environmental
remediation liability should be treated as probable of being incurred if
the following two conditions are met:
a. Litigation has commenced or a claim or an assessment has been
asserted, or, based on available information, commencement of
litigation or assertion of a claim or an assessment is probable.
(In other words, it has been asserted or it is probable that it will
be asserted that the entity is responsible for participating in a
remediation process because of a past event.)
b. Based on available information, it is probable that the outcome
of such litigation, claim, or assessment will be unfavorable. (In
other words, an entity will be held responsible for participating
in a remediation process because of the past event.)
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2. SOP' 96-1 discusses in detail the various administrative stages of a
typical Superfund matter and how reporting of liabilities should be
handled at each stage.
3. SOP 96-1 also provides guidance on how to estimate the amount of an
environmental remediation liability once it has been determined that such
a liability must be recognized. Under SOP 96-1, the estimated costs
should include the allocable share of the liability for a specific site and
the share of amounts related to the site that will not be paid by the
government or other PRPs.
a. Specific costs that are to be included in the determination of the
magnitude of a liability include the incremental direct costs of
the remediation effort and the costs of compensation and benefits
for those employees who are expected to devote a significant
amount of time directly to the remediation effort to the extent of
the time spent on such effort.
b. Remediation efforts include precleanup activities (such as site
characterization), remedial activities, government oversight and
enforcement related activities, operation and maintenance
("O&M") activities and post-remediation monitoring.
c. Incremental direct costs of remediation include consulting and
contractor fees, costs of dedicated machinery and equipment that
does not have an alternative use, PRP group assessments, O&M
costs, government oversight and response costs, and attorneys
fees for work related to determining the extent of remedial
actions that are required, the type of remedial actions to be used,
or the allocation of costs among PRPs.
d. Remediation liabilities should be based on the statutes,
regulations and policies currently in place rather than those
requirements as they might evolve at the time the remediation is
actually performed. Moreover, remediation liabilities should be
based on the remediation technology that is expected to be
approved to complete the cleanup effort.
e. Remediation liabilities should be based on the estimated cost to
perform ·each of the remediation elements when those elements
are expected to be undertaken. Discounting to take into account
the time value of money is permissible under certain
circumstances.
4. SOP 96-1 provides specific guidance on methods for determining an
allocable share of overall liability assuming that multiple PRPs are being
subject to joint and several liability.
5. SOP 96-1 provides that potential recoveries that might offset remediation
liabilities are to be determined and recognized separately.
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6.1 While SOP 96-1 provides very useful guidance, the assumptions about
the manner in which site contamination cases unfold may be overly
simplistic in certain circumstances. The central thrust of SOP 96-1
suggests, however, that accrual of liabilities associated with site
contamination may need to be done earlier than had been typically
occurring, even if such accrual is done in a piecemeal fashion.
E. FASB has developed rules to address obligations stemming from the closure of
long-lived "hard" assets. See "Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No.
144: Accounting for the Impairment or Disposal of Long-Lived Assets (Aug.
2001). Such assets run the gamut from power plants, mines and waste
management facilities to utility poles and metal finishing shops. In many
instances, such assets may be subject to legally enforceable obligations such as
closure or reclamation plans under environmental statutes and regulations. How
to properly account for such obligations has sparked controversy..
F. In 1998, the SEC brought an administrative enforcement action against a
pharmaceutical company and three individuals affiliated with the company (the
current CEO and chairman of the board, the former chairman of the board, and
the CFO) arising out of inadequate disclosure of environmental liabilities. See In
re Lee Pharmaceuticals, Admin. Order No. 3-9573 (April 9, 1998). This action
brought to fruition repeated warnings by the SEC that it intended to enforce
requirements pertaining to environmental disclosure.
1. The SEC charged that Lee Pharmaceuticals learned in 1987 that its
property was contaminated. The California Regional Water Quality
Control Board thereafter ordered the company to perform an
investigation and the investigation confirmed the presence of
contamination. In 1991, EPA designated the company a PRP in
connection with the San Gabriel (area 1) Superfund Site, a regional
groundwater contamination site. The same year, the company obtained
an estimate of $465,000 for its share of investigation and remediation
costs associated with the site. In 1992, the company submitted an
insurance claim estimating its costs at $700,000.
2. The SEC charged that despite the foregoing information, the company
failed to disclose the nature of its environmental liabilities in reports filed
with the SEC between 1991 and 1996. For example, in its 1991 Form
10-K, the company failed to disclose that it was not continuing to
investigate groundwater conditions as it had been ordered and failed to
disclose that it had been named a PRP by EPA. The SEC also charged
that the company falsely reported that environmental tests were
"inconclusive." In subsequent Form 10-Ks, the SEC charged that the
company included false and materially misleading statements including
representing that it was not a PRP, that EPA had determined that no
cleanup would be required of groundwater, that it had no information
about cleanup costs for its property and that it had not caused the
contamination (despite a study conducted by EPA that concluded to the
contrary).
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3. The SEC determined that the company had failed to properly accrue a
liability on its financial statements for remediation costs in accordance
with GAAP. The SEC also determined that the company had violated
the antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder.
4. In settlement of the enforcement action, the respondents agreed to entry
of a cease-and-desist order. The SEC also barred the CFO from
practicing as an accountant before the SEC for a period of three years.
G. During the past several years, shareholders of various corporations have sought
to include in proxy materials proposals regarding environmental matters over the
objection of the corporation. The SEC has resolved these disputes. For example,
in 1999, the SEC ruled that Eastman Kodak Company could not exclude from
proxy materials a shareholder proposal requesting that the company disclose in
its environmental progress report a list of hazardous waste sites and other
circumstances in which it expected to accrue environmentally-based financial
liabilities.
H. On August 12, 1999, the SEC issued a staff accounting bulletin (Release No.
SAB 99) emphasizing that exclusive reliance on quantitative benchmarks to
assess materiality in preparing financial statements and performing audits of
those financial statements is inappropriate. See 64 Fed. Reg. 45150 (Aug. 19,
1999). In particular, SAB 99 focuses on the materiality of misstatements in a
registrant's financial statements. While not aimed directly at the disclosure of
environmental liabilities, the points emphasized in SAB 99 may have particular
relevance in evaluating the reporting of environmental liabilities on financial
statements.
1. In SAB 99, the SEC's Division of Corporation Finance and the Office of
the Chief Accountant underscored the fact that materiality must be
considered in the context of all of the facts. As stated in SAB 99, "[a]
matter is 'material' if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
person would consider it important."
2. Under the foregoing formulation of materiality, the SEC staff noted that
both "quantitative" and "qualitative" factors are to be used in
determining what is material.
3. While acknowledging that quantitative "rules of thumb" may be useful as
an initial step in assessing materiality, the SEC staff emphasized that
such rules of thumb cannot be used as a substitute for a full analysis of
all relevant considerations.
4. In determining whether multiple 'misstatements may cause the financial
statements of a registrant to be materially misstated, the SEC staff
directed that each misstatement should be considered separately and the
aggregate effect of all misstatements should be independently
considered.
5. SAB 99 includes a number of strongly-worded directives against
intentional misstatements in financial statements, even where such
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misstatements rnight not be considered to be material. Moreover, the
SEC staff noted that while the intent of management does not, itself,
render a misstatement material, it might provide significant evidence of
materiality in circumstances, for example, where management misstated
items in financial statements to "manage" reported earnings.
I. Investing based on non-financial considerations is on the rise. For example,
investors may select companies based not only on their financial performance but
also on their environmental performance. Recent studies are indicating that
"socially conscious" investing may reap significant financial rewards. It has
been suggested that as a strong proxy for management quality, relative
environmental performance is increasingly being used to project stock market
returns. See William Thomas, Taking Stock: New Methods Emerge to Assess
Financial Gains by Environmental Leaders, Trends, September/October 2000. If
environmental performance becomes a benchmark for predicting overall financial
performance, it could have dramatic implications for environmental disclosure
requirements. Certainly additional information regarding the environmental
management and performance of a company could take on added importance to
investors. This in tum may stimulate further evolution of the SEC's disclosure
requirements with respect to environmental matters. Nevertheless, as the Office
of Cooperative Environmental Management's Green Dividends Report indicates,
there are a number of "informational and institutional barriers to the
incorporation of environmental information in financial analysis.,,2
J. In February 2002, ASTM International issued a publication entitled "Standard
Guide for Disclosure of Environmental Liabilities" (Standard E 2173-01). This
guide, a supplement to GAAP, provides general parameters for determining
whether a disclosure of environmental liabilities is warranted and for determining
the content of that disclosure. It also identifies sources of information to be
reviewed in determining whether conditions warrant disclosure.
K. Future reform is likely in the wake of the collapse of Enron Corporation in late
2001 and the media attention that it attracted. In January of 2002, President Bush
indicated that the Treasury Department, the SEC, the Federal Reserve Board and
the Commodities Futures Trading Commission will all be reviewing disclosure
regulations with an eye toward ensuring the protection of the investor. Further,
the major accounting firms proposed the issuance of a MD&A guidance
document as a starting point for disclosure reform post-Enron. Although not
specifically addressing environmental risk disclosure, the guidance does call for
increased risk disclosure in other areas, such as off-balance-sheet arrangements
and certain trading activities. On February 13, 2002, the SEC announced that the
2 Another potential information barrier is SEC Regulation FD (fair disclosure). Promulgated in August,
2000, Regulation FD prevents issuers from intentionally disclosing material information to securities
analysts without simultaneously making a public disclosure of such information. Following the
promulgation of Regulation FD, there was a heated debate regarding its likely impact. Some analysts
claimed that the regulation would chill all disclosure, while others claimed it would encourage the
dissemination of relevant information to all investors and discourage selective disclosure. It appears that
both sides of the argument are correct, as early reports on the effect of Regulation FD reveal that some
companies have restricted their disclosures, while others have fulfilled the intention of Regulation FD and
undertaken to make more complete disclosures ofmaterial information.
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corporate disclosure regUlations will undergo major changes to require
companies to explain, in the words of Chairman Harvey Pitt, "what the key
factors are that drive the company's business, what the significant trends are that
could impact the company's performance going forward, and other key factors
that could affect the company's business, both on an historical and prospective
basis." It is unclear when this reform effort will be completed.
VII. Litigation Highlights Pertaining to the Disclosure of Environmental Liabilities and
Compliance Issues
A. Litigation concerning environmental disclosure (or lack thereof) has occurred on
a repeated basis.
B. Cases which have involved issues relating to environmental disclosure include
the following:
1. In Levine v. NL Industries, Inc., 926 F.2d 199 (2nd Cir. 1991), the
Second Circuit affirmed dismissal of an action charging NL Industries
with fraudulently failing to disclose that a wholly-owned subsidiary was
operating a federal uranium processing facility in violation of federal and
state environmental requirements. The court's decision turned on the fact
that because the subsidiary was fully indemnified by the federal
government for any environmental liabilities, the alleged environmental
non-compliance was not material. The court noted, however, that as a
general rule "disclosure ofpotential costs for violations of environmental
law, ifmaterial, is ordinarily required." 926 F.2d at 203.
2. In United Paperworkers International Union v. International Paper
Company, 801 F.Supp. 1134, (S.D.N.Y. 1992), the district court held that
the defendant company had knowingly made misleading statements and
omissions concerning the company's environmental compliance record in
proxy materials distributed to its shareholders in an effort to defeat a
shareholder proposal sponsored by the Presbyterian Church (USA) that
the company adopt and implement the Valdez Principles, a set of
principles pertaining to corporate environmental responsibility. In its
opinion, the court stated, "The Board [of the defendant] was
presumptively and constructively aware of all relevant details of the
Company's environmental record [which indicated serious and ongoing
environmental difficulties]; rather than portraying that record accurately,
or remaining silent, it chose instead to engage in flowery corporate
happy-talk in order to defeat the proposal." 801 F.Supp. at 1144. On
appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion that the
proxy materials in question were materially misleading. United
Paperworkers International Union v. International Paper Company, 985
F.2d 1190 (2nd Cir. 1993). The Second Circuit also ruled that the
Presbyterian Church could include a description of the results of the
litigation in connection with the resubmission of its resolution
concerning the Valdez Principles.
3. In Roosevelt v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 958 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir.
1992), the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals recognized a
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private right of action to enforce a corporation's obligation to include
shareholder proposals in annual meeting proxy materials, but held that
the specific proposal at issue - relating to the timing of DuPont's phase-
out of the production chlorofluorocarbons and halons and the reporting
of (a) research and development efforts to find environmentally sound
substitutes and (b) marketing plans to sell those substitutes - concerned
matters relating to the corporation's normal business operations and
therefore could be excluded from the proxy materials.
4. In Goldsmith v. Rawl, 755 F.Supp. 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), the district court
rejected motions for summary judgment filed by the defendants, holding
that issues of material fact existed as to whether Exxon could be held
liable to shareholders for failure to disclose in proxy materials pending
shareholder litigation arising out the 1989 accident involving the Exxon
Valdez.
5. In AES Corporation Securities Litigation, 825 F.Supp. 578, 588-89
(S.D.N.Y. 1993), the district court refused to dismiss claims brought on
behalf of purchasers of securities of AES Corporation where the
plaintiffs alleged that statements in prospectuses regarding AES's
environmental achievements were rendered false or misleading by the
fact that AES's employees had intentionally falsified wastewater
discharge reports to give the appearance that one of AES's facilities was
operating in compliance with relevant environmental regulations.
6. In Endo v. Albertine, 812 F.Supp. 1479, 1486-88 (N.D. 111. 1993), the
district court refused to dismiss claims for securities fraud based on the
alleged failure of Fruit of the Loom, Inc. to disclose adequately
environmental liabilities under Superfund and other environmental
statutes retained from Velsicol Chemical Company potentially exceeding
$60,000,000. In a subsequent decision, the court likewise refused to
grant defendants summary judgment on the same issues. Endo v.
Albertine, 863 F.Supp. 708 (N.D. TIL 1994).
7. In Klein v. PDG Remediation, Inc., 937 F.Supp. 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1996),
the district court refused to dismiss a class action suit claiming that a
company involved in the remediation of petroleum contaminated sites in
Florida funded largely by a state reimbursement program for leaking
underground storage tanks had violated the Securities Act by failing to
disclose information relating to the curtailment of this program in
connection with an initial public offering of common stock. The
company derived a large portion of its revenue from the reimbursement
program but failed to disclose in its registration statement and prospectus
that three separate governmental entities had conducted investigations
relating to the program. As a result of these investigations, the
governmental entities had called for modifications to the program and a
moratorium on payments. In addition, the company failed to disclose
that the program had operated at a sizable deficit for the previous two
years. The court rejected·arguments by the company that disclosure was
not required because the reports were publicly available and in the "total
mix" of information available to prospective investors. The court
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maintained that it was unreasonable to assume that nationwide investors,
or even Florida investors, would be aware of the reports in question, and
denied the company's motion to dismiss.
8. In Horsehead Resource Development Co., Inc. v. B.U.S. Environmental
Services, Inc., 928 F.Supp. 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), the district court
dismissed a complaint alleging that a corporation's filings failed to
disclose that it had been the subject of regulatory investigations in
Germany relating to serious environmental matters, "repeatedly
result[ing] in the finding of violations of environmental laws and/or
regulations in the recent past." The suit was brought by more than five
percent of the corporation's shareholders whose' stock was registered
with the SEC. In an earlier ruling, the court had held that the corporation
was obliged to disclose the existence of any and all ongoing criminal
cases related to environmental violations. Specifically, the court directed
the corporation to either report that its criminal environmental lawsuits
were continuing or present evidence that the case had been closed
without convictions. Ultimately, the corporation submitted the
necessary evidence that the criminal cases were closed and that neither
the corporation nor any of its personnel had been convicted of any
environmental violations.
9. In Gannon v. Continental Ins. Co., 920 F.Supp.566 (D.N.J.1996), the
district court dismissed a claim by a stockholder against the parent
company of an insurance carrier alleging mismanagement and violations
of federal securities law. The court held, inter alia, that annual reports
for 1990, 1991 and 1992, which failed to state that the insurance
company had not established reserves for incurred but unreported
environmental pollution and asbestos losses, were not actionable as
securities fraud. The court determined that the failure to include such
information was a simple omission which did not render misleading
statements that were actually made. The district court likewise dismissed
the claim that inclusion of a statement in the 1993 annual report that no
reserves had been established violated the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5
because the thrust of the claim was one of corporate mismanagement
rather than securities fraud.
VII. Conclusion
A. The issues posed by the intersection of financial disclosure and environmental
requirements are of critical importance to many businesses. The marriage of
these requirements may not be a happy one but is likely to be one of long
duration. It is also a marriage that can generate issues of enormous difficulty and
complexity - issues that may require the cooperation of professionals from a
variety of different fields to resolve in any meaningful fashion.
B. Those businesses which fail to pay close attention to the issues of environmental
disclosure may find themselves held accountable by the SEC, lenders, those with
whom they engage in transactions, and/or disappointed investors. At the same
time, recognition must be given to the many intrinsic difficulties associated with
accurately evaluating environmental liabilities and compliance obligations.
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Ultimately, it may be left to the courts to sort out whether environmental
disclosure responsibilities are being satisfied in an appropriate manner.
C. As the environmental field continues to evolve and members of the regulated
community respond in new ways to the challenges posed by environmental
considerations, disclosure issues are likewise almost certain to change. For
companies that successfully and fully integrate environmental considerations
with their overall operations, a meaningful and accurate description of the
manner in which environmental issues are being handled may become as
important if not more important to investors than a description of episodic
compliance problems. In this respect, disclosure models that the SEC considered
and rejected in the 1970's during a period in which the SEC perceived
environmental issues to be primarily of social rather than financial importance
may take on a renewed vitality.
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I. MORATORIUM ON PERMITTING POWER PLANTS
A. Energy Restructuring and the Rise of Merchant Power Plants
1. The Growth of Merchant Plants in the Region
• Ongoing energy "restructuring" by FERC has resulted in development of
"merchant" power plants that sell power on the open market as opposed to
serving a specific utility customer base.
• The Midwest and Southeast markets have been targeted for merchant plant
projects by many developers. Dozens ofprojects have been proposed for
states such as Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, and Tennessee.
• Many of the proposed merchant plants are gas-fired peak load units as
opposed to the coal-fired base load units that make up most of the existing
generating capacity.
• States such as Georgia and Tennessee have adopted permitting moratoria
to buy time to assess potential impacts of the proposed facilities.
2. Merchant Power Plant Proposals in Kentucky
• Most ofKentucky's 34 existing power plants were built more than 20
years ago with only 4 built since 1980. These plants were largely built to
serve a specific utility customer base.
• From 1999-2001, the state received permit applications for 29 new or
expanded power plants, most ofwhich involved merchant generation.
Most of the plants would be gas-fired peak load facilities, although some
are coal or coal refuse-fired.
• The proposed plants would add more than 12,000 Megawatts (MW) of
capacity to the existing capacity of 18,000 MW.
B. Preliminary Regulatory Developments in Kentucky
1. Permitting Moratorium and Review of Impacts
• On June 19, 2001, Governor Patton issued a six-month moratorium on
permitting new power plants. This was subsequently extended to July 16,
2002.
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• The Governor directed the NREPC and 'PSC to review the'impacts of the
proposed power plants on the environment and the state's power supply
grid.
• The Governor created the Kentucky State Energy Policy Advisory Board
to develop a statewide energy policy, coordinate review of these issues,
and make recommendations for legislation in the 2002 General Assembly.
2. NREPC Cumulative Assessment of Environmental Impacts -
December 17, 2001 Report
• The report concluded that most environmental impacts were associated
with existing power plants and that the limited impacts of the proposed
plants could be mitigated through the environmental permitting process.
• Potential air quality impacts include NOx emissions that could impact
attainment under the 8-hour ozone standard and emissions ofhazardous air
pollutants.
• Potential water impacts include water withdrawal rates that could impact
aquatic life or downstream users, wastewater discharges that could impact
surface waters, and groundwater impacts from ash ponds.
• Land quality impacts include substantial additional disposal and beneficial
reuse of coal combustion ash and deposition of acids and metals from flue
gas that could contribute to soil toxicity and bioaccumulation ofheavy
metals.
• Recommendations include determining the need for additional NOx
reductions beyond the NOx SIP call, analyzing air toxic emissions and
developing appropriate standards, removing water withdrawal exemptions
for power plants, establishing limits for additional effluent constituents,
establishing appropriate groundwater standards, addressing landfill and
ash pond groundwater issues, modifying the special waste permitting and
beneficial reuse programs, studying the total statewide carrying capacity
for power plants, adding more staff, and analyzing secondary impacts.
3. PSC Review of the Adequacy of Kentucky's Generation Capacity and
Transmission System - Case No. 387
• Kentucky's transmission system is adequate to reliably serve native load
and, with minor upgrades, to handle a large portion of the proposed new
generation.
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• Significant upgrades may be needed if the transmission system is to more
fully support the future wholesale markets envisioned by FERC.
• Upgrades and expansions required to serve new generation should be
funded by those who cause and benefit from these upgrades.
• In the event of transmission constraints, native load should be curtailed
only after all other customers have been curtailed.
• Consideration should be given to a public power authority to develop coal-
fired generation, shared utility ownership of future base load generation,
and coordination of scheduled maintenance of units by utilities.
• There is a need for a regulatory body with jurisdiction over the siting of
merchant power plants and transmission.
4. Recommendations of Kentucky State Energy Policy Advisory Board -
December 20, 2001 Report
• The Advisory Board established siting, moratorium, and NOx allowance
committees to assess key issues identified by stakeholders.
• The committees recommended that the governor extend the permitting
moratorium, establish siting requirements for power generation and
transmission lines, and auction the five percent NOx allowance pool set
aside for new generation.
c. New Siting Legislation Passed in the 2002 General Assembly - Senate Bill 257
1. The bill creates the Kentucky State Board on Electric Generation and
Transmission Siting and the Environment.
• No person may construct a merchant electric generating facility or non-
regulated electric transmission line without first obtaining a construction
certificate from the Board.
• "Merchant plant" is defined to cover facilities capable of generating 10
MW or more which sell power on the wholesale market at rates not
regulated by the PSC.
• "Non-regulated electric transmission line" is defined to cover lines which
do not require a certificate ofpublic convenience and necessity, are not
subject to PSC regulation, and can operate at or above 69,000 volts.
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• Merchant plants do not include facilities which are qualifying
cogeneration facilities or contract to sell 100% of their power to PSC-
regulated utilities for baseload purposes, locate on existing utility sites,
and obtain PSC approval of their power supply contracts.
• Approval requirements do not apply to a utility owned by a municipality
unless it constitutes a merchant plant.
• Replacement with a like facility or repair, modification, retrofitting,
enhancement or reconfiguration does not constitute construction.
• The Board may assess fees to cover the cost of reviewing applications.
2. Board membership includes representatives of state agencies and local
governments.
• The three members of the PSC (with the PSC chairman also chairing the
Siting Board)
• The Secretary of the NREPC or designee
• The Secretary of the Cabinet for Economic Development or designee
• One representative at large appointed by the Governor for a two year term
• One local representative appointed by the county judge/executive or
mayor of the local jurisdiction in the case ofmerchant generation or non-
regulated transmission line applications.
3. Setback requirements for merchant plants.
• Setback of 1,000 feet from the property boundary of any adjoining
property owner (except for facilities to be located on former coal prep
plant sites which will utilize on-site waste coal as a fuel source).
• Setback of 2,000 feet from any residential neighborhood, school, hospital,
or nursing home facility.
• Setback of400 feet from any residential structure, residential
neighborhood, school, hospital, or nursing home facility if the proposed
facility is to be located on a river and use clean coal technology.
• Setback requirements established by a local Planning and Zoning
Commission have primacy over the Board's setback requirements.
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• The Board may grant a deviation, except in the case of local setback
requirements, on a finding that the proposed facility is designed and
located to meet the goals of the Act at a closer distance.
4. Application requirements for merchant plants.
• A full description of the site, including map showing distance to specified
structures within a two mile radius.
• Evidence of compliance with public notice requirements.
• A report of the applicant's public involvement program activities.
• Proofof service of the application upon the chief executive officer of
county, municipal corporation, and land use planning agency.
• A summary of the efforts made to locate the proposed facility on a site
where existing facilities are located.
• A certification that the plant will be in compliance with all local
ordinances and regulations concerning noise control and with any
applicable planning and zoning requirements.
• A statement that the plant complies with setback requirements.
• Analysis of the proposed facility's projected effect on the electricity
transmission system.
• Analysis of the proposed facility's economic impact on the affected region
and state.
• A detailed listing of all violations by the applicant or any of its affiliates or
subsidiaries where violations have resulted in criminal convictions or fines
exceeding $5,000 (and status of any pending action whether judicial or
administrative).
• A site assessment report identifying site impacts (or in the alternative,
documentation ofNEPA compliance).
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5. Site assessment reports
(a) Preparation of the report
• The report must be prepared by a consultant from a list ofboard-
approved consultants.
• The board may hire a consultant to review the site assessment
report and provide recommendations concerning the adequacy of
the report and proposed mitigation measures.
(b) Element of the report
• A description of the proposed facility including surrounding land
uses; proposed site access control, location ofproposed structures
and property boundaries; location and use of access ways, internal
roads, and railways; existing or proposed utilities; compliance with
setback requirements; and evaluation of expected noise levels.
• An evaluation of the compatibility of the facility with scenic
surroundings.
• The potential changes in area property values resulting from siting,
construction, and operation.
• Evaluation of anticipated peak and average noise levels associated
with construction and operation.
• Impact of operation on road and rail traffic, including anticipated
fugitive dust levels, and degradation of roads and lands in the
vicinity.
• Suggested mitigating measures including planting trees, changing
outside lighting, erecting noise barriers, and suppressing fugitive
dust.
6. Determination to grant or deny.
(a) Criteria for determination
• Impact of the facility on scenic surroundings, property values, the
pattern and type of development of adJacent property, and
surrounding roads.
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• Anticipated noise levels expected as a result of construction and
operation.
• The economic impact upon the affected region and the state.
• Whether the facility is proposed for a site upon which are located
existing generating facilities of greater than 10 MW capacity.
• Whether the applicant has met all requirements for transmission
interconnection under Kentucky law and the open access
transmission tariff of the host transmission owner or regional
transmission owner.
• Compliance with setback requirements.
• Whether the applicant possesses the financial, technical, and
managerial capacity to construct and operate the proposed facility.
• The efficacy of any proposed measures to mitigate adverse
impacts.
• Whether the applicant has a good environmental compliance
history.
(b) Other approval issues
• The Board may also consider the policy of the General Assembly
to encourage the use of coal as a principal fuel for electricity
generation.
• The Board may condition approval on implementation of any
mitigation measures the Board deems appropriate.
• A construction certificate for a merchant generating plant may not
be transferred to another party without a Board determination that
the acquirer has a good environmental compliance history; and the
financial, technical, and managerial capacity to meet obligations.
7. Compatibility certificates for proposed utility generating plants.
• No utility shall commence construction of a generating facility with a
capacity ofmore than 10 MW, for which a certificate ofpublic necessity
and convenience has not been granted prior to the effective date, without
having first obtained a site compatibility certificate from the PSC.
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• An application shall include submittal of a site assessment report, except
that a facility proposed for an existing generating site shall not be required
to comply with setback requirements.
• The PSC may deny an application or require reasonable mitigation of
impacts including planting trees, changing outside lighting, erecting noise
barriers, and suppressing fugitive dust. The PSC may not order relocation
of the facility.
• No person may acquire ownership or control or the right to control any
assets that are owned by a utility without prior PSC approval if such assets
have an original book value of $1 million or more and are transferred for
reasons other than obsolescence or will continue to be used to provide the
same or similar service to a utility or its customers.
8. Non-regulated transmission lines.
(a) Application Requirements
• A description of the proposed route including proposed right of
way and proximity to specified structures.
• A description of the proposed line including design, specifications,
capacity, costs, and appearance.
• A statement that the facilities will be constructed and maintained in
accordance with the National Electric Safety Code.
• Evidence of compliance with requirements for notice to the public
and local officials and a report of the applicant's communication
and public involvement efforts.
(b) Determination to grant or deny
• A detennination, by .majority vote, to grant or deny must be made
within 90 days of receipt of the application or 120 days if a local
public hearing is held.
• The detennination to grant or deny must be based on the following
criteria: the proposed route will minimize adverse impact on the
scenic assets ofKentucky; the applicant will construct and
maintain the line in accordance with all applicable legal
requirements.
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• If the Board detennines that there will be degradation of scenic
factors or violation of applicable legal requirements, the Board
may deny the application or condition approval on relocation of the
route of the line.
9. A Cumulative Environmental Assessment must be submitted by
persons applying to the NREPC for a permit.
(a) Applicability
• No person shall commence construction of a facility to be used for
the generation ofelectricity on or after April 15, 2002 without
submitting a cumulative environmental assessment and paying any
fees imposed by the NREPC.
• The requirement applies to both the merchant and utility
generating plants.
(b) Elements of report
• Identification and quantification of air contaminants that may be
emitted, description of emissions controls, and identification and
quantification of air contaminants that may be deposited onto land
or waters.
• Identification and quantification ofwater pollutants that may be
discharged and description of control methods.
• Identification and quantification ofwaste that may be generated
and description ofmethods to be used to manage and dispose.
• Identification and quantification ofwaters that my be withdrawn
and description ofmethods for managing water usage.
(c) Conditional approval
• The NREPC may condition approval of a pennit subject to
reduction or elimination of cumulative environmental impacts.
• Conditions may include reductions in air emissions, water
discharges, waste generation, and water withdrawal as necessary to
prevent air pollution, prevent water pollution, protect the best
interests of the public and water users, or promote waste reduction.
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10. Procedural Requirements.!
• A local public hearing may be convened if requested by not less than three
interested parties that reside in the county or municipal corporation of the
proposed facility or the planning and zoning commission, mayor, or fiscal
court of the jurisdiction of the proposed facility.
• Parties to hearings include the applicant and interested persons granted the
right of intervention. Hearings must be conducted in accordance with
rules adopted by the Board.
• The Board must, by majority vote, grant or deny a certificate within 90
days of receipt of an administratively complete application or within 120
days of receipt if a hearing is requested.
• Any party may appeal a final determination to the circuit court of the
county in which the proposed facility is to be located within 30 days of
receipt of the determination.
11. Mitigation of transmission impacts.
• No utility shall begin construction of facilities to establish interconnection
with a merchant plant in excess of 10 MW capacity without prior approval
ofplans and specifications by the PSC.
• Expenses associated with upgrading the existing transmission grid as a
result of additional load caused by a merchant plant shall be borne by the
merchant plant.
• In the event of transmission curtailments, there shall be no curtailments or
interruptions of retail electric service or wholesale electric service to a
distribution cooperative (except for interruptible service) unless service
has first been interrupted to all other customers whose interruption may
relieve the emergency or other event.
II. MORATORIUM ON NON-COAL MINING PERMITS
A. Background
• Non-coal mining in the state includes limestone quarries, sand and gravel
operations, and clay pits. These include 211 permitted sites that cover 37,809
acres.
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• Environmentalists have criticized the non-coal program as its requirements are
less stringent than the requirements placed on the coal industry pursuant to
SMCRA.
• On September 21,2001, Governor Patton imposed a moratorium on issuance of
non-coal permits through July 15, 2002 and required review of all oil and gas
permits. The Governor directed the Department ofMines & Minerals to review
applications for new wells in the vicinity ofBreaks Interstate Park, Cumberland
Gap, and Pine Mountain. The Governor also directed the agencies to review
permitting and reclamation requirements for non-coal mining operations and oil
and natural gas wells.
• The NREPC's December, 2001 report identified areas where the non-coal
program is less stringent than requirements imposed on coal operations.
B. Changes under consideration for the non-coal program.
• More stringent bonding requirements
• Highwall elimination for quarries
• Contemporaneous reclamation
• Lands unsuitable for mining
• Pre-blasting surveys
• Fugitive dust control
C. Action Anticipated in the Future
• The NREPC is currently pursuing a dialogue with stakeholders on potential
revisions to the non-coal permitting program.
• Emergency regulations are anticipated prior to expiration of the permitting
moratorium on July 15, 2002.
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OPTIMIZING LAND RECLAMATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION:
MAKING THE MOST OUT OF SURETY AGREEMENTS
WILLIAM T. GORTON ill, ESQ.
STITES & HARBISON
250 West Main Street, Suite 2300
Lexington, Kentucky 40507
I. INTRODUCTION - SMCRA AND SURETYSHIP
A. SMCRA
• The regulation of coal mining in the United States is governed by the
federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 1 ("SMCRA").
Several purposes of SMCRA include the establishment of a nationwide
program to protect society and the environment from the adverse effects of
surface coal operations;2 assuring the rights of surface landowners and
other persons with a legal interest in the land are fully protected3 and
assuring that adequate procedures are undertaken to reclaim surface areas
as contemporaneou~ly as possible with the surface coal operations.4
• Under SMCRA a mining company must file an application for a surface
mining permit which includes detailed operations and reclamation plans
and the posting ofreclamation performance bonds.5
1 30 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq.
2 30 U.S.C. § 1202(a)
3 30 U.S.C. § 1202(b)
4 30 U.S.C. § 1202(e)
5 30 U.S.C. § 1256; 30 C.F.R. § 800 et. seq. There has been confusion in the regulatory arena as to
whether reclamation are "penal bonds" or "performance bonds." OSM has stated, "OSM views a
reclamation bond as one guaranteeing the performance ofreclamation work. Therefore it is not a penal
bond." See 48 Fed. Reg. § 32932, July 19,1983
©W.T. Gorton III
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• SMCRA has specific regulatory frameworks for bonding the reclamation
plans and performance of the coal mine permittee. Bonds may be in the
form of a corporate surety bond, cash collateral or securities.6
• The bonded obligations include compliance with other environmental laws
and regulations often including laws related to water quality, coal refuse
disposal, mine subsidence and waste management.
B. Suretyship - Very few outside of the surety industry (including judges), fully
understand exactly what a surety bond is. Many mistakenly regard "bonds" as insurance
policies. Suretyship is not insurance.? The distinction between the two concepts is as follows:
• In suretyship: There is a three party contract where a surety provides a financial
guarantee, only if the principal (permittee) fails to meet its obligation to the
obligee (regulatory agency). The principal is required to reimburse the surety,8
therefore a surety expects no loss. The principal is the primary obligor and the
surety is the secondary obligor.
• In insurance: There is a two-party contract where an insurance company spreads
the risk of losses over a group of insureds and expects to take a loss during the
policy period. If an insured event occurs, the insurance company pays with no
recourse against the insured.
630 C.F.R. § 800.12
7 Pearlman v. Reliance Ins. Co., 371 U.S. 132, 137, 83 S. Ct. 232 (1962)
8 See The Law of Suretyship 2d Ed. 1993 Edward Gallagher. In the underwriting analysis, the principal's
financial and performance capability is assessed; risk is not spread as in insurance.
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• Many principles of surety law apply along with the regulatory framework. For
example: "Subrogation" is an important concept that allows the surety to "step
into the shoes" of either the permittee or the regulatory agency depending on the
situation. A surety is entitled to assert all of the defenses of its principal. A
surety who pays the debts of another is entitled to all the rights of the person he
paid (obligee) to enforce his rights to be reimbursed.9 The doctrine of subrogation
also allows a surety to step into the shoes of the government for whom the job
was completed. Io
Often there are conflicts between secured creditors (lenders) who want money
from the bankrupt estate and the regulatory agency, permittee and surety who all
want reclamation accomplished. The surety, for example, can argue the state's
position regarding the need for compliance with state law under § 95911 of the
bankruptcy code.
c. Reclamation surety bonds fit into the special category of "statutory bonds" and as
such encompass the requirements of the regulatory program itself. 12
II. BOND FORFEITURE
A. Due in large part to the adverse economic climate surrounding the coal and steel
industries, (notwithstanding the recent up-tic in the coal market and subsequent plummet)
9 ide
10 National Shawmut Bank ofBoston v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co. 411 F.2d 843, 845 (1 st Cir. 1969)
11 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) "... a trustee, receivers or managers, including a debtor in possession shall manage
and operate the property in his possession ... according to the requirements of the valid laws of the state
in which such property is situated, in the same manner that the owner ... would be bound to do if in
Eossession thereof."
2 Exchange Insurance Co. v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, Interior Bd. of Land Appeals 820 F. Supp. 357
(E.D.T.N. 1993)
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numerous companies witll large coal mine environmental obligations have been dissolved or
become bankrupt in the last ten years including most recently Lodestar Energy, LTV Steel,
Bethlehem Steel, AEI Resources, Quaker Coal, Pen Holdings and others. In such an event,
notwithstanding a potential successful reorganization, coal operations that have stopped in mid-
operation become "problem mines," and may be subject to bond forfeiture for various reasons. I3
B. From our experience the first sign that a company is strapped for cash, is lack of
environmental compliance. Often, the field inspectors are the first to notice "short cuts" by a
company.
c. Under SMCRA, the regulatory agency must notify the permittee and surety of its
intent to forfeit the bonds and advise of conditions under which forfeiture may be avoided. I4 By
this time, however, it is usually very late in the game for the surety to be able to have significant
influence over its bonded principal. Earlier notice to the surety when the agency anticipates a
problem may have a more positive result and may avoid forfeiture altogether. As a matter of
fact, during the rulemaking process OSM recognized that "adequate latitude is available for the
regulatory authority to withhold forfeiture if an operator or a surety agree to a compliance
schedule for completing reclamation successfully."Is
D. Under SMCRA the agency can generally proceed to collect the bonds unless there
have been actions to avoid forfeiture or an appeal has been filed,I6 however some states (e.g.,
Kentucky) require a pre-payment of the bond in order to pursue the appeal. 17
13 30 C.F.R. § 800.50
14 30 C.F.R. § 800.50(a)(1) & (2)
15 See 46. Fed. Reg. 45082, Sept. 9, 1981
16 30 C.F.R. § 800.50(b)1
17 KRS 350.032(3).
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E. Principles of surety law ordinarily allow a surety to either perform the bonded
obligation in the event of a default or to pay the bond amount. Under SMCRA and most state
programs surety reclamation is allowed. I8 Based on our experience in the field, under the most
complicated technical and legal scenarios, surety reclamation should be encouraged.
III. SURETY RECLAMATION WORKOUTS
A. Many of the most complicated matters facing the regulatory agencies and sureties
have involved the large company bankruptcies or dissolutions with numerous sites involving all
aspects ofmining. The handling of these matters particularly by the agency, affects other
interests including landowners, neighbors, communities and environmental interests.
B. If the bond is forfeited and collected by the agency, the agency, usually through
its AML program, may conduct reclamation under specific, time consuming and more expensive
state procurement procedures ("AML Dollars").
C. It has been our experience that surety reclamation can provide more reclamation
on the ground per dollar by using private sector resources, expedience and experience in bidding
and contracting.
D. Recent successful surety reclamation projects have included:
• Open dragline pits
• Acid mine drainage passive system development
• Burning refuse piles
• Mine shaft closures
• Borehole sealing
18 30 C.F.R. § 800.50(a)(2)(ii).
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• Prime fann land restoration
• Wetlandslhabitat enhancement
• Preparation plant demolition
• Coal refuse/slurry impoundment reclamation
• PCB removal
• Aerial tram removal
• Contour mine reclamation
• Hydraulic seals to flooding deep mines.
E. Reclamation is conducted under a Consent Order and Agreement, Consent
Agreement or Settlement Agreement which defines the scope ofwork, work schedule and bond
release or "waiver of collection" schedule where the bond remains technically "forfeited."
• A critical factor to the surety is "certainty" as to perfonnance requirements
since it will have conducted its own engineering/economic analysis
regarding the project prior to signing an agreement to perfonn.
F. The surety is not the pennittee and is not subject to pennitting requirements as is
an operator. 19
G. Many of the larger cases are also subject to u.S. Bankruptcy Court jurisdiction
therefore the surety, pennittee and agencies must deal with a Trustee or Debtor in Possession and
19 See 48 Fed. Reg. 32932, July 19, 1983 where OSM in discussing its final federal rules regarding
bonding requirements stated in response to a state agency question as to "whether in accepting a
permittee's obligation for reclamation after forfeiture, the state or surety assumes the obligation for phase
releases, water quality control, NPDES monitoring and revegetation" OSM stated, "All plans and
specifications found in the permit must be met in contracting for completion of reclamation. However,
neither the regulatory authority nor the contractor assumes the liability of the permittee." (emphasis
added)
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other creditors. Most re~llegal conflicts occur here due to the intersection of environmental law,
surety law and bankruptcy law. There are inherent competing interests:
• Goals ofbankruptcy law: get funds back to creditors;
• Goals of SMCRA: get land reclaimed (i.e. put $ in the dirt)
H. The surety and agency interests are usually aligned in bankruptcy proceedings,
however, often th~ agency takes a back seat in the proceedings.
IV. PROBLEMS IN NEGOTIATING SURETY AGREEMENTS
A. Large multi-mine bankruptcies create~ complicated situations - technically
and legally and require significant time and effort to understand relevant relationships and
prospects for successful emergence from bankruptcy in order to develop strategy, M Quaker
Coal, AEI Resources.
B. Due to usual negative history with the permittee leading to bond forfeiture, the
surety is often faced with an irritated audience at the agency and with landowners.
• Very often, the principal/permittee is in arrears regarding royalty
payments to the mineral owners, has left surface owner's property in
disrepair and has created bad relations with the regulatory agency.
• More often that not, regulatory staff does not understand suretyship and
often confuses the surety as a surrogate coal operator.
• Regulatory staff often view the bond amounts as "agency money."
• It is not uncommon for the bond amount to not cover full reclamation
since the operation was stopped in mid-stream.
• Bankruptcy court jurisdiction may overlay the entire matter.
• Landowners can be recalcitrant and litigious.
©W.T. Gorton III
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C. Bankruptcy court approval of any. workout is necessary (remember, the primary
environmental obligation is that of the bankrupt company).
v. WHEN RECLAMATION EXCEEDS THE BOND AMOUNT
A. SMCRA allows the agency to pursue the permittee for excess costs if the bond
amounts do not cover the reclamation costs.20 This provision is probably moot since the
permittee is bankrupt.
B. If the bond amounts go to the agency, then using "AML Dollars" and government
contracting procedures, less work gets accomplished and it takes longer.
C. In recent experiences with a few states we were told "OSM won't let the state
enter surety agreement if it's for less than the entire reclamation plan" even though there are
discreet, identifiable reclamation tasks that must be accomplished: e.gs. eroding hollow filIon
steep slopes; acid filled pits, where the surety would have been able to abate the hazard or make
a substantial contribution to reclamation within the bond amount, but not reclaim the entire site.
D. In other cases, in resolution of appeals filed with the administrative hearing
officers under SMCRA or in the bankruptcy cases we have been able to identify key tasks in the
reclamation plan that required immediate attention or high priority and come to an agreement on
scope ofwork and waiver ofbond collection.
E. In those cases, it's a win for all parties and the states AML funds are preserved.
20 30 C.F.R. § 800.50(d)(I)
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VI. BENEFITS OF SURETY RECLAMATION
A. Facilitates the purposes of SMCRA in addressing the adverse effects of surface
coal mining operations, protection of the environment and the rights of landowners.
B. Land gets stabilized; pollution gets abated using private sector resources instead
of limited government resources (agency still has jurisdiction).
C. More actual reclamation activity can be conducted on a per dollar basis since
there are no government procurement requirements in private contracts between the surety and
contractors.
D. Surety can mitigate its loss.
E. Landowner gets property returned to stable status.
F. Surety is additional advocate for environmental protection in bankruptcy
proceedings.
©W.T. Gorton III
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1. Overview
A. Operators in industries subject to environmental regulations, are required to
post bonds in order to commence and continue operations.
[1] KRS KRS 350.060 conditions the issuance ofa surface coal mining
and reclamation pennit upon the filing ofa reclamation bond for perfonnance, "payable to
the Commonwealth of Kentucky...conditioned upon the faithful perfonnance of the
requirements set forth in this chapter and of the administrative regulations of the Cabinet."
[2] 405 KAR Chapter 10 sets forth the regulatory scheme for surface
mining perfonnance bond and liability requirements.
B. Insurance Law
[1] On August 24, 2001, the New York Superintendent ofInsurance and
Frontier Insurance Company jointly petitioned the New York courts to place Frontier in
rehabilitation.
[2] As a result of Frontier's placement in rehabilitation, the Kentucky
Department ofInsurance suspended its certificate ofauthority in Kentucky pursuant to KRS
304.
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[3] This course ofevents, coupled with an apparent incongruence between
Frontier's ability to honor its bonds under KRS 304, although its certificate ofauthority has
been suspended, and surface mining regulations requiring replacement ofFrontierbonds, led
to particularly well-publicized problems in coal surface mining, involving several large coal
companies.
C. Bankruptcy
[1] Debtors in bankruptcy are protected by the automatic stay provisions
of 11 U.S.C. §362, which preclude "the commencement or continuation ... ofeach judicial,
administrative, or other action or proceeding against" debtors.
[2] States may avoid the protections ofthe automatic stay pursuant to its
police and regulatory exception in §362(b)(4), which exempts from the stay "the
commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a government unit . . . to
enforce such governmental unit's ... police or regulatory power ..• other than [the
enforcement of] a money judgment."
D. IssuelProblem
[1] Is state action forcing the replacement of bonds violative of the
automatic stay or does it fall within the police or regulatory power exception?
2. Objective or Subjective Test- Chao or Safety Kleen?
A. Chao v. Hospital Staffing Services, Inc., 270 F.3d 374 (6th Cir. 2001)
[1] Facts of the case
[a] The debtor, HSSI engaged in home health care and related
services in Tennessee and New England.
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[b] HSSI files for Chapter 11 protection, but converted to Chapter
7.
[c] In the last two weeks of its operations, HSSI did not pay
employees' wages, and thus, the goods produced by their labor were considered "hot
goods" for purposes of the Fair Labor Standards Act's minimum wage provisions.
[d] The United States Secretary ofLabor sought an injunction in
the Western District of Tennessee to stop transportation of the "hot goods."
[e] The district court issued a preliminary injunction and ordered
the trustee ofHSSI's bankruptcy estate to pay approximately $615,000.00 in order
to purge the taint ofhot goods. These funds came from the creditor pool ofHSSI's
Chapter 7 liquidation assets, as detennined in the parallel Florida bankruptcy action.
[f] After the district court's ruling on the issue, the bankruptcy
court held that Secretary's suit was an action to collect a debt rather than an exercise
ofpolice power, taking it out of the automatic stay exception, supra. However, the
bankruptcy court did not enter the orderbecause ofthe contemporaneous proceedings
in district court and corresponding jurisdictional concern.
[g] Thereafter, the trustee appealed from district court's denial of
its motion to dismiss, the court's grant of a preliminary injunction, and the order
directing the deposit of funds purging the taint of the hot goods.
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[2] Looking behind the stated legislative Purpose -- Chao's subjective
tests for purpose ofthe police power or regulatory exception to the automatic stay- primary
purpose of the governmental unit's (state or federal) enforcement action. 1
[3] Court applies two tests: the pecuniary purpose test and the public
policy test.
[a] Pecuniary Interest test·
[i] "Reviewing courts focus on whether the governmental
proceeding relates primarily to the protection ofthe government's pecuniary
interest in the debtor's property, and not to matters ofpublic safety. Those
proceedings which relate primarily to matters ofpublic safety are excepted
from the stay." Id. at 387.
[ii] "Wejoin the Eighth Circuit in refining the "pecuniary
interest test to focus our inquiry on whether the enforcement action would
result in a pecuniary advantage to the government vis-a-vis other creditors
of the bankruptcy estate." Id. at 389 n. 9 (italics in original, emphasis
otherwise added).
As discussed infra, Safey-Kleen's analysis of the exception relies on the stated Congressional or
legislative purpose for the law pursuant to which enforcement is sought. This test is
characterized as the "primary purpose t~st," i.e., what is the primary purpose of the law being
enforced. On the other hand, Chao retains the pecuniary interest and public policy tests and
emphasizes the fact that their analyses are to be conducted subjectively to determine the motive
behind the government's particular enforcement action. Thus, although Safety Kleen and Chao
probably can't be reconciled, Chao's tests can also involve the examination of the "primary
purpose" behind an action, but do so by looking behind the cloak of the government's stated
policy.
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[iii] Chao explained that a subjective case-by-case analysis
is required for the analysis under both tests. The Court reasoned that although
all acts ofCongress declare national policy, the "public policy test calls upon
courts to analyze whether aparticular lawsuit is undertaken by a government
entity in order to effectuate public policy ...." * * * "This court's
pecuniary interest and public policy tests recognize this limitation and are
designed to sort out cases in which the government is bringing suit in
furtherance ofeither its own or certain private individuals interest in certain
private parties' interest in obtaining a pecuniary advantage over other
creditors." * * * "Accordingly, courts should examine the type of
enforcement action brought and the relationship between a particular suit and
Congress's (or a state's) declared public policy." Id. 389, 390. (underline
added, emphasis otherwise in original).
[iv] Although Chao went to great lengths to explain the
pecuniary interest test, the court held that it was inapplicable because the
Secretary was seeking a pecuniary advantage for private citizens, not itself:
per public policy test, as explained infra.
[b] Public Policy test
[i] "Underthe publie policy test, the reviewing court must
distinguish between proceedings that adjudicate private rights and those that
effectuate public policy. Those proceedings that effectuate a public policy
are excepted from stay."
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[ii] As explained above, Chao held that the court should
not rely blindly upon the stated policy of the law being enforced. All laws
by definition declare public policy, so courts applying the tests must look at
the particular motive behind the state or federal government's action.
[iii] In Chao, the Secretary ofLabor was enforcing FLSA
provisions primarily to have HSSI's employees paid for the work conducted
in its last weeks' existence.
[iv] Accordingly, the court held "[W]hen the action
incidentally serves the public interest but more substantially adjudicates
private rights, courts should regard the suit as outside the police power
exception, particularly when a successful suit would result in a pecuniary
advantage to certain private parties vis-a-vis other creditors of the estate,
contrary to the Bankruptcy Code's priorities."
[c] Analysis/Conclusions- Chao sets forth subjective and flexible
tests that prevent the governmental unit from hiding behind the veil of its stated
public policy.
B. Safety Kleen v. Wyche, et al., 274 F.3d 846 (4th Cir. 2001)(December)
[1] Facts of the Case
[a] Safety Kleen ("SK"), which operated hazardous waste
facilities in South Carolina, had purchased performance bonds from Frontier. On
June 1, 2000 the United States Treasury removed Frontier from its list ofapproved
sureties, triggering South Carolina requirements that hazardous waste performance
bonds issued by an insurance company which is not on the approved list, be replaced.
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[b] On June 9, 2000, the South CarolinaDepartment ofHealth and
Environmental Control ("DHEC") ordered SK to replace its bonds. SK filed Chapter
11 that day.
[c] SK filed an adversary proceeding against DHEC in district
court seeking a preliminary injunction against DHEC closing its facility.
[d] The district court denied the preliminary injunction but held
that forcing bond replacement violated the automatic stay.
[e] SK appealed the denial of the preliminary injunction and
DHEC cross-appealed the court's determination that its actions violated the
automatic stay.
[2] Relying on State's Policy As Stated- Safety Kleen's objective primary
purpose test.
[a] Primary Purpose Test
[i] The Court explained the considerations due when
applying the police or regulatory power exception to the automatic stay as
follows:
The difficulty in applying [the police and regulatory
power] exception comes in distinguishing between
situations in which the state acts pursuant to its
'police and regulatory power' and situations in which
the state acts merely to protect its status as a creditor.
To make this distinction, we look to the purpose of
the law that the state is attempting to enforce. If the
purpose of the law is to promote 'public safety and
welfare' or to 'effectuate public policy,' then the
exception applies. On the other hand, if the purpose
of the law relates 'to the protection of the
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government's pecuniary interest in the debtor's
property,' then the exception is inapplicable.
Id. at 865 (citations omitted).
[ii] The most important aspect of the court's analysis
stated: "[t]he inquiry is objective: we examine the purpose ofthe law that the
state seeks to enforce rather than the state's intent in enforcing the law in a
particular case." Id. (emphasis added).
[iii] In this regard, Safety Kleen's analysis of the issue
appears to diverge from the analysis required in this circuit by Chao.
[iv] The difference in application is evidenced by the
following statement by the court: "[t]he fact that one purpose of the law is
to protect the state's pecuniary interest does not necessarily mean that the
exception is inapplicable. Rather, we must determine the primary purpose
ofthe law that the state is attempting to enforce." Id. (emphasis in original).
[v] "In considering whether the regulatory exception
applies to environmental laws, courts often focus on whether deterrence is the
primary purpose of the law." Id.
[vi] With regard to South Carolina's bonding requirements
for hazardous waste facilities the court reasoned as follows:
The financial assurance regulations are within the
regulatory exception because they serve the primary
purpose of deterring environmental misconduct.
Stated more positively, the regulations serve to
promote environmental safety in the design and
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operation ofhazardous waste facilities. The incentive
for safety is obvious: the availability and cost of a
bond will be tied directly to the structural integrity of
a facility and the soundness of its day-to-day
operations...Id. at 866 (emphasis added).
The court did not further explain the link between the availability and costs ofbonds and hazardous
waste facilities' structural integrity and the soundness ofits day-to-day operations, but its focus on
costs suggests the logic that ifthe facility cannot afford bonds or afford to replace them, it probably
cannot afford to operate with the level of safety demanded by state regulations.
[vii] The EPA and South Carolina hazardous waste
financial assurance regulations examined in Safety Kleen spell out "how the
regulations would promote environmental protection at active hazardous
waste facilities ... ," by creating incentives "'to locate, design, and operate
facilities to minimize closure and post-closure costs' and to 'improve
operating procedures and reduce the risk of accidents'." Id.
[viii] The court holds that South Carolina's assurance
requirements are an exercise of state's regulatory power because they have
the primary purpose ofdeterring environmental misconduct and safe design
and operation. Accordingly, the stay was not violated.
[b] Analysis
[i] The particular policies and concerns at issue in Safety
Kleen may be peculiar to hazardous waste facilities.
[ii] In the case ofcoal surface mining, such as the Lodestar
case, discussed infra, location (one of the factors relied upon by the Safety
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Kleen court) is dictated by the presence of coal, i.e., coal is generally in
seams beneath the earth's surface whereas the location ofa hazardous waste
facility is usually a controversial process involving considerations highly
sensitive to public safety and often fraught with public concern regarding
alternative placements.
[iii] Likewise, the link between financial assurance
requirements and day-to-day operations is not as evident in the coal industry
as in the hazardous waste industry.
[iv] SafetyKleen's instruction on how the primarypurpose
test should be applied is opposed to the tests set forth in Chao.
3. Lodestar- Chao and Safety Kleen
A. Facts and Kentucky law
[1] On March 30, 2001 involuntary petitions were filed against
Lodestar, and it entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy on April 27, 2001, maintaining operations
as a debtor in possession.
[2] When Frontier lost its certificate of authority under KRS 304.3-
220, it maintained its ability to "service its business already in force in this state." Id.
[3] The Cabinet filed a notice of replacement under 405 KAR 10:030,
which required Lodestar to replace its Frontier bonds within 90 days or stop operating
and begin reclamation, also conditioning any resumption of operations on bond
replacement.
[4] The notice was failed on August 28, 2001 creating a November 26,
2001 deadline.
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[5] Lodestar did not seek review of the Cabinet's determination.
[6] On November 16, 2001, Lodestar filed an adversary proceeding to
enjoin the Cabinet from enforcing the replacement of the Frontier bonds.
[7] Lodestar also filed a Motion for an Order Determining that Certain
Threatened Actions Would Violate the Automatic Stay in its main bankruptcy action.
[8] The bankruptcy court heard both matters on November 19, 2001
and November 21,2001.
[9] The court, relying in part on Chao and applying the pecuniary
interest test found for Lodestar on both.
B. Analysis
[1] The court relied on Chao and its tests.
[2] Pecuniary interest found- "The Defendants demand replacement of
bonds be primarily an action to preserve the private rights and interests ofKentucky as a
potential creditor of Lodestar and not to effectuate public policy. The adverse actions are
pecuniary in nature and not being undertaken to effectuate public policy. Adverse actions
do not constitute actions to enforce the Commonwealth's police and/or regulatory power
within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. Section 362(b)(4)."
[a] The court relied heavily on the continued validity of
Frontier bonds- under KRS 304, and the apparent incongruence between those
provision and the replacement requirement under 405 KAR 10:030 §2(5)(c)3.
Transcript at 55, See In re Lodestar Adversary Proceeding No. 01-5248,
November 21,2001.
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[b] Unlike the 4th Circuit in Safety Kleen, the bankruptcy
court found that "Lodestar's inability to comply with the rebonding demand does
not create ... an imminent threat to public health, safety, or welfare, and that
there is no current threat to the environment arising from the uncertainties
associated with the Frontier bonds." Transcript at 57.
[c] The court noted that Lodestar has perfonned the
reclamation efforts comprehended by its pennits, or substantially perfonned
them...and intends to continue doing so, unless forced to cease operation by
enforcement of rebonding demands. Transcript at 57.
[d] The court also found that "the practical significance of
enforcement of the - rebonding demand would be to compel Lodestar to cease
operations and immediately tenninate all of its eight hundred and fifty to nine
hundred employees. The officers and directors at Lodestar could possibly be the
subject ofcivil and criminal liability, and may, therefore, be required to resign
rather than subject it to those potential liabilities." Transcript at 57.
c. Safety Kleen
[1] The state is now seeking to have the bankruptcy court set its
previous order aside, relying, in part, upon Safety Kleen, which was decided after Chao
and after the issuance of the bankruptcy court's injunction orders.
[2] The analyses in these cases may not be reconcilable. Chao is the
law of this circuit and Safety Kleen is not.
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APPENDIX
304.3-220. Duration of suspension - Insurer's obligation during suspension period -
Reinstatement.
(1) Suspension of an insurer's certificate of authority shall be for such period as the commissioner
specifies in the order of suspension, but not to exceed one (1) year. During the suspension the
commissioner may rescind or shorten the suspension by his further order.
(2) During the suspension period the insurer shall not solicit or write any new business in this state,
but shall file its annual statement, pay fees, licenses, and taxes as required, and may service its business
already in force in this state, as if the certificate ofauthority had continued in full force.
(3) Upon expiration of the suspension period, if within such period the certificate of authority has
not terminated, the insurer's certificate of authority shall be automatically reinstated unless the
commissioner finds that the causes of the suspension have not terminated, or that the insurer is otherwise
not in compliance with the requirements of this code, and of which the commissioner shall give the
insurer notice not less than thirty (30) days in advance of the expiration of the suspension period. If not
so automatically reinstated the certificate of authority shall be deemed to have terminated as of the end
of the suspension period.
(4) Upon reinstatement of the insurer's certificate of authority, the authority of its agents in this state
to represent the insurer shall likewise be reinstated. The commissioner shall promptly notify the insurer
and its agents in this state of record in the department, of such reinstatement. If pursuant to subsection
(3) ofKRS 304.3-210, the commissioner has published notice of such suspension he shall in like manner
publish notice of the reinstatement.
(Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 301, subtitle 3, § 22.)
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. 43 Am. Jur. 2d, Insurance, §§ 23, 34.
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350.060. Permit requirement· - Contents of application - Fee -
Bond - Exemptions - Administrative regulations -
I Successive renewal - Auger mining ·of previously
mined area - Exempt operations. .. . . . .
(i) (a) No person shall. engag~ in ,surface coal mi~g. and reclamation
.operations wit!J.Qut having.first obtained from the"cabinet a permit
designating th~ area of land affected by the. operation. Permits
shall authorize the permittee to engage in surfa~ecoal mining and
reclamation operations upon the area of land described in his
.application for a period not to exceed.five (5) years. However, if an
applicant demonstrates that a specified longer term is reasonably
needed to obtain necessary financing for equipment and 'the open-
ing of the operation arid .if the application is full and complete for
the specified longer ~rm, the cabinet may grant a permit for, the
'longer term. No mining shall be permitted Deyond the time period
, obligations of the initial Or extend~d bond coverage. .' _ -,
(b) Subject to the provisions ofKRS 350.010(1) and (2), no person shall
knowingly and willfully receive, transport, sell, convey, transfer,
trade, exchange, donate, purchase, delive~, or in any way derive
, benefit from coal removed. from any surface mining operation which
does not have a permit as required under this section'!
(2) No permit or revision application shall be approved unless the applica-
tion affirmatively demonstrates, and the cabinet finds in writing on the
basis of the information set forth in the application or from'information
otherwise available, that the permit application is ·accurate and com-
plete and that all the requirements of this chapter have been complied
with. - , __ . '.' .
(3) A person desiring. a p~rmit ~ engage in surface coal mining operations
shall file an applIcatIon ~hIch shall state: . .
(a) The location and'ar~a of land to be affected by the operatio'n, with ~
description of access' to- the area from' the nearest public highways;
(b) The owner or owners of the surface of the area ofland to be affected
by the permit and the owner or owners of all surface area adjacent
fu any part of the .affecte~ area; '. '. . '
(c) The owner or owners .of the coal to be mined; .
(d) The source of the applicant's legal right to mine the coal-on the land
affected by the permit; , . . .
(e) Th~ permanent and temporary post office' addresses of the appli-
cant, which shall be 'updated immediately if changed 'at any point
. prior to final bond release; .
(0 ~ether the applicant or· any person, partnership, or corporation
associated with the applicant holds or has held any other permits
. under thi~ chapter, and an ~dentificationof the. permits; . .
(g) The names and addresses of every officer, partner, director,. or
person performing a function similar to a director of the applicant,
together with the names and addresses ofany individual owning of
tecord·ten percent (10%) or more 'of any class ofvoting stock of the
applicant, ~.dwhether the ~pplicantor any person is subject to any
of the prOVISIons of subsectIon (3) of KRS 350.130 and he shall so
c~rtify. The permittee shall submit updates of this information as
changes occur or as otherwise provided by administrative regula-
tiQn; however, failure to ~ubmit ~pdated information shall const~­
tute a violation of this chapter only upon the permittee's .refusal or
failure to timely submit the information to the cabinet upon
request. Upon receipt of updated info~mation satisfactory to the
cabinet, the cabinet' shall promptly' update its -computer 'system
containing the information; .,. . "
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(h) A listing ofany violations ofthis chapter, PublicLaw 95-87, and any
law, rule, or 'regulation in'effect for the protection of air or water
resources incurred by the appli~antin.connection·with·any'surface
coal mining and reclamation operation during the three (3) .year
period prior to the date ofan application. The list shall indicate ~he
final-resolution of the violations;· and . " .,. ..... . .
(i) Whether 'the area of land. to ~ affected by the operation has been
Rreviously mined and is in compliance with. current reclaination
standards,- and, if not, identify the needed reclamation work..
(4) The' application' for a permit ,shall be accompanied by ~ official
document, and an affidavit attesting to the' document's authenticity,
which will evidence 'what particular business entity the· applicant is,
WhrJRtlwJ1l m~6\mtJl';vdaV'~i&~mmomljJiR,~§ J4~ge!.§!riPl--rl\!"t~ti~
whether a foreign or do~estic corporation, ·a partn.ership;. an ·.entity
d0in:g, business, as another, or, If· $o~e ·proprietOrship, an affi~aVit. so
statmg. .: ,- , .' . . ......_., _
(5) The application for a· permit shan be accompanied by copies, in numbers
satisfactory to the cabinet, of a United S~tes Geological Survey
topqgraphic map or other map acceptable to, the. cabinet on which the
applicant has indicated the location of the operation, ~he course ,which
would be'taken by drainage from the operation to the stream or streams
to which the drainage would normally flow, the name of. tl;le applicant
and date, and the name pf the person who located the operation on the
map.. , .' . ......T
(6) The application for a permit shall be accompanied by ~opies, in ~umbers
satisfactory to the cabinet, of an enlarged United Stat~s.Geological
Survey topogra,phicmap or other map. acceptable to the .cabinet meeting
the requirements of paragraphs (a) to (i) of this subsection. 11le 'map
shall: .,:
(a) Be prepared and certified by .a ·professi~nal .engineer r~gistered
under the provisions ofRRS Chapter 322. The certification shall be
in the form as provided in subsection (8) of this section, except·that
, the engineer shall not be required to certify the'trueownership of
,property under paragraph (d) of this subsection;. -.
(b)' Identify the area to correspond with the application;
(c) Show adjacent deep mining; ..
(d) Show the boundaries of surf~ce properties and naines of ~wners of
the affected area and adjacent to any part. of the affected area;
(e) Be of a scale of 1:24,000 or larger; .... . ,
(0 Show the names and locations of all streains, creeks, or other bodies
of public water, rQads; buildings" cemeteries, oil and gas wells, and
utility lines on the area of lan~ affected and within five ~hundred(500) feet of the area; . . . . .
(g) Show by appropriate markings the boundaries of the area of land
affected, the cropline ofthe seam o.r deposit ofcoal to ~emined, and
the total number of acres involved in the area of land affected;
(h) Show the date on which the map was prepared, the north ~int, and
the quadrangle name;' and . . . .
(i) Show the drainage ~lan on and,_away,from the area.ofland affected.
The plan shall incUcate the directjo~al flow of water, co~tructed .
drainways, natural waterways used for drainage, and the streams
or tributaries receiving the discharge. .
(7) Each application shall include.8 determination of the pr~bable hydro-
logic consequences of the mining·and reclaination opera~ions, both on
. arid off t~e mine sit~, with respect to·the hydrologic regipie, q\?-antity
and quality ofwater it1 surface ~d groundwater systems, mcluding the
dissolved and suspended solids under seasonal flow conditions, and the
collection of s~cientdata for the mine site and surt:0UJiding' areas' so
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that an. assessment can be made by the cabinet of the probable
cumulative impacts of all anticipated mining ,in' the area upon the
hydrology of the area ,~d particularly upon w~ter ·~~l.lilability.. This
determination shall n~t·be required until the time. hydrologic informa-
tion on the .general area prior' to mining·, is made available from an .
appropriate federal or state agency. The permit ~hall,notbe app~oved
until the inform~tionis available and is incorporated into ~he applica-
tion. ,". . . . .
(8) All certifications r~quired by this chapter to ~e made by professional
.engineers shall b~ done. in the form. prescribed by the cabinet and.shall
be reasonably' specific ~as to the .worlt being. certified. The cabinet may
reject any document or map as inco~pleteif it is not .prop~rlycertified.
(9). In .addition to the informati9n .and maps: required abqv~,. each applica-
~ tion for a permit shall be ·accompanied .by.detailed.plans or proposals
showing the met~od of operation; the manner, time,: and .distance for
backfilling;.grading work;· and a reclamation.plan for the affected area,
which proposals,· shall meet the requirements. Qf this chapter and
administrative regulations adopted pursuant thereto. . .
(10). ·The application for a permit shall be accompanied by proof that the
applicant has public liability insurance coverage sati~factory to the
cabinet for the surface mining and reclamation operations for :which the
permitis sought, or proofthat the applicant has satisfied self-insurance
requirements as provided by administ~ative regulations of the cabinet.
The coverage shall be maintained in full force and. effect· during the
terms o.f the ,permit and any peflIlit renewal, ,and. until .:r:eclamation
operations ar~completed. ";' '. ' t: .. . . '... ,
(11) A basic fe~ set by administrative regulation, and beari:qg a reasonable
, relationship to the cost of processing the permit application but. not to
exceed three hundred seventy-five dollars ($375), plus a fee, set by
administrative regulation but not to e~ceed seventy-five dollars ($75),
for each. ~cre o'r fraction thereof of the area of land to be· ~ected b.y the
operation, shall be paid before the permit required in· this section shall
be issued; pr~vided that ifthe cabinet approves an incremental bonding
plan submitted by the applicant, the acreage fees may be 'paid in .
increments and at times. corresponding to. the approved plan. The
appli~t shall file with the cabinet a bond payable to the .Common-
wealth of-Kentucky with surety satisfactory to th~ cabinet·in the sum to
be determined by the cabinet for each acre .or fi;action there9fofthe area
of land affected, with a minimum bond of ten thousand dollars
($10,000), c~Qditioned upon. the (aithful performance ·of the require-
ments set forth in this chapter and of the administrative regulations of
the cabinet..The cabinet shall forfeit the entire amount ·of tne bond for
the_pelmit ar.~a'or increment In' the event of forfeiture.' .In determining
the amount.of the bond, the cabinet. shall. take .into consideration the
character and nature of the overbw;den; the future .suftaple use of the
land involved; the. COB.t of backfilling, gradiAg, and reclam~.tion.to be
required; and the probable difficulty·. of reclamation, ~ving' consider-
ationto.sllch factors as topography,geology, hydrology,andrevegetation
potential. The bond amount sha}l initially be computed to ,be sufficient
to assure completion of reclamation jf the wo~lt. had to be rerformed by
th.e. cabinet in· the ev~nt of forfeiture. The cabinet sh.al promulgate
administrative .regulations setting ~fonh bonding requirements includ-
ing, b.ut not limited to, requirements for the "amount, duration, release,
and forfeiture of boilds. .'
(12) Surface coal mining and reclamation operations which affected two (2)
.acres pr less, ~s defined by administrative xegulations of the cabinet,
which wer~ ~onducted pursuant to two (2)-acre-or-Iess permits issued
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by the cabinet, which were c~mmencedon or before June 5, 1987, and
on which mining ceased on-Qr before'November 7, 1987, shall be exempt
from the requirements ofthis chapter, ex¢ept as follows. Re~lamation of
~he operations shall be accompJjshed inaccord8Ii.ce.with adDiijiistrative
regulations promulgated by the cabinet for operations oftWo (2) acres or
less.· The cabinet sh.all not reqUire·,that the'·highwalls left by the
operations be elimmated~Bo~d shall be maintaiped ':Ulti1 ~eclaniation' is
successfully. completed. All procedural provisions and the penalty
provisions ofKRS 350.990 shall apply to operations conducted pursuant
. to this subsection. The cabinet shall enforce this subsection consistent
with this chapter, except that the "'cabinet .shall'not . issue .orders
requiring cessation of operations for mere failure to abate a violation.
(13) ,The cabinet shall' promulgate, administrative regulations for ~he' per-
mitting of operatioI).s wi,th surface effects of underground nrining and
other sur:fa~e coal ID:ining and reclamation operations consistent with
this section. The cabinet shall recognize the distinct differences be-
tween the surface effects· of undergroun,d mining and strip mining, as
also provided in KRS· .350.151, in promulgating permitting- require-
ments for these operatio~s;provided, that the cabinet shall ;require that
all the areas overlying .underground'workings be permitted but that the
areas overlying und~rgroundworkings not affected by·operations and
facilities occurring on.the surface'shall not be subject to the payment of
acreage fees or bond requirements ofsubsection (11) ofthis section, KRS
350.070, or.KRS 350.151. '. . '.
(14) Any valid permit issued pursuant to this chapter shall carry with it the
right ofsuccessive renewal upon expiration with respect to areas within
t~e boundaries. of the existing permit. 1m .applic~t fo~ renewal of a
perniit shall. pay a basic fee set by regulation,' not· to exceed three
.' hundred seventy-five dollars .($375). The holders of the permit may
apply for renewal. and the renewal shall be issued, provi~~d' th~t Oil.
application for renewal the burden ~hallbe on the QPporie~tsofrenewal',
subsequent to the fulfillm~ntof the public notice. requirements' of this
chapter, unless it is established and written findings .by the cabinet are
made that:. '
(a) The terms and conditions of the existing permit are no~ being
satisfactorilymet;· .' ·
.(b) Thepre$ent surface 'coal mining and reclamation operat~on is not in
compliance.with the environmental protection standards of this
chapter; .-. '. . . ,
(c) The ren~wal requested substantially jeopardizes the. applicant's
con~inuing responsibility on existing permit are~s;' - "
(d) ~e ~pplicant has not p~ovid~devid~nce~hat the performance bond
m effect 'for the operatIon WIll contmue m full force and effect for
, any renewal 'requested in the application as well as any additional
bond the cabinet might reqUire; or . ... .,' . "
(e) Any additional'revised or updated information required by the
,cabinet has not been provided. " , . ",
Prior to, the ·app.roval of any renewal'of permit, the cabinet shall
provide notice· to the appropriate public authorities.' -. .
(15) If an application for ,renewal 'of a valid permit includes' a 'proposal to
.' extend the mining operation beyond the boundaries authorized in the
exist~g'p~rm~t, the po~ion of the applicati!ln for ..renewalof a ·vali~
, pernut which addresses any new areas of suiface disturbance shall be
subject to .the full standards applicable to new applications ~der this
chapter.' , "..' '.'
(16) Any permit renewal shall. be for a term not to exceed the'period of the
original permit. App.lication for permit renew~ shall be made at .least
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one hundred twenty (120) days prior to the expiration of the valid
permit. However, if a permit has expired or. if a permit renewal.
application has not been timely filed, and the operator or" permittee
desires to continue the surfacecQal mining operation, the cabinet shall
forthwith cause a notice of noncompliance to be issued. The notice of
noncompliance shall be deemed to" have been complied with, and the
permit may be renewed, if the cabinet receives a permit renewal
application within t~y (30) days of the receipt of the notice of
-noncompliance. Uponthe submittal ofa permit renewal application, the
"operator or permittee shall be deemed to have' timely filed the permit
renewal application and shall be entitled to continue, under the .ter1l1s
Qf the. expired permit, the surface coal mining operation, pending the
issuance of the permit renewal. Failure to comply with the remedial
measures of the notice of noncompliance shall result in the cessation of
the surface coal ~ining operation. ". . '"
(17) No~thstanding any of the proVisions of this section, a permit"shall
terminate if the permittee has not co~encedthe surface .coal min4tg
operations covered by the permit within three (3).years of the issuance
of the permit. However, the .cabinet may grant reasonable extensions of
time upon a showing that the extensions are necessary by reason of
... litigation precluding commencement of operations, or threatening' sub:" ,
stantial economic "loss' to the permittee, or' by reason of conditions
beyond the control and without the fault or negligence of the permittee.
With respect to coal to be mined for use in a synthetic fuel facility or
specific major electric generating facility, the permittee shall be deemed
to have commenced surface mining operations at the time the construc-
\ tionof the synthetic fuel or generating facility is initiated. .
(18) Each application for a permit or revision for auger mining on a
. previously mined area shall contain infonnation to describe the area to
be affected, -to show that the proposed method ofoperation will result in
stable post-mining conditions; and reduce or eliminate adverse environ-
mental conditions created by previous mining activities. If the cabinet
determines that the affected area cannot be stabilized and reclaimed
subsequent to augering or that the operation will result in anadvers·e
impact to the propose4 or adjacent area, the permit or revision shall not
be issued. The cabinet shall, consistent with all applicable require-
ments of this chapter, issue a permit or revision if the applicant
demonstrates that the proposed coal mining operations will provide for
reduction or elimination of the highwall, or reduction or abatement of
adverse impacts resulting from past mining activities, or stabilization .
or. enhancement of a previously mined area. The cabinet shall insure
that ~l reasonably. available spoil material will be used to backfill the
highwall to the extent practical and feasible;.provided, however, that in
all cases the holes be properly sealed' and backfilled to a minimum of
four (4) feet above the coal seam being mined." -
(19) All operations involving the loading of coal which do not separate the
~. coal from its impurities, and which are not located at or near the mine
site, shall be exempt from the requirements of this chapter.
(Enact. Acts 1954, ch. 8, § 6; 1956 (1st Ex.· Sess~), ch.··-7, Art. VII, § 6; 1960,
ch. 1~3,§ 4; 1962,ch. 105,§ 4; 1964,ch.61,§ 3; 1966,ch.4,§ 7; 1972,ch.
270, § 3; 1972 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 65; 1974, ch. 69, § 1; 1974, ch. 74, Art..
III, § 13(7); 1974, ch. 258, § 1; 1974, ch. 373, §2; 1976, ch. 291, § 1; 1978,
ch. 330, § 23, effective M~y 3, 1978; 1978, ch. 332, § 4, effective June 17,
1978; 1980, ch. 62, § 5, effective March 21, 1980; 1980, ch. 377, § 3, effective
March 21, 1980; 1982, ch. 266, § 10, effective July 15, 1982; 1982, ch. 283,
§ 3, effective April 2, 1982; 1984, ch. ~111, § 144, effective July 13, 1984;
1984, cli. 145, § 2, effective March 28, 1984; 1984, ch. 358, § 1, effective July
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13, 1984; 1986, ch. 448, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; 1988; ch. 294, § 1~
effective July 15, 1988; 1988, ch. 415, § 2, effective July 15, ·1988; 1988, ch.
417, § .1, eff~ctiveJuly 15, 1988; 1990, ch. 210,§ 1, effe~tive July 13,.1990;
1990, ch. 212, § 4, effective July 13, 1990; 1992, ch. 429, § 5,eff~~ive··~uly
14, 1992; 1998, ch. 38~, § l,.effective July 15, 1998.)
NOTES TO DECISIONS.
6. Cabinet's Jurisdiction. 0 permit site an4. the Cabinet's -enforcement
The Cabinet's jurisdiction to order mining Jurisdiction continue until such time as the ..
company to reclaim permitted sites did not required reclamation is comple~.Natural Re-
expire on the dates when its mining permits sources & Envtl. Protection· Cabinet v.
expire, for although the right to mine may·' Whitley Dev. Corp.,. 940 S.W.2d 99~ (Ky. Ct.
expire, both the obligation to ~eclaini the App. 1997). . 0 00·
350.004. Reclamation bond
o
to be filed by ·applicant.
Cited: Natural Resources.& Envtl. Protec-
tion Cabinet~ Kentucky Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 972
S.W.2d 276 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998).
350.090. Metho4of operation, grading, backfilling, and reclaniation
plans - Funding from reclamation development fund
" - Waste ~aterials in permi~ area only.
Cited: Natural Resources & Envtl. Protec-
tion Cabinet v. Whitley Dev. Corp., 940 S.W.2d
904 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997).
350.iso. Notice of-noncompliance - Revocation of permit - Bond
forfeiture :- Ineligibility for future pe~its. ·
Cited: Natural Resources & Envtl. Pr9tec-
tion Cabinet v. Kentucky Ins. Guar..Ass'ri, 972
S.W.2d 276 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998).
NOTES TO DECISIONS
3. Remedies Not Mutually Exclusive.
. The remedy of bond forfeiture.and the rem-
edy of ordering a permittee to ·reclaim a site
are not mutually exclusive; nothing in the
statutes providing for forfeiture of bond if a
reclamation violation is not abated, that au-
thorize the cabinet to order that a permittee
undertake certain.abatementobli~atioDSor
that authorize ij1e cabinet to seek· mjunctive
relief suggest that these rePledies are in-
tended to be mutually exclusive; on the con-
trary the cabinet's ability to· seek remed~es of
both bond forfeiture and injunctive· relief af·
ford it protection.in those cases in which the
amount of the bond is ~adequate to pay for
the cost of completing reclamation. Natural
Resources & Envtl. Protection Cabinet v.
Whitley Dev. Corp., 940 S.W.2d 904 (Ky. Ct.
App.1997).
350.131. Use of forfeited reclamation bond funds -. Contract to
reclaim overlapped disturbed area for which bond
has been forfeited and collected.
. . ,
(1) When a bo~d for an interim or preinterim program permit was forfeited
,'prior to July 15, 1988·, by the cabinet, and the" entire forfeited "amount is
not necessary to establish proper drainage and revegetation on· the
permit area for w~ch ~t was submitted," the cabinet may. ~s~ any·
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CHAPTER 10
BOND AND INSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
001. Definitions for 405 KAR Chapter 10.
010. General requirements for performance bond and liability insur-
ance.
020. Amount and duration of perfonnance bond.
030. Types. tenns and conditions of performance bonds and liability
Insurance.
035. ProcecUes. aiteria and hearing requirements for cancenation
of surety bonds after notice d noncompliance issued for failure
to main:ain contemporaneous reclamation.
040. Procedures, aiteria and schedule for release (1 performance
bond.
050. Bond forfeiture.
200. Kentucky bond pool.
405 KAR 10:001. Definitions for 405 KAR Chapter 10.
RELATES TO: KRS Chapter 350, 7 CFR Part 657, 30 CFRParts
700.5, 701.5, 707.5, 730-733, 735, 761.5, 762.5, n3.5, 800.5, 843.5,
917,40 CFR Part 136, 30 USC 1253, 1255, 1291
STATUTORY AUTHORITY: KRS Chapter 131\, 350.028, 350.465.
7 CFR Part 657, 30 CFR Parts 700.5, 701.5, 707.5. 730-733, 735,
761.5, 762.5, n3.5, 800.5, 843.5, 917, 40 CFR Part 136, 30 USC
1253, 1255, 1291
NECESSITY, FUNCTION, AND CONFORMITY:" KRS Chapter
350 in pertinent part requires the cabinet to promulgate rules and
administrative regulations pertaining to surface ooal mining and recla-
mation operations under the pennanent regulatory program. This
administrative regulation provides for the defining of certain" essential
teons used in 405 KAR Chapter 10.
section 1. Definitions. (1) -Adjacent area- means land located
outside the affected area or permit area, depending on the oontext in
which -adjacent area- is used, where air, surface or groundwater, fish,
wildlife, vegetation or other resources protected by KRS· Chapter 350
may be adversely impacted by surface ooaI mining and reclamation
operations.
(2) -Administrator" or "bond pool administrator", as used in 405
KAR 10:200, means the cabinet employee named by the seaetary to
assist the commission and to perform certain administrative functions
in (X)l'lnection with the bond pool, as required by KRS 350.715.
(3) -Affected area- means any land or water area which is used to
fadUtate, or is physicaUy altered by, surface mal mining and reclama-
tion operations. The affected area includes the disturbed area: any
area upon which surface coal mining and reclamation operations are
mnducted: any adjacent lands the use of which is incidental to surface
coal mining and reclamation operations: aU areas covered by new or
existing roads used to gain access to, or for hauting coal to or from.
surface mal mining and reclamation operations, except as provided in
this definition: any area covered by surface excavations, workings,
impoundments, dams, ventilation shafts, entryways, refuse banks,
dumps, stockpiles, overburden piles, Spol, banks, culm banks, taDings,
holes or depressions, repair areas, storage areas, shipping areas: any
areas upon which are sited structures, facilities, or other property or
material on the surface resulting from, or incident to, surface coal
mining and reclamation operations: and the area located above un-
derground workings associated with underground mining activities,
auger mining, or in situ mining. The affected area shall include every
road used for the purposes of access to, or for hauling coal to or from,
surface coal mining and reclamation operations, unless the road:
(a) Was designated as a public road pursuant to the laws of the
jurisdiction in which it is located:
(b) Is maintained with public funds, and constructed In a manner
similar to other public roads of the same dassification within the juris-
diction; and
(c) There is substantial (more than incidental) public use.
(4) -Applicant', as used in 405 KAR 10:010, means any person
seeking a permit, permit revision, pennit amendment, pennit renewal,
or transfer, assignment, or sale of permit rights from the cabinet to
conduct surface coal mining and reclamation operations pursuant to
KRS Chapter 350 and aU applicable administrative regulations.
(5) wBond pooIw or -Kentucky Bond Poor means the voluntary
alternative bonding program established at KRS 350.700 through
350.755.
(6) -Cabinet' is defined in KRS 350.010.
(7) -CFR- means Code of Federal Regulations.
(8) -eoar means combustible carbonaceous rock, dassified as
anthracite, bituminous, subbitumlnous, or lignite by ASTM Standard 0
388-77.
(9) -Collateral bond" means an indemnity agreement in a sum
certain payable to the cabinet executed by the pennittee and which is
supported by the deposit with the cabinet of cash, negotiable certifi-
cates of deposit. or an inevocable letter of credit of any bank organ-
ized and authorized to transact business in the United States.
(10) -Commission- or "bond pool commission- means the body
established at KRS 350.705.
(11) -Cropland" means land used for the production of adapted
aops for harvest, alone or in a rotation with grasses and legumes, and
indudes roN aops, small grain aops, hay aops, nursery aops, or-
chard aops, and other similar specialty aops. .
(12) -Day".means calendar day unless otherwise specified to be a
working day.
(13) -Department' means the Department for Surface Mining
Reclamation and Enforcemenl
(14) "Disturbed area- means an area where vegetation, topsoil, or
overburden is removed or upon which topsoil, spoil, mal processing
waste, underground development waste, or noncoaI waste is placed
by surface "mal mining operations. Those areas are classified as -dis- .
turbed- until reclamation is complete and the performance bond or
other assurance of performance required by 405 KAR Chapter 10 is
released.
(15) -FDIC" means Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
(16) -Federal lands- means any lands, induding mineral interests,
owned by the United States, without regard to haN the United States
acquired ownership of the lands or which agency manages the lands.
It does not indude Indian lands. .
(17) -FSLIC" means Federal Savings arid Loan Insurance C0rpo-
ration.
(18) "Historically used for aopIand.-
(a) "Historically used for aopIancr' means that Iands- have been
used for cropland for any five (5) years or more out of the ten (10)
years immediately preceding:
1. The application: or
2. The acquisition of the land for the purpose of conducting sur-
face coal mining and reclamation operations. .
(b) Lands meeting either paragraph (a)1 or 2 of this subsection
shan be considered 1listorically used for aopIand.- •
(c) In addition to the lands oovered by paragraph (a) of this sub-
section, other lands shan be considered "historically used for aopIand-
as desaibed below:
1. Lands that would likely have been used as aopIand for any five
(5) out of the last ten (10) years Immediately precedLtg the acquisition
or the application but for some fad of ovmership or control of the land
unrelated to the productivity of the land: and .
2. Lands that the cabinet detennines. on the basis of additional
aopIand history of the surrounding lands and the lands under c0nsid-
eration, are cleariy aopIand but faU outside the specific five (5) years
in ten (10) aiterion.
(d) Acquisition indudes purchase, lease, or option of the land for
the purpose of conducting or allowing through resale, lease or option,
the conduct of surface coal mining and reclamation operations.
(19) -'mpoundment' means a dosed basin, nabJrally formed or
artificially built, which is danvned or excavated for the retention of
water, sediment, or waste.
(20) -KAR- means Kentucky administrative regulations.
(21) "KRS- means Kentucky Revised Statutes.
(22) "Land use- means specific functions, uses, or management-
related activities of an area, and may be identified in combination
when joint or seasonal uses occur and may indude land used for
support facilities that are an integral part of the use. In some in-
stances, a specific use can be identified without active managemenl
(23) -Month of operation,- as used in 405 KAR 10:200. Section 7.
means a calendar month In whidl a duty exists to reclaim a disturbed
area for which a pennit was issued under KRS Chapter 350. It is not
necessary that coal extraction OCaJr during the month.
(24) "Notice of noncompliance and order for remedial measures·
means a written document and order prepared by an authorized rep-
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resentative of the cabinet which sets forth with specificity the violations
of~S Chapter 350, 405 KAR Chapters 7 through 24, or permit con-
ditidhs which the authorized representative of the cabinet detennines
to have occurred based upon his inspection, and the necessary reme-
dial actions, if any, and the tirrie schedule for completion thereof,
which the authorized representative deems necessary and appropriate
to oorrect the violations.
(25) -Operations- is defined in KRS 350.010.
(26) -opera~ is defined in KRS 350.010.
(27) -Order for cessation and immediate· compliance- means a
written document and order issued by an authorized representative of
the cabinet when:
(a) A person to whom a notice of nonampliance and order for
remedial measures was issued has failed, as detennined by a cabi~t
inspection, to comply with the terms of the notice of noncompliance
and order for remedial measures within the time limits set therein, or
as subsequently extended; or
(b) The authorized representative finds, on the basis of a cabinet
inspection, any oondition or practice or any violation of KRS Chapter
350,405 KAR Chapters 7 through 24, or any oondition of a permit or
exploration approval which:
1. Creates an imminent danger to the health or safety of the pub-
flC; or
2. Is causing or can reasonably be expected to cause significant,
imminent environmental harm to land, air or water resources.
(28) -Owned or controlled- and -owns or controls- mean anyone
(1) or a combination of the relationships specified in paragraphs (a)
and (b) of this definition:
(a)1. Being a permittee d a surface coal mining operation;
2. Based on instruments of ownership or voting sea.trities, owning
of record in excess of fifty (50) percent of an entity; or
3. Having any other relationship that gives one (1) person author-
ity directly or indirecUy to determine the manner in which an applicant,
an operator, or other entity oonducts surface Coal mining operations.
(b) The following relationships are presumed to constitute owner-
ship or control unless a person can ctemonstrate that the person sub-
ject to the presumption does not in fad have the authority direcUy or
ildiredly to determine the manner in which the relevant surface mal
mining operation is oonducted:
1. Being an officer or director of an entity;
2. Being the operator of a surface coal mining operation;
3. Having the ability to cxmmit the financial or real property assets
or working resources of an entity;
4. Being a general partner in a partnership;
5. Based on the instnments of ownership or the voting securities
of a oorporate entity, owning of record ten (10) through fifty (SO) per-
cent of the entity; or
6. ONQing or controlling coal to be mined by another person under
a lease, sublease, or other contrad and having the right to receive the
mal after mining or having authority to determine the manner in which
that person or another person oonducts a surface coal mining 0pera-
tion.
(29) "Performance bond" means a surety bond, a collateral bond,
or acxmbination thereof, or bonds filed pursuant to the provisions of
the Kentucky Bond Pool Program (405 KAR 10:200, KRS 3SO.595.
and KRS 350.700 through 3SO.755), by which a permittee assures
faithful performance of au the requirements of KRS Chapter 350, 405
KAR Chapters 7 through 24, and the requirements of the permit and
reclamation plan.
(30) -Permit" means written approval issued by the cabinet to
CXXlduct surface coal mining and reclamation operations.
(31) "Pennit area- means the area of land and water within
boundaries designated in the approved pennit application, which shall
include, at a minimum, all areas which are or will be affected by sur-
face ooal mining and reclamation operations under that pennil
(32) -Permittee- means an operator or a person holding or re-
quired by KRS Chapter 350 or 405 KAR Chapters 7 through 24 to hold
a permit to condud surface 0031 mining and reclamation operations
during the pennit tenn and until all redamation obligations imposed by
KRS Chapter 350 and 405 KAR Chapters 7 through 24 are satisfied.
(33) -Person- is defined in KRS 350.010.
(34) -Person having an interest which is or may be adversely
affected- or -person with a valid legal interest" shall indude any per-
son:
(a) Who uses any resource of economic, reaeational, aesthetic,
or environmental value that may be adversely affected by coal explo-
ration or surface coal mining and reclamation operations, or by any
related action of the cabinet; or
(b) Whose property is or may be adversely affected by coal explo-
ration or surface 0031 mining and reclamation operations, or by any
related action of the cabinel
(35) -Prime farmland- means those lands which are defined by the
Seaetary of Agriculture in 7 CFR 657 and which have been "histori-
cally used for aopIand" as that phrase is defined abOve.
(36) "Reclamation- is defined in KRS 350.010.
(37) -Seaetary" is defined in KRS 350.010.
(38) -SMCRA- means Surface Mining Control and Redamation
Ad of 19n (pL 95-87), as amended.
(39) -Surety bond" means an indemnity agreement in a sum cer-
tain, payable to the cabinet and executed by the permittee, which is
supported by the perfonnance guarantee of a oorporation licensed to
do business as a surety in the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
(40) -Surface coal mining and reclamation operations- is defined
in KRS 350.010.
(41) -Surface coal mining operations- is defined in KRS 350.010.
(42) -Suspended solids- or nonfilterable residue, expressed as
milligrams per liter, means organic or inorganic materials carried or
held in suspension in water which are retained by a standard glass
fiber filter in the procedure outlined by the U.S. EPA's regulations for
waste water and analyses (40 CFR 136).
(43) 'Ion- means 2000 pounds avoirdupois (.90718 metric ton).
(44) "Topsoir means the A and E soil horizon layers of the four (4)
master SOIl horizons.
(45) "U.S. EPA- means United States Environmental Protection
AgenC/.
(46) 'Willfuny- and 'Willful violation- mean that a person acted
either intentionally, voluntarily, orconsdously, and with intentional
disregard or plain indifference to legal requirements, in authorizjng.
ordering, or canying out an act or omission that constituted a violation
of SMCRA. KRS Chapter 350, 405 KAR Chapters 7 through 24. or a
pennit condition, or that constituted a failure or refusal to comply with
an order issued pursuant to SMCRA, KRS Chapter 350, or 405 KAR
Chapters 7 through 24. (18 Ky.R. 2468; Am. 2842; eff. 4-3-92.)
405 KAR 10:010. General requirements for performance bond
and liability Insurance.
RB.ATES TO: KRS 350.020, 350.060. 350.062, 350.064,
350.151, 350.465, 30 CFR Parts 730-733, 735, 800.11, 800.60, 917,
30 USC 1253, 1255
STATUTORY AUTHORITY: KRS 350.020. 350.028, 350.060,
350.064, 350.151, 350.465, 30 CFR Parts 730-733, 735. 800.11,
800.60, 91'r, 30 USC 1253, 1255
NECESSIlY, FUNCTION, AND CONFORMITY: KRS 350.028(1),
(5), 350.151(1), and 350.465(2) authorize the cabinet to promulgate
administrative regulations relating to surface and Underground roal
mining operations. This administrative regulation estabrlShes the re-
quirements for filing and maintaining performance bonds and liability
insurance, and bonding methods.
Section 1. Applicability. This chapter sets forth the minimum re-
quirements for filing and maintaining performance bonds and insur-
ance for surface 0031 mining and reclamation operations under KRS
Chapter 350.
Section 2. Requirement to File a Bond. (1) An applicant shall not
disturb surface acreage or extend any underground shafts, tunnels. or
operations prior to receipt of approval from the cabinet of a perform-
ance bond covering areas to be affected by surface operations and
facilities.
(2) After an application for a new, amended, revised or renewed
pennit to conduct surface coal mining and redamation operations has
been approved under 405 KAR Chapter 8, but before the pennit is
issued, the applicant shall file with· the cabinet, on a fonn prescribed
and furnished by the cabinet. a performance bond payable to the
cabinet. The applicant shall file the form designated at Section 5(1)(a)
of this administrative regulation for operations on lands other than
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federal lands, or the form designated at Section 5(1)(g) of this admin-
istrative regulation for operations on federal lands. The performance
bond shall be mnditioned upon the faithful performance of all the re-
quirements of KRS Chapter 350, 405 KAR Chapters 7 through 24, and
the provisions of the reclamation plan and permit. and shall cover all
surface coal mining and reclamation operations to be mnducted within
the pennit area or inaement thereof until all reclamation requirements
of 405 KAR Chapters 7 through 24 have been met The amount. dura-
tion, type, conditions and tenns of the performance bond shall conform
to 405 KAR 10:020 arid 405 KAR 10:030. .
(3) No permit shaD be revised or amended to include additional
area unless the liability of the current bond(s} is extended to cover the
entire pennit area or ina'ement as revised or amended, and the liabil-
ity of the supplemental bond(s) covers the entire permit area as re-
vised or amended. Unless these conditions are met with respect to the
bond(s), the additional area shall be permitted as a separate inae-
ment of the current pennit area or under a new permit
(4) A rider to the applicable performance bond, confinning cover-
age of the revision, shan be submitted by the applicant if a revision to
a penni! does not change the aaeage of the permit area or inaement
but
(a) Adds a coal washer, a aush and load facility, a refuse pile, or
a coal mine waste impoundment to the existing permit or
(b) Alters the boundary of a pennit area or inaement
section 3. Bonding Methods. The method of performance bonding
for a pennit area shall be selected by the applicant and approved by
the cabinet prior to the issuance of a pennit, and shall consist of one
(1) of the following methods:
(1) Method "S. - single area bonding. A single area bond is a bond
which covers the entire permit area as a single undivided area, for
which the applicant shall file the entire bond amount required by the
cabinet prior to issuance of the pennit Usbility under the bond shall
extend to every part of the pennit area at all times. Except as provided
in 405 KAR 10:020, section 3(2) regarding extended bond liability,
there shall be no release of all or part of the bond amount for comple-
tion of a partiaJlar phase of reclamation on any part of the permit area
under 405 KAR 10:040 until that phase of reclamation has been suc-
cessfully completed on the entire pennit area.
(2) Me1hod -I- - inaemental bonding. Inaemental bonding is a
method of bonding in which the permit area is divided into individual
inaements, each of which is bonded separately and independentty,
and for which bond is filed as operations proceed through the pennit
area.
(a) The permit area shall be divided into distinct inaements which
shall be subject to approval by the cabinet Each inaement shall be of
sufficient size and configuration to provide for efficient reclamation
operations should reclamation operations by the cabinet beoome nec-
essary. If the approved postmining land use is of such nature that
successful inpIementation of the postrnining land use capability de-
pends upon an area being integrally reclaimed, then that area shall be
mntained within a single increment These inaemenm shall be dearly
identified on maps submitted in the pennit application under 405 KAR
Chapter 8, and the applicant shall desatbe the approximate time
schedule for beginning operations in each inaement
(b) Prior to issuance of a pennit, the applicant shall file with the
cabinet the full bond amount required by the cabinet for the first in-
aement or inaements of the pennit area to be disturbed, which shall
be not less than the minimum bond required for the pennit area re-
quired under 405 KAR 10:020, section 2.
(c) The permittee shall not engage in any surface coal mining and
reclamation operations on any inaement of the permit area unless the
full bond amount required by the cabinet has been filed with the ap-
propriate regional office of the department for that inaement, the cabi-
net has verified the validity of the bond, and written authorization to
condud surface coal mining and reclamation operations on that in-
aement is issued by the administrator of the regional office. No aedit
shall be given for reclamation on other ina-ements.
(d) The boundaries of each inaement shall be physically marked
at the site in a manner approved by the cabinet
(e) The bond amount for an inaement shall be released or for..
feited independently of any other ina-ement of the pennit area. and
liability under the performance bond shall extend only to the increment
expressly covered by the bond. A single bond amount may be filed to
cover more than one (1) inaement, in which case the increments so
covered shall be treated as a single inaement
(f) Except as provided in 405 KAR 10:020, Section 3(2) regarding
extended bond liability, there shall be no release of bond for comple-
tion of a phase of redamation on any part of an increment until that
phase of redamation has been successfully completed on the entire
inaement
(g) When the bond for an inaement is completely released under
405 KAR 10:040, the inae!llent shall be deleted from the permita~.
Section 4. Requirement to File a Certificate of UsbiJity Insurance.
Each applicant for a permit shall submit to the cabinet, as part of the
permit application, a certificate issued by an insurance company
authorized to do business in Kentucky. The amount, duration, form,
conditions and terms of this insurance shall conform to 405 KAR
10:030.
- section 5. Incorporation by Reference. (1) The foIkMing material
is incorporated by reference:
(a) -Performance Bond, Form SME-42, (June, 1999)", Department
for Surface Mining Redamation and Enforcement
(b) -'rrevocable Standby Letter of Credit, Form SME-72, (July.
1994)-, Department for Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement
(c) -Confirmation of Irrevocable Standby Letter of Credit, Form
SME-72-A, (July, 1994)-, Department for Surface Mining Reclamation
and Enforcement
(d) "Certificate of Uability Insurance, Form SME-29", Deparbnent
for Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement
(e) "Notice of Cancellation, Nonrenewal or Change of Liability
Insurance, Form SME-30·, Department for Surface Mining Reclama-
tion and Enforcement
(1) "Escrow Agreement, Form SME-64, (May, 1991)", Deparbnent
for Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement
(g) "Performance Bond for Surface Coal Mining and Redamation
on Federal Lands, Form SME-42-F, (June, 1999)", Department for
Surface Mining Redamation and Enforcement
(2) This material may be inspected, copied, or obtained at the
Department for Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement, #2
Hudson Hollow. Frankfort, Kentucky 40601, Monday through Friday, 8
a.m. to 4:30 p.m. (8 Ky.R. 1515: eff. 1-6-83; Am. 15 Ky.R. 438; eft. 12-
13-88; 21 Ky.R. 526: eff. 12-12-94: 25 Ky.R. 2935: 26 Ky.R. 3n; eff.
8-16-99.)
405 KAR 10:020. Amount and duration of performance bone!.
RELATES TO: KRS 350.020, 350.060, 350.064, 350.093,
350.095, 350.110, 350.465
STATUTORY AUTHORITY: KRS Chapter 13A, 350.020, 350.028.
350.060, 350.064, 350.465
NECESSITY, ·FUNCTION, AND CONFORMITY: KRS Chapter
350 in pertinent part requires the cabinet to adopt rules and adminis-
trative regulations governing the amount and duration of performance
bonds for surface ooaI mining and reclamation operations. This ad-
ministrative regulation specifies aiteria upon which to base determina-
tion of bond amounts and requires certain periods of liability during
which the bonds must remain in effect. This administrative regulation
provides for adjustments in bond amounts.
Section 1. Detennination of Bond Amount The standard applied
by the cabinet in determining the amount of perfonnance bond shall
be the estimated cost to the cabinet if it had to perform the redama-
lion, restoration and abatement work required of a person who con-
ducts surface coal mining and reclamation operations under KRS
Chapter 350, 405 KAR Chapters 7 through 24 and the pennit This
amount shalJ be based on. but not be limited to:
(1) The estimated costs submitted by the pennittee in accordance
with 405 KAR 8:030, Section 24(4) and 405 KAR 8:040, Section 24(4):
(2) The additional estimated costs to the cabinet which may arise
from applicable public contracting requirements or the need to bring
personnel and equipment to the permit area after its abandonment by
the permittee to perfonn redamation. restoration, and abatement
work:
(3) All additional estimated costs necessary. expedient. and ina-
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dent to the satisfactory completion of the requirements identified in this
section:
• (4) An additional amount based on factors of cost changes during
the previoUs five (5) years for the types of activities associated with the
reclamation to be perfoimed; and
(5) Such other cost information as may be required by or available
to the cabinet
Section 2. Minimum Bond Amount The minimum amount of the
bond for surface coal mining ant1 reclamation operations at the time
the permit is issued or amended shaD be $10,000 for the entire area
under one (1)pennit.
Section 3. Period d LiabiIit¥. (1) Liability under performance
bond(s) applicable to an entire permit area or inaement thereof shall
oontinue until an reclamation, restoration and abatement work required
of persons who conduct surface coal mining and redamation opera-
tions under requirements of KRS Chapter 350, 405 KAR Chapters 7
through 24 and the provisions of the permit have been completed, and
the permit or inaement terminated by release of the pennittee from
any further liability in accordance with 405 KAR 10:040.
(2) In addition to the period necessary to achieve compliance with
all requirements of KRS Chapter 350, 405 KAR Chapters 7 through 24
and the pennit including the standards for the success of revegetation
as required by 405 KAR 16:200 and 405 KAR 18:200, the period of
liability under performance bond shall continue for a period of five (5)
years beginning with the last year of augmented seeding, fertilizing,
irrigation or other work. The period of liability shall begin again when- .
ever augmented seeding, fertilizing, inigation or other work is required
or conducted on the site prior to bond release. Isolated and clearty
defined portions of a bonded area requiring extended liability because
of augmentation may be separated from the original area and bonded
separately upon approval by the cabinet Such areas shall be limited
in extent, and not constitute a scattered, intermittent, or checkerboard
pattern of failure. Access to the separated areas for remedial work
may be induded in the area under extended liability if deemed neces-
sary by the cabinet
(3) If the cabinet approves a Iong-tenn intensive agriaJltural post-
mining land use in accordance with 405 KAR 16:210, augmented
seeding, fertilization, irrigation or other husbandry practices normally
associated with the approved postmining land use shall not require
restarting the five (5) year period of liabifrty.
(4) The bond liability of the permittee shall indude only those ac-
tions which the pennittee is required to take under the permit, indud-
ing completion of the reclamation plan in such a manner that the land
will be capable of supporting a postmining land use approved under
405 KAR 16:210. Actions of third parties which are beyond the control
and influence of the permittee and for which the permittee Is not re-
sponsible under the pennit shall not be covered by the bond.
Section 4. Adjustment of Amount (1) The amount of the perform-
ance bond liability applicable to a permit or inaement shall be ad-
justed by the cabinet
(a) When the aaeage in the permit area or inaement is either
inaeased or decreased; or
(b) When the cabinet determines that the oost of future reclama-
tion, restoration or abatement work has changed. When it is deter-
mined that an adjustment under this paragraph is necessary, the cabi-
net shall:
1. Notify the pennittee, the surety, and any person with a property
interest in collateral who has previously rec:p!Sled such notification in
writing; and
2. Provide the pennittee an opportunity for an informal conference
on the adjustment The requirements of 405 KAR 7:091 and 405 KAR
.7:092 shall not apply to the conduct of the conference.
(2) The amount of the performance bond liability applicable to a
permit or inaement may be adjusted by the cabinet upon application
by the pennittee under 405 KAR 8:010, Section 20 to delete aaeage
from the pennit area or ina-ement thereof where such aaeage has not
been affected by the surface coal mining and redamation operation.
The provisions of 405 KAR 10:040, section 2(3) shall apply. However,
a reduction due to such deletion of aaeage shall not constitute a bond
release and shall not be subject to the procedures of 405 KAR 10:040,
Section 1.
(3) The cabinet may grant reduction of the required perfonnance
bond amount if the pennittee's method of operation or other circum-
stances will reduce the maximum estimated oost to the cabinet to
complete the reclamation responsibilities and therefore warrant a
reduction of the bond amount The request shall not be considered as
a request for partial bond release subject to the procedures of 405
KAR 10:040, Section 1.
(4) The cabinet shall refuse to approve any reduction of the per-
formance bond Iabili1y amount if an action for revocation or suspen-
. sian of the permit covered by the bond is pending, if there is a pending
action for forfeiture of the bond, or if the permittee is currenUy in viola-
tion of 405 KAR on that pennit (8 Ky.R. 1417; eff. 1-6-83: Am. 15
Ky.R. 441: eff. 12-13-88.)
405 KAR 10:030. Types, tenns and conditions of performance
bonds and liability insurance.
RELATES TO: KRS 350.020, 350.060, 350.064, 350.100,
350.110, 350.465
STATUTORY AUTHORITY: KRS Chapter 13A, 350.020, 350.028,
350.060,350.064,350.151,350.465
NECESSITY, FUNCTION, AND CONFORMITY: KRS Chapter
350 in pertinent part requires the cabinet to specify types, terms, and
conditions for performance bonds and liability insurance. This admin- .
istrative regulation sets forth the various types and conditions which
, the cabinet will accept in satisfaction of the bonding requirements.
This administrative regulation sets forth that bonds shall be payable to
the cabinet and other concfltions. This administrative regulation speci-
fies certain alternative types of bonds, in addition to the surety bond,
and the conditions upon which the cabinet will accept them. This ad-
ministrative regulation specifies the terms and conditions of liability
insurance.
Section 1. Types of Performance Bond. (1) The cabinet shall ap-
prove performance bonds of only those types which are set fot1h in
this section.
(2) The performance bond shall be either:
(a) A surety bond;
(b) A collateral bond;
(e) A combination of the above bonding types; or
(d) Bonds filed pursuant to the provisions of the Kentucky Bond
Pool Program (405 KAR 10:200, KRS 350.595, and 350.700 through
350.755).
Section 2. Terms· and Conditions of Performance Bond. (1) The
performance bond shall be in an amount determined by the cabinet as
provided in 405 KAR 10:020, Sections 1 and 2.
(2) The performance bond shaD be payable to the cabinet
(3) The performance bond shaH be mnditioned upon faithful per-
formance of an d the requirements of KRS Chapter 350, 405 KAR
Chapters 7 through 24 and the conditions of the pennit and shall cover
the entire permit area or such inaemental area as the cabinet has
approved pursuant to 405 KAR 10:010, Section 3(2).
(4) The duration of the bond shall be for a time period provided in
405 KAR 10:020, Section 3.
(5) Surety bonds shall be subject to the following conditions:
(a) The cabinet shall not accept the bond of a surety company
unless the bond shall not be cancelable by the surety at any time for
any reason including, but not limited to, nonpayment of premium or
bankruptcy of the permittee during the period of liability. Surety bond
coverage for permitted lands not disturbed may be cancelled with the
written approval of the cabinet, provided the surety gives written notice
to both the permittee and the cabinet of the intent to cancel prior to the
proposed cancellation. Such notice shaD be by certified mail. Cancel-
lation shall not be effective for lands subject to bond coverage which
are affected after receipt of notice, but prior to approval by the cabinet
The cabinet may approve such cancellation only if a replacement
bond has been filed by the pennittee, or if the permit area has been
reduced by revision to the extent that the remaining bond amount.
after cancellation, is sufficient to cover all the costs attributable to the
completion of reclamation operations on the reduced pennit area in
accordance with 405 KAR 10:020. The cabinet shall advise the surety,
within thirty (30) days after receipt of a notice to cancel bond. whether
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tile bond may be cancelled on an undisturbed area.
(b) The bond shall provide that the surety and the permittee shall
ba jointly and severally liable.
(c)1. The surety shall give prompt notice to the permittee and the
cabinet of any notice received or action filed alleging the insolvency or
bankruptcy of the surety, or aneging any violations of regulatory re-'
quirements which could result in suspension or revocation of the
surety's liamse to do business.
2. In the event the surety becomes unable to fulfiU its obligations
under the bond for any reason, the surety shall promptly provide writ-
ten notice to the pennittee and the cabinet
3. Upon the incapacity of a surety by reason of bankruptcy, insol-
veney, or suspension or revocation of its fJCense or certificate of
authority, the permittee shall be deemed to be without proper bond
coverage and shall promptly notify the cabinet However, nothing
herein shall relieve the permittee of responsibility under the permit or
the surety of liability on its bond. The cabinet shall issue a notice to the
permittee spedfy;ng a reasonable period to replace bond coverage,
not to exceed ninety (90) days. If an adequate bond is not posted by
the end of the period allowed, the permittee shall cease coal extraction
and coal processing operations and shall comply with the provisions of
405 KAR 16:010. Section 6 or 405 KAR 18:010. Section 4 and shall
immediately begin to condud reclamation operations in acoordance
with the reclamation plan. Coal extraction and coal processing 0pera.-
tions shall not resume until the cabinet has determined that an ac-
ceptable bond has been posted. If an acceptable bond has not been
posted by the end of the period allowed, the cabinet may suspend the
permit until acceptable bond is posted.
(d) A surety bond shall be executed by the operator and a c0rpo-
rate surety licensed to do business in the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
(6) Collateral bonds may indude cash deposits with the cabinet,
certificates of deposit, and letters of aedil Collateral bonds, except for
letters of aedit, shall be subject to the foIIovving conditions:
(a) The cabinet or its authorized agent shafl obtain possession of
and keep in custody an collateral deposited by the applicant, until
authorized for release or replacement as provided in this chapter.
(b) The cabinet shall require that certificates of deposit be as-
signed to the cabinet or its authorized agent in writing, and the as-
signment evidenced on the books of the bank issuing such certificates.
(c) The cabinet shall not accept an individual certificate of deposit
unless it is issued by a FDIC or FSLIC insured finandal institution, and
in no event shall the cabinet accept a denomination in excess of the
maximum insurable amount as detennined by FDIC and FSLIC.
(d) The cabinet shall require the issuer of aH1ificates of deposit to
waive all rights of setoff or liens which it has or might have against
those certificates.
(e) Persons with an interest in collateral posted as a bond. and
who desire notification of actions pursuant to the bond, shan request
the notification in writing to the cabinet at the time the ooIIateral is
offered.
(f) The cabinet shaD require the applicant to deposit sufficient
amounts cI certificates of deposit, so as to assure that the cabinet will
be able to liquidate those certificates prior to maturity, upon forfeiture,
for the amount of the bond required by this chapter.
(7) Letters of aedit shall be subject to the following conditions:
(a) The letter may only be issued by a bank organized or author-
ized to do business in the United States. Any letter of aedit issued by
a non..Kentucky lending institution must be confinned by an approved
Kentucky lending institution.
(b) Letters of aedit shall be irrevocable..
(e) The letter must be payable to the cabinet upon demand and
receipt from the cabinet of a notice of forfeibJre issued in acoordance
with 405 KAR 10:050. or in the event the bank wishes to tenninate the
letter on its expiration date. the cabinet may draw upon demand.
(d)1. The issuer shaH give prompt notice to the pennittee and the
cabinet of any notice received or action filed alleging the insolvency or
bankruptcy of the issuer, or alleging any violations of regulatory re-
quirements which could result in suspension or revocation of the is-
suer's charter or license to do business:
2. In the event the issuer becomes unable to fulfill its obligations
under the letter of credit for any reason. notice shall be given immedi..
ately to the pennittee and the cabinet.
3. Upon the incapacity of an issuer by reason of bankruptcy, insol-
vencf or suspension or revocation of its charter or license, the per-
mittee shall be deemed to be without proper performance bond cover-
age and shall promptly notify the cabinet However. nothing herein
shall relieve the pennittee of responsibility under the pennit or the
issuer of liability on the letter of aedil The cabinet shall issue a notice
to the pennittee spedfying a reasonable period to replace bond cover..
age. not to exceed ninety (90) days. If an adequate bond is not posted
by the end of the period allowed, the pennittee shall cease coal ex-
traction and 0081 processing operations and shall cxmply with the
provisions of 405 KAR ~6:010, Section 6 or 405 KAR .18:010. Section
4 and shaH immediately begin to condud reclamation operations in
accordance with the reclamation plan. Coal extraction and coal pr0c-
essing operations shall not resume until the cabinet has detennined
that an acceptable bond has been posted. If an acceptable bond has
not been posted by the end of the period allowed. the cabinet may
suspend the pennit until acceptable bond is posted.
(8) When a permittee chooses to combine two (2) or more bonds
for one (1) pennit area or inaement, the bonds may be accompanied
by a schedule, acceptable to the cabinet and agreed to be all parties.
which sets forth the agreed distribution o~ bond amounts to be re-
leasedor reduced under 405 KAR 10:040 and 405 KAR 10:020. Sec-
tion 4, respectively. If no schedule is submitted. the cabinet may re-
lease equal percentages of each bonet.
Section 3. Substitution of Bonds. (1) The cabinet may allow per-
mittees to Substitute existing surety or collateral" bonds for equivalent .
surety or ooIlateral bonds, if the Hability which has acaued against the
pennittee on the pennit area or inaement is transferred to such sub-
stitute bonds.
(2) The cabinet shall not release existing performance bonds until
the pennittee has submitted and the cabinet has approved acceptable
substitute performance bonds. A substitution of performance bonds
pursuant to this section shall not constitute a release of bond under
405 KAR 10:040.
(3) The cabinet may refuse to allow substitution of bonds if an
action for revocation or suspension of the permit covered by the bond
is pending or if there is a pending action for forfeiture of the bond.
Section 4. Tenns and Conditions for uability Insurance. (1) The
applicant shall submit, as a part of the permit application at the time of
bond submission. a certificate issued by an ·insurance company
authorized to do business in Kentucky certifying that the applicant has
a public liability insurance policy in force for the surface coal mining
and reclamation operation for which the pennit is sought The certifi-
cation shall be on a form presaibed by the cabinet The poficy shall
provide for personal injury and property damage protection in an
amount adequate to compensate for all personal Injury and property
damage resulting from surface coal mining and reclamation 0pera.-
tions, Including damage caused by the use of explosives and damage
to water wells. Minimum insurance coverage for bodily injury and
property damage shall be $300,000 for each occunence and
$500.000 aggregate.
(2) The policy shan be maintained in full force during the tenn of
the pennit or any renewal thereof, and during the liability period nec-
essary to complete all reclamation operations under 405 KAR Chap-
ters 7 through 24, unbl full bond release has been granted.
(3) The policy shaH include a clause requiring that the insurer
notify the cabinet whenever substantive changes are made in the
policy, indudingany tennination or failure to renew.
(4) In the event the insurer becomes unable to fulfill its obligations
under the policy, notice shall be given immediately to the pennittee
and the cabinet
(5) Upon the incapacity of an insurer by reason of bankruptcy,
insolvency, or suspension or revocation of its license or certificate of
authority, the permittee shall be deemed to be without insurance cov-
erage and shall prompUy notify the cabinet However. nothing herein
shall relieve the insurer of liability on its policy. The cabinet shall issue
a notice to the permittee spedfy;ng a reasonable period to replace
such coverage, not to exceed ninety (90) days. If an adequate insur-
ance coverage is not posted by the end of the period allowed. the
permittee shall cease coal extraction and coal processing operations
and shall comply with the provisions of 405 KAR 16:010, Section 6 or
405 KAR 18:010, Section 4 and shalt immediately begin to conduct
reclamation operations in accordance with the redamation plan. Coal
extraction and coal processing operations shall not resume until the
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cabinet has detennined that an acceptable insurance coverage has
befl posted. If an acceptable insurance coverage has not been
posted by the end of the period allowed, the cabinet may suspend the
permit until acceptable insurance coverage is posted. (8 Ky.R. 1518;
eff. 1-fH33: Am. 12 Ky.R 579; elf. 12-1D-85; 15 Ky.R. 443; 1070: eft.
12-13-88.)
405 KAR 10:035. Procedures, criteria and hearing require-
ments for cancellation of surety bonds after notice of noncompli-
ance Issued for failure to maintain contemporaneous reclama-
tion.
RELATES TO: KRS 350.020, 350.060, 350.062, 350.064,
350.068,350.151,350.465
STATUTORY AUTHORITY:KRS Chapter 13A. 350.020, 350.028,
350.060,350.064,350.151,350.465
NECESSITY, FUNCTION, AND CONFORMITY: KRS Chapter
350 in pertinent part provides authority for the cabinet to approve the
cancellation of surety bonds upon notice by the surety when a notice
of f'lOI'KD1lpliance is issued for failure to maintain contemporaneous
reclamation. This administrative regulation spedfies the procedures
and aiteria for surety bond cancellation. This administrative regutation
also sets forth certain notice and hearing requirements relating to
surety bond cancellation.
section 1. Procedures for Request for and Notice of Surety Bond
cancellation. (1) Notice of intent to cancel.
(a) After the issuance, on or after July 13, 1984, of a notice of
noncompliance for failure to maintain contemporaneous reclamation,
the surety obligated on the performance bond for the pennit or any
inaement thereof may send notice to the insured and to the depart-
ment. of its intent to request cancellation of bond coverage on any
area disturbed after thirty (30) days from the effective date of the
surety's notice of intent to cancel, if the violation is not abated.
(b) The notice of intent to cancel shall be sent by certified mail,
return receipt requested, to the insured, and a copy to the Director of
the Division of Field 5ervices, of the depar1ment The effective date of
the notice of intent to cancel shaD be the date on which it is received
by the insured or seven (7) days after mailing of the notice by certified
mail, return receipt requested, to the address oontained on the pennit
application and any other address known to the insurer, whichever
occurs first
(c) The notice of intent to cancel shall be signed by an officer,
tdirector, or attorney-in-fact of the surety company and contain at a
minimum the following:
1. Name of pennittee;
2. Pennit number and inaement number, if applicable;
3. Name of surety;
4. Bond number and amount;
5. Date of issuance of notice of noncompliance and noncompli-
ance number;
6. Date of notice of intent to cancel; and
7. A copy of a power-of-attorney, if applicable.
(2) Notice of cancellation.
(a) If the surety eJects to cancel pursuant to its notice of intent to
cancel, the surety shall send a notice of cancellation to the insured by
certified mail, return receipt requested. A copy of said notice shall also
be sent to the Director of the Division of Field Services by certified
mail, rebJm receipt requested.
(b) The notice of cancellation shan be on a form specified by the
cabinet and shall be sworn to by an officer, diredor or attomey-in-fad
of the surety, notarized and contain at a minimum the following:
1. Name of pennittee and pennit number;
2. Increment number, if applicable;
3. Name of surety and bond number;
4. Date of issuance of notice of noncompliance and nonaxnpli-
ance number;
5. Date the notice of intent to cancel was received by pennittee:
6. Date of notice of cancellation;
7. A statement that the violation has not been abated within thirty
(30) days of the effective date of the notice of intent to cancel;
8. A statement that the surety acknowledges that it will not be
relieved of its liability for areas disturbed prior to the department's
approval of cancellation;
9. A request for the cabinet to approve the notice of cancellation:
and
10. A ropy of a power-of-attomey, if applicable.
(c) The notice of cancellation shall become effective upon the
cabinefs approval.
(3) Cabinet approval of cancellation. Within thirty (30) days of
receipt of the notice of cancellation, the cabinet shall approve the
surety's notice of cancellation in writing, only if the following conditions
exist· .
(a) The violation has not been abated by the permittee; and
(b) The surety has complied with the notice requirements of sub-
section (1) and (2) of this section; and
(c) The cabinet has:
1. Revoked the permit by order of the commissioner of the de-
partment or
2. Deleted the area subject to the cancellation by order of the
commissioner of the department or
3. Accepted and approved a substitute bond submitted by the
permittee.
Section 2. Procedures for Permit Revocation or Deletion of the
Areas Subject to cancellation. The cabinet shall by order delete the
areas subject to bond cancellation or revoke the pennit for the entire
permit area within thirty (30) days from receipt of the surety's notice of
cancellation, without prior hearing, unless an acceptable substitute
bond has been submitted to the cabinet
(1) The order shall be issued by the oommissioner of the depart-
ment, without prior hearing, based u;>oo information available to the
cabinet and the surety's notice of cancellation.
(2) The permittee may request a hearing on the order of the com-
missioner pursuant to KRS 224.081(2).
(a) A hearing requested pursuant to KRS 224.081(2) shall be
requested within thirty (30) days of entry of the order of the commis-
sioner.
(b) The order of the commissioner shall be affinned unless the
permittee can affinnatively establish that bond coverage was not can-
celled and the violation was abated at the time of entry of the oommis-
sioner's order, or that substitute bond was approved by the cabinet
(c) Within thirty (30) days after entry of the order of the commis-
sioner, the order may be rescinded if the permittee can demonstrate
that a substitute bond has been accepted and approved by the cabinet
:Jnd the violations have been abated.
Section 3. Procedures for Bond Release or Forfeiture After Ap-
proval of Cancellation. (1) The cabinet shall not release any portion of
a bond for a permit area or inaement thereof, induding but not limited
to undisturbed aaeage, after cancellation, unless and until all dis-
turbed areas on the permit or inaement have been reclaimed to the
standards set for1h in KRS Chapter -350 and the administrative regula-
tions promulgated pursuant thereto, or substitute bond has been filed
and approved by the cabinet and the substitute surety has expressly
assumed liability for all disturbed areas of the pennit or inaemenl
(2) In the event of bond forfeibJre the entire bond held by the cabi-
net shall be forfeited upon order. of the seaetary pursuant to KRS
Chapter 350 and the administrative regulations pursuant thereto. (11
Ky.R. 331; Am. 5n; eff. 10-9-84.)
405 KAR 10:040. Procedures. criteria and schedule for re-
lease of perfonnance bond.
RELATES TO: KRS 350.060, 350.064, 350.093, 350.113,
350.151,350.465,30 CFR Parts 730-733,735,800.40,917,30 USC
1253,1255,1269
STATUTORY AUTHORITY: KRS Chapter 13A, 350.020, 350.028,
350.060,350.064,350.093,350.151,350.465,30 CFR Parts 730-733,
735. 800.40, 917, 30 USC 1253, 1255, 1269
NECESSITY, FUNCTION, AND CONFORMITY: KRS Chapter
350 in pertinent part requires the cabinet to set out by regulation pro-
cedures and criteria for the release of performance bond. This admin-
istrative regulation specifies the procedures, criteria, and schedule.
induding reclamation phases, for the release and partial release of
liability under performance bonds. This administrative regulation also
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sets forth certain notice and hearing requirements pertinent to bond
release.
Section 1. Procedures for Release of Performance Bonet (1) Ap-
plication for bond release. The permittee or any person authorized to
act on his or her behalf may or the cabinet shall. initiate an application
for release of all or part of the performance bond liability applicable to
a partiaJlar penni or inaement after at reclamation, restoration and
abatement work: in a reclamation phase as defined in section 2(4) of
this administrative regulation has been completed on the entire· permit
area or inaement
(a) Bond retease applications may only be filed at times or sea-
sons that allow the cabinet to evaluate proper1y the reclamation 0p-
erations alleged to have been completed.
(b) Within thirty (30) days of the initiation of any bond release
request. the pennittee shaD submit copies of letters which it has sent
to adjoining property owners, surface owners (their agents and 1es-
sees), local governmental bodies•. plaming agendes, sewage and
water treatment authorities. and water companies in the locality in
which the surface coal mining and reclamation operation took place.
notifying them of the intention to seek release from the bond. For bond
releases initiated by the cabinet, the cabinet shan undertake the notifi-
cation requirements set foI1h in this subsection. The notices shall also
state that these individuals and their representatives may participate- in
a bond release inspection by CXJntacting the cabinel These notices
shaD be sent at the time the permittee initiates the apprlCation far re-
lease.
(c) Upon the filing of an application for bond release byaperrnit-
tee. or the initiation of such release by the cabinet. the cabinet shan
notify. by certified mail. within thirty (30) days of such filing or initiation.
the municipality or county judge-exeaJtive where 1he surface coal
mining operation is located.
(d) Within thirty (30) days after advertising an appJication for bond
release as per the requirements of subsectioil (2) of this section. the
permittee. or the cabinet if it elected k) advertise as per subsection (2)
of this section. shaD submit proof d said pubfication. Proof of pub1ica-
tion shall be placed, by the cabinet, 'lAth the bond release appflC8tion.
Such proof of publication shaD be considered part of the bond release
application.
(2) Pubfic notice. At the time of initiating an application for bond
release under this section. the pennittee shal" and the cabinet may at
permittee expense. advertise the filing of the application in the news-
paper of largest bona fide dra.dation acoording to the definition in KRS
424.110 to 424.120 in the axJnty or counties in which the permit area
is located. Said advertisement shall begin within sixty (60) days of the
initiation of any application for bond release whether said-bond release
application is initiated by the pennittee or the cabinel Should the cabi-
net initiate ~ bond release pursuant to this subsection but choose not
to advertise the release pursuant to this section. and the pennittee
does not advertise the request for the release within the time sched-
ules established by this subsection. the bond release application shall
be denied. The advertisement shaD be placed in the newspaper at
least once a week for four (4) conseaJtive weeks. The advertisement
shan contain:
(a) The name of the permittee. the pennit number and the date of
issuance or renewal of the pennit or lnaement
(b) The precise location and the number of aaes of the lands
subject to the application;
(c) The type and total amount of bond filed for the pennit area or
inaement and the reclamation phase for which release is sought
(d) The type and approximate dates of reclamation work: per-
formed;
(e) A desaiption of the results achieved as they relate to the per-
mittee's approved reclamation plan;
(I) A statement that written comments. objections, and requests
for a public hearing may be submitted to the cabinet. provide the ap-
propriate address of the cabinet, and the dosing date by which com-
ments, objections. and requests must be received;
(g) A statement that a public hearing has been scheduled, indud-
ing the date and location of the hearing; and
(h) A statement that the schedule public hearing shall be can-
celled if the cabinet does not receive a request for the public hearing
by the closing date for requests for hearing.
(3) Objections. convnents or requests for public hearing prior to
bond release.
(a) Any person with a valid legal interest which might be adversefy
affected by release of the bond, or the responsible officer or head of
any federal, state, or local governmental agency which has jurisdiction
by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental, social.
or economic impact involved in the operation or which is authorized to
develop and enforce environmental standards with respect to such
operations. shall have the right to file written objections to the pro-
posed release from bond and. if desired. file a request for a public
hearing with the cabinet within thirty (30) days after the last publication
d the noIia! required by subsection (2) of this section.
(b) The cabinet shaD schedule a public hearing for each request
for bond release. such hearing to be scheduled within five (5) work:ing
days of the end of-the public comment period. If the cabinet does not
receive a request for a public hearing by the end of the public com-
ment period. the cabinet shall cancel the public hearing. The public
hearing shall be held in the locality of the surface coal mining opera-
tion for which bond release is sought The person requesting the re-
lease shall contact the cabinet prior to beginning advertisements un-
der subsection (2) of this section to obtain the date and location of the
public hearing in order to include this information in the advertisement
(c) The hearing under paragraph (b) of this subsection shall be
legislative In nature and the provisions of 405 KAR 7:091 and 405
KAR 7:092 shaD not apply. The cabinet shall have the authority to
administer oaths. subpoena witnesses or written or printed material.
compel the attendance of witnesses or the production of materials.
and take evidence including. but not limited to. inspection of the larid
affected and other surface mal mining operations carried on by the
applicant in the general vicinity. A verbatim record of each public
hearing shan be made, and a transcript shan be made available on the
motion of any party or by order of the cabinet
(d) Without prejudice to the right of an objector or the applicant
and upon agreement of all parties. the cabinet may hold an infonnal
conference in accordance with the procedures in 405 KAR 8:010,
Section 11 for pennit conferences to resolve such written objections in
lieu of the public hearing under paragraph (b) of this subsection. The
informal conference shaH- be held at the same time and location as
was scheduled for the public hearing. The cabinet shall make a record
of the informal conference unless waived by all parties. which shall be
accessible to all parties..The cabinet shall also furnish all parties of the
informal conference with a written finding. of the cabinet on the infor-
mal conference. and the reasons for said finding.
(4) Inspection and evaluation. The cabinet shall inspect and
evaluate the reclamation work: involved within thirty (30) days after
initiation of a bond release request by the pennlttee. or any person
authorized to ad on his or her behalf. or as soon thereafter as weather
CXJIlditions pennit The evaluation shaH coosider. among other factors.
the degree of diffia.alty to complete any remaining reclamation,
whether pollution of surface and subsurface water is occurring, the
probability of future occunence of such pollution. and the estimated
cost of abating such pollution. The surface owner. agent. or lessee
known to the cabinet shall be given notice of such inspection and may
participate with the cabinet in making~ bond release inspection. The
cabinet may arrange with the pennittee to allow access to the pennit
area. upon request by any person with an interest in bond release. for
the purpose of gathering information relevant to the proceeding.
(5Xa) Notice of decision. The cabinet shall as desaibed in para-
graph (b) of this subsection provide notification in writing of its decision
to release or not to release all or part of the performance bond within
five (5) days following receipt of proof of -public advertisement as re-
quired in this section. or within five (5) days of the end of the thirty (30)
day public comment period provided for in subsection (3) of this sec-
tion. whichever is later. Provided. however, that if an informal confer-
ence or public hearing has been requested pursuant to subsection (3)
of this section. the cabinet shall provide its notice of decision within
thirty (30) days following said informal conference or public hearing.
(b) The notice of the decision shall state the reasons for the deci-
sion, recommend any corrective actions necessary to secure the re-
lease, and notify the pennittee, the surety, any person with an interest
in collateral who has previously requested such notification in writing,
persons who filed objections in writing, and objectors who were a party
to the infonnal conference or public hearing of their right to request.
within thirty (30) days of notice, a formal hearing as provided for by
subsection (6) of this section. Where the decision is to release all or
E(b) - 26
TITLE 405, CHAPTER 10 - BOND AND INSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
part of the performance bond. the notice shall state that the release
shall occur fourteen (14) days after the date of the decision unless
ter4x>rary relief is granted under 405 KAR 7:092. Section 12.
(c) In no event shall the cabinet disapprove an application for
reclamation phase I or II release of a surety bond or a bond seoJred
by a letter of aedit solely upon the permittee's failure to pay penalties
or fines, if applicable reclamation requirements for the requested re-
lease have been fully mel
(6) Requests for formal hearing after bond release or denial. Any
person aggrieved by the decision of the cabinet to approve or disap-
prove a bond release application, in whole or in Part. shall have the
right to request a formal hearing pursuant to 405 KAR 7:092, Section
9. When the cabinet has decided to release au or part of the perform-
ance bond, the release shall not OCQJr until fourteen (14) days after
the date of the decision. At the end of that fourteen (14) days, the
cabinet shan effect the release unless temporary relief is granted un-
der 405 KAR 7:092, Section 12.
Section 2. Criteria and Schedule for Release of Performance
Bond. (1) Monies pledged under performance bonds shall not be ertgi-
bIe for release until the permittee has met the requirements of the
applicable reclamation phase as defined in subsection (4) of this sec-
tion. The cabinet may release portions of the monies pledged under
performanoe bonds applicable to a pennit or inaement following c0m-
pletion a reclamation phases on the entire pennit area or entire in-
aemenl
(2) The maximum portion of the monies pledged under perform-
ance bonds applicable to a permit area which may be released shall
be calaJlated on the following basis:
(a) Release an amount not to exceed sixty (60) percent of the total
original bond amount on the pennit area, section, or inaement upon
ampletion of phase I reclamation.
(b) Release an additional amount not to exceed twenty-five (25)
percent of the total original bond amount on the permit area « incre-
ment upon completion of phase II reclamation, but in al cases the
amount remaining shall be sufficient to reestabflSh vegetation and
reconstrud any drainage structures.
(e) Release the remaining portion of the total performance bond
on an entire pennit area or inaement after standards of phase III rec-
lamation have been attained on the entire pennit area or inaement
and final inspection and procedures of section 1 of this administrative
regulation have been satisfied. After the final bond release for phase
III reclamation on an inaement. the inaement shall be deleted from
the pennit area.
(3) The cabinet shall not release any monies pledged under per-
formance bonds applicable to a pennit if such release would reduce
the total remaining monies pledged under performance bonds to an
amount less than that necessary for the cabinet to complete the ap-
proved reclamation plan, achieve compliance with the requirements of
KRS Chapter 350. 405 KAR Chapters 7 through 24 or the permit, and
abate any significant environmental hann *' air, water or land re-
sources or danger to the public health and safety which might occur
prior to the release of all performance bond liability for the permit area.
(4) Reclamation phases are defined as follows:
(a) Reclamation phase I shall be deemed to have been completed
on the entire pennit area or increment when the permittee completes
backfilling, regrading, topsoil replacement. and drainage control in-
duding soil preparation and initial seeding and mulching in accor-
dance with the approved reclamation plan and a report for the area
has been submitted to the cabinet in accordance with 405 KAR
16:200. section 8 or 405 KAR 18:200, Section 8;
(b) Reclamation phase II shall be deemed to have been c0m-
pleted on the entire pennit area or inaement when:
1. Revegetation has been estabfished in acoordance with the
approved reclamation plan and the standards for the success of
revegetation. except productivity standards. have been met;
2. The lands are not conbibuting suspended solids to stream tbN
or run off outside the permit area or inaement in excess of the re-
quirements of KRS 350.420, 405 KAR Chapters 16 or 18. or the per-
mit;
3. With respect to prime fannlands, soil productivity has been
restored as required by 405 KAR 20:040. Section 6 and the plan ap-
proved under 405 KAR 8:050. Section 3; and
4. The provisions of a plan approved by the cabinet for the sound
future management of any pennanent impoundment by the pennittee
or landowner have been implemented to the satisfaction of the cabi·
net
(c) Reclamation phase III will be deemed to have been completed
on the entire permit area or inaement when the permittee has sue-
oessfuDy completed all surface mal mining and reclamation operations
in accordance with the approved reclamation plan, such that the land
is capable of supporting the posbnining land use approved pursuant to
405 KAR 16:210 or 405 KAR 18:220; and has achieved compliance
with the requirements of KRS Chapter 350, 405 KAR Chapters 7
Ihrough 24, and the permit; and the applicable faabifity period under
405 KAR 10:020, Section 3(2) has expired. (8 Ky.R. 1519; eff. 1--6-83;
Am. 15 Ky.R 447:2016; eff. 1-25-89; 17 Ky.R 2499; elf. 4-24-91.)
405 KAR 10:050. Bond forfeiture.
RELATES TO: KRS 350.020, 350.060, 350.064. 350.093.
350.095,350.130,350.131,350.151,350.465.30 CFR Parts 730-733.
735, 800.50, 917, 30 USC 1253, 1255
STATUTORY AUTHORITY: KRSChapter 13A. 350.020. 350.028.
350.060,350.064,350.130,350.151.350.465,30 CFR Parts 730-733.
735,800.50, 917, 30 USC 1253, 1255
NECESSITY, FUNCTION, AND CONFORMITY:· KRS Chapter
350 in pertinent part requires the cabinet to regulate surface coal .
mining and reclamation operations in a manner as to insure that sat-
isfactory reclamation is accomplished. This administrative regulation
sets forth the procedures and aiteria by means of which a bond may
be forfeited to the cabinel This administrative regulation sets forth that
certain violations of KRS Chapter 350 and administrative regulations
promulgated pursuant to that chapter may cause a bond to be for-
feited. This adm~tive regulation sets forth that a hearing may be
requested before forfeiture can be effected. This administrative regu-
lation specifies a method to determine the amount of bond forfeiture.
This administrative regulation establishes aiteria under which unused
forfeited bond funds shall be returned to the person from whom they
were collected.
section 1. General. (1) The cabinet shaft forfeit all of the remaining
bond amount for any pennit or inaement pursuant to the procedures
and aiteria of this administrative regulation.
(2) The cabinet may withhold forfeiture if the permittee or the
surety agrees to a compliance schedule to oorrect the violations of the
pennit or bond conditions.
(3) The cabinet shaH withhold forfeiture and allow the surety or
other financial institution providing bond to complete the reclamation
plan if the surety or other financial institution can demonstrate the
ability to amplete the reclamation plan, including achievement of the
capability to support the pos1mining land use approved by the cabinet.
and will undertake to do so within a reasonable time frame and agrees
to a compraance schedule. Neither the surety company nor other fi-
nancial institution shaD employ anyone to perform the measures who
has been barred from mining pursuant to the provisions of KRS
Chapter 350.
Section 2. Procedures. (1) If forfeiture of the bond· is required by
section 3 of this administrative regulation, the cabinet shaD:
(a) Send written notification by certified mail, return receipt re-
quested, to the permittee, and to the surety on the bond. If applicable.
of the cabinefs detennination to initiate forfeiture of the bond and the
reasons for the forfeiture:
(b) Advise the pennittee and surety. if applicable. of their right to
challenge the determination pursuant to 405 KAR 7:092. Section 9;
and
(c) If no hearing is requested within thirty (30) days following noti-
fication and the bond proceeds are not received. the seaetary shall
enter a final order of forfeiture and the cabinet shall proceed in an
action tor collection on the bond.
(2) The cabinet may, as an alternative to following the procedures
of subsection (1) of this section. initiate formal hearing procedures
conceming forfeiture of the bond alone or in conjunction with the cabi·
nefs action for other appropriate remedies against the permittee pur-
suant to 405 KAR 7:092, Section 5.
(3) The cabinet shall utilize funds collected from bond forfeiture to
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u:mplete the reclamation ptan on the perin:t area or inaement on
which bond coverage applied. and to cover associated administrative
expenses. The funds shall be deposited in an appropriate account for
the payment of these costs. Funds remaining after reclamation shaD
be returned to the person from whom the forfeiture proceeds were
received. subject to the cabinefs right to attach or setoff the proceeds
under state law.
(4) In the event the amount forfeited is insufficient to pay for the
full cost of reclamation, Jhe permittee or operator shall be liable for
remaining msts. The cabinet may complete, or authorize completion
of. reclamation of the bonded area and may recover from the pennit-
tee or operator all costs of reclamation in excess of the amount for-
feited.
(5) Retum of unused forfeited bond funds for interim or pennanent
program pennit area overtapped by pennanent program permit area. If
the cabinet has not completed the reclamation plan on a permit area
under 405 KAR Chapter 1 or 3 for which the bond was forfeited on or
after July is, 1988, or if the cabinet has nOt completed the reclamation
plan on a pennit area under 405 KAR Chaplet's 7-24 for which the
bond was forfeited, and if the permit area and any related off-pennit
disturbances are entirely contained within the permit area of a subse-
quent valid permit under 405 KAR Chapters 7-24 for which the bond is
in force. the cabinet shaD retain the funds from the forfeited bond until
the entire Overtapped permit area and any related off-permit distur-
bances have been disturbed by the overtapping pennittee and then
shall retum the unused funds to the person from whom the forfeiture
proceeds were received, subject to the cabinefs right to attach or set
off the proceeds under state law.
Section 3. Criteria fa" Forfeiture. (1) A bond for a permit area or
inaement shall be forfeited, if the cabinet finds that
(a) The pennittee has violated any of the terms or conditions of
the bond and has failed to take oorrective action:
(b) The pennittee has failed to condud the surface mining and
redamation operations in acoordance with KRS Chapter 350, the
conditions of the permit or 405 KAR Chapters 7 through 24 within the
time required;
(c) The permit for the area or inaement under bond has been
revoked or the operation tenninated. unless the permittee, surety, or
other finandal institution providing bond assumes liability pursuant to
an agreement for the completion of redamation; or
(d) The permittee. surety, or other financial institution providing
bond has faaled to comply with a oompliance schedule approved pur-
suant to Section 1(2) or (3) of this administrative regulation.
(2) A bond may be forfeited if the cabinet finds that
(a)1. The permittee has beame insolvent; ex
2. A aeditor of the pennittee has attached or eXeaJted judgment
against the permittee's equipment. materials, or facilities. at the permit
area; and
(b) The permittee cannot demonstrate or prove the ability to c0n-
tinue to operate in compliance with KRS. Chapter 350, -405 KAR
Chaptets 7 through 24, and the permit.
(3) The cabinet may forfeit a bond solely upon the permittee's
failure to pay penalties or fines (If all reclamation requirements have
been futly met) and retain the bond proceeds, or portion thereof as
necessary to offset the penalty or fine owed (induding administrative
costs incurred by the cabinet), but the cabinet shan fafei~ a bond un-
der this dramstance only after the five (5) year liability period has
expired: except that for surety bonds or bonds seaJred by a letter of
oedit·
(a) In no event shan the cabinet take any action to forfeit a surety
bond or bond secured by a letter of aedit under this QraJmstance until
reclamation phase I and II monies have been released and the five (5)
year liabitity period has expired; and
(b) If a forfeiture of a surety bond or a bond seaJred by a letter of
aedit under this drcumstance has occurred. the cabinet shall not
retain the surety bond or bond seaJred by letter of credit or any pro-
ceeds thereof and the permittee shall continue to be responsible for
payment of the penalties or fines as well as administrative costs in.
curred by the cabinel
Section 4. ForfeibJre Amount. The cabinet shall forfeit the entire
amount of the bond for the permit area or inaemenl (8 Ky.R. 1521:
eft. 1-6-83: Am. 15 Ky.R. 451; 1073; eff. 12-13-88: 20 Ky.R 132; 544;
eff. 9-22-93.)
405 KAR 10:200. Kentucky bond pool.
RELATES TO: KRS Chapter 304, 350.020, 350.028. 350.060.
350.062, 350.064, 350.068, 350.085, 350.093, 350.095. 350.100,
350.113, 350.130. 350.135, 350.151, 350.260. 350.465, 350.700.
350.705, 350.710, 350.715, .350.720, 350.725, 350.730, 350.735,.
350.740, 350.745, 350.750, 350.755, 350.990, 30 CFR Parts 730-733,
735, 8OO.11(e), 917, 30 USC 1253, 1255, 1259
STATUTORY AUTHORITY: KRS Chapter 13A, 350.020, 350.028.
350.060, 350.062. 350.064, 350.093, 350.130, 350.151, 350.465,
350.710, 350.715. 350.720, 350:~25, 350.730, 350.735. 350.740,
350.750. 30 CFR Parts 730-733, 735. 8OO.11(e), 917, 30 USC 1253,
1255, 1259
NECESSITY, FUNCTION, AND CONFORMITY: KRS Chapter
350 in pertinent part requires the cabinet to regulate surface coal
mining and reclamation operations, including requiring bond sufficient
to ensure satisfactofy reclamation. KRS Chapter 350 further author-
izes the cabinet to establish alternative methods of meeting bonding
requirements. ThIs administrative regulation implements an alternative
bonding program known as a bond pool. This administrative regulation
establishes requirements for applications for membership in the bond
pool: proc8dures for submittal of, review of, and-decisions on' applica- .
tions, including detenninations ci financial standing and reclamation
compliance recDds of applicants: piocedures for acceptance of spe-
cific permit areas into COY8t'8g8 by the bond pool; and procedures for
keeping ci production records, reporting of production, and payment of
fees based on coal production.
Section 1. Applicability. This administrative regulation applies only
to the voluntary alternative bonding program knaM1 as the Kentucky
Bond Pool. as established at KRS 350.700 through 350.755. and to
pennanent program permi1s or inaements covered under that pool.
Section 2. Forms. (1) The following forms, which are required to
be submitted by applicants and members, are hereby incorporated by
reference:
(a) Application for Membership, BP-01, revised September 1.
1988; and
(b) Monthly Production Report. BP-02.
(2) These forms may be reviewed or obtained at the Department
for Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement. #2 Hudson Hollow.
Frankfort. Kentucky 40601, Monday through Friday, 8 a.m. to 4:30
p.m.
section 3. Review of Decisions. There shaft be no administrative
appeal under 405 KAR 7:092 from a decision of the cornrr:-ission.
Hc7Never, the applicant or member may, within sixty (60) days after
notice of the decision, request the canmission to reconsider its deci-
sion. The conmission may, at its cfasaetion, grant or deny the request
for reconsideration.
8ection 4. Applications for Membership. (1) Any person desiring
membership in the bond pool shaD submit an application for member-
ship to the ccmmission at the address established by the administra-
tor.
(2) The application shan be submitted on forms prov;ded by the
convnission and shall be of the form, content, and number of originals
and copies as the ccmmission may require. The application shall be
typed or printed, and shan be legible throughout
(3) Financial statements required with the application shall be
prepared by a certified pubrlC 8C(X)lJf1tanl Financial statements shall
be kept confidential to the convnission, the administrator. and cabinet
personnel authorized by the administrator.
(4) The application shall indude an application fee of $100 by
cash or by certified check, cashier's check or money order made pay-
able to -Kentucky State Treasurer.- The fee shall not be refunded in
any circumstances, but shall be applied toward the membership fee if
the applicant is accepted for membership.
(5) The application shall be complete in all respects.
Section 5. Review of AppUcations. (1) As soon as practicable after
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A KENTUCKY GOVERNMENT PERSPECTIVE ON
BONDING COMPANY FAILURES AND MINING
INDUSTRY BANKRUPTCIES IN 2000-2002
C. Michael Haines
J. Alec Mackenzie
Office of Legal Services
Kentucky Natural Resources and
Environmental Protection Cabinet
This outline is an attempt to provide a government perspective on two tumultuous
years in the mining industry. The tumult was the result of a combination of the failures
of three companies that provided millions of dollars in workmen's compensation and
mining reclamation bonds, an unforgiving coal market, and some promising business
decisions that did not live up to their promise. These factors dr~ve three of the state's
largest mining enterprises into bankruptcy over the last two years. Two of them emerged
from the bankruptcy process in significantly different form, while the other is still in the
court.
The first section of the outline deals with the facts and figures relating to the three
bonding company failures. The second portion of the outline deals with the bankruptcies
of Quaker Coal Company, Inc. ("Quaker"), Lodestar Energy, Inc. and Lodestar Holdings,
Inc. (collectively referred to as "Lodestar"), along with AEI Resources Holding, Inc.
("AEI"). We readily admit that there is not as much discussion of legal issues and
theories as we would like, particularly in the first section. This is a function of the fact
that many issues are still in litigation and caution must be exercised.
One of the things that occurred during this period, was an increased level of
communication and cooperation between our agency and other agencies. The events of
the last two years spawned weekly, and sometimes daily, conferences between the
Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet (KNREPC), the Department of
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Insurance ("KDOI"), and the Department of Workers' Claims ("KWC"). When
appropriate, these meetings included members of Governor Patton's staff and the
Governor's Office of Policy and Management ("GOPM"). Many of the other states
adversely effected by these events also conferred with us, as did the United States Office
of Surface Mining ("OSM"). There were also many meetings and conferences with the
parties directly effected, as well as representatives of their industries.
Much of the information contained in this outline came from these meetings and
their participants. Several individuals deserve special recognition for their contributions
of data and information over the course of these events. While they did not participate
directly in the preparation of this outline, we wish to acknowledge contributions by the
following people: Julie M. McPeak, Acting General Counsel of the Department of
Insurance and her predecessor, Gale Pearce; Mark Thompson, Director of the Division of
Field Services, Department for Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement; and Gary
w. Davis, Director of Security and Compliance, Department of Workers' Claims.
I. THE BONDING PROBLEMS
The outline and our presentations will not deal with the fundamentals of bonding,
Le., the why it's done and how we do it. It is enough to say that the laws of the
Commonwealth require mining and environmental companies to post bonds to cover the
performance of their remedial work, should they fail to do it. The laws also require
businesses to post bonds to cover their obligations to the workmen's compensation
programs. The laws require that these bonds be issued in particular forms, subject to
relevant statutes and regulations, and be issued by entities capable of paying the
obligations when called upon to do so.
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Much of the information in this portion concerns the problems of Frontier
Insurance Company ("Frontier"), simply because of the magnitude of its impact. Its
impact was so great that the bankruptcies discussed in the second section of this outline
were either caused or severely complicated by it. The problems of the other two
companies, Cumberland Surety Insurance Company ("CSIC"), based in Lexington, and
Reliance Insurance Company ("Reliance"), based in Pennsylvania, had less impact
because their bonding business was quickly taken over by other companies.
The following are background facts necessary to an understanding of the
magnitude of the bonding problem:
The Surety Companies
• As of April 2000, KNREPC held approximately 8,300 surface mining bonds totaling
$780 million.
• In April of 2000, Frontier had issued approximately $339 million in reclamation
bonds, $80 million worth of workers compensation bonds, and $12 million worth of
bonds on hazardous waste facilities and landfills.
• In April of 2000, CSIC had issued approximately $73 million in surface mining
bonds.
• In April of 2000, Reliance and its subsidiaries had issued approximately $20 million
in surface mining bonds.
The Mining Companies
• In April of 2000, AEI had posted approximately $226 million worth of surface
mining bonds issued on Frontier paper.
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• In April of 2000, Lodestar had posted approximately $28 million worth of surface
mining bonds issued on Frontier paper.
• In April of 2000, Quaker had posted approximately $38 million worth of surface
mining bonds issued on Frontier paper.
As you can see, approximately 40% of all surface mining bonds and a large amount
of workmen's compensation bonds were impacted during this time period. The
companies put at risk by the Frontier failure represented more than 25% of the coal
produced in Kentucky.
A. What Happened and When
What follows is a timeline of the events over the last two years that will allow the
reader to gain a better understanding of how the saga unfolded. The daily and weekly
internal agency meetings are not included. Only those meetings where multiple agencies
were involved are included. However, this lengthy list of events will give the reader
some idea of how much time and effort were expended by the agencies involved. There
were some times where not much happened, but there were others when things happened
at a fast pace:
• February 2000: OSM sends material to KNREPC indicating mounting financial
troubles for Frontier and financial problems faced by its largest Kentucky customer,
AEI.
• April 10, 2000: (1) Cumberland Surety is taken over by KDOI. Cumberland had
suffered financially since the entry of Frontier into the Kentucky reclamation bonding
business. (2) KNREPC learns that KWC is refusing Frontier bonds as acceptable
bonding for that program.
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• April 20, 2000: US Treasury Dept. gives Frontier ultimatum to sell its surety business
or face loss of its certificate of authority for federal programs.
• April 28, 2000: (1) AM Best lowers its rating of Frontier from B- to C++. (2) OSM
advises KNREPC that it will no longer allow the issuance of permits with Frontier
bonds, in accordance with Treasury Dept. rules.
• May 31, 2000: The US Treasury Dept. revokes Frontier's certificate of authority to
provide surety in federal programs.
• June 14,2000: Frontier and the state ofNew York agree on a corrective action plan.
• June 19, 2000: Quaker files for bankruptcy with $38 million in Frontier bonds.
• June 28, 2000: KDOI signs an agreed order with Frontier that stops the writing of any
new business in Kentucky on all lines of insurance, but allows the renewal of surface
mining permits with Frontier bonds already in place. The order also directed Frontier
to insure that all bonds were adequately capitalized and priced and imposed additional
financial reporting requirements.
• August 2, 2000: Representatives of insurance brokers and an insurance company meet
with representatives of KNREPC, KDOI, and KWC to discuss possible bonding
solutions. While their solution wouldn't meet program requirements, they were
willing to consider issuing bonds themselves.
• September 19, 2000: Representatives of the insurance brokers and insurance
companies meet again with representatives from KNREPC, KDOI, GOPM, and KWC
to discuss other bonding solutions.
• September 21, 2000: KNREPC furnishes Willis and AIG with documentation
pertaining to the causes of, and procedures for, bond forfeiture.
E(c) - 5
• September 28, 2000: Frontier negotiates the purchase of a reinsurance agreement with
National Indemnity, a Berkshire Hathaway company. The agreement covers those
policies/bonds issued prior to 1/1/2000.
• December 29, 2000: Frontier stock value is at 6 cents per share.
• January 2001: National Indemnity and Frontier attempt to provide verification of
bonds covered by the reinsurance by executing an endorsement to the prior bulk
reinsurance agreement. The companies assure KNREPC that Frontier's obligations
can be met in the event bonds are forfeited.
• February 28,2001: New York directs Frontier not to write any new or renewal
business in that state, without prior written approval from the state.
• March 28, 2001: KDOI modifies its agreed order with Frontier by ordering the
company to cease the writing of all new and renewal business, except for in-force,
non-cancelable bonds covered by the reinsurance agreement with National Indemnity.
Surface mining bonds are non-cancelable and excluded from the order.
• April 3, 2001: Lodestar Energy, Inc. is taken into bankruptcy by its creditors.
Lodestar carried approximately $28 million in Frontier bonds.
• August 21, 2001: A KDOI financial examiner arrives at Frontier to ascertain the
financial condition of the company, due to a lack of information from the company or
New York.
• August 24, 2001: New York begins rehabilitation proceedings in their state c~urts.
New York's Petition for Rehabilitation finds Frontier to be insolvent. Payments to
workers comp claimants are stopped. The New York DOl discovers that all other
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claims payments were suspended by Frontier on August 5, 2001, due to a lack of
available funds.
• August 27, 2001: (1) New York Supreme Court issues order granting the state
insurance department's petition to begin the voluntary rehabilitation of Frontier. (2)
KDOI issues an order suspending Frontier's certificate of authority. A copy of the
order follows this outline.
• August 28, 2001: KDSMRE issues a letter to all permittees with Frontier bonds
demanding replacement of those bonds within 90 days (November 26, 2001),
pursuant to 405 KAR 10:030.
• September 10, 2001: A Pennsylvania court orders regulators to either rehabilitate
Reliance or liquidate it. Reliance and its subsidiaries have issued approximately $20
million in reclamation bonds.
• September 13, 2001: Representatives from New York and National Indemnity
participate in a conference call with KDOI, KNREPC and KWC. New York states
that it has no authority to pay claims under its current order and National Indemnity
will not pay unless New York/Frontier pays first. They are not willing to cover the
$1.8 million owed to the Coal Guaranty Fund, nor are they willing to begin payments
to workers comp recipients.
• September 28, 2001: KNREPC learns that Frontier, New York and National
Indemnity have renegotiated the reinsurance agreement following the seizure of
Frontier by New York to take away payment for forfeitures resulting from the
demand for replacement. The renegotiated agreement segregates a portion of the
reinsurance for claimants residing in California. Additionally, the reinsurance
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agreement was altered to provide operating capital for Frontier, with those sums
acting as an offset to the reinsurance aggregate.
• October 1-2, 2001: Representatives of various coal and insurance companies meet
with KDOI, KNREPC, GOPM and KWC concerning the status of efforts to replace
bonds for mining and workers comp.
• October 5,2001: A Pennsylvania court orders the liquidation of Reliance. Notices for
replacement are mailed to all Reliance-bonded permittees by KNREPC. Reliance
bonds are to be replaced by Travelers Group pursuant to its purchase of the Reliance
surety line.
• October 11,2001: Quaker subsidiaries file a Petition for Hearing under KRS 304.2-
310, seeking review of the KDOI suspension of Frontier's certificate of authority.
• October 12, 2001: Hearing in bankruptcy court on reorganization plans for Quaker
Coal.
• October 13, 2001: KDOI Commissioner rejects the petition of the Quaker
subsidiaries. A copy of this order follows the outline.
• October 16,2001: KDOllearns from California insurance regulators that New York
entered a formal rehabilitation order for Frontier on October 10. The order finds,
among other things, that Frontier is insolvent.
• October 18,2001: New York and Frontier representatives meet with KNREPC and
KDOI to discuss alternatives to replacement on November 26. They propose that
KNREPC give another 90 days with firm milestones for partial replacement, until all
are replaced.
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• October 19, 2001: The bankruptcy court enters an order accepting the AEP plan for
the reorganization of Quaker Coal.
• October 26, 2001: (1) At another hearing in the Quaker bankruptcy, the AEP and
Quaker reach an agreement on a division of the company's assets. (2) AEI files a
Petition for Hearing and Motion for Stay of the KDOI order suspending Frontier's
certificate of authority, pursuant to KRS 304.2-310, challenging KDOI's authority to
order replacement of Frontier bonds.
• November 1, 2001: West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection begins
issuing NOV's to Frontier-bonded permittees for inadequate bonds because of the
finding of insolvency by the New York court.
• November 2, 2001: (1) OSM meets with representatives of KNREPC and KDOI to
discuss replacement schedule. (2) KDOI Commissioner rejects the petition of the
Quaker subsidiaries. A copy of this order follows the outline.
• November 5, 2001: KDOI and KNREPC personnel meet with representatives of the
insurance industry and the Kentucky Coal Council to discuss a way to provide
companies with the collateral necessary to replace Frontier bonds. $279,148,015 in
reclamation bonds remain on Frontier paper.
• November 16, 2001: (1) Lodestar files an adversary action in bankruptcy court
seeking an injunction against KNREPC. (2) OSM notifies Tennessee companies that
less than full replacement of Frontier bonds is acceptable.
• November 21, 2001: (1) OSM agrees that Kentucky can follow its lead and demand
less than full replacement of Frontier bonds. (2) KNREPC notifies coal industry
associations that it has altered its demand for replacement to allow replacement over a
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90-day period with 1/3 of "active" permits covered at 30, 60, 90-day intervals. (3)
Bankruptcy court grants Lodestar's request for an injunction preventing KNREPC
from shutting down its operations for failure to replace Frontier bonds.
• November 26, 2001: KNREPC alters its replacement schedule again, following an
OSM change of opinion on what constituted sufficient replacement, and notifies coal
industry association that it will allow 5% of active site replacement on December 5,
and 1/3 remainders at the 30, 60 and 90 day intervals.
• December 5, 2001: All active bonds are replaced in accordance with the decisions of
November 26.
• December 21, 2001: Deputy Secretary of the US Interior Department, Steven Griles,
sends a letter to the OSM office in Knoxville outlining reasons supporting an
extension of time to March 1, 2002, for AEI to replace its Frontier bonds.
• December 27, 2001: AEI files suit in Boyd Circuit Court to enjoin KNREPC from
requiring further bond replacement under its November 26 plan. The Court issued a
temporary restraining order.
• January 28, 2002: AEI, KNREPC and KWC reach agreement on a plan to allow AEI
to replace its bonds in accordance with its plan to file a prepackaged Chapter 11
bankruptcy in late February and to provide for dismissal of the Boyd Circuit Court
action and TRO.
• February 28, 2002: AEI files its Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
• March 15, 2002: All Frontier bonds posted by AEI are replaced.
B. Remaining Issues
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• There are approximately 450 increments still bonded with Frontier bonds,
representing approximately $70 million. This figure includes the bonds covered by
the Lodestar injunction and those being replaced under the AEP reorganization plan.
The majority of these bonds are on increments that are in phase 1 or phase 2 bond
release status. What happens with these increments will largely be determined by the
outcome of the Frontier rehabilitation process.
• There is no clear sense of how the Frontier rehabilitation process will tum out. New
York has pledged that it intends to bring Frontier out of the process and not take it to
liquidation. There are plenty of skeptics among insurance and coal industry people.
We must admit some skepticism on our own part, but are hopeful that New York can
make that happen.
•
• It is safe to say that Frontier still disputes KNREPC's assertion that it is
"incapacitated" within the meaning of 405 KAR 10:030 Sec. 2(c). The language of
the regulation makes it clear that its "bankruptcy, insolvency, or revocation or
suspension of its license or certificate of authority" causes the incapacity of an
insurer. Here, KDOI has suspended Frontier's certificate of authority to operate in
Kentucky, rendering it "incapacitated" under the regulation. Further, the New York
superintendent of insurance alleged in court pleadings that Frontier is insolvent and
the court entered an order finding that Frontier is insolvent.
• The agencies involved in this matter are concerned that modifications to the
reinsurance agreement made by New York, National Indemnity, and Frontier are
allowing the reinsurance cap to be diminished to the detriment of Kentucky.
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• Another area of concern, is Frontier's willingness, or unwillingness, depending upon
one's point of view, to meet its obligation to pay claims that come due. Frontier has
said that it will not pay bonds that are forfeited due to violations for failure to replace
Frontier bonds. However, it has said that it will pay on those bonds forfeited by
reason of outstanding unabated violations. To date, KNREPC has been unsuccessful
in making a claim to FrontierlNew York in a manner that has resulted in payment.
This is one of those areas where the prospect of litigation probably requires us to
exercise the better part of valor and say no more.
II. BANKRUPTCY CASES AND ISSUES
The Frontier surety problems have had an impact in the bankruptcy forum. In the
past year, there have been three prominent chapter 11 bankruptcy cases in the Eastern
.District of Kentucky, in which Frontier reclamation bonds have played a significant role.
Set forth below is a brief discussion of these cases and some of the issues that have been
raised as a result of the Frontier bonds.
A. Quaker Coal Company, Inc., et al., Case Nos. 00-51374 and 00-51376
through 00-51394
Quaker Coal Company, Inc. and nineteen of its subsidiaries filed Chapter 11
Bankruptcy Petitions in the Eastern District of Kentucky on June 16, 2000. The Debtors
had approximately $45.5 million in Frontier reclamation bonds on their mining permits.
The Debtors filed a Disclosure Statement with respect to their proposed Joint Plan of
Reorganization on June 1, 2001. The Motion to Approve the Disclosure Statement·was
continued from time to time. During this period America Electric Power C?mpany, Inc.
E(c) - 12
and its subsidiaries (AEP) and Wexford Capital, LLC (Wexford) both sought to file their
own Plans of Reorganization.
On August 27, 2001, the Department of Insurance entered an Order suspending
Frontier's Certificate of Authority, and on August 28, 2001 the Cabinet sent out ninety
(90) day letters requiring the replacement of the Frontier bonds pursuant to 405 KAR
10:030, Section 2(5)(c)3. On August 29, 2001, the Bankruptcy Court entered an Order
denying an extension of Quaker's exclusivity period for filing a plan and on September
21, 2001 the court entered an Order approving the Disclosure Statements of the Debtors,
AEP, and Wexford. Numerous objections to the Disclosure Statements and the proposed
plans were filed including objections by the State of Colorado, Frontier Insurance
Company and the Commonwealth of Kentucky based on issues relating to the Debtors'
Frontier surety bonds and their reclamation obligations. Ultimately, the Bankruptcy
Court entered an Order confirming the AEP Plan over the Debtors' Plan. At the
Confirmation Hearing, Wexford withdrew its plan due to its failure to obtain sufficient
votes.
Set forth below, are brief discussions of how each of the plans proposed to deal
with the Frontier bonds, and some of the issues raised by these proposed treatments.
1. Quaker's Plan: The Debtors proposed to continue mining operations with the
Frontier bonds in place. They proposed to place fifty cents (50¢) per ton of coal sold by
the Reorganized Debtors into a bond reserve that would be used to replace the Frontier
bonds over time. The Cabinet objected to the Debtors' plan pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section
1129(a)(II) (feasibility) and 11 U.S.C. Section 1129(a)(3) (the plan was not proposed in
good faith or by any means forbidden by law). The Cabinet's objection was based on the
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fact that the Debtors' reorganization plan relied on their ability to continue mInIng
operations on their Kentucky permits while Frontier bonds remained in place. However,
pursuant to 405 KAR 10:030, Section 2(5)(c) 3, the Debtors would be required to cease
all coal extraction and coal processing operations on said permits once the ninety (90)
day period set forth in said regulation and the Cabinet's August 28, 2001 letters ran.
2. The Wexford Plan: Under this Plan, Wexford would own 100% of the
stock of Quaker Coal Company, Inc., the current Board of Directors of the Debtors would
be replaced by a new Board of Directors appointed by Wexford. (The Wexford Plan
specifically indicated that three of the former directors and officers would not be retained
by the Reorganized Debtors.) Wexford also proposed that it would replace all of the
Frontier bonds on the active mining operations, but would have the option of not
replacing Frontier bonds on inactive mining operations. The Cabinet objected to
Wexford's plan pursuant to 11 U.S.C., Section 1129(a)(3) and (11). The basis for the
Cabinet's objection was that a transfer of the Debtors' Kentucky permits to the
Reorganized Debtors as envisioned by the Wexford Plan would constitute a transfer,
assignment, or sale of permit rights. Therefore, all of the Debtors' permits would have to
be transferred and bonds satisfactory to the Cabinet be filed with the transfer application
for each permit.
• 405 KAR 8:001, Section 1(132) defines a transfer, assignment, or
sale of permit rights as "a change in ownership or other effective
control over the right to conduct surface coal mining operations
under a permit issued by the cabinet." In order for a transfer of a
permit to occur, the Cabinet must approve the transfer pursuant to
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KRS 350.135(1). In the case of Com. Natural Resources and
Environmental Protection Cabinet v. Neace, 14 S.W.3 fd 15 (Ky.
2000), the Kentucky Supreme Court held that a change in
ownership or other effective control over the rights to conduct
surface coal mining operations constitutes a transfer which must be
approved by the Cabinet.
• KRS 350.135(1) requires that a transferee must file with the
transfer application a bond satisfactory to the Cabinet.
Additionally, KRS 350.135(3) provides that "[t]he cabinet shall not
release the first permittee from bond liability...until the transferee,
having filed a bond satisfactory to the cabinet, receives written
approval from the cabinet for the transfer". Therefore, under the
Wexford Plan all Frontier bonds would have to be replaced on all
of the Debtors' Kentucky permits as a result of the corporate
restructuring.
3. The AEP Plan: AEP proposed to purchase all of the assets of the Debtors
except for certain specifically excluded assets. AEP would replace all of the Frontier
bonds on the permits that it purchased. However, among the assets that AEP would not
purchase were five Kentucky permits with Frontier bonds totaling $4.2 million. The
Cabinet, therefore, objected to AEP's plan. As the basis for its objection, the Cabinet
asserted that AEP's plan would constitute an impermissible de facto abandonment of
these excluded permits.
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Various pleadings filed by Frontier Insurance, the State of Colorado and the
Commonwealth of Kentucky dealt with this issue of abandonment and the corollary issue
of whether the cost of reclamation would be an administrative expense. Although the
court never specifically ruled on these issues, various proposed Plans and Disclosure
Statements were amended to try to address these concerns. In the case of the Cabinet's
Objection, AEP removed three of the five Kentucky permits from the excluded asset list,
and provided that the Cabinet could seek to recover reclamation liabilities from AEP as
an administrative expense on the remaining two excluded permits if certain preconditions
were met. As a result, the Cabinet withdrew its objection to AEP's plan.
• Abandonment: 28 U.S.C., Section 959(b) provides as follows:
a trustee, receiver or manager appointed for
any cause pending in any court of the United
States, including a debtor in possession shall
manage and operate the property in his
possession as such trustee, receiver or
manager according to the requirements of
the valid laws of the State in which such
property is situated, in the same manner the
owner or possessor thereof would be bound
to do if in possession thereof.
In the context of complying with environmental law Section 959 does not
allow a bankrupt estate to abandon property that exhibits on-going
environmental hazards. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of
Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494,106 S.Ct. 755, 88 L.Ed 2d 859 (1986).
• Administrative Expense: The Sixth Circuit has addressed the interplay
between Section 959(b), state environmental laws and the Bankruptcy
Code. In the case of In re Wall Tube & Metal Products Co., 831 F.2d 118
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(6th Cir. 1987), the Sixth Circuit determined that a state was entitled to
recover as an administrative expense its costs of responding to improper
disposal of hazardous substances. The Sixth Circuit, in relying on
Midlantic, found that:
[i]f the Wall Tube trustee could not have
abandoned the estate in contravention of the
state's environmental law, neither then
should he have maintained or possessed the
estate in continuous violation of the same
law. Otherwise, the result avoided in
Midlantic would... remain an ongoing,
potentially disastrous health hazard without
remedy from those at fault. The only
difference here is that the danger arose
because of the trustee's and the debtor's
failure to correct the violation, not because
of the trustee's exercise of the abandonment
power as in Midlantic.
Wall Tube at 122 (emphasis original).
The case of In re Coal Stripping, Inc., 222 B.R. 78 (Bankr. W.D.
Pa. 1998) also held that actual reclamation costs on a mine site incurred
post-petition were entitled to administrative expense priority. This was so
even though the debtor ceased its mining operations prior to filing its
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy. The Court held that "[b]ecause this is a chapter
11 with a debtor-in-possession, to the extent [the state] expended money to
perform post-petition clean-up, it would have an administrative expense.
This is so, even though [d]ebtor did not operate in the chapter 11." In re
Coal Stripping, at 82.
B. Lodestar Energy, Inc. and Lodestar Holdings, Inc., Case Nos. 01-50969 and
01-50972
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1. Factual Background
On March 30, 2001, involuntary petitions were filed against Lodestar Energy, Inc.
and Lodestar Holdings, Inc. (Lodestar) under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy
Code. On April 27, 2001, Lodestar consented to the Chapter 11 and an Order for Relief
was entered by the court. Lodestar has continued to operate as debtor-in-possession, and
continues to operate its mining operations. Lodestar has approximately 68 Kentucky
surface mining permits, and Frontier Insurance Company issued all of their reclamation
bonds. To date the exclusivity period for filing a plan has run, but no Plan of
Reorganization has been proposed.
On November 16, 2001 Lodestar filed an Adversary Proceeding (Adv. Pro. No. 01-
5248) against Cabinet officials requesting a temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction to enjoin them from requiring that Lodestar either cease coal
extraction and processing operations or replace its Frontier bonds in compliance with the
requirements set forth in the Cabinet's August 28, 2001, ninety day letters. Additionally,
Lodestar filed a Motion for an Order Determining that Certain Threatened Actions Would
Violate the Automatic Stay. (i.e. the Cabinet's efforts to enforce Kentucky law as it
pertained to Lodestar's Frontier bonds would violate the automatic stay.)
A hearing was held on November 19,2001 and continued to November 21,2001,
on Lodestar's Motions. On November 21, 2001 the Bankruptcy Court issued oral
findings and fact and conclusions of law and entered two orders, one in the main
bankruptcy case determining that certain threatened actions by the Cabinet would violate
the automatic stay, and the second order in the Adversary Proceeding granting Lodestar's
Motion for Preliminary Injunction. The Cabinet and its officers filed Motions to (1) Alter
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or Amend Judgment and/or (2) Amend the Courts Findings in both the main bankruptcy
action and the Adversary Proceeding. These Motions were subsequently held in
abeyance to allow the parties time for settlement negotiations. However, no agreement
was reached and a briefing schedule on the Cabinet's Motions is now in effect. It is
anticipated that the matter will be submitted to the court for its decision by June 7, 2002.
Subsequent, to the Bankruptcy Court's November 21, 2001 rulings, the Fourth
Circuit decided the case of Safety-Kleen Inc., (Pinewood) v. Wyche, 274 F.3d 846 (4th
Cir. 2001) on December 19, 2001. As discussed below, Safety-Kleen should have a
significant impact on the Bankruptcy Court's determination that the Cabinet and its
officials' actions were subject to the automatic stay set forth in 11 U.S.C. Section 362(a).
On January 2, 200.2, Lodestar brought an adversary proceeding (Adv. Pro. No. 02-
5001) against the State of Utah and its officers, and brought a Motion to determine that
actions threatened by the State of Utah would violate the automatic stay. These actions
were based on the same Frontier bonding issues that had been raised in Lodestar's actions
against the Cabinet. On January 31, 2002, a hearing was held on this matter. However,
prior to Judge Scott rendering a decision, the parties reached an agreement resolving the
matter. On February 25, 2002, Agreed Orders were entered in the Adversary Proceeding
and the main bankruptcy case dismissing the adversary complaint and the motion to
determine that the State of Utah had violated the automatic stay.
2. Issues Raised in the Lodestar Case
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In Lodestar's actions against Kentucky, Utah and their officials, several issues
have been raised regarding the states' ability to require Lodestar to replace its Frontier
bonds in light of Lodestar's bankruptcy. The Kentucky officers were enjoined under the
Ex parte Young doctrine. The Cabinet raised sovereign immunity as a defense to the
injunctive relief granted by the court to Lodestar. Although, the importance of the
sovereign immunity issue cannot be understated it is not germane to the scope of this
outline and therefore will not be discussed. Set forth below is a brief discussion of some
of these issues.
(a). The automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C., Section 362.
In its November 21,2002 Orders, the bankruptcy court held that the actions of the
Cabinet to require Lodestar to replace its Frontier bonds or cease mining activities and
commence reclamation would be a violation of the automatic stay set forth in 11 U.S.C.,
Section 362(a). In its oral findings of fact and conclusions of law the court found that
these actions did not fall within the police power exception to the automatic stay set forth
11 U.S.C. Section 362(b)(4) and relied on the case of Chao v. Hospital Staffing Services,
Inc., 270 F.3d 374 (6th Cir. 2001) for support.
• The Automatic Stay. Under 362(a) the filing of a bankruptcy
petition creates an automatic stay. Among the actions stayed are:
the commencement or continuation of a judicial or administrative
action against the debtor that was, or could have been commenced
prior to the bankruptcy (11 U.S.C., Section 362(a)(I)); any act to
obtain possession of property of the estate or to exercise control
over property of the estate (11 U.S.C. Section 362(a)(3)); and any
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act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the Debtor that
arose before the commencement of the bankruptcy (11 U.S.C.
Section 362(a)(6)). The court in the Lodestar Case found that the
Cabinet's threatened actions would violate each of these
provisions.
• The Police Power Exception. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section
362(b)(4), the automatic stay provision of Section 362(a)(I), (2),
(3) and (6) does not operate as a stay to the "commencement or
continuation of any action or proceeding by a governmental
unit ... to enforce such governmental unit's ...police and regulatory
power, including the enforcement of a judgment other than a
money judgment, obtained in an action or proceeding by the
governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's ...police or
regulatory. power."
• The police power exception generally applies to a governmental
unit's enforcement of the environmental laws enacted to protect
public health and safety. See Midlantic, 474 U.S. 494; Penn Terra
Ltd. v. Department of Environmental Resources, Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania, 733 F.2d 267 (3 rd Cir. 1984); In re
Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., Inc., 805 F.2d 1175; In re
Commerce Oil Co., 847 F.2d 291 (6th Cir. 1988); and United States
v. Nicolet, Inc., 857 F.2d 202 (3 rd Cir. 1988).
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• Chao v. Hospital Staffing Services, Inc., 270 F.3d 374 (6th Cir.
2001). The Chao case involved the Department of Labor's filing of
a "hot goods" action under the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act to
prevent a Chapter 7 trustee from conducting the sale of the debtor's
assets in interstate commerce, reasoning that the debtor's assets
were produced by employees who were not compensated in
accordance with the minimum wage and overtime standard. The
Sixth Circuit adopted a two-prong test to determine whether the
police power exception to the automatic stay applied. These two
tests are:
1. Pecuniary purpose test. Under this test the court focuses
"on whether the governmental proceeding relates primary
to the protection of the government's pecuniary interest in
the debtor's property, and not to matters of public safety.
Those proceedings which relate primarily to matters of
public safety are excepted from stay." Chao at 385.
2. Public policy test. Under this test the court "must
distinguish between proceedings that adjudicate private
rights and those that effectuate public policy." Chao at
385-386.
The Chao court determined that the Department was
attempting to collect unpaid wages for the employees of the
debtor (or the private rights of third parties) and therefore
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the police power exception did not apply under the public
policy test.
It should be noted that Lodestar's argument for why the
police power exception did not apply was based on their
assertion that the Cabinet's actions to require adequate
bonding is primarily an action to preserve the private rights
and interests of the Commonwealth as a potential creditor
and not to effectuate a public policy. The Chao court did
not address this pecuniary interest argument in any detail as
it found that the government was not attempting to protect
its pecuniary interest in the debtor's property. Rather, the
Chao court looked to the public policy test and whether the
government's actions would result in a pecuniary advantage
to third private parties. Chao at 388-389.
• Safety-Kleen Incorporated v. Wyche, 274 F.3d 846 (4th Cir. 2001).
In this case the Fourth Circuit analyzed the question of whether
South Carolina's efforts to require Safety-Kleen to replace its
Frontier bonds on an operating landfill fell within the police power
exception set forth in Section 362(b)(4). The Fourth Circuit
conducted and extensive analysis of whether this was an action to
promote public safety and welfare or an action to protect the state's
pecuniary interest. In holding that South Carolina's actions fell
within the police power exception set forth· in Section 362(b)(4) the
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Fourth Circuit found that South Carolina's "financial assurance
regulations are within the regulatory exception because they serve
the primary purpose of deterring environmental misconduct."
Safety-Kleen at 866. The recent cases analyzing the police power
exception to the automatic stay make it clear that the reviewing
court should look to any legislative intent (In Kentucky the
importance of reclamation is addressed at KRS 350.020) and defer
to that legislative intent when making the determination as to
whether the Police Power Exception applies.
(b) Pre-Petition verses Post-Petition Obligations
In its oral findings of fact and conclusions of law the Bankruptcy Court
held that Lodestar's reclamation obligations were pre-petition matters and the Cabinet
was required to file a proof of claim. The Court cited no authority for this proposition.
The Cabinet's position on this matter is that Lodestar continues to operate its surface
mining permits and has an on-going post-petition reclamation obligation. Furthermore,
as demonstrated in this outline's discussion of the Quaker bankruptcy, the post-petition
reclamation of pre-petition disturbance is an administrative expense and not a pre-petition
claim. See: In re Wall Tube & Metal Products Co., 831 F.2d 118 (6th Cir. 1987); and In
re Coal Stripping, Inc., 222 B.R. 78 (Bankr. W.D. Penn. 1998).
(c) Violations of federal law and duty to comply with state law under 11
U.S.C., Section 959(b).
In its Motions, Lodestar argued that the threatened actions by the Cabinet
would violate 11 U.S.C., Section 363, 365, 507, 541 and the Supremacy Clause of the
E(c) - 24
United States Constitution. Section 363 deals with the use, sale or lease of property of
the estate; Section 365 deals with executory contracts and unexpired leases; Section 541
deals with property of the estate; and Section 507 deals with the priority scheme under
the Bankruptcy Code. In essence, Lodestar claims that the requirement to replace its
Frontier bonds or cease mining activities is an attempt to restructure the priority scheme
of the Bankruptcy Code. Furthermore, Lodestar also claims that the bonding requirement
improperly interferes with Lodestar's rights to use, sell or lease its property, and to
perform, assume, or assign its executory contracts, because bond replacement requires
Lodestar to devote its resources to that end. Lodestar further argued that the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution would be violated by the Cabinet in that the state law requiring
them to replace the Frontier bonds would reorder the priorities established by the
bankruptcy code.
The Cabinet's position is that the requirement that Lodestar replace its Frontier
bonds or cease operation would not violate any of these federal provisions. As already
discussed, the Cabinet believes that its actions clearly fall within the police power
exception to the automatic stay set forth in 11 U.S.C., Section 362(b)(4). As also
discussed above, Lodestar's reclamation obligation is not merely a pre-petition claim but
an ongoing post-petition matter that may be entitled to administrative expense status.
Finally, federal law (28 U.S.C. Section 959(b)) specifically requires that the debtor-in-
possession comply with valid state laws in the operation of its mine sites. This includes
maintaining adequate bonds on its mining permits. In light of this duty and the police
power exception to the automatic stay, the Cabinet believes that any impact that the
Frontier bond may have on its use, sale, or lease of assets, its executory contracts, and the
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property of the estate are appropriate and proper. Numerous courts have noted that a
debtor-in-possession is required to operate its ongoing business in compliance with state
law. See In re Baker & Drake, Inc., 35 F.3d 1348, 1353-1354 (9th Cir. 1994); Wilner
Wood Products v. State of Maine DEP, 128 B.R. 1 (D. Me. 1991); In re Security Gas &
Oil, Inc., 70 B.R. 786, 796 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1987); and In re Grace Coal Company, Inc.,
155 B.R. 5,6 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1993).
C. AEI Resources Holding, Inc. et al., Case Nos. 02-10150 through 02-10224
AEI Resources Holding, Inc. and 73 of its subsidiaries (AEI) filed prepackaged
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Petitions on February 28, 2002. One of the driving factors behind
AEI filing bankruptcy was the $533 million in Frontier bonds that AEI had
(approximately $360 million of these were reclamation bonds). AEI had been given
March deadlines by several governmental agencies including a March 1, 2002 deadline
by the Cabinet for replacing its Frontier bonds. Prior to filing its bankruptcy, AEI had
obtained commitments from companies to replace the Frontier bonds, and received
sufficient votes to get its plan confirmed by the Bankruptcy Court. On the same day that
it had filed its Bankruptcy Petitions, AEI also filed an adversary proceeding against
officials from OSM, Kentucky, Illinois, Indiana, Tennessee and West Virginia seeking a
preliminary injunction on the same basis as Lodestar had in its bankruptcy. However,
prior to the hearing on its Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, AEI reached an
agreement with all of the various government "agencies giving them an additional period
of time to get the substitute bonds in place. AEI subsequently replaced all of its Frontier
bonds, and on April 17, 2002 the Bankruptcy Court entered an Order confirming its Plan
of Reorganization.
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II. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
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CONUMONWEALTHOFKENTUCKY
DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE
Frankfort, Kentucky
In the Matter of:
Frontier Insurance Company
195 Lake Louise Marie Road
Rock Hill, New York 12775-8000
ORDER SUSPENDING CERTIFICATE of AUTHORITY
WHEREAS, KRS 304.3-190(1) empowers the Commissioner ofInsurance to
immediately suspend or revoke a foreign insurer's Certificate ofAuthority to transact
business in the Commonwealth ofKentucky, ifthe insur~'sCertificate ofAuthority is
suspended or revoked by its state or country ofdomicile;
WHEREAS, 806 KAR 3:150 empowers the Commissioner of Insurance to
immediately suspend the certificate ofauthority ofany insurer found to be in such
condition as to render the continuance of their business hazardous to policyholders.
creditors or the public; and,
WHEREAS, the Supreme Court ofNew York, New York County, has ordered
Frontier Insurance Company into rehabilitation, as ofAugust 27, 2001.
NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to KRS 304.190(1)(b) and (d), 806 KAR 3:150,
and all other applicable law IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. The Certificate ofAuthority of Frontier Insurance Company to transact
insurance business in Kentucky is suspended;
2. Frontier Insurance Company shall cease writing any and all new and
renewal business in Kentucky;
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3. All appointments of agents with Fronteir Insurance Company are
suspended.
Effective this a.1..f1..-day of~ . 2001.
A. MILLER, Commissioner
cky Department of Insurance
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that an accurate copy of this Order was served by first-class u.s.
mail, postage prepaid, on:
Attn: Mark H. Mishler, Pres. and Joseph P. Loughlin, Process Agent
Frontier Insurance Company
195 Lake Louise Marie Road
Rock Hill, New York 12775-8000
Liquidation Bureau
New York Department of Insurance
160 West Broadway
New York, New York 10013
this 2 7~ay of ,4'} \(.11- , 2001.
/Z~~~/!.?-
Russell R. Coy ll, Counsel
Kentucky Department of Insurance
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JAMES E. BICKFORD
SECRETARY
PAUL E. PATTON
GOVERNOR
NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION CABINET
OFFICE OF LEGAL SERVICES
BARBARA A. FOSTER
GENERAL COUNSEL
FIFTH FLOOR, CAPITAL PLAZA TOWER
FRANKFORT, KENTUCKY 40601
TELEPHCrfA5fE:564-5576
TELEFAX: 502-564-6131
Company
Address
City
CERTIFIED MAIL, RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED
RE: Replacement of Performance Bond Coverage
Permit Number(s) and Accompanying Frontier Insurance Company Bond Number(s):
Dear Permittee:
It has come to our attention that New York, the home state of Frontier Insurance
Company, has entered an "Order of Rehabilitation" as to this insurance company. As a
consequence thereof, the Kentucky Department of Insurance has suspended Frontier's Certificate
of Authority to do business in the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
As a result of the incapacity of Frontier Insurance Company, the performance bond(s)
which you filed for the above-referenced permit(s) is (are) inadequate and you are deemed to be
without performance bond coverage. You must obtain new performance bond coverage for the
above-referenced permit(s), including for all disturbances that have been made in connection
with each permit. You shall continue to be responsible u,nder the permit(s). Frontier Insurance
shall continue to remain liable on the existing bond(s) until you file a new performance bond(s)
with the Department for Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement.
This letter constitutes official notice that you must obtain new performance bond
coverage within ninety (90) days from the date of this letter. Pursuant to 405 KAR 10:030,
Section 2(5)(c)3, if an adequate replacement bond is not posted within ninety (90) days, you
shall: 1) cease coal extraction and coal processing operations; 2) comply with the provisions of
405 KAR 16:010, Section 6 (or 405 KAR 18:010, Section 4); and 3) immediately begin to
conduct reclamation operations in accordance with your reclamation plan. Coal extraction and
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Replacement of Performance Bond Coverage
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coal processing operations shall not resume until the Cabinet has determined that an acceptable
bond has been posted. Failure to comply with these requirements will result in the issuance of a
Notice ofNon-Compliance or Cessation Order.
Any new performance bond(s) obtained for the above-referenced permit(s) should be
filed with this office. If you have any questions, please contact Connie Downey at
(502) 564 2340.
Sincerely,
Mark W. Thompson, Director
Division of Field Services
MWT/cs
x: Permit Application File
Bond File
Office of Legal Services
Frontier Insurance Company
Gregory V. Serio, Superintendent of Insurance for the State of New York
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COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Kentucky Department of Insurance
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
BRANHAM & BAKER COAL COMPANY,
PANTHER LAND CORPORATION, and
MILLARD PROCESSING CORPORATION
v.
KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE
ORDER
PETITIONERS
RESPONDENT
WHEREAS, the New York Department of Insurance requested and
received approval from Frontier Insurance Company's Board of Directors to
proceed with voluntary rehabilitation, which action was filed into the New York
Supreme Courtt New York County on August 24,2001;
WHEREAS, the New York Department of Insurance was granted
temporary rehabilitation of Frontier Insurance Company on August 27,2001, and
all persons, with the excepti0r' of the New York Superintendent, were restrained
from taking possession of the company's assets and transacting its business;
WHEREAS, the Kentucky Department of Insurance issued an Order
suspending Frontier Insurance Company's certificate of authority to transact the
business of insurance within the Commonwealth on August 27, 2001, pursuant to
KRS 304.3-190 and 806 KAR 3:150; and
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WHEREAS, the Petitioners herein filed a Petition for Hearing under KRS
304.2-310 on October 11 t 2001 :
NOW, THEREFORE, as a basis for her Order. Janie A. Miller,
Commissioner, finds as follows:
1. The Petition for Hearing was not filed in good faith as it contains
material misstatements of law and fact. Specifically in paragraph 7(a).
Petitioners claim the Commissioner's suspension order was not issued "in
accordance with KRS Chapter 304 and corresponding regulations." In fact, the
statutory provision upon which the Commissioner relied in issuing her August
27th Order was KRS 304.3-190, entitled ceSuspension or evocation of certificate of
authority; mandatory grounds" (emphasis added.).
In paragraph 7(b), Petitioners remarkably claim that Frontier Insurance
Company ("Frontier') "does not have a 'deficiency of capital or surplus,' nor is the
continuance of Frontiers business in Kentucky 'hazardous to policyholders,
creditors or the pUblic' as Frontier meets minimum required capital and surplus
requirements required of insurers by KRS Chapter 304 [sic] and corresponding
regulations. and otherwise meets the requirement for a certificate of authority."
At the very least, a reasonable inquiry into the facts of this case an~ a review of
public documents would evidence such a statement to be baseless in fact.
Frontier was removed from the U.S. Department of Treasury's list of approved
sureties. due to its financial condition, on JUly 1t 2000. Additionally, immediately
following the seizure of Frontier by the New York Department of Insurance. the
two major insurer rating agencies substantially downgraded the company. On
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August 28, 2001, Standard & Poor's assigned an uR" rating to Frontier. following
a Credit Watch ratings withdrawal five months earlier and based on weakened
capitalization and weak earning levels. A..M. Best downgraded Frontier to an "E"
rating on August 30, 2001. on the basis of poor operating results, a massive
deterioration in overall capitalization and below-average liquidity, and following
repeated incremental downgrades through the prior five months. Finally, the
New York Department o~ Insurance included language in its annexed petition for
rehabilitation! filed in New York County1 New York, that it believed Frontier to be
insolvent.'
Paragraph 7(c) states that "Frontier's certificate of authority has not been
'suspended or revoked' by order of the New York Department of Insurance:'
Admittedly, while the New York Department of Insurance has n~t issued an order
suspending or revoking Frontier's certificate of authority in New York, the
Department has taken possession of the certificate of authority in the same
manner that the Department has taken possession of every other asset of the
insurer.
Finally, in paragraph 7(d), the Petitioners allege that the New York County
Supreme Court has "not ordered Frontjer into rehabilitation as of the date this
Petition was filed." In factt as eVidenced by Petitioners' Exhibit 1 to the Petition,
the Supreme Court of New York County. New York, has appointed the New York
Superintendent as temporary rehabilitator of Frontier as of August 27 t 2001 , and
in compliance with §7409 of the New York Insurance Law, as the proper manner
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to commence delinquency procee~ingsagainst an insurer within the state of New
York.
2. The Petitioners are not "aggrieved persons" as contemplated by
KRS 304.2-310(2)(b) and the Commissioner of Insurance is without the authority
to grant the relief requested by the Petitioners in the event they should
successfully prove their specious allegations. As the sole basis for considering
themselves to be "aggrieved" by the Commissioner's order suspending Frontier's
certificate of authority, the Petitioners state that replacement coverage, as
required by the Natural Resources & Environmental Protection Cabinet, will be
more costly or require collateral not presently required by Frontier.
The fact that a policyholder finds substitute coverage to be available at a
higher premium or collateral amount does not constitute a basis for considering
the person to be "aggrieved" under KRS 304.2..310(2)(b) and therefore eligible to
request an administrative hearing on the Commissioner's order and postpone the
effective date of the companyJs suspension. In fact, these "aggrieved"
Petitioners are precisely the consumers to be protected from the issuance of the
Commissioners suspension order to Frontier. If replacement coverage is priced
at premium and collateral levels sUbstantially different than was required by
Frontier, the value of the present coverage should be somewhat suspect.
Clearly, if Frontier is, or is found to be, insolvent, the coverage provided by
Frontier has only minimal value.
The seizure by New York, coupled with the Kentucky Department's
knowledge regarding the seriously hazardous financial condition of the company,
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required the Commissioner to suspenq the certificate of authority issued to
Frontier in Kentucky. Although this action is alleged to have "aggrieved" the
Petitioners, it was designed to allow policyholders to quickly replace their
coverage prior to the occurrence of a claim that could not be adequately covered
by Frontier. Also, the Kentucky Department of Insurance undertook all
incremental action possible. issuing an Agreed Order to cease writing all new
business on June 28, 2000, and an Order to cease writing all renewal business,
with the exception of in-force non-cancelable bonds. on March 28, 20014
Accordingly. policyholders of Frontier had more· than seventeen months notice
that the Kentucky Department was concerned about Frontier and they should
consider replacing their coverage.
Even assuming the Petitioners are truly Uaggrieved," the Kentucky
Department of Insurance has yet to require the replacement of the Petitioner's
bonds issued by Frontier. If the Petitioners are "aggrieved" by any action
described in their Petition, it would necessarily be the action of the Natural
Resources & Environmental Protection Cabinet in r~quiring th.e Frontier bonds to
be replaced within ninety dayst an action outside the purview of the
Commissioner of Insurance. Accordingly, in the event the Petitioners were
successful in proving each allegation contained in their Petition, the
Commissioner is without the authority to obviate the replacement reql:Jirement
issued by the Natural Resources cabinet pursuant to its regUlatory authority.
3. KRS 304.2-310(2)(b) is not applicable to the suspension of
certificates of authority as the controlling statute is KRS 304.3-190(2), which
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,limits the entity eligible to appeal an insurer's, certificate suspension to be only
the insurer. Additionally, KRS 304.3-190(2) further limits an insurers ability to
request an administrative hearing on its suspension to within twenty days of its
notice as provided by the Department of Insurance in cases without an
impairment of capital or surplus. Therefore, as KRS 304.2-310(2)(b) specifically
states:
Any application for a hearing shall be filed in the
department within sixty (60) days after the person
knew or reasonably should have known, of the act,
threatened act, failure, report, administrative
regulation, or order, unless a different period is
provided for by other laws applicable to the particular
matter, in which case the other law shan govern
(emphasis added.)
As the language contained in KRS 304.2-310(2)(b) clearly defers to a
more specific statute on the matter, KRS 304.3-190 controls in this instance.
Accordingly, only an insurer is eligible to request an administrative hearing on the
suspension of its certificate of authority, and as Frontier, under the management
and control of the New York Department, has failed to do so, a mere policyholder
is not entitled to delay the effective date of the suspension on the basiS that it
believes itself to be "aggrieved."
In addition, the Commissioner has discretion to suspend Frontier's
certificate of authority, without any notice or hearing. pendent to the action of the
New York Department, according to KRS 304.2-200(4).
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THEREFORE. pursuant to KRS 304.2-065~ KRS 304.2-310(4), KRS
304.3-190(2). KRS 304.99-015, 806 KAR 3:150, and all other applicable law, it is
hereby ORDERED that the Petition for Hearing filed on behalf of Branham &
Baker Coal Company, Panther. Land Corporation, and Millard Processing
Corporation is DENIED.
This is a final and appealable Order. with no just cause for delay.
Done and effective this~ day of October, 2001.
Certificate of Service
I certify that a COP(sfl; the foregoing Order was served, via U.S. mail,
postage prepaid. on this day of October, 2001, upon:
Martin J. Cunningham
Barbara Reid Hartung
Kelly A. Dant
Greenebaum Doll & McDonald PLLC
333 West Vine Street J Suite 1400
Lexington, KY 40601
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William T. Gorton III
Frontier Insurance Company
Stites & Harbison
250 West Main Street, Suite 2300
Lexington, KY 40507
Liquidation Bureau
New York Department of Insurance
160 West Broadway
New York, New York 10013
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tie Mix McPeak
nterim General Counsel
COMMONWEALTtl OF KENTUCKY
Kentucky Department of Insurance
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
AEI RESOURCES, INC.
v.
KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE
ORDER
PETITIONERS
RESPONDENT
WHEREAS. the New York Department of Insurance requested and
received approval from Frontier Insurance Company's Board of Directors to
proceed with voluntary rehabilitation, which actfon was filed into the New York
Supreme Court, New York County on August 24, 2001 ;
~HEREAS, the New York Department of Insurance was granted
temporary rehabilitation of Frontier Insurance Company ("Frontier") on August
27. 2001, and all persons, with the exception of the New York Superintendent,
were restrained from taking possession of the company's assets and transactfng
its business;
WHEREAS, the Kentucky Department of Insurance Issued an Order
suspending Frontier Insurance Company's certificate of authority to transact the
business of insurance within the Commonwealth on August 27, 2001, pursuant to
KRS 304.3-190 and 806 KAR 3:150;
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WHEREAS, ~e Superintendent of the New York Department of Insurance
was named Rehabilttator of Frontier by the New York County Supreme Court on
~ober15,2001;and
WHEREAS, Petitioner herein filed a Petition for Hearing under KRS 304.2-
310 on OCtober 26, 2001;
NOW, THEREFORE, as a basis for her Order, Janie A. Miller,
Commissioner, finds as follows:
1. The Petition for Hearing does not challenge the Commlssione(s
authority and obligation to enter the Order of Suspension regarding Frontier, only
the effect and interpretation of the Order of Suspension.
2. The Commissioner has neither Interpreted the Order of Suspension
to reqUire Frontier to cancel the Insurance policies and bonds presently in-force,
nor has the Commissioner required any policyholder or bondholder of Frontier to
replace its coverage with another carrier.
3. By letter dated November 2, 2001, the Kentucky Department of
Insurance has notified Frontier, through its rehabilitator, that it acknowledges the
Order .of Rehabilitation entered by the New York County Supreme Court.
Further, the Department recognizes that It Is precluded from taking any·
enforcement action against Frontier pursuant to the rehabilitation order, should
the company choose to collect premium from Kentucky Insureds during the
period of suspension. A copy of the Departments letter to Frontier Is attached as
Exhibit 1.
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4. Petitioner's, request for an administrative hearing was premised on
the Departmenfs Interpretation of Frontier's suspension order and the
interpretation has been resolved as requested by the Petitioner.
Now, THEREFORE, pursuant to KRS 304.2-065, KRS 304.2-310(4), KRS
304.3-190(2), KRS 304.99-015, 806 KAR 3:150, and all other applicable law, It Is
hereby ORDERED that the Petition for Hearing filed on behalf of AEI Resources
Is DENIED.
This Is a final and appealable Order, with no Just cause for delay.
~
Done and effective this:;" day of November, 2001.
E A. MILLER, COMMISSIONER
ky Department of Insurance
Certificate of Service
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order was s8lVed, via U.S. mall,
postage prepaid, on this 'bL day of November, 2001, upon:
Denise H. McClelland
Frost Brown Todd LlC
2700 Financial Center
Lexington. KY 40507-1749
And
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Janet Craig
William T. Gorton III
Frontier Insurance Company
Stites & HarbISon
250 West Main Street, Suite 23O(j
Lexington, KY 40507
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J e Mix McPeak
er1m General Counsel
SURVEY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS
Patricia L. Dugger
Director, DEEM
Lexington Fayette Urban County Government
Lexington, Kentucky
Copyright 2002. Patricia L. Dugger. All rights reserved.
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SURVEY OF LOCAL
;q;GOVERNMENTAL
519102
Who has local environmentalla\vs
What type of issues are regulated at the
local level
\Vhy regulate environmental issues at the
local level
2
• tvlany local jurisdictions are \vanting to have
input in various issues that directly affect their
communities
• It is important to understand what communities
feel are important to them and what the impact of
complying \vith these ordinances nlean
Examples of what is out there at the local level
SURVEY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS
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Owensboro
Paducah
Hopkinsville
Florence
Covington
Boone County
• Northern K·Y
Louisville
Ohio River
Lexington
County health departments \vith an
environmental section
• Storm\vater Drainage Municipal Code
Chapter 26 Article VII
Certain acts or conditions that afft'Ct
srormwater
Obstructions and or encroachments
Definitions
Penalties
SURVEY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS
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• Hazardous Materials Municipal Code
Chapter 10 Article III
Definitions
Preplamling
Telllporary storage .... .'
Handler or
user responsibility
• Hazardolls Materials Municipal Code
Chapter 10 .Article III Continued
Authority to respond to release
Costs recovery
Enforcement
Penalties
• Chapter XII Fire Prevention Storage of
Hazardous Substances and response to
• Chapter XXIII Water and Se\ver
• Chapter XXVI Public Trees
ff Community Tree Advisory Board
Tree topping, m.aintenance and remova.l
• Chapter XXI Streets and Side\valks
X* Control of erosion and filling or obstruction of
natural drainage crevices
Sinkholes, ditches and known subterranean \vater
channels
SURVEY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS
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Vegetation Chapter 118Article II
Trees on public property
City Forester
Street tree species and spacing
w; Public tree care, topping, pruning
License of tree care business
~ Appeals
10
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".x~.
~/~
'«<~*.:@f~"> x
-'<yq<"H,/.;y I-
j ~ "':' ",,~:'
Land Usage Title XV
Chapter 155 Storm\vater Management and
Control
Sinkhole
Subterranean
Water Chamlcls
Requirelnents for developers
Ohio .River Valley \Vater Sanitation Commission
COlnpact signed in 1948 by the governors of
Illinois, Indiana, K.entucky, New' York, PA,
Virginia, Ohio and West Virginia
• Purpose To ensure that all \vaters in the disttict
be placed and maintained in a satisfactory,
sanitary condition, available for certain beneficial
uses
12
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• Metropolitan Sewer District (MSD)
Wastewater Discharge Regulations
Hazardous Materials ()rdinance
Industrial COlupliance and J\.lonitoring
Water Quality
Erosion Prevention & Sediment Control
Ordinance
13
Louisville MS.D
• Hazardous Materials Title IX Chapter 99
Definitions
Reporting requirenlents
Notil1cation,
Cleanup
Enforcement
Penalties
• Development Code (Zoning and Subdivision
regulations)
• Currently in the process of revie\ving and
updating the code to be in cOll1pliance with the
2020 Comprehensive Land Use Plan
• Land Developlllent Code Oversight Committees
is overseeing the process ofrevising the code
• Code revisions \vill be release in sections and
each \vi11 have a public hearing
• Envirolllnental assessment for development on
s/9/0zenvironm.entally constrained sites 15
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ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS
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Development on steep slopes and unstable
soil
Tree canopy regulations
Outdoor Lighting
Air Pollution Control District
> 50 years, Citizen board appointed by Mayor
and County Judge
Goals:
to ensure healthy air
assist local entities to meet air emission standards
Responsibilities:
Pennits
NIonitoring, Louisville
Air Pollution control .District
City of Florence
• Trees Title IX Chapter 99
Definition
Pemlissions
Exceptions
Review of development plans
Notification of tree injury
;f~ Tree planting criteria
Tree classi fications, penalties
Establishment of Urban Forest Commission
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ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS
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!?.@ Provide for use, possession and control of all
stonn and surface water drainage Jacilities
Maintenance, operation and managetnent of
said system
Establish a reasonable Storm \-Vater Service
Charge
19
Hazardous Materials Title IX Chapter 95
DefInitions
Reportable quantities
Permit !1)r a release
'Notification and response authority
Liability for costs, confidential information
Inspections, enJbrcement
20
• Sanitation and Health
Unifonn litter control
Transportation of hazardous waste
Hazardous nlaterials spills
• Zoning Code
Excavation, movement of soil, tree renl0val,
erosion and sedinlcntation control
21
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Northern Kentucky
• Boone, Campbell and Kenton Counties
• Vehicle Emissions Testing Program
Began in Sept. 1999
Deal with ground level ozone or snlog
Testing is required very other year
Exenlpt vehicles < 1968, alternately fueled
vehicles, gross vehicle weight> 18,000 lbs.
Cost 20$
Lexington -Fayette County
• Hazardous Materials Ordinance Chapter
16A
UGST regulations for petroleum
lJSGT for nonpetToleu111
UGST J.brfann petroleunl tanks
• Mining and Quarrying
• Public Nuisances
• Se\vage, Garbage, Refuse and Weeds
Lexington. - Fayette County
• Zoning
• Streets and Sidewalks
• Subdivision
SURVEY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL
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Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention
• Environlnental Health Education
• Food Service
Hazardous Materials
Mosquito Control
• Residential Housing
• S\viln"ming Polls
• \Vastewater managenlent
Water Quality
Public Facilities
Many locales have environmental
ordinances or regulations
• Look in unusual areas
• Talk to health depts, building inspectors,
zoning commissions, and others to
determine iflocal regulations exists
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to Get More Information
Search any municipality Code of
Ordinances for the follo\ving key \vords:
EnvironUlent
~ I-Iazardous
Trees
Sinkholes
Erosion
SURVEY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS
28
F-IO
SMART GROWTH ISSUES
Lloyd R. ("Rusty'') Cress, Jr.
Greenebaum Dol1-& McDonald PLLC
Frankfort and Lexington, Kentucky
Deborah A. Bilitski
Assistant Jefferson County Attorney
Louisville, Kentucky
Robert M. Weiss
Homebuilders Association ofKentucky
Frankfort, Kentucky
Copyright 2002. Cress, Bilitski, Weiss. All rights reserved.
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REDEVELOPING BROWNFIELDS:
Smart Growth Tools In Kentucky
Lloyd R. ("Rusty'') Cress, Jr.
Greenebaum Doll & McDonald PLLC
Frankfort and Lexington, Kentucky
Copyright 2002. Lloyd R. Cress, Jr. All rights reserved.
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REDEVELOPING BROWNFIELDS: SMART
GROWTH TOOLS IN KENTUCKY
The Kentucky Voluntary Environmental Remediation Act ("VERA") was passed by the
2001 General Assembly. The bill establishes a much needed "BrownfieldsNoluntary Remediation"
program, which will foster environmental cleanup and spur redevelopment ofidled and abandoned
properties.
I. Purpose.
A. The law states that it is "intended to establish an efficient and predictable process ...
to promote voluntary cleanup and redevelopment of properties suspected of
environmental contamination ... while stimulating economic development and job
creation through the construction of new residential, commercial, and industrial
facilities." KRS 224.01-510.
B. The law creates a "shell" within which existing environmental remediation statutes
may be inserted, and, if followed, results in the issuance of a covenant not to sue.
II Benefits ofNew Program.
A. Voluntary Environmental Remediation Program ("VERP") provides property owners
with certainty in:
1. Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet remediation review
time lines; and,
2. Level of comfort following completion of remediation activities, without
stymieing remediation management at site.
B. Does not create new technical requirements - merely a process for receiving a
covenant not to sue.
III Existing Remedial Statutes.
A. KRS 224.01-400.
1. Any person possessing or controlling a hazardous substance, pollutant, or
contaminant which is released to the environment, or any person who caused
a release to the environment of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or
contaminant, shall characterize the extent of the release as necessary to
determine the effect ofthe release on the environment, and shall take actions
necessary to correct the effect of the release on the environment.
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2. Four options:
a. Demonstrating that no action is necessary to protect human health,
safety, and the environment;
b. Managing the release in a manner that controls and minimizes the
harmful effects of the release and protects human health, safety, and
the environment, provided that the management may include any
existing or proposed engineering or institutional controls and the
maintenance of those controls;
c. Restoring the environment through the removal of the hazardous
substance pollutant or contaminant; or,
d. Any combination ofparagraphs (a), (b), and (c).
3. No real finality associated with final determination.
B. KRS 224.01-405.
1. For releases of petroleum or petroleum products from sources other than
petroleum storage tanks, any person who owns or operates the source from
which the release occurred or any person who caused the release shall
characterize the extent of the release as necessary to determine the effect of
the release on the environment and shall perform corrective action.
2. Corrective action means those actions necessary to protect human health,
safety, and the environment, and includes: remedial actions to clean up
contaminated media; actions to address residual effects after initial corrective
action is taken; actions to restore or replace potable water supplies; and
actions necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate a release, as well as actions
necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the effectiveness of remedial
action.
3. Until regulations are promulgated, same options available under KRS 224.01-
400 are available.
4. No real finality.
C. Historical effort to provide finality - 224.01-450 - 465.
1. In 1996, the legislature created a law providing for the issuance of a No
Further Remediation Letter to a public entity for a site when a remediation
plan has been successfully completed.
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2. Letter intended to signify a release from further responsibilities for a
remediation plan approved under KRS 224.01-460 and any further
responsibilities under KRS 224.01-400 to undertake any other remedial
action on the site.
3. Well-intended, but ineffective - not available for private lands and scarcely
utilized by public entities.
IV 2001 Senate Bill 2 (Codified at KRS 224.01-510 - 532).
A. Establishes VERP - applies to sites under KRS 224.01-400 and KRS 224.01-405.
B. Ineligible sites.
1. The property is part of or contains a site which is on the National Priorities
List established by the United States Environmental Protection Agency;
2. The property is part of or contains a hazardous waste treatment, storage, or
disposal facility for which a permit has been issued, or the site is otherwise
the subject ofhazardous waste closure or corrective action pursuant to KRS
224.46-520 or KRS 224.46-530;
3. The property or site is the subject of state or federal environmental
enforcement action relating to the release, for which the application is
submitted; or
4. The property or site presents an environmental emergency, as defined in KRS
224.01-400.
C. Program requirements.
1. Application must include:
a. Form provided on Superfund Branch web page
(http://www.nr.state.ky.us/nrepc/dep/waste/programs/sf/vcpguide.h
tm)
b. Filing fee:
1. Site size up to 3 acres = $1,000.
11. Site size 3 - 10 acres = $2,500.
iii. Site size greater than 10 acres = $3,500.
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IV. Possible fee waiver.
c. Characterization Plan - Identify any hazardous substance and any
petroleum released or believed to be released to the environment at
the site and provide a characterization plan for the releases or
threatened releases adequate to comply with KRS 224.01-400,
224.01-405, 224.01-510 to 224.01-532, and any administrative
regulations promulgated pursuant thereto.
d. Public notice.
1. Upon filing ofapplication, the applicant shall notify the chief
executive of local governmental units in which the property
or site that is the subject ofthe application is located and shall
provide the chief executives with a copy of the application.
11. Publish notice of the application in the newspaper of largest
circulation in the county in which the site is located.
e. NREPC time for approval or disapproval - 45 days.
2. Voluntary Remediation Agreed Order includes:
J
!
Ij
J
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
Agreement to identify and characterize releases at site and submit
characterization report.
Agreement to submit corrective action plan and final report which
certifies that the work has been completed in accordance with the
Corrective Action Plan.
Listing ofcosts to be reimbursed to cabinet for oversight and review
and a payment schedule (costs must be reasonable, actual, and
necessary).
Definite remediation schedule.
Agreement that applicant may withdraw from agreed order prior to
issuance of covenant not to sue (must pay Cabinet costs).
Other prOVISIons necessary to protect human health and the
environment.
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3. Work plans set forth in Agreed Order must be completed.
a. Submittal ofSite Characterization Report and Corrective Action Plan
(120 days from entry of Agreed Order) - Site characterization and
corrective action must comply with KRS 224.01-400 and KRS
224.01-405.
b. Must include plan of action to inform public of remediation and
provide for public comment.
c. NREPC review ofplan (120 days).
d. Reasons Cabinet may disapprove Corrective Action Plan:
1. Failure to comply with KRS 224.01-400 and KRS 224.01-
405.
11 Failure to respond to request for information.
e. Implementation of plan on approved schedule.
f. Corrective Action Completion Report.
4. Public notice and participation (includes notice of activities, availability of
information, and opportunity for comment).
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
Publish notice of application in newspaper.
Notification to local government unit officials offiling ofapplication,
along with providing copy of application.
Notification to local government unit of corrective action plan.
Publish notice ofCorrective Action Plan and request for comment in
newspaper.
30-day comment period and possible public hearing.
Property sign stating that property is undergoing remediation and
location of information.
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g. Documents to be maintained in local public library:
1. Agreed Order;
11. Characterization Plan;
111. Characterization Report;
IV. Corrective Action Plan;
v. Corrective Action Completion Report;
VI. Notices of Deficiency and responses thereto;
VII. Covenant not to sue.
D. Covenant not to sue.
1. Covers releases identified in Corrective Action Plan for:
a. No further remediation.
!
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2.
b. Prosecution of civil or administrative enforcement for:
1. Failure to perform remediation under state and federal law;
11. Injunctive relief;
111. Lien assertion;
IV. Reimbursement of costs;
v. Civil penalties.
Does not cover:
a. Releases not identified in Corrective Action Plan;
b. Failure to comply with Agreed Order or plans required;
c. Exacerbation of releases;
d. Criminal liability;
e. Underground storage tanks;
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f. Misrepresentation or intentional omissions;
g. Conditions not known to the Cabinet which prevent remedy from
being protective;
h. Changes in scientific knowledge indicating that remedy is no longer
protective;
1. Environmental emergencies;
J. Natural Resource Damages under CERCLA.
Screening levels and remediation standards (applicable to all sites, whether
participating in VERP or not).
1. Use of U.S. EPA Region 9 Preliminary Remediation Goals as screening
levels.
2. Promulgation of remediation standards.
a. Residential "walk-away" standards.
b. Tiered remediation standards based upon land use.
c. Continued availability of existing standards and procedures.
Moneys expended under program are qualifying costs under:
1. Economic development laws;
2. Infrastructure projects.
Agricultural Warehousing Sites Cleanup Fund
1. Creates "The Agricultural Warehousing Sites Cleanup Fund" to be
administered by the Cabinet for Economic Development.
1
1
2. The purpose ofthe agricultural warehousing sites cleanup fund is to provide
financial assistance to persons who did not cause or contribute to the
contamination on property used for agricultural warehousing activity, and
who propose to undertake a voluntary cleanup of the property.
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3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
The financial assistance shall be in an amount ofup to seventy-five percent
(75%) of the costs incurred for completing an environmental study and
implementing a cleanup plan by an eligible applicant.
Financial assistance may be in the form ofgrants or low-interest loans, to be
lent at a rate not to exceed two percent (2%).
Loans may be made to the following categories of applicants:
a. Local economic development agencies;
b. Political subdivisions or their instrumentalities; and
c. Other persons determined to be eligible by the Cabinet for Economic
Development.
The Cabinet for Economic Development is required to take all of the
following factors into consideration when determining which applicants shall
receive financial assistance:
a. The benefit of the remedy to human health, safety, and the
environment;
b. The permanence of the remedy;
c. The cost-effectiveness of the remedy in comparison with other
alternatives;
d. The financial condition of the applicant;
e. The financial or economic distress ofthe area in which the cleanup is
being conducted; and
f. The potential for economic development.
Loans may be made based upon the ability to repay from future revenue to be
derived from the cleanup, by a mortgage or other collateral, or on any other
fiscal matters which the Cabinet for Economic Development deems
appropriate.
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Conservation easements in general.
KRS 382.800(1) defines a conservation easement as "a nonpossessory interest of a holder
in real property imposing limitations or affirmative obligations, the purposes of which include
retaining or protecting natural, scenic, or open-space values of real property, assuring its
availability for agricultural, forest, recreational, or open-space use, protecting natural resources,
maintaining or enhancing air or water quality, or preserving the historical, architectural,
archaeological, or cultural aspects of real property."
A "holder" is defined as "(a) A governmental body empowered to hold an interest in real
property under the laws of this state or the United States; or (b) A charitable corporation,
charitable association, or charitable trust, the purposes or powers of which include retaining or
protecting the natural, scenic, or open-space values of real property, assuring the availability of
real property for agricultural, forest, recreational, or open-space use, protecting natural resources,
maintaining or enhancing air or water quality, or preserving the historical, architectural,
archaeological, or cultural aspects of real property." KRS 382.800(2)
Two valuable uses of a conservation easement.
• Land conservation
• Estate planning/tax benefits
In order to qualify for federal tax benefits, a conservation easement must meet the requirements
of §170(h) of the Internal Revenue Code:
(1) A "qualified conservation contribution" means a contribution-
(A) of a qualified real property interest,
(B) to a qualified organization,
(C) exclusively for conservation purposes.
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(2) A qualified real property interest means any of the following:
(A) the entire interest of the donor other than a qualified mineral interest,
(B) a remainder interest, and
(C) a restriction granted in perpetuity on the use which may be made of the real
property.
(3) A qualified organization means generally a governmental entity or a 501(c)(3)
charitable organization in the conservation or historic preservation field (see §170(h)(3)
for specific provisions).
(4) Conservation purpose means -
(A) (i) the preservation of land for outdoor recreation by, or the education of, the
general public,
(ii) the protection of a relatively natural habitat of fish, wildlife, or plants or
similar ecosystem,
(iii) the preservation of open space (including farmland or forest land) where such
preservation is for the scenic enjoyment of the general public, or pursuant to a
clearly delineated Federal, State, or local governmental conservation policy, and
will yield a significant public benefit, or
(iv) the preservation of an historically important land area or a certified historic
structure.
(5) A contribution of a conservation easement shall not be treated as exclusively for
conservation purposes unless the conservation purpose is protected in perpetuity.
Tax Benefits.
Income tax deduction: A charitable deduction on income tax may be taken for the gift of
a conservation easement that meets the requirements of §170(h) of the Internal Revenue Code up
to 30% ofdonor's income for the year (5-year carryforward).
• In addition to the income tax benefit of donating a qualified conservation
easement, the donor's estate tax will be less because the value of the land
included in the decedent's estate is reduced by the value of the conservation
easement.
• In the case of conservation contributions made after February 13, 1986, no
deduction will be permitted under §170 for an interest in property which is subject
to a mortgage unless the mortgagee subordinates its rights in the property to the
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right of the qualified organization to enforce the conservation purposes of the gift
in perpetuity." Treas. Reg. §1.170A-14(g)(2).
Estate tax deduction: If a conservation easement is donated by will or the executor is
authorized by will to donate an easement, a deduction on federal estate taxes may be taken for
the gift of a conservation easement that meets the requirements of §170(h). See §2055(f). A gift
by will is fully deductible, not subject to the 30% of income rule.
Additional estate tax benefit - §203I(c): Up to 40% of the value of land subject to
conservation easement may be excluded from the decedent's estate if the easement meets the
requirements of §2031(c) of the Internal Revenue Code.
(1) Land must be located in or within 25 miles of an area which is
a metropolitan area (as defined by the Office of Management
and Budget) or a National Park or Wilderness Area, or within
10 miles of an Urban National Forest (as designated by the
Forest Service.
(2) The easement must meet the requirements of §170(h).
(3) The land must be owned by the decedent or a member of the
decedent's family·for at least 3 years immediately prior to the
decedent's death.
(4) The easement must have been donated by the decedent or a
member of the decedent's family or the executor.
(5) The easement must prohibit more than a de minimus use for a
commercial recreational activity.
Valuation of the gift of a conservation easement.
The value of the charitable contribution of a conservation easement is the fair market
value of the conservation restriction at the time of the contribution. Treas. Reg. §I.170A-
14(h)(3)(i).
(1) If there is a substantial record of sales of easements comparable to the
donated easement (such as purchases pursuant to a governmental
program), the fair market value of the donated easement is based on the
sales prices of such comparable easements. Id.
(2) If no substantial record of market-place sales is available to use as a valid
comparison, as a general rule the fair market value of a perpetual
conservation restriction is equal to the difference between the fair market
value of the property it encumbers before the granting of the restriction
and the fair market value of the encumbered property after the granting of
the restriction. Id.
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.:. If, as a result of the donation of a perpetual conservation restriction,
the donor or a related person receives, or can reasonably expect to
receive, financial or economic benefits that are greater than those that
will inure to the general public from the transfer, no deduction is
allowable under §170. Thus, a deduction most likely will not be
allowed to a developer who donates an easement in exchange for, or as
a condition to, development approval. Id.
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KRS 382.800 - 382.990
382.800 Definitions.
As used in KRS 382.810 to 382.860, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) "Conservation easement" means a nonpossessory interest of a holder in real property
imposing limitations or affinnative obligations, the purposes of which include retaining or
protecting natural, scenic, or open-space values of real property, assuring its availability for
agricultural, forest, recreational, or open-space use, protecting natural resources, maintaining or
enhancing air or water quality, or preserving the historical, architectural, archaeological, or
cultural aspects of real property.
(2) "Holder" means:
(a) A governmental body empowered to hold an interest in real property under the laws of this
state or the United States; or
(b) A charitable corporation, charitable association, or charitable trust, the purposes or powers of
which include retaining or protecting the natural, scenic, or open-space values of real property,
assuring the availability of real property for agricultural, forest, recreational, or open-space use,
protecting natural resources, maintaining or enhancing air or water quality, or preserving the
historical, architectural, archaeological, or cultural aspects of real property.
(3) "Third-party right of enforcement" means a right provided in a conservation easement to
enforce any of its tenns granted to a governmental body, charitable corporation, charitable
association, or charitable trust, which, although eligible to be a holder, is not a holder.
Effective: July 15, 1988
History: Created 1988 Ky. Acts ch. 251, sec. 1, effective July 15,1988.
382.810 Creation -- Acceptance and recordation necessary -- Duration -- Preexisting
property interest.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in KRS 382.810 to 382.860, a conservation easement may be
created, conveyed, recorded, assigned, released, modified, tenninated, or otherwise altered or
affected in the same manner as other easements.
(2) No right or duty in favor of or against a holder and no right in favor of a person having a
third-party right of enforcement shall arise under a conservation easement before its acceptance
by the holder and a recordation of the acceptance.
(3) Except as provided in KRS 382.820(2), a conservation easement shall be unlimited in
duration unless the instrument creating it otherwise provides.
(4) An interest in real property in existence at the time a conservation easement is created shall
not be impaired by it unless the owner of the interest is a party to the conservation easement or
consents to it.
Effective: July 15, 1988
History: Created 1988 Ky. Acts ch. 251, sec. 2, effective July 15, 1988.
382.820 Actions affecting easements.
(1) An action affecting a conservation easement may be brought by:
(a) An owner of an interest in the real property burdened by the easement;
(b) A holder of the easement;
(c) A person having a third-party right of enforcement; or
(d) A person authorized by other law.
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(2) KRS 382.810 to 382.860 shall not affect the power of a court to modify or terminate a
conservation easement in accordance with the principles of law and equity.
Effective: July 15, 1988
History: Created 1988 Ky. Acts ch. 251, sec. 3, effective July 15, 1988.
382.830 Validity of easement.
A conservation easement shall be valid even though:
(1) It is not appurtenant to an interest in real property;
(2) It can be or has been assigned to another holder;
(3) It is not of a character that has been recognized traditionally at common law;
(4) It imposes a negative burden;
(5) It imposes affirmative obligations upon the owner of an interest in the burdened property or
upon the holder;
(6) The benefit does not touch or concern real property; or
(7) There is no privity ofestate or of contract.
Effective: July 15, 1988
History: Created 1988 Ky. Acts ch. 251, sec. 4, effective July 15, 1988.
382.840 Applicability and effect.
(1) KRS 382.800 to 382.860 shall apply to any interest created after July 15, 1988, which
complies with KRS 382.800 to 382.860, whether designated as a conservation easement or as a
covenant, equitable servitude, restriction, easement, or otherwise.
(2) KRS 382.800 to 382.860 shall apply to any interest created before July 15, 1988, if it would
have been enforceable had it been created after July 15, 1988, unless retroactive application
contravenes the constitution or laws of this state or the United States.
(3) KRS 382.800 to 382.860 shall not invalidate any interest, whether designated as a
conservation or preservation easement or as a covenant, equitable servitude, restriction,
easement, or otherwise, that is enforceable under other law of this state.
Effective: July 15, 1988
History: Created 1988 Ky. Acts ch. 251, sec. 5, effective July 15,1988.
382.850 Transfer of easement -- Effect on mining operations and on eminent domain
powers.
(1) A conservation easement shall not be transferred by owners of property in which there are
outstanding subsurface rights without the prior written consent of the owners of the subsurface
rights.
(2) A conservation easement shall not operate to limit, preclude, delete or require waivers for the
conduct of coal mining operations, including the transportation of coal, upon any part or all of
adjacent or surrounding properties; and shall not operate to impair or restrict any right or power
of eminent domain created by statute, and all such rights and powers shall be exercisable as if the
conservation easement did not exist.
Effective: July 15, 1988
History: Created 1988 Ky. Acts ch. 251, sec. 6, effective July 15,1988.
382.860 Application and construction -- Uniformity of interpretation.
KRS 382.800 to 382.860 shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general purpose to make
uniform the laws with respect to conservation easements among states enacting them.
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Effective: July 15, 1988
History: Created 1988 Ky. Acts ch. 251, sec. 7, effective July 15,1988.
382.990 Penalties.
(1) Any grantor of a deed or any holder of a note who lodges for record a deed, instrument, or
deed assigning a note or a deed of release or an. instrument wherein there is a release, and any
county clerk or deputy county clerk who receives and permits to be lodged for record any such
instrument or deed contrary to the provisions of KRS 382.110, 382.120, 382.290, or 382.360,
shall be guilty of a violation; the clerk or deputy who actually receives and files the instrument
for record shall incur the penalty, but no clerk or deputy shall be fined because of any false or
erroneous statement in the instrument filed.
(2) Any person who willfully and fraudulently makes affidavit to any statement mentioned in
KRS 382.120, which is false, knowing the statement to be false, shall be guilty of a Class A
misdemeanor, and in addition shall be liable to any person who may be injured by the making,
filing, recording, or use of the affidavit.
(3) Any person who causes to be recorded in a county clerk's office a deed, deed of trust, or
mortgage in violation of KRS 382.330, or fails to file the statement required by KRS 382.380,
shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.
(4) Any county clerk who records a deed or mortgage in violation ofKRS 382.330 shall be guilty
of a violation.
(5) Any county clerk who, by himself or deputy, fails to perform any duty enjoined upon him by
any of the provisions ofKRS 382.110, 382.160, 382.180 to 382.200,382.210,382.250,382.300
to 382.320, 382.360, or 382.370 shall be guilty of a violation.
(6) Any person who knowingly and intentionally gives a false name or address in any instrument
or assignment mentioned in KRS 382.430, shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.
(7) Any county clerk who fails to perfonn his duties under KRS 382.430, shall be guilty of a
violation.
(8) Any person who willfully and fraudulently gives a false statement as to the full actual
consideration of property or the full estimated value under KRS 382.135, shall be guilty of a
Class D felony.
Effective: July 14, 1992
History: Amended 1992 Ky. Acts ch. 463, sec. 44, effective July 14, 1992. -- Amended
1990 Ky. Acts ch. 411, sec. 5, effective July 13, 1990. -- Recodified 1942 Ky. Acts
ch. 208, sec. 1, effective October 1, 1942, from Ky. Stat. secs. 495, 495a-3,
498, 498a, 511a-3, 522, 4051a.
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Internal Revenue Code
26 U.S.C. 170
Sec. 170. - Charitable, etc., contributions and gifts
(h) Qualified conservation contribution
(1) In general
For purposes of subsection (f)(3)(B)(iii), the term "qualified conservation
contribution" means a contribution -
(A) of a qualified real property interest,
(B) to a qualified organization,
(C) exclusively for conservation purposes.
(2) Qualified real property interest
For purposes of this subsection, the term "qualified real property interest"
means any of the following interests in real property:
(A) the entire interest of the donor other than a qualified mineral interest,
(B) a remainder interest, and
(C) a restriction (granted in perpetuity) on the use which may be made of the
real property.
(3) Qualified organization
For purposes of paragraph (1), the term "qualified organization" means an
organization which -
(A) is described in clause (v) or (vi) of subsection (b)(l)(A), or
(B) is described in section SOl(c)(3) and -
(i) meets the requirements of section S09(a)(2), or (ii) meets the
requirements of section S09(a)(3) and is controlled by an organization
described in subparagraph (A) or in clause (i) of this subparagraph.
(4) Conservation purpose defined
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(A) In general
For purposes of this subsection, the term "conservation purpose"
means -
(i) the preservation of land areas for outdoor recreation by, or the
education of, the general public,
(ii) the protection of a relatively natural habitat of fish, wildlife, or plants,
or similar ecosystem,
(iii) the preservation of open space (including farmland and forest land)
where such preservation is -
(I) for the scenic enjoyment of the general public, or
(II) pursuant to a clearly delineated Federal, State, or local
governmental conservation policy, and will yield a significant public
benefit, or
(iv) the preservation of an historically important land area or a certified
historic structure.
(B) Certified historic structure
For purposes of subparagraph (A)(iv), the term "certified historic
structure" means any building, structure, or land area which -
(i) is listed in the National Register, or
(ii) is located in a registered historic district (as defined in section
47(c)(3)(B)) and is certified by the Secretary of the Interior to the
Secretary as being of historic significance to the district.
A building, structure, or land area satisfies the preceding sentence if it
satisfies such sentence either at the time of the transfer or on the due date
(including extensions) for filing the transferor's return under this chapter for the
taxable year in which the transfer is made.
(5) Exclusively for conservation purposes
For purposes of this subsection -
(A) Conservation purpose must be protected
A contribution shall not be treated as exclusively for conservation
purposes unless the conservation purpose is protected in perpetuity.
(B) No surface mining permitted
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(i) In general
Except as provided in clause (ii), in the case of a contribution of any
interest where there is a retention of a qualified mineral interest,
subparagraph (A) shall not be treated as met if at any time there
may be extraction or removal of minerals by any surface mining
method.
(ii) Special rule
With respect to any contribution of property in which the ownership
of the surface estate and mineral interests has been and remains
separated, subparagraph (A) shall be treated as met if the
probability of surface mining occurring on such property is so
remote as to be negligible.
(6) Qualified mineral interest
For purposes of this subsection, the term "qualified mineral interest"
means -
(A) subsurface oil, gas, or other minerals, and
(8) the right to access to such minerals.
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Internal Revenue Code
26 U.S.C. 2031
Sec. 2031. - Definition of gross estate
(a) General
The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by including to
the extent provided for in this part, the value at the time of his death of all property,
real or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated.
(b) Valuation of unlisted stock and securities
In the case of stock and securities of a corporation the value of which, by reason
of their not being listed on an exchange and by reason of the absence of sales
thereof, cannot be determined with reference to bid and asked prices or with
reference to sales prices, the value thereof shall be determined by taking into
consideration, in addition to all other factors, the value of stock or securities of
corporations engaged in the same or a similar line of business which are listed on an
exchange.
(e) Estate tax with respect to land subject to a qualified conservation easement
(1) In general
If the executor makes the election described in paragraph (6), then, except
as otherwise provided in this subsection, there shall be excluded from the gross
estate the lesser of -
(A) the applicable percentage of the value of land subject to a qualified
conservation easement, reduced by the amount of any deduction under section
2055(f) with respect to such land, or
(B) the exclusion limitation.
(2) Applicable percentage
For purposes of paragraph (1), the term "applicable percentage" means 40
percent reduced (but not below zero) by 2 percentage points for each
percentage point (or fraction thereof) by which the value of the qualified
conservation easement is less than 30 percent of the value of the land ill
(determined without regard to the value of such easement and reduced by the
value of any retained development right (as defined in paragraph (5)).
(FOOTNOTE 1) So in original. No closing parenthesis was enacted.
(3) Exclusion limitation
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For purposes of paragraph (1), the exclusion limitation is the limitation
determined in accordance with the following table: In the case of estates of The
exclusion decedents dying during: limitation is: 1998 $100,000 1999 $200,000
2000 $300,000 2001 $400,000 2002 or thereafter $500,000.
(4) Treatment of certain indebtedness
(A) In general
The exclusion provided in paragraph (1) shall not apply to the extent
that the land is debt-financed property.
(8) Definitions
For purposes of this paragraph -
(i) Debt-financed property
The term "debt-financed property" means any property with
respect to which there is an acquisition indebtedness (as defined in
clause (ii)) on the date of the decedent's death.
(ii) Acquisition indebtedness
The term "acquisition indebtedness" means, with respect to debt-
financed property, the unpaid amount of -
(I) the indebtedness incurred by the donor in acquiring such
property,
(II) the indebtedness incurred before the acquisition of such
property if such indebtedness would not have been incurred but for
such acquisition,
(III) the indebtedness incurred after the acquisition of such
property if such indebtedness would not have been incurred but for
such acquisition and the incurrence of such indebtedness was
reasonably foreseeable at the time of such acquisition, and
(IV) the extension, renewal, or refinancing of an acquisition
indebtedness.
(5) Treatment of retained development right
(A) In general
Paragraph (1) shall not apply to the value of any development right
retained by the donor in the conveyance of a qualified conservation
easement.
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(B) Termination of retained development right
If every person in being who has an interest (whether or not in
possession) in the land executes an agreement to extinguish permanently
some or all of any development rights (as defined in subparagraph (D))
retained by the donor on or before the date for filing the return of the tax
imposed by section 2001, then any tax imposed by section 2001 shall be
reduced accordingly. Such agreement shall be filed with the return of the
tax imposed by section 2001. The agreement shall be in such form as the
Secretary shall prescribe.
(e) Additional tax
Any failure to implement the agreement described in subparagraph
(8) not later than the earlier of -
(i) the date which is 2 years after the date of the decedent's death, or
(ii) the date of the sale of such land subject to the qualified conservation
easement,
shall result in the imposition of an additional tax in the amount of the
tax which would have been due on the retained development rights
subject to such agreement. Such additional tax shall be due and payable
on the last day of the 6th month following such date.
(D) Development right defined
For purposes of this paragraph, the term "development right" means
any right to use the land subject to the qualified conservation easement
in which such right is retained for any commercial purpose which is not
subordinate to and directly supportive of the lJse of such land as a farm
for farming purposes (within the meaning of section 2032A(e)(5)).
(6) Election
The election under this subsection shall be made on or before the due date
(including extensions) for filing the return of tax imposed by section 2001 and
shall be made on such return. Such an election, once made, shall be
irrevocable.
(7) Calculation of estate tax due
An executor making the election described in paragraph (6) shall, for
purposes of calculating the amount of tax imposed by section 2001, include the
value of any development right (as defined in paragraph (5)) retained by the
donor in the conveyance of such qualified conservation easement. The
computation of tax on any retained development right prescribed in this
paragraph shall be done in such manner and on such forms as the Secretary
shall prescribe.
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(8) Definitions
For purposes of this subsection -
(A) Land subject to a qualified conservation easement
The term "land subject to a qualified conservation easement" means
land -
(i) which is located -
(I) in or within 25 miles of an area which, on the date of the
decedent's death, is a metropolitan area (as defined by the Office of
Management and Budget),
(II) in or within 25 miles of an area which, on the date of the
decedent's death, is a national park or wilderness area designated
as part of the National Wilderness Preservation System (unless it is
determined by the Secretary that land in or within 25 miles of such
a park or wilderness area is not under significant development
pressure), or
(III) in or within 10 miles of an area which, on the date of the
decedent's death, is an Urban National Forest (as designated by the
Forest Service),
(ii) which was owned by the decedent or a member of the decedent's
family at all times during the 3-year period ending on the "date of the
decedent's death, and
(iii) with respect to which a qualified conservation easement has been
made by an individual described in subparagraph (C), as of the date of
the election described in paragraph (6).
(8) Qualified conservation easement
The term "qualified conservation easement" means a qualified
conservation contribution (as defined in section 170(h)(1)) of a qualified
real property interest (as defined in section 170(h)(2)(C)), except that
clause (iv) of section 170(h)(4)(A) shall not apply, and the restriction on
the use of such interest described in section 170(h)(2)(C) shall include a
prohibition on more than a de minimis use for a commercial recreational
activity.
(e) Individual described
. An individual is described in this subparagraph if such individual is -
(i) the decedent,
(ii) a member of the decedent's family,
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(iii) the executor of the decedent's estate, or
(iv) the trustee of a trust the corpus of which includes the land to be
subject to the qualified conservation easement.
(D) Member of family
The term "member of the decedent's family" means any member of
the family (as defined in section 2032A(e)(2)) of the decedent.
(9) Treatment of easements granted after death
In any case in which the qualified conservation easement is granted after
the date of the decedent's death and on or before the due date (including
extensions) for filing the return of tax imposed by section 2001, the deduction
under section 2055(f) with respect to such easement shall be allowed to the
estate but only if no charitable deduction is allowed under chapter 1 to any
person with respect ,to the grant of such easement.
(10) Application of this section to interests in partnerships, corporations, and trusts
This section shall apply to an interest in a partnership, corporation, or trust
if at least 30 percent of the entity is owned (directly or indirectly) by the
decedent, as determined under the rules described in section 2057(e)(3).
(d) Cross reference
For executor's right to be furnished on request a statement regarding
any valuation made by the Secretary within the gross estate, see section
7517
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Internal Revenue Code
26 U.S.C. 2055
Sec. 2055. - Transfers for public, charitable, and religious uses
(a) In general
For purposes of the tax imposed by section 2001, the value of the taxable estate
shall be determined by deducting from the value of the gross estate the amount of all
bequests, legacies, deVises, or transfers -
(1) to or for the use of the United States, any State, any political subdivision thereof,
or the District of Columbia, for exclusively public purposes;
(2) to or for the use of any corporation organized and operated exclusively for
religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes, including the
encouragement of art, or to foster national or international amateur sports
competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic
facilities or equipment), and the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part
of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private stockholder or
individual, which is not disqualified for tax exemption under section SOl(c)(3) by
reason of attempting to influence legislation, and which does not participate in, or
intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political
campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office;
(3) to a trustee or trustees, or a fraternal society, order, or association operating
under the lodge system, but only if such contributions or gifts are to be used by such
trustee or trustees, or by such fraternal society, order, or association, exclusively for
religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes, or for the prevention
of cruelty to children or animals, such trust, fraternal society, order, or association
would not be disqualified for tax exemption under section SOl(c)(3) by reason of
attempting to influence legislation, and such trustee or trustees, or such fraternal
society, order, or association, does not participate in, or intervene in (including the
publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in
opposition to) any candidate for public office;
(4) to or for the use of any veterans' organization incorporated by Act of Congress,
or of its departments or local chapters or posts, no part of the net earnings of which
inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual; or
(5) to an employee stock ownership plan if such transfer qualifies as a qualified
gratuitous transfer of qualified employer securities within the meaning of section
664(g).
For purposes of this subsection, the complete termination before the date
prescribed for the filing of the estate tax return of a power to consume, invade, or
appropriate property for the benefit of an individual before such power has been
exercised by reason of the death of such individual or for any other reason shall be
considered and deemed to be a qualified disclaimer with the same full force and effect
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as though he had filed such qualified disclaimer. Rules similar to the rules of section
SOl(j) shall apply for purposes of paragraph (2).
(b) Powers of appointment
Property includible in the decedent's gross estate under section 2041 (relating to
powers of appointment) received by a donee described in this section shall, for
purposes of this section, be considered a bequest of such decedent.
(e) Death taxes payable out of bequests
If the tax imposed by section 2001, or any estate, succession, legacy, or
inheritance taxes, are, either by the terms of the will, by the law of the jurisdiction
under which the estate is administered, or by the law of the jurisdiction imposing the
particular tax, payable in whole or in part out of the bequests, legacies, or devises
otherwise deductible under this section, then the amount deductible under this section
shall be the amount of such bequests, legacies, or devises reduced by the amount of
such taxes.
(d) Limitation on deduction
The amount of the deduction under this section for any transfer shall not exceed
the value of the transferred property required to be included in the gross estate.
(e) Disallowance of deductions in certain cases
(1) No deduction shall be allowed under this section for a transfer to or for the use of
an organization or trust described in section S08(d) or 4948(c)(4) subject to the
conditions specified in such sections.
(2) Where an interest in property (other than an interest described in section
170(f)(3)(B)) passes or has passed from the decedent to a person, or for a use,
described in subsection (a), and an interest (other than an interest which is
extinguished upon the decedent's death) in the same property passes or has passed
(for less than an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth) from
the decedent to a person, or for a use, not described in subsection (a), no deduction
shall be allowed under this section for the interest which passes or has passed to the
person, or for the use, described in subsection (a) unless -
(A) in the case of a remainder interest, such interest is in a trust which is a
charitable remainder annuity trust or a charitable remainder unitrust (described
in section 664) or a pooled income fund (described in section 642(c)(S)), or
(8) in the case of any other interest, such interest is in the form of a
guaranteed annuity or is a fixed percentage distributed yearly of the fair market
value of the property (to be determined yearly).
(3) Reformations to comply with paragraph (2). -
(A) In general. -
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A deduction shall be allowed under subsection (a) in respect of any
qualified reformation.
(8) Qualified reformation. -
For purposes of this paragraph, the term "qualified reformation"
means a change of a governing instrument by reformation, amendment,
construction, or otherwise which changes a reformable interest into a
qualified interest but only if -
(i) any difference between -
(I) the actuarial value (determined as of the date of the decedent's
death) of the qualified interest, and
(II) the actuarial value (as so determined) of the reformable
interest,
does not exceed 5 percent of the actuarial value (as so determined)
of the reformable interest,
(ii) in the case of -
(I) a charitable remainder interest, the nonremainder interest
(before and after the qualified reformation) terminated at the same
time, or
(II) any other interest, the reformable interest and the qualified
interest are for the same period, and
(iii) such change is effective as of the date of the decedent's death.
A nonremainder interest (before reformation) for a term of years in excess
of 20 years shall be treated as satisfying subclause (I) of clause (ii) if such
interest (after reformation) is for a term of 20 years.
(e) Reformable interest. -
For purposes of this paragraph -
(i) In general. -
The term "reformable interest" means any interest for which a
deduction would be allowable under subsection (a) at the time of
the decedent's death but for paragraph (2).
(ii) Beneficiary's interest must be fixed. -
The term "reformable interest" does not include any interest unless,
before the remainder vests in possession, all payments to persons
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other than an organization described in subsection (a) are
expressed either in specified dollar amounts or a fixed percentage
of the fair market value of the property. For purposes of
determining whether all such payments are expressed as a fixed
percentage of the fair market value of the property, section
664(d)(3) shall be taken into account.
(iii) Special rule where timely commencement of reformation. -
Clause (ii) shall not apply to any interest if a judicial proceeding is
commenced to change such interest into a qualified interest not
later than the 90th day after -
(I) if an estate tax return is required to be filed, the last date
(including extensions) for filing such return, or
(II) if no estate tax return is required to be filed, the last date
(including extensions) for filing the income tax return for the 1st
taxable year for which such a return is required to be filed by the
trust.
(iv) Special rule for will executed before january 1, 1979, etc. -
In the case of any interest passing under a will executed before
January 1, 1979, or under a trust created before such date, clause
(ii) shall not apply.
(D) Qualified interest. -
For purposes of this paragraph, the term "qualified interest" means
an interest for which a deduction is allowable under subsection (a).
(E) Limitation. -
The deduction referred to in subparagraph (A) shall not exceed the
amount of the deduction which would have been allowable for the
reformable interest but for paragraph (2).
(F) Special rule where income beneficiary dies. -
If (by reason of the death of any individual, or by termination or
distribution of a trust in accordance with the terms of the trust
instrument) by the due date for filing the estate tax return (including any
extension thereof) a reformable interest is in a wholly charitable trust or
passes directly to a person or for a use described in subsection (a), a
deduction shall be allowed for such reformable interest as if it had met
the requirements of paragraph (2) on the date of the decedent's death.
For purposes of the preceding sentence, the term "wholly charitable
trust" means a charitable trust which, upon the allowance of a deduction,
would be described in section 4947(a)(1).
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(G) Statute of limitations. -
The period for assessing any deficiency of any tax attributable to the
application of this paragraph shall not expire before the date 1 year after
the date on which the Secretary is notified that such reformation (or other
proceeding pursuant to subparagraph (J) ill has occurred.
(H) Regulations. -
The Secretary shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary
to carry out the purposes of this paragraph, including regulations
providing such adjustments in the application of the provisions of section
508 (relating to special rules relating to section 501(c)(3) organizations),
subchapter J (relating to estates, trusts, beneficiaries, and decedents),
and chapter 42 (relating to private foundations) as may be necessary by
reason of the qualified reformation.
(I) Reformations permitted in case of remainder interests in residence or farm,
pooled income funds, etc. -
The Secretary shall prescribe regulations (consistent with the
provisions of this paragraph) permitting reformations in the case of any
failure -
(i) to meet the requirements of section 170(f)(3)(B) (relating to
remainder interests in personal residence or farm, etc.), or
(ii) to meet the requirements of section 642(c)(5).
(l) Void or reformed trust in cases of insufficient remainder interests. -
In the case of a trust that would qualify (or could be reformed to
qualify pursuant to subparagraph (B)) but for failure to satisfy the
requirement of paragraph (l)(D) or (2)(D) of section 664(d), such trust
may be -
(i) declared null and void ab initio, or
(ii) changed by reformation, amendment, or otherwise to meet such
requirement by reducing the payout rate or the duration (or both) of any
noncharitable beneficiary's interest to the extent necessary to satisfy such
requirement, pursuant to a proceeding that is commenced within the
period required in subparagraph (C)(iii). In a case described in clause (i),
no deduction shall be allowed under this title for any transfer to the trust
and any transactions entered into by the trust prior to being declared void
shall be treated as entered into by the transferor.
(4) Works of art and their copyrights treated as separate properties in certain cases.
(A) In general. -
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In the case of a qualified contribution of a work of art, the work of art
and the copyright on such work of art shall be treated as separate
properties for purposes of paragraph (2).
(8) Work of art defined. -
For purposes of this paragraph, the term "work of art" means any
tangible personal property with respect to which there is a copyright
under Federal law.
(e) Qualified contribution defined. -
For purposes of this paragraph, the term "qualified contribution"
means any transfer of property to a qualified organization if the use of the
property by the organization is related to the purpose or function
constituting the basis for its exemption under section 501.
(D) Qualified organization defined. -
For purposes of this paragraph, the term "qualified organization"
means any organization described in section 501(c)(3) other than a
private foundation (as defined in section 509). For purposes of the
preceding sentence, a private operating foundation (as defined in section
4942(j)(3)) shall not be treated as a private foundation.
(f) Special rule for irrevocable transfers of easements in real property
A deduction shall be allowed under subsection (a) in respect of any transfer of a
qualified real property interest (as defined in section 170(h)(2)(C)) which meets the
requirements of section 170(h) (without regard to paragraph (4)(A) thereof).
(g) Cross references
(1) For option as to time for valuation for purpose of deduction under this
section, see section 2032.
(2) For treatment of certain organizations providing child care, see section
501(k).
(3) For exemption of gifts and bequests to or for the benefit of Library of
Congress, see section 5 of the Act of March 3, 1925, as amended (2 U.S.C.
161).
(4) For treatment of gifts and bequests for the benefit of the Naval Historical
Center as gifts or bequests to or for the use of the United States, see section
7222 of title 10, United States Code.
(5) For treatment of gifts and bequests to or for the benefit of National Park
Foundation as gifts or bequests to or for the use of the United States, see
section 8 of the Act of December 18, 1967 (16 U.S.C. 191).
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(6) For treatment of gifts, devises, or bequests accepted by the Secretary of
State, the Director of the International Communication Agency, or the Director
of the United States International Development Cooperation Agency as gifts,
devises, or bequests to or for the use of the United States, see section 25 of the
State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956.
(7) For treatment of gifts or bequests of money accepted by the Attorney
General for credit to "Commissary Funds, Federal Prisons," as gifts or bequests
to or for the use of the United States, see section 4043 of title 18, United States
Code.
(8) For payment of tax on gifts and bequests of United States obligations to the
United States, see section 3113(e) of title 31, United States Code.
(9) For treatment of gifts and bequests for benefit of the Naval Academy as
gifts or bequests to or for the use of the United States, see section 6973 of title
10, United States Code.
(10) For treatment of gifts and bequests for benefit of the Naval Academy
Museum as gifts or bequests to or for the use of the United States, see section
6974 of title 10, United States Code.
(11) For exemption of gifts and bequests received by National Archives Trust
Fund Board, see section 2308 of title 44, United States Code.
(12) For treatment of gifts and bequests to or for the use of Indian tribal
governments (or their subdivisions), see section 7871
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Future Housing Needs for Kentucky
2001- 2020
Housin~ and the Economy in Kentu.cky in the 1990's
During the decade of the 90's Kentucky's growth was greater than the past three decades
combined.
According to the latest census reports the state's population grew from 3.5 million people
to 4,041,769, a gain of9.6%. This growth in population was unexpected as the Kentucky
either lost population or remained stagnant during the past three decades. Even thought
the growth rate was strong for "Kentucky it was still less than the national population
growth rate of 13.1%
From 1992 to 1998 Kentucky attracted 300,000 jobs for a 15 % gain. The growth rate in
manufacturing jobs was twice the national average, according to Dr.Paul Coomes of the
University of Louisville. Most of these jobs were created in the middle of the state in
areas along and between Interstates 75 and 65.
One down note is that although the creation of new jobs was strong the state still lags
behind the national average in earnings per job.
The ability to attracting new jobs has been tied to the flourishing airports in Louisville
and Northern Kentucky - Cincinnati.
The Census Report also cites the need for housing as extremely strong in Kentucky. In
1999 the Census report indicates that 21,581 new homes were built. This figure is
somewhat conservative since the statistics were based on the number ofbuilding permits
issued, and only 48 counties issue building permits.
New housing units increased at a rate of 18%, almost double the population increase.
This statistic exemplifies the change in the average household which in the past consisted
of a husband, wife and children.
Today we are seeing more one person households, and single parent households as the
Kentucky income continues to rise in certain sectors.
All of this created a huge demand for new. homes in the past decade.
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Lookine Forward
As we move into the new millennium the population of the state is predicted to increase
at a rate equal to that of the last decade.
National Economists predict the need for between 1.3 and 1.5 million new housing starts
per year for the next ten years. In fact a panel of eight economists recently predicted that
housing starts will rise in the next three years from 1.55 million in 2001 to 1.60 million in
2002 to 1.64 million in 2003.
Looking at how that affects Kentucky we see that historically the Bluegrass State
produces between one and two percent of the nation's housing needs.
This would mean that in during the period between 2000 and 201aKentucky would see
the need for approximately 25,000 homes each year.
The panel of economists were surprised that the new housing figures for the first part of
this year were so strong given the slowing economy. They cite falling interest rates as
the reason housing remained strong.
The Joint Center for Housing Studies ofHarvard University agrees with the strength of
the housing industry. In a report called "The State of the Nation's Housing - 2001",
Nicolas P. Retsinas, Director of the Joint Center said, "Normally sharp drops in housing
production and slowing home sales, take the wind out of the economy ahead of other
sectors, but low interest rates and a strong demand have helped housing markets stay
strong.
The future ofhousing is strong, according to the Harvard study. "Although no longer
adding net new households, the baby boomers will continue to swell the ranks of
homeowners during the next decade. As t~ey reach the ages of 45 to 64, over 3 million
baby boom households will likely make the shift from renter to owner. This growth will
be fueled by delayed home buying among married and remarried couples, financial
windfalls from inheritances, and risinghomeownership rates among the never married
and divorced."
The largest increases in owner households, however, will come from the echo boomers as
they move into the prime homebuying ages of25 to' 34. These children of the baby
. boomers will be between the ages of 15 and 34 in the year 2010.
The study points out that even ifhomeownership rates held at late 1990's levels, the age
structure of the population alone would keep the number ofhomeowners rising steadily
for the next 20 years. A large portion of the new echo boomers creating the housing
demand will be minorities and immigrants.
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Where we are choosio2 to live
The Harvard study points out that the population growth is still moving toward the
suburbs. Even though cities, as a group experienced their strongest population growth in
decades, the study notes tha~ for every three households that moved to central cities in
1999, five departed for the suburbs.
The group perceived to be leading the back to the city movement, the 25 to 34 year olds,
,twice as many individuals left the cities as moved in.
The study cites the intense develop·ment pressures in less populated areas of the country,
where strong job growth has enabled people to work at ever greater distances from
traditional employment centers.
Between 1990 and 1998, average job growth exceeded 15% in the nations low and
moderate density counties. In contrast, job gains in the highest density counties averaged
less than 6%.
The study points out that "the vigorous pace ofhome building has stirred political
activism at both state and local levels to curb growth in outlying areas and closer in low
density suburbs. These efforts are primarily intended to preserve open space and to slow
or halt further development".
They say "as additional growth limitations measures are approved, land costs will rise
even more sharply and housing affordability in less developed areas will continue to
erode..These pressures underscore the importance offmding.ways to strike a balance
between the desire to preserve open space and the need to expand affordable housing".
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Survey Suggests Market~BasedVision of Smart
Growth
April 22, 2002 - More is better when it comes to buying a
home, according to a new survey of home buyers co-sponsored
by the National Association of Home Builders (NAHB) and the
National Association of Realtors<8> (NAR).
The home buyers indicated that price and home size Vlere far
more important considerations than proximity to vvork, the city
or schools. Given three statements to choose from,· for
example, 62 percent indicated that "the top concern was price,It
"""ile 31 percent indicated that ''finding a home in the right
neighborhood was the top priority." Just 7 percent of
respondents said that "being close to 'NOrk and minimizing the
commute Was really important.II
When asked to agree with various statements about their
homes, 64 percent agreed with the statement, "I wish my home
\Vere larger." This was follo¥Jed by "I wish I could walk to more
places from my home," 27 percent; "I wish my home were
closer to where I work," 23 percent; It I wish my home were
closer to shopping and restaurants," 17 percent; "I wish my
home ¥Jere closer to public transportation," 9 percent; and "I
wish I were closer to the city," 5 percent.
"This survey demonstrates that home buyers are quite
conscious of the tradeoffs they make when buying a home,"
said Gary Garczynski, president of the National Association of
Home Builders (NAHB) and a builder/developer from
Woodbridge, Va. "They are willing to live further from the city
in order to have a larger home, and the quality of the
community is more important then the length of the commute.
A better understanding of these tradeoffs enables us to develop
planning and growth policies that take into account home
buyers' preferences.It
"Price, home size, and neighborhood quality are the most
important factors affecting buyers' decision making. The
marketplace will continue to determine the shape of America's
communities. As the 2002 home buying season opens, this
study provides valuable findings that can guide poJicymakers to
arrive at solutions to the challenges of growth -solutions that
reflect consumer choices," said NAR Treasurer Pat Kaplan, a
Realtort> from Portland, Ore.
The survey was done to provide a better understanding of the
factors that drive home buyers' deciSions in the marketplace.
The nationalsarnpleof 2,000 households was derived from a
panel maintained by the polling firm National Family Opinion
(NFO) of households that have purchased a primary residence
within the past four years. NFO conducted the survey in
January 2002.
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Other findings of the survey \Vere:
• When asked to rate the importance of 16 aspects of a
home and its location, "houses spread ouf' received the
highest rating, with 62 percent of respondents checking
important or very important This was follOYJed by less
traffic In neighborhood, 60 percent; 10000r property taxes,
55 percent; bigger home, 47 percent; bigger lot, 45
percent; less developed area, 40 percent away from the
city, 39 percent; closer to work, 28 percent; closer to
public transportation, 13 percent; smaller house, 10
percent; and smaller lot, 9 percent.
• When asked about the importance of 18 community
amenities, the highest ranking features were (with
percent ranking as important or very important): highway
access, 44 percent; jogginglbike trails, 36 percent;
sidewalks, 28 percent; parks, 26 percent; playgrounds,
21 percent, and shops within walking area, 19 percent
• Asked to rank three alternatives for where new growth
should occur, 37 percent selected "build new homes in
existing. partially developed suburban areas" as their
first choice and 51 percent as their second choice. "Build
nevv homes on vacant land in the central city or inner
suburbs" was the preferred choice of 35 percent and the
second choice of 23 percent. "Build homes in outlying
areas," was the first choice of 29 percent and second
choice of 26 percent
• Asked which single factor they would change in their
home or community, ''taxes VtfOuld be lower" led with 35
percent, folloYJed by "I'd live in a bigger home,It 26
percent; "I'd own a larger lot," 17 percent; "my home
would be closer to where I \YOrk, II 8 percent; "schools
would be better." 5 percent; and "other," 9 percent.
"The survey responses suggest a vision of smart growth that
home buyers are prepared to embrace,n Garczynski said. itA
majority of consumers want single-family detached homes in a
pedestrian-friendly community that has shopping within walking
distance. They want a mix of open space, including parks,
recreational facilities, playgrounds, farms, nature preserves
and undeveloped areas. They want traffic minimized on
neighborhood streets. To the extent that we - builders,
developers, planners, elected officials - can create high quality,
walkable, mixed-use communities, we will deliver a version of
smart growth that is more likely to be accepted in the
marketplace."
Powerpoint presentation of survey results.
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Growth in the Golden Triangle in Kentucky
Northern Kentucky - 366,480
Kenton County - 151,464 (+6.7)
Boone County - 85,991 (+49.3)
Campbell County - 88,616 (+5.7)
Grant County - 22,384 (+42.2)
Gallatin County - 7,870 (+45.9)
Carroll County-lO,155 (+9.3)
Population: .
Louisville - 846,121
Jefferson - 693,604 (+4.3)
Shelby - 33,337 (+34)
Bullitt - 61,236 (+28.7)
Oldham - 46,178 (+38.8)
Spencer - 11,766 (+27.7)
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1,725,702
Lexington - 513,101
Fayette - 260,512 (+16)
Scott - 33,061 (+39)
Woodford - 23,208 (+16)
Jessamine - 39,041 (+28)
Clark - 33,144 (+12)
Anderson - 19,111 (+31)
Madison-70,872) (+23)
Bourbon-19,360 (+1)
Garrard - 14,792 (+27.7)
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Source: U.S. census
Buteau; research by
UNDA J. JOHN_ON/STAFF
CRAIG JOHNSON/STAFF
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100 Fastest Growing Counties by Percent Change: April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2001
April 1, 2000 April 1, 2000
to to
April 1, 2000 July 1, 2001 July 1, 2001
Population Numeric Percent
July 1, 2001 Estimates PopUlation Population
Rank County State Estimate Base Change Change
1 Douglas Colorado 199,753 175,766 23,987 13.6
2 Loudoun Virginia 190,903 169,599 21,304 12.6
3 Forsyth Georgia 110,296 98,407 11,889 12.1
~ROCkwall Texas 47,983 43,080 4,903 11.4
Williamson Texas 278,067 249,967 28,100 11.2
6 Henry Georgia 132,581 119,341 13,240 11.1
7 Spencer Kentucky 13,039 11,766 1,273 10.8
8 Flagler Florida 54,964 49,832 5,132 10.3
9 Collin Texas 541,403 491,675 49,728 10.1
~ Paulding Georgia 89,734 81,678 8,056 9.911 Newton Georgia 68,047 62,001 6,046 9.8
~ Scott Minnesota 98,100 89,498 8,602 9.6~ Rains Texas 10,006 9,139 867 1 9.51
14 Lincoln South Dakota 26,322 24,131 2,191 9.1
15 Delaware Ohio 119,752 109,989 9,763 8.9
16 Tooele Utah 44,157 40,735 3,422 8.4
17 Wakulla Florida 24,761 22,863 1,898 8.3
18 Spotsylvania Virginia 97,760 90,395 7,365 8.1
19 Lake Florida 227,598 210,528 17,070 8.1
20 Placer California 268,512 248,399 20,113 8.1
21 Hamilton Indiana 197,477 182,740 14,737 8.1
22 Elbert Colorado 21,445 19,872 1,573 7.9
23 Stafford Virginia 99,692 92,446 7,246 7.8
24 Pickens Georgia 24,776 22,983 1,793 7.8
2S Weld Colorado 194,949 180,936 14,013 7.7
26 Hays Texas 105,115 97,589 7,526 7.7
27 Archuleta Colorado 10,659 9,898 761 7.7
28 Denton Texas 466,240 432,976 33,264 7.7
29 Fort Bend Texas 381,200 354,452 26,748 7.5
30 Bastrop Texas 62,059 57,733 4,326 7.5
31 Walton Georgia 65,224 ~O,687 4,537 7.5
32 Montgomery Texas 315,418 293,768 21,650 7.4
33 Dawson Georgia 17,176 15,999 1,177 7.4
34 Park Colorado 15,580 14,523 1,057 7.3
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35 Union North Carolina 132,676 123,677 8,999 7.3
36 Cherokee Georgia 152,170 141,903 10,267 7.2
37 Teton Idaho 6,419 5,999 420 7.0
38 Saint Johns Florida 131,684 123,135 8,549 6.9
39 Will Illinois 536,416 502,266 34,150 6.8
40 Kendall Illinois 58,227 54,544 3,683 6.8
41 Warren Ohio 169,025 158,383 10,642 6.7
42 DeSoto Mississippi 114,352 107,199 7,153 6.7
43 Lyon Nevada 36,783 34,501 2,282 6.6
44 Sherburne Minnesota 68,621 64,417 4,204 6.5
4S Wasatch Utah 16,200 15,215 985 6.5
~ CJark Nevada 1,464,653 1,375,765 88,888 6.5
47 Hendricks Indiana 110,784 104,093 6,691 6.4
48 Canyon Idaho 139,821 131,441 8,380 6.4
49 Prince William Virginia 298,707 280,813 17,894 6.4
~ Kaufman Texas 75,810 71,313 4,497 6.3
51 Caldwell Texas 34,193 32,194 1,999 6.2
52 White Georgia 21,182 19,944 1,238 6.2
53 Barrow Georgia 48,946 46,144 2,802 6.1
54 Fluvanna Virginia 21,257 20,047 1,210 6.0
55 Fayette Tennessee 30,536 28,806 1,730 6.0
S6 Coweta Georgia 94,571 89,215 5,356 6.0
57 Burnet Texas 36,151 34,147 2,004 5.9
58 Riverside California 1,635,888 1,545,387 90,501 5.9
59 Comal Texas 82,563 78,021 4,542 5.8
60 Jackson Georgia 44,010 41,589 2,421 5.8
61 Washington Utah 95,590 90,354 5,236 5.8
62 Chisago Minnesota 43,476 41,101 2,375 5.8
63 Collier Florida 265,769 251,377 14,392 5.7
64 Deschutes Oregon 121,949 115,367 6,582 5.7
65 Polk Texas 43,479 41,133 2,346 5.7
66 Williamson Tennessee 133,825 126,638 7,187 5.7
67 Butts Georgia 20,629 19,522 1,107 5.7
68 San Joaquin California 595,324 563,598 31,726 5.6
69 Gwinnett Georgia 621,528 588,448 33,080 5.6
70 Effingham Georgia 39,616 37,535 2 i 081 5.5
71 Christian Missouri 57,270 54,285 2,985 5.5
72 Wise Texas 51,475 48,793 2,682 5.5
73 Osceola Florida 181,932 172,493 9,439 5.5
74 Custer Colorado 3,693 3,503 190 5.4
75 san Miguel Colorado 6,951 6,594 357 5.4
76 Suffolk City Virginia 67,107 63,677 3,430 5.4
77 Carroll Georgia 91,956 87,268 4,688 1 5.41
78 Brunswick North carolina 77,058 73,143 3,915 5.4
79 Wright Minnesota 94,789 89,986 4,803 5.3
80 Dallas Iowa 42,914 40,750 2,164 5.3
.-
.- _ ..
. --- - -
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81 lincoln Missouri I 41,010 I 38,944 2,066 5.3
82 Kane Illinois 425,545 404,119 21,426 5.3
83 Bartow Georgia 80,026 76,019 4,007 5.3
84 Matanuska-Susitna Alaska 62,426 59,322 3,104 5.2
85 Boone Kentucky 90,489 85,991 4,498 5.2
86 Pasco Florida 362,658 344,765 17,893 5.2
87 Saguache Colorado 6,224 5,917 307 5.2
88 Johnston North Carolina 128,248 121,965 6,283 5.2
89 Bandera Texas 18,553 17,645 908 5.1
90 Boise Idaho 7,011 6,670 341 5.1
91 Pinal Arizona 188,846 179,727 9,119 5.1
92 Hood Texas 43,181 41,100 2,081 5.1
93 Walton Florida 42,644 40,601 2,043 5.0
94 Calvert Maryland 78,307 74,563 3,744 5.0
95 San Juan Colorado 586 558 28 5.0
~ Saint Croix Wisconsin 66,319 63,155 3,164 5.097 Hanson South Dakota 3,294 3,139 155 4.998 Livingston Michigan 164,678 156,951 7,727 4.9~ Nye Nevada 34,075 32,485 1,590 4.9100 lee Florida 462,455 440,888 21,567 4.9
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Kentucky QuickFacts from the US Census Bureau
u.s. Census Bureau r.r~:;;~k'~ ,\ .
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State and CountyQuickFat:ls
f~" KY;, Kentucky.
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definition and source information
Select a state
USA QuickFacts
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People QuickFacts Kentucky USA
? Population. 2000 4.041.769 281.421.906
? Population. percent change. 1990 to 2000 9.6% 13.1%
? Persons under 5 years old, percent. 2000 6.6% 6.8%
? Persons under 18 years old, percent, 2000 24.6% 25.7%
? Persons 65 years old and over, percent, 2000 12.5% 12.4%
? White persons, percent. 2000 (a) 90.1% 75.1%
? Black or African American persons, percent. 2000 (a) 7.3% 12.3%
? American Indian and Alaska Native persons. percent, 2000 (a) 0.2% 0.9%
? Asian persons. percent. 2000 (a) 0.7% 3.6%
? Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander. percent. 2000 (a) Z 0.1%
? Persons reporting some other race, percent. 2000 (a) 0.6% 5.5%
? Persons reporting two or more races, percent. 2000 1.1% 2.4%
? Female persons, percent, 2000 51.1% 50.9%
? Persons of Hispanic or Latino origin, percent, 2000 (b) 1.5% 12.5%
? White persons, not of Hispanicll..atino origin, percent, 2000 89.3% 69.10/0
? High school graduates, persons 25 years and over, 1990 1,507,976 119,524,718
? College graduates, persons 25 years and over, 1990 318,127 32,310,253
? Housing units, 2000 1,750,927 115,904,641
? Homeownership rate. 2000 70.8% 66.2%
? Households, 2000 1,590,647 105,480,101
? Persons per household, 2000 2.47 2.59
? Households with persons under 18, percent, 2000 35.5% 36.0%
? Median household money income, 1997 model-based estimate $31,730 $37,005
? Persons below poverty, percent, 1997 model-based estimate 16.0% 13.3%
? Children below poverty, percent, 1997 model-based estimate 23.1% 19.9%
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Kentucky QuickFacts from the US Census ~ureau
Business QuickFacts Kentucky USA
? Private nonfarm establishments, 1999 89,946 7,008,444
? Private nonfarm employment, 1999 1,469,315 110,705,661
? Private nonfann employment, percent change 1990-1999 23.9% 18.4%
7 Nonemployer establishments, 1998 217,806 15,708,727
? Manufacturers shipments, 1997 ($1000) 86,636,107 3,842,061,405
? Retail sales, 1997 ($1000) 33,332,675 2,460,886,012
? Retail sales per capita, 1997 $8,530 $9,190
? Minority-owned firms, percent of total, 1997 4.5% 14.6%
? Women-owned firms, percent of total, 1997 23.4% 26.0%
? Housing units authorized by building permits, 2000 18,460 1,592,267
? Federal funds and grants, 2000 ($1000) 24,443,764 1,623,475,453
? Local government employment - full-time equivalent, 1997 134,740 10,227,429
Geography QuickFacts Kentucky USA
? Land area, 2000 (square miles) 39,728 3,537,441
? Persons per square mile, 2000 101.7 79.6
(a) Includes persons reporting only one race.
(b) Hispanics may be cI any race. so also are included in applicable race categories.
FN: Footnote on this item for this area in place of data
NA: Not available
0: Suppressed to avoid disclosure of confidential information
X: Not applicable
S: Suppressed; does not meet publication standards
Z: Value greater than zero but less than half unit of measure shown
F: Fewer than 100 firms
Data Quality Statement
What do you think of our new QuickFacts? send comments to guickfacts@lists.census.gov
Source U.S. Census Bureau: State and County QuickFacts. Data derived from Population Estimates, 2000 Census cI Population and Housing,
1990 census of Population and Housing. Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates, County Business Patterns, 1997 Economic census,
Minority- and Women-Owned Business, Building Pennits. Consolidated Federal Funds Report. 1997 census of GCMlIllments
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Comments by the Home Builders Association
On the
Purchase ofDevelopment Rights
. And
Transfer ofDevelopment Rights
Transfer ofDevelopment Rights
In 1990 the Kentucky Legislature passed Senate Bill 405, which enabled local
governments with planning uni~s to institute a Transfer ofDevelopment Rights Program
within their jurisdiction.· ,
Although the Jaw has been on the books for eleven years, it has not been successfully
used within the Commonwealth ofKentucky.
The premise behind the Transfer ofDevelopment Rights is that agricultural land may be
preserved, through the transfer ofdevelopment rights to other areas in a county, which
would be re-zoned to include a higher density ofdevelopment than was previously
permitted.
The Transfer ofDevelopment Rights has been used in Mo~tgomeryCounty, Maryland,
and in New Jersey arid have been somewhat successful due to the fact that there was a
huge demand for high density housing in the ''receiving areas", as they were located in
large urban areas.
The Transfer ofDevelopment Rights program has not been successfully used in
Kentucky due to the lack ofdemand for high density housing.
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Purchase ofDevelopment Rights '
Fayette County, Kentucky
EnabUng Legislation for Urban County Governments
In 1998 the Kentucky Legislature passed House Bill 644, which enabled only Urban
County Governments in Kentucky to institute a Purchase ofDevelopment Rights
Program. The bill stated that ifnew tax dollars were committed to purchase these
development rights that a referendum ofa percentage ofvoters voting in the last mayoral
election needed to approve before these taxes could be instituted.
The taxes referred to in the HB 644 included 1) an ad valorem tax not to exceed $.05 per
$100 ofassessed value ofall taxable property in the Urban County; 2) a 1/8 ofone
percent license fee on occupations and professions ofresidents ofthe Urban County, and
3) a transient tax on motels and hotels consist,ing ofone percent oftotal rents.
This bill only applies to Urban County Governments which translates into only applying
in Fayette County.
Funding of the Program
During the 2000 Legislative Session the Governor ofKentucky appropriated $15 million
in grant money to Fayette County to help fund the Purchase ofDevelopment Rights
Program.
Also the Lexington/Fayette Urban County Governme~t appropriated a $2 million annual
commitment to make payments on government bond revenue of$25 million.
Since no new tax dollars were proposed'the Urban County Government has $40 million
to run such a program.
It was speculated that no new tax dollars were proposed by the Urban County
Government due to the fact that a silent poD jodieated that the taxes proposed
would not pass in ~ referendum.
It has also been speculated that $40 million is not enough· to fund the 50,000 acres'
and that a tax increase is inevitable should the program continue toward the goal set
by the LexingtonIFayette Urban County Government.
Status of the Program
Currently the program is proceeding at a slower pace than expected. Some 37
landowners have applied to have their property evaluated for purchase ofdevelopment
rights. These evaluations are expected to provide the rural land owner with a price for
development rights somewhere between the price for agricultural land and the price for
which it could be sold for development.
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The major question at this time is whether or not the landholders will be satisfied with the
price offered by the Board created to come up with the evaluations. -Only time will tell.
Purchase ofDevelopment Rights - General Terms
In general the major problem with the implementation <;>fPurchase ofDevelopment
Rights Programs is coming up with the funds necessary to purchase the rural land.
As cited in the Boone County Report, the most successful program in the country is the
Pennsylvania Purchase ofDevelopment Rights Program. It has been reported that the
program has been funded with $143 million in a one time appropriation, and a $20
million ann~ tax income from a tax on cigarettes.
It was also cited that Pennsylvania has permanently protected 186,000 acres of land.
The 5143 million dollars doesn't seem to be a lot of money fora state that is 114,817
square miles in land mass. ~d the 186,000 acres p·reserved is miniscule in
comparison to the total land mass. '
Compare this with the $40 mOlion currently in place in Fayette County with a goal
to purchase 50,000 acres out ofa total land mass of285 square miles.
Summary
Although the Purchase of Development Rights may be an admirable goal by local
governments the truth ofthe matter is that the program needs funding, which seems to be
lacking.
The question arises, Will the taxpayers be burdened with the cost ofpreserving farmland
that they cannot use for recreational" or other purposes? If so will there have to be a
referendum to get approval.
What is the true cost to the farmer to take his land from the sale for development for at
least 25 years ifnot eternity?
What happens to the farmers' descendants when and if they decide not to farm and
cannot sell the land for any other purpose?
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I. INTRODUCTION
Frequent regulatory change relating to the coal mining industry is a way of life, given the
industry's status as one of the most heavily-regulated industries in the country. In the spirit of
that tradition, the agencies with regulatory authority over administering Sections 401, 402 and
404 of the Clean Water Act ("CWA") and other agencies with jurisdiction over mining are
currently involved in the process of determining how mountaintop mining and valley fill
construction should be regulated under the CWA and under other statutes. Under pressure from
environmental groups and such agencies as the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), the
u.S. Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS") and others, both in the courts and in other arenas, the
Corps of Engineers ("Corps") is feeling the pressure to come up with a cohesive program on
permitting fills and slurry impoundments insofar as such activity involves the placement of
material in streams or stream channels. A number of side shows are unfolding simultaneously so
that the ultimate outcome for the mining industry as this point is far from clear.
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II. SOME RECENT HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
a. The Bra22 v. West Vir2inia Coal Association Case
In 1998 a group of individuals and the West Virginia Highlands Conservancy sued the
West Virginia Division ofEnvironmental Protection ("DEP") and the Corps claiming that the
Corps and DEP lacked authority to approve placement of excess spoil into waters of the United
States in connection with mountaintop removal operations and the construction of excess spoil or
valley fills. Plaintiffs claimed that the Corps' authority under § 404 of the CWA was limited to
discharges of "fill material" and that excess spoil was not fill material, but rather was "waste"
which, under the Corps' own definitions, was excluded from the definition of "fill."
Alternatively, the plaintiffs in Bragg claimed that even if the Corps had authority to allow
placement of excess spoil into streams in connection with fill construction, the practice should
never be allowed under the Corps' nationwide permit program, but rather should only be
considered by the Corps in the context of an individual § 404 permit application process
inasmuch as, by its very nature, placing fill material in streams as part of fill construction at
mountaintop removal operations involved "more than minimal impacts" to the environment,
necessitating an individual § 404 perinit.
In 1998, the Corps settled the claims asserted against it in Bragg by agreeing to conduct
with OSM, EPA and FWS a programmatic environmental impact statement ("EIS") on the
effects of mountaintop removal and valley fills. West Virginia DEP and Kentucky Department
for Surface Mining, Reclamation and Enforcement ("DSMRE") were to contribute to the EIS
effort as consulting agencies. For their part, the plaintiffs agreed that they would no longer press
the issue that excess spoil is "waste," thereby giving up the jurisdictional argument. The Corps
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also agreed that while the programmatic EIS was being developed, the Corps would limit the use
ofnationwide permits for excess spoil fills to those fills with drainage areas of 250 acres or less
(fills with drainage areas of greater than 250 acres would require individual permits from the
Corps).
With the Corps removed from the case, the court agreed with plaintiffs in their assertion
that DEP's so-called "stream buffer zone" regulation1 did not authorize DEP to allow coal
operators to place excess spoil, e.g. valley fills, in perennial or intermittent streams. Bragg v.
West Virginia Coal Association, 72 F. Supp. 2d 642 (S.D.W.V.,1999). The court also expressed
concern about DEP granting a stream buffer zone variance without making the required
findings. 2 The court ultimately found that mountaintop removal violates the Clean Water Act.
The court noted that excess spoil was neither "dredged" material (excavated from a water body)
nor "fill" material (since it was not being placed in streams for the "primary purpose of replacing
aquatic areas with.dry materials" as that term was defined by the Corps. Thus, the court
concluded that the Corps' § 404 permitting authority did not include allowing valley fills to be
1 The "buffer-zone regulation in West Virginia prohibited disturbance within 100 feet of
a perennial or intermittent stream unless approved by DEP which must find, to give such
approval, that the disturbance will not violate applicable water quality standards and will not
adversely affect water quality or quantity or other environmental resources of the stream.
2 The federal stream buffer zone rule (30 CFR 816.57(a)(1)) states, in part, as follows:
No land within 100 feet of a perennial stream or an intermittent stream shall
be disturbed by surface mining activities, unless the regulatory authority
authorizes surface mining activities closer to, or through, such a stream ...
upon a finding that -
(1) Surface mining activities will not ... violate ... applicable water quality
standards, and will not adversely affect the water quantity or quality or other
environmental resources of the stream.
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constructed into and over streams. This ruling sent shock waves around the industry in the
Appalachian region of the country because it would have effectively eliminated mountaintop
removal as a mining method since there is no practical way to avoid placing excess spoil in
stream beds when performing mountaintop removal operations. The court in Bragg rejected the
arguments that since EPA guidelines under § 404 of the CWA defines "fill" to include any
pollutant that enters and changes the bottom elevation ofwaters of the United States for any
reason, such guidelines legitimized Corps jurisdiction over construction ofvalley fills in
connection with mountaintop removal.
In 2001, the Fourth Circuit Court ofAppeals reversed the lower court on other grounds,
namely that the 11 th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution bars actions in federal court against
state governments to enforce state law. Bragg v. West Virginia Coal Assn, 248 F. 3d 275 (4th Cir.
2001). The Fourth Circuit rejected plaintiffs' assertion that the state had not waived its 11 th
Amendment immunity by obtaining OSM approval of its state program and that West Virginia's
program was state law, not federal.
b. Kentucky Resources Council's Notice of Intent To Sue
On June 28, 2000, Tom Fitzgerald of the Kentucky Resources Council filed with OSM
and Kentucky a notice of intent to sue under Section 520 of the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977 ("SMCRA") asserting, among other grounds, that Kentucky's state
program regulation on stream buffer zones, 405 KAR 16:060 Section 11, impermissibly limits
the application of the prohibition against impairment ofwater quality or quantity to the stream
reach below any impounding structure, including a valley fill and any sediment ponds. Fitzgerald
asserted in his notice of intent that Kentucky's regulation was inconsistent with and less stringent
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than OSM's standard and the terms of SMCRA. Fitzgerald also asserted that such regulation and
practice by Kentucky's DSMRE was inconsistent with the lower court's ruling in Bragg v.
Robertson, supra. The notice of intent further asserted that OSM had failed to perform its duty
to require Kentucky DSMRE to revise its buffer zone regulation to make it consistent with the
federal standard and SMCRA. While a number of other issues raised in the notice of intent were
seemingly resolved to the satisfaction ofMr. Fitzgerald and the Kentucky Resources Council, the
central'issue regarding Kentucky stream buffer zone regulation has not been resolved. No suit
has been filed against OSM and Kentucky to date in connection with this issue.
c. Kentuckians For the Commonwealth, Inc. v. Rivenbur2h
On August 21, 2001, a citizens group, Kentuckians for ~he Commonwealth, Inc.,
("KFTC") brought suit against the Corps in federal court in the Southern District ofWest
Virginia challenging the Corps' authorization of a nationwide permit issued to Martin County
Coal Company in connection with a large mountaintop removal operation in Kentucky which
entailed 27 valley fills and allegedly over six miles of streams. The suit was filed in federal
court in West Virginia on the theory that court had jurisdiction since the Huntington, West
Virginia District of the Corps has jurisdiction over the Martin County operation.3 The issues
raised in the KFTC case are essentially the same as were raised in the Bragg case.
3 Despite an attempt by defendants and intervenors to transfer the case to federal court in
Kentucky, the case remains in the Southern District ofWest Virginia. Plaintiffs obviously favor
keeping the case in front of Judge Hayden in view ofhis rulings in the Bragg litigation. On the
other hand, as long as the case remains in West Virginia, any appeal would be before the Fourth
Circuit Court ofAppeals which reversed Judge Hayden in the Bragg litigation on the basis of the
Eleventh Amendment issue as discussed above.
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On February 7, 2002, plaintiffs in the KFTC case filed a motion for summary judgment
and for permanent injunction on Count 1 of the complaint - Count 1 being that the Corps has no
authority under the CWA to issue permits to dispose of excess spoil from surface coal mining
operations in streams. KFTC seeks a declaratory judgment and permanent injunction (1)
prohibiting the Corps from authorizing any activity at any site that would involve the placement
of excess spoil into "waters of the United States" and (2) requiring the Corps to revoke Martin
County Coal's authorization to do so pursuant to Nationwide Permit # 21 ("NWP 21 ").
The gist ofplaintiff's argument is as follows: (1) excess spoil material is "waste" and not
"fill" based on the Corps' own definition of "fill material." 4 Thus, under the plain language of
the Corps' definition, § 404 permits cannot be issued for disposal ofwaste. Disposal ofwaste is
regulated instead under § 402 of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1342. Also, plaintiffs are arguing that
under the Corps' contemporaneous construction of its regulation, such material is waste.5 The
4 In 33 CFR § 323.2(e) the Corps defined "fill material" as "any material used for the
primary purpose of replacing an aquatic area with dry land or of changing the bottom elevation of
a water body. The term does not include any pollutant discharged into the water primarily to
dispose of waste, as that activity is regulated under section 402 of the Clean Water Act."
Plaintiffs also rely on preamble language contained in the Federal Register accompanying this
definition which, according to plaintiffs, demonstrates the Corps' intent that disposal of such
things as solid waste, sludge, garbage, trash and "debris" in water is not allowed under § 404 of
the CWA, but rather must be regulated under § 402 (the NPDES program).
5 In its preamble to its current rule defining "fill material" (42 Fed. Reg. at 37130) (July
19, 1977), the Corps stated that during two years of experience with the 404 program, discharges
of industrial and municipal solid waste materials should be regulated through the NPDES
program and not under the 404 program of the CWA. Thus they modified their definition of fill
material to exclude those pollutants that are discharged into water primarily to dispose ofwaste.
As will be discussed below, EPA and the Corps are in the process ofre-defining "fill material" so
as to address specifically the issue, among others, ofwhether the construction ofvalley fills in
areas that include streams is allowable under § 404 of the CWA as fill material. This rule change
may be finalized prior to the date of the seminar.
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plaintiffs in the KFTC litigation are also pointing to deposition statements by three key Corps
officials that the purpose ofplacing mining spoil in valley fills is to dispose ofwaste, and that
such discharges should be regulated by EPA under the NPDES program pursuant to § 402 of the
CWA. The plaintiffs further rely upon informal policy issued by the Corps' Division Office in
Cincinnati to that effect. They further remind Judge Hayden that in the Bragg case he had
concluded that overburden or excess spoil, "being a pollutant and waste material, is not 'fill
material' subject to authority under 404 of the CWA, but rather subject to EPA jurisdiction under
402.
The 404-402 argument being presented in the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment
may be, in the end, a negotiating point for the plaintiff if it was able to persuade the Corps to
focus on the other issue in the case, namely that, as EPA has stated many times6, the construction
of large valley fills or a series ofvalley fills covering large portions of stream beds in connection
with mountaintop removal operations involves more than "minimal impacts" on the aquatic
environment, thus necessitating an individual § 404 Corps permit as opposed to one or more
nationwide permits.
d. Corps of En2ineers/Environmental Protection A2ency
Rulemakin2 To Revise CWA Definition of "Fill Material."
6 For example, on July 18, 2000, the Regional Administrator ofRegion 4, EPA wrote to
the District Engineer of the Huntington, West Virginia District of the Corps to express his strong
opposition to the Corps' approval, via a single nationwide #21 permit, the Martin County Coal
Company project in Kentucky which EPA characterized as involving 27 valley fills that would
"destroy" over "33,000 linear feet of streams." EPA demanded that the Corps proceed via an
individual permit. Since this letter, EPA gave notification that it intended to elevate the issue
with the possibility of an EPA veto of the Corps' action.
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On April 20, 2000, EPA and the Corps jointly issued a proposed rule 7 in which they
propose to revise their CWA regulations defining the term "fill material." As noted above, the
Corps' and EPA's definitions of that term differ from each other which, as they noted, has led to
uncertainty and confusion. While the Corps had amended its definition in 1977 to add its
"primary purpose" test and excluded from the definition material that was discharged primarily
to dispose ofwaste8, EPA did not add this test. To resolve this inconsistency and to reduce or
eliminate extensive litigation engendered by the inconsistent definitions (including the cases
discussed above involving mountaintop removal/valley fills), EPA and the Corps propose to re-
define "fill material" to mean "material that has the effect of replacing any portion of a water of
the U.S. with dry land, or changing the bottom elevation of any portion of a water of the U.S."
At the same time, it would exclude from the definition fill material discharges subject to EPA
proposed or promulgated effluent limitation guidelines and standards under the CWA sections
301, 304 and 306 and discharges under an NPDES permit under § 402 of the CWA. With regard
to coal mining overburden, the proposed rule states that EPA and the Corps believe that such
material has the effect of "fill" and thus should be regulated under Corps jurisdiction under §
404. The preamble to the rule goes on to state that the placement of "rock and other material in
the heads ofvalleys, with a sedimentation pond located downstream" has historically been
regulated by the Corps under § 404 and that they believe that it should continue to be so
regulated.
7 65 Fed. Reg. 21292 (4-20-2000)
8 42 Fed. Reg. 41291 (7-19-77)
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This proposed rule has produced both a veritable avalanche of written comments as well
as some political fall-out. The former is best reflected in the preamble to the Corps' January 15,
2002 final rule re-issuing its nationwide permits9 where the Corps acknowledges the substantial
number of comments it had received on the "fill material" rulemaking and the difficulty it was
having in that rulemaking. On the political front, both Democrats and Republicans alike have
openly criticized the Corps/EPA proposed re-definition of fill material. Several GOP House
members have called on the agencies to withdraw the proposed rule. For example,
Representative Christopher Shays (R-Conn.) indicated that the rule would have a "devastating
effect on the nation's waters." Rep. Nancy Johnson (R.Conn.), Rep. Rick Lazio (R-N.Y.), Rep.
Brian Bilbray (R-Cal.) and Rep. Benjamin Gilman (R-N.Y.) joined Rep. Shays in filing
comments on the proposed rule opposing the revised definition. The stakes grow higher with the
virtual certainty that numerous environmental groups have promised to challenge the rule if it
becomes final. The aforementioned GOP lawmakers are urging President Bush to have the
Corps and EPA to change course away from the proposed rule so as not to allow disposal of coal
mining spoil into valley fills. In a March 25, 2002 letter to the President, a dozen Republican
House members expressed strong opposition to the proposed rule change, arguing that the rule
"is designed to legitimize mountaintop removal mining." They also argue that the rule change
would enable other undesirable non-mining wastes to be dumped in streams, rivers, lakes and
wetlands, contrary to the CWA.
One side issue is reflected in the preamble to the proposed regulation where the
Corps/EPA discuss creating a definition of "unsuitable fill material." The National Mining
9 67 Fed. Reg. 2020 (1-15-02) at page 2038
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Association has urged EPA's Office ofWater to drop this concept from the final rule, urging
instead that the Corps make such determinations on a case-by-case basis. NMA has argued that
"a refusal to process a permit application [under § 404 of the CWA] on the basis of 'unsuitable
fill' raises procedural and due process issues."
The national media, including major stories on National Public Radio, the television
networks and major national newspapers, have highlighted the importance of the impending
Corps/EPA rule, raising the specter that the revised rule could even become an important election
issue in somewhat the same vein as opening up the Arctic National Wildlife Reservation to oil
and gas exploration.
e. Pr02rammatic Environmental Impact Statement on
Mountaintop Minin2 and Valley Fills
As part of the price of getting out of the Bragg litigation in West Virginia discussed
above, the Corps, EPA, OSM and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS") agreed to prepare
a programmatic environmental impact statement ("EIS") under NEPA on mountaintop mining
and valley fills. As discussed, plaintiffs in the Bragg litigation in West Virginia, in agreeing to
dismiss their case against the Corps and the other federal defendants, received an agreement from
the federal defendants (the Corps, OSM, and FWS) to perform this programmatic EIS on
mountaintop removal and valley fills. The Corps indicated in its preamble to its January 15,
2002 rulemaking (re-authorizing its nationwide permit program) that the Corps will use this EIS
to "better understand the environmental effects ofmountaintop mining and valley fills, as well as
programmatic changes that may be necessary to address those impacts." The Corps further stated
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that it would reevaluate NWP 21 when the mountaintop EIS is completed. 10 Presumably, based
on the Corps' own preamble comments in its nationwide regulations, the use ofNWP 21 for
valley fills and mountaintop removal operations will be guided and utilized only to the extent
deemed appropriate based on the findings in the joint agency programmatic EIS. If the EIS
concludes that valley fills involve more than "minimal impact" (either individually or
cumulatively) at a site, then it would seem that the Corps will be locked into requiring individual
permits.
The latest estimate by the agencies working on the EIS is that an official draft is expected
to be available in August, 2002.
f. OSM's Rulemakin2 To Revise Its Stream Buffer Zone Re2ulation
As if there weren't already enough regulatory activity surrounding the issue of the
placement of spoil material and coal refuse into streams as part of coal mining operations,
OSM is working on a revision to its stream buffer rule, 30 CFR 816.57(a)(I), which is quoted, in
part, above. As in the case of the Corps/EPA joint rulemaking on the definition of"fill material"
and the Corps' implementation of its nationwide permit program as to mountaintop mining,
OSM's rulemaking to amend or clarify its stream buffer zone rule would appear to be tied to the
result of the joint agency programmatic EIS on mountaintop removal/valley fills. These actions
are all seemingly tied together in the scheme of things. Discussions with OSM regarding the
10 67 Fed. Reg. 2039 (1-15-02); The Corps added that it will use the results of the EIS
and "all other information that may be available at that time, including information resulting
from individual verification ofall NWP 21 projects to make sure that NWP 21 results in no more
than minimal imp~cts (site-specific or cumulatively) on the aquatic environment.
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status of its rulemaking confirm that OSM will be guided by the findings of the EIS as much as
anything.
According to an April 11, 2002 Department of Interior memorandum, OSM intends to
propose a rule to modify the stream buffer zone rule to clarify that the buffer zone rule should not
be interpreted "as a prohibition on placement of excess spoil fills in streams." The memo was
released by environmental groups, following which it was released by Interior.
Environmentalists cite this memo, together with the Corps/EPA proposed revision of the
definition of"fill material" as evidence ofa "one-two punch that will knock out all federal
protection for streams in Appalachia."11
g. Refuse Impoundments , the Corps of En2ineers and
the Kentucky Division of Water
A somewhat related issue to the placement of spoil or overburden in streams in
connection with the construction ofvalley fills is the construction of new refuse impoundments
that would cover or affect streams. The Corps has considered coal refuse to be "fill material"
and thus appropriate for regulation under the Corps' § 404 CWA jurisdiction. However, the
Kentucky Resources Council ("KRC") wrote to the Corps' Louisville District on July 4, 2001
serving notice of its opposition to the construction of a coal slurry pond at the confluence of Jake
Campbell Branch and the North Fork of the Kentucky River. The basis for the opposition is
KRC's reading of the Corps' definition of "fill material" which, in KRC's view, would preclude
coal refuse and fine slurry/water material which KRC concludes is coal preparation "waste"
11 Per the statement of Joan Mulhern, a lawyer at Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund, to the
Associated Press on April 30, 2002.
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material. As such, KRC assets that it must be regulated under Section 402 of the CWA and not
Section 404.
Alternatively, KRC argues that assuming for the sake of argument that filling the stream
with coal slurry can be approved under § 404 of the CWA, the proposal to do so still cannot be
approved because: (I) an environmental impact statement ("EIS") is needed in order to comply
with NEPA; (2) the proposal must be accompanied with a discussion and assessment of the
"practicable alternatives" to locating the impoundment at this location; (3) the proposal is
contrary to the public interest because there are available alternative, cost-competitive and safer
technologies for disposal of coal preparation wastes. KRC pins its EISINEPA argument on its
assertion that the scale, location and potential environmental and public safety considerations of
such a project (invoking the two recent coal slurry spills as evidence) make the permitting of
such a facility a "major federal action" that may significantly affect the human environment,
mandating an EIS under CEQ regulations at 40 CFR 1508.8(b). KRC goes on to point out
inadequacies in the application for a permit/authorization, arguing that it fails to satisfy the §
404(b)(I) guidelines which are the roadmap for the Corps' approval ofa project. Specifically,
KRC asserts that in addition to no discussion of "practicable alternatives" as to site location,
configurations and technologies, there is also no discussion ofwhat is the "project purpose" for
purposes of evaluating impacts and complying with NEPA. Finally, the KRC asserts that there is
no evaluation of a public interest review apart from the requirements ofNEPA and the
performance of an EIS.
Whether or not the Corps and EPA will address the issue ofplacing coal slurry into
streams as part of their soon-to-be released redefinition of"fill material" remains to be seen.
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Many in industry fear that the joint Corps/EPA definition and accompanying preamble may "split
the baby" by defining overburden/spoil material as "fill material" while defining coal slurry as
"waste" which, as mentioned, may not be regulated under § 404 of the CWA, but rather under §
402 which would effectively eliminate coal slurry impoundments.
By letter dated October 11, 2001, Jack Wilson, then Director ofKentucky's Division of
Water, informed Czar Coal Company that its application for a water quality certification under
Section 401 of the CWA was denied in connection with Czar Coal's proposed coal slurry
impoundment on Middle Fork Rockcastle Creek. The letter (which was later withdrawn by then
Director Wilson) references the pending Corps/EPA rulemaking on the definition of"fill
material" which may be determinative on the issue of disposal of coal slurry in connection with a
§ 404 permit application. Regardless ofhow the rulemaking comes out, Wilson's letter states
that he recommends that this project, as well as other projects of "similar magnitude," should be
processed by the Corps as an individual 404 permit because of the potential for significant impact
to aquatic resources and because of the increased opportunity for public input and scrutiny via the
individual permit process. As of the date this paper is being prepared, no action has been taken
either by the Corps or by the DOW to act on Czar Coal's request to construct a slurry
impoundment. The problem mayor may not be solved by the CorpslEPA rulemaking on
redefining "fill material."
III. STATE WATER QUALITY CERTIFICATIONS UNDER § 401 OF
THECWA
Coal operators have many hurtles to clear in order to obtain the requisite
approvals to construct valley fills in connection with mountaintop removal operations. In
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addition to approvals/authorizations by the Corps under its permitting system under § 404, and
the requisite permit by the state surface mining authority, approvals must be obtained from state
water quality agencies pursuant to § 401 of the CWA. The CWA requires that states adopt water
quality standards to protect uses ofwaters within the statel2, and further requires as a prerequisite
for a federal permit involving a discharge into waters that there be a certification from the state
that the discharge will comply with state water quality standards. 13 In establishing water quality
standards, the state must designate what use is to be protected for the various waters of the state
and then adopt criteria sufficient to protect those designated uses.
In connection with the Corps regulatory process, the water quality certification process
generally begins when the Corps issues its public notice of a permit application and sends a copy
to the state water quality agency. Section 401 of the CWA provides that the state certification
requirement is waived if the state fails to act within a "reasonable time" which shall not exceed
one year. It is important to note, however, that frequently the water quality certification becomes
a bone of contention before the Corps even gets involved since the state mining agency may
decline to issue a mining permit until the water quality certification is issued. EPA can also play
a role since it may raise independently of the state its own water quality concerns.
In the context ofwater quality certifications applicable to nationwide permits, such as
NWP 21 applicable to mining, each state must certify a particular NWP for it to be applicable in
that state. In Kentucky, there are several factors to be aware of. First, in 1994 the legislature
12 33 U.S.C. 1313(a)
13 33 U.S.C. 1341. The water quality certification requirement is noted in the Corps
regulations at 33 CFR 320.4(d).
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enacted House Bill 633 14 which clarified that for valley fills greater than 480 acres, a 401 water
quality certification may only be issued if it requires as a condition stream mitigation on a one-to-
one ratio as discussed below. HB 633 also provided that no water quality certification would be
required for a road crossing on the permitted area impacting l~ss than 200 linear feet ofwater.
This legislation was a compromise reached between environmentalists and the coal industry. It
does not specifically authorize the purchase ofmitigation as exists under West Virginia law.
KRS 224.16-070 also provides that it only applies if the applicant for the water quality
certification is eligible for a NWP #21 and if the surface coal mining operation will not impact
waters designated by the cabinet in its water quality standards as outstanding state or national
resource waters or as cold water aquatic habitat. It further provides that if the watershed above
the toe of the farthest downstream permanent structure authorized by NWP #21 is less than 480
acres, the Cabinet "shall" issue a water quality certification containing only the standard
conditions set out in other parts of the statute. If the watershed is to be greater than 480 acres,
the Cabinet may require a water quality certification containing additional conditions. Further, a
water quality certification may require mitigation at a maximum ratio of one acre ofmitigation
area for every one acre ofpermanent loss ofwaters of the Commonwealth. Such mitigation may
be on or off the permitted area, and mitigation banking may be utilized.
During the 2002 Kentucky legislative session, there was an unsuccessful attempt to
amend KRS 224.16-070 to allow certain additional types of activities to serve as acceptable
mitigation for compensation for the loss of stream in connection with water quality certifications
from Kentucky in connection with NWP #21. House Bill 798 would have authorized such
14 This legislation is codified at KRS 224.16-070
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activities as expending costs to extend public sewer lines to areas where homes were discharging
raw sewage into streams, and other similar "public works" type projects that would have a direct
effect on the water quality of the Commonwealth. Specifically this bill would have allowed as
compensatory mitigation such things as (1) removing sediment control structures at abandoned
sites and restoring the stream where the applicant had no legal responsibility to do so; (2)
improving impaired streams; (3) constructing new or upgraded existing wastewater treatment
facilities of local communities or homeowners; (4) extending sanitary sewer lines to areas not
presently served; (5) funding the preparation ofwastewater facility plans; (6) relocating local
road segments directly impacting water quality and aquatic habitat (other than roads already
permitted and bonded under KRS Chapter 350); (5) purchasing conservation easements to protect
riparian zones. This legislation was not enacted primarily because there was insufficient time in
the session to enable it to be properly considered.
In addition to publishing general conditions for water quality certifications, the Kentucky
Division ofWater has also established "Section 401 Water Quality Certification Conditions for
Nationwide Permit #21 Within the Commonwealth ofKentucky." These may be accessed on the
Division ofWater's website at www.water.nr.state.ky.us/wq/wqcertification/NW21.htm.
Water quality certifications can be a powerful tool in the hands of a state to prevent or to
place significant conditions on a proposal to conduct mountaintop removal and its attendant use
ofvalley fills. Care must be taken to insure that all of the requisite steps are taken to satisfy
Division of Water requirements/concerns as part of the overall regulatory strategy and approval
process. Without Division of Water approval, a coal operator will go nowhere on its proposal to
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construct a valley fill. It should be noted, however, that a denial of a water quality certification
or unreasonable conditions may be challenged administratively and then judicially.
IV. CURRENT STATUS OF PERMIT APPLICATIONS WITH THE
CORPS
The starting point with the Corps during this interim period prior to the preparation of the
joint CORPS/OSM/EPA/FWS programmatic EIS on mountaintop mining/valley fills and prior to
the promulgation of a final EPA/Corps rule on redefining "fill material" are the terms of the
settlement agreement that grew out of the Bragg litigation in West Virginia. As mentioned, this
agreement provided that the Corps would limit the application ofNWP #21 to fills that,
measured from the toe of the fill, drained an area 250 acres or less. Fills that drained larger Jlreas
would require an individual § 404 permit. A question still remains as to whether the 250 acre
cutoff is limited to single fills or could be interpreted to mean multiple fills on the same permit
which, when considered cumulatively, drain more than 250 acres. An additional question exists
as to whether the Corps can authorize or deny fill construction under a nationwide permit,
regardless of the drainage area, without a site-specific evaluation of the cumulative impacts on
the aquatic environment as mandated by the CWA and the §404 (b)(I) guidelines. In general, it
appears that coal operators in West Virginia are intentionally designing proposed fills so that they
do not individually receive drainage from more than 250 acres to avoid triggering the individual
permit process. However, a number of operators in West Virginia have also applied for
individual §404 permits from the Huntington District of the Corps. To date, only two individual
permits have been issued by the Huntington District since the Bragg case settlement agreement.
Hobet Mining (which was the subject of the original Bragg lawsuit) and which is a very large
H -18
operation, has applied for an individual permit and a site-specific EIS is being performed under
NEPA. A public hearing will be held as part of this individual permitting process, and the fate of
the permit application is far from certain.
Miti&ation Requirements
The Corps offices with jurisdiction over mountaintop mining/valley fill-related
applications (which are confined to the Appalachian region of the country) are located primarily
in Huntington, West Virginia and Louisville, Kentucky.ls One of the "quirks" of the Corps
organization is that the Corps District offices operate somewhat independently of each other and
differ occasionally on regulatory issues. The Corps headquarters has published a "Regulatory
Guidance Letter ("RGL") on October 31, 2001 on mitigation (RGL 01-1) which applies generally
to all Corps-issued permits and which emphasizes that mitigation is a "critical element in the
Corps' decisions to issue permits under Section 404 of the CWA and that it is intended to
encourage consistency among Corps district offices. However, each Corps District office still
operates somewhat independently. The "sense" of the RGL is that the Corps would be imposing
tougher standards for mitigation plans. 16 The Huntington and Louisville District offices of the
15 The other Corps District offices with jurisdiction in Appalachia are Memphis and
Nashville which have jurisdiction over watersheds in portions of the Mississippi and its
tributaries, the Cumberland River, Red River, Rockcastle River, Clarks River, Laurel River,
Poor Fork of the Cumberland River, Big South Fork of the Cumberland River and Little South
Fork-Tennessee River.
16 The Corps RGL 01-1 was created in response to a June, 2001 report by the National
Research Council, an arm of the National Academy of Science, which found that permits were
inadequate to protect the aquatic ecosystems. The Corps guidance letter adopts a system of
credits and debits regarding disturbed acreage to better account for the comparability of the
mitigation project. The Corps would consider the use of off-site mitigation projects when on-site
mitigation was not practical.
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Corps have been evolving or developing their policy on mitigation during the past few years.
The Huntington District office had traditionally been looking to the respective state water
regulatory agencies to approve an operator's mitigation plan, while the Louisville District
established an eastern Kentucky field office which conducts site visits and take a more proactive
approach to mitigation. An unpublished "grid" system was implemented by the Louisville
District which calculated the number of feet of stream to be disturbed, the quality of the streams
(ephemeral, intermittent or perennial), applied certain multipliers and came up with the
"cumulative impact" of the proposed fill.
In-lieu Fee-Based Mitigation
Another concept that has evolved is the use by both Districts of so-called "in-lieu fee-
based" mitigation which means the payment ofmoney to offset adverse impacts to streams to be
used in lieu of on-site or off-site stream mitigation. This fee-based mitigation is discussed in a
"draft" memorandum from the Corps which states that the applicant may elect to pay a fee to
compensate for the loss of aquatic habitat, and that the fee will be calculated based on the length
of the stream(s) times the mitigation ratio times $100 times 1.2.17 In a letter to the Corps dated
October 30, 2001, the Kentucky Coal Association ("KCA") complained about the uncertainty in
the in-lieu fee-based mitigation, indicating that while the Louisville District used the above-
described formula for calculating the amount of fee, the Huntington District used $200,000 an
acre. While this may change in the weeks or months ahead, the Louisville District is currently
17 The memo notes that for purposes of determining the length of stream affected, the
stream is defined as a channel having" a recognizable bed and bank. For disturbances in
ephemeral streams we will need to determine the upper limit of the stream so as to minimize the
length of stream to be affected. The factor of 1.2 in the above formula was explained as being a
regional adjustment of cumulative impacts."
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using a somewhat more refined version of the above-described grid, incorporating additional
ecological information based upon a site-specific evaluation by the Eastern Kentucky office of
the Louisville District. The Huntington District is currently still calculating the fee on the basis
of the acreage of stream affected at the rate of $200,000 per acre. A number of operators are
opting to use in-lieu fee-based mitigation because of the lack of suitable on-site or off-site
streams on which to perform mitigation activities. Potential offsite streams are frequently off-
limits because ofproblems with landowner approval, access and the like.
v. CONCLUSION.
As described above, there are a myriad of agencies that are engaged in either (or all) of
the following: litigation, rulemaking, environmental impact statement preparation, internal
policy development and permitting decisions, all ofwhich pertain, directly or indirectly, to
mountaintop mining/valley fill activity. Superimposed on all of this activity are the political
ramifications of agency decisions relating to these issues. In such an environment, it is difficult
to predict how all of this will work out in the end. It appears that ultimately each federal agency
that is involved in the process (the Corps, EPA, OSM, and FWS) must get guidance from the
White House on how the Bush Administration wants to play this in view of the high profile these
issues are achieving. In the interim, coal companies and regulators are muddling through this
maze with regard to pending and new applications for permits and authorizations to conduct
mountaintop removal mining and valley fill construction.
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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Department of the Army, Corps of Engineers
33 CFR Part 323
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
40 CFR Part 232
[FRL 7209-2]
Final Revisions to the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definitions of
"Fill Material" and "Discharge of Fill Material"
AGENCIES: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Department of the Army, DoDi
and Environmental Protection Agency.
ACTION: Final rule.
SUMMARY: The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) and the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) are promulgating a final rule to reconcile our
Clean Water Act (CWA) section 404 regulations defining the term "fill
material" and to amend our definitions of "discharge of fill
material." Today's final rule completes the rulemaking process
initiated by the April 20, 2000, proposal in which we jointly proposed
to amend our respective regulations so that both agencies would have
identical definitions of these key terms. The proposal was intended to
clarify the Section 404 regulatory framework and
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generally to be consistent with existing regulatory practice. Today's
final rule satisfies those goals.
Today's final rule defines "fill material" in both the Corps' and
EPA's regulations as material placed in waters of the U.S. where the
material has the effect of either replacing any portion of a water of
the United States with dry land or changing the bottom elevation of any
portion of a water. The examples of "fill material" identified in
today's rule include rock, sand, soil, clay, plastics, construction
debris, wood chips, overburden from mining or other excavation
activities, and materials used to create any structure or
infrastructure in waters of the U.S. This rule retains the effects-
based approach of the April 2000 proposal and reflects the approach in
EPA's longstanding regulations. Today's final rule, however, includes
an explicit exclusion from the definition of "fill material" for
trash or garbage.
Today's final rule also includes several clarifying changes to the
term "discharge of fill material." Specifically, the term
"infrastructure" has been added in several places following the term
"structure" to further define the situations where the placement of
fill material is considered a" "discharge of fill material." In
addition, the phrases "placement of fill material for construction or
http://www.usace.army.mil/inet/functions/cw/cecwo/reg/definfil.htm
maintenance of any liner, berm, or other infrastructure associated with
solid waste landfills" and "placement of overburden, slurry, or
tailings or similar mining-related materials" have been added to the
definition of "discharge of fill material" to provide further
clarification of the types of activities regulated under section 404.
As indicated in the proposal, as a general matter, this final rule
will not modify existing regulatory practice. Today's final rule, which
establishes uniform language for the Corps' and EPA's definitions of
"fill material" and "discharge of fill material," will enhance the
agencies' ability to protect aquatic resources by ensuring more
consistent and effective implementation of CWA requirements.
EFFECTIVE DATE: June 10, 2002.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For information on today's rule,
contact either Mr. Thaddeus J. Rugiel, U.s. Army Corps of Engineers,
ATTN CECW- OR, 441 "G" Street, NW., Washington, DC 20314-1000, phone:
(202) 761-4595, e-mail address: ~~d~~~~£~~~~~.~~~~~!,
or Ms. Brenda Mallory, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, EPA West,
Office of Wetlands, Oceans and Watersheds (4502T), 1200 Pennsylvania
Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20460, phone: (202) 566-1368, e-mail
address: mallory.brenda@epa.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
A. Potentially Regulated Entities
Persons or entities that discharge material to waters of the U.S.
that has the effect of replacing any portion of a water of the U.S.
with dry land or changing the bottom elevation of any portion of a
water of the U.S. could be regulated by today's rule. The CWA generally
prohibits the discharge of pollutants into waters of the U.S. without a
permit issued by EPA, or a State or Tribe approved by EPA under section
402 of the Act, or, in the case of dredged or fill material, by the
Corps or an approved State or Tribe under section 404 of the Act.
Today's final rule addresses the CWA section 404 program's definitions
of "fill material" and "discharge of fill material," which are
important for determining whether a particular discharge is subject to
regulation under CWA section 404. Today's final rule reconciles EPA's
and the Corps' differing definitions of "fill material" and provides
further clarification for the regulated public on what constitutes a
"discharge of fill material." Examples of entities potentially
regulated include:
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Category
State/Tribal governments or
instrumentalities.
Local governments or instrumentalities.
Examples of potentially
regulated entities
State/Tribal agencies or
instrumentalities that
discharge material that has
the effect of replacing any
portion of a water of the U.S.
with dry land or changing the
bottom elevation of a water of
the U.S.
Local governments or
instrumentalities that
discharge material that has
the effect of replacing any
portion of a water of the U.S.
with dry land or changing the
bottom elevation of a water of
the U.S.
,
Federal government agencies or
instrumentalities.
Industrial, commercial, or agricultural
entities.
Land developers and landowners .
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Federal government agencies or
instrumentalities that
discharge material that has
the effect of replacing any
portion of a water of the u.s.
with dry land or changing the
bottom elevation of a water of
the u.s.
Industrial, commercial, or
agricultural entities that
discharge material that has
the effect of replacing any
portion of a water of the u.s.
with dry land or changing the
bottom elevation of a water of
the u.s.
Land developers and landowners
that discharge material that
has the effect of replacing
any portion of a water of the
u.s. with dry land or changing
the bottom elevation of a
water of the u.s.
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This table is not intended to be exhaustive, but rather provides a
guide for readers regarding entities that are likely to be regulated by
this action. This table lists the types of entities that we are now
aware of that could potentially be regulated by this action. Other
types of entities not listed in the table also could be regulated. To
determine whether your organization or its activities are regulated by
this action, you should carefully examine the applicability criteria in
sections 230.2 of Title 40 and 323.2 of Title 33 of the Code of Federal
Regulations, as well as the preamble discussion in Section II of
today's final rule. If you have questions regarding the applicability
of this action to a particular entity, consult the persons listed in
the preceding section entitled FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT.
B. Summary of Regulatory History Leading to Final Rule and Related
Litigation
The CWA governs the "discharge" of "pollutants" into
"navigable waters, " which are defined as "waters of the United
States. " Specifically, Section 301 of the CWA generally prohibits the
discharge of pollutants into waters of the U.S., except in accordance
with the requirements of one of the two permitting programs established
under the CWA: Section 404, which regulates the discharge of dredged or
fill material, or sction 402, which regulates all other pollutants
under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES)
program. Section 404 is primarily administered by the Corps, or States/
Tribes that have assumed the program pursuant to section 404(g), with
input and oversight by EPA. In contrast, Section 402 and the remainder
of the CWA are administered by EPA or approved States or Tribes. The
CWA defines the term "pollutant" to include
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materials such as rock, sand, and cellar dirt that often serve as
"fill material." The CWA, however, does not define the terms "fill
material" and "discharge of fill material," leaving it to the
agencies to adopt definitions consistent with the statutory framework
of the CWA.
Prior to 1977, both the Corps and EPA had defined "fill material"
as "any pollutant used to create fill in the traditional sense of
replacing an aquatic area with dry land or of changing the bottom
elevation of a water body for any purpose. * * *" 40 FR 31325 (July
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25, 1975); 40 FR 41291 (September 5, 1975).
In 1977, the Corps amended its definition of "fill material" to
add a "primary purpose test, " and specifically excluded from that
definition material that was discharged primarily to dispose of waste.
42 FR 37130 (July 19, 1977). This change was adopted by the Corps
because it recognized that some discharges of solid waste materials
technically fit the definition of fill material; however, the Corps
believed that such waste materials should not be subject to regulation
under the CWA section 404 program. Specifically, the Corps' definition
of "fill material" adopted in 1977 reads as follows:
(e) The term "fill material" means any material used for the
primary purpose of replacing an aquatic area with dry land or of
changing the bottom elevation of an [sic] water body. The term does
not include any pollutant discharged into the water primarily to
dispose of waste, as that activity is regulated under section 402 of
the Clean Water Act." 33 CFR 323.2(e) (2001) (emphasis added).
EPA did not amend its regulations to adopt a "primary purpose
test" similar to that used by the Corps. Instead, the EPA regulations
at 40 CFR 232.2 defined "fill material" as "any 'pollutant' which
replaces portions of the 'waters of the United States' with dry land or
which changes the bottom elevation of a water body for any purpose' ,
(emphasis added). EPA's definition focused on the effect of the
material (an effects-based test), rather than the purpose of the
discharge in determining whether it would be regulated by section 404
or section 402.
C. April 2000 Proposal
These differing definitions of "fill material" have resulted in
some confusion for some members of the regulated community which has
not promoted effective implementation of the CWA. See 65 FR at 21294.
As a result, in April 2000, the agencies proposed revisions to their
respective definitions of "fill material" and "discharge of fill
material, " adopting a single effects-based definition similar to that
in EPA's regulations. The April 2000 proposed rule defined "fill
material" as material that has the effect of replacing any portion of
a water of the U.S. with dry land, or changing the bottom elevation of
any portion of a water of the U.S. The agencies believe that an
effects-based definition is, as a general matter, the most effective
approach for identifying discharges that are regulated as "fill
material" under section 404. Thus, the proposal removed from the
Corps" definition the "primary purpose" test and the provision
excluding pollutants discharged into water primarily to dispose of
waste.
The April 2000 proposal also would have excluded from the
definition discharges subject to an EPA proposed or promulgated
effluent limitation guideline or standard under CWA sections 301, 304,
306, or discharges covered under a NPDES permit under CWA section 402.
Finally, the April 2000 proposal solicited comments on the idea of the
agencies creating an "unsuitable fill" category in the regulations
that would identify materials that the Corps District Engineer could
determine were not appropriate as fill material and, consequently,
refuse to process an application seeking authorization to discharge
such material.
In the preamble for the April 2000 proposal, the agencies discussed
the need to address the confusion created by the agencies' differing
definitions. While in practice some Corps Districts and EPA Regions
have developed consistent approaches for determining whether proposed
activities would result in a discharge of fill material, national
uniformity will ensure better environmental results. Moreover, two
judicial decisions discussed in the April 2000 proposal, Resource
Investments Incorporated v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 151 F. 3d
1162 (9th Cir. 1998) ("RII' ') and Bragg v. Robertson, (Civil Action
No. 2:98-636, S.D. W. Va.), vacated on other grounds, 248 F. 3d 275
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(4th Cir. 2001) ("Bragg' '), indicate that the differing EPA and Corps
definitions can result in judicial decisions that further confuse the
regul~tory context. See 65 FR at 21294-95. The clarification in the
April 2000 proposal was intended to promote clearer understanding and
application of our regulatory programs.
With respect to the term "discharge of fill material, " the April
2000 proposal also included several clarifying changes. Unlike the
definition of "fill material," EPA's and the Corps" then-existing
regulations defining the term "discharge of fill material" were
substantively identical. The proposed changes to the term were intended
to provide further clarification of the issue. Specifically, the
proposal provided for adding two phrases to the definition: (1)
"Placement of fill material for construction or maintenance of liners,
berms, and other infrastructure associated with solid waste landfills;
and (2) "placement of coal mining overburden.' ,
As summarized in more detail in the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers'
and Environmental Protection Agency's Response to Comments on the April
20, 2000, Proposed Rule Revising the Clean Water Act Regulatory
Definitions of "Fill Material" and "Discharge of Fill Material,"
dated May 3, 2002 ("Response to Comments' '), we received a number of
comments addressing these proposed changes. The comments and the above-
referenced document are part of the administrative record for this rule
and are available from either agency. See the section entitled FOR
FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT.
II. Discussion of Final Rule
A. Overall Summary of Comments
We received over 17,200 comments on the proposed rule, including
several hundred late comments, most of which consisted of identical or
substantially identical e-mails, letters, and postcards opposing the
rule. (In April 2002, an additional several thousand letters and e-
mails were sent opposing the adoption of a rule similar to the
proposal.) Approximately 500 of the original comments consisted of more
individualized letters, with a mixture of those comments supporting and
opposing the rule. The comments of environmental groups and the various
form letters were strongly opposed to the proposal, in particular, the
elimination of the waste exclusion and the discussion in the preamble
regarding treatment of unsuitable fill material. Except for several
landfill representatives, comments from the regulated community
generally supported the proposal, in particular, the fact that the rule
would create uniform definitions of "fill material" for the Corps"
and EPA's rules and maintain regulation of certain discharges under
section 404 as opposed to section 402 of the CWA. A detailed discussion
of the issues raised in the comments and the agencies' responses can be
found in the Response to Comments document.
The April 2000 proposal would have achieved four major outcomes and
these were the focus of many of the comments. These outcomes were (1)
Conforming the EPA and Corps definitions of "fill material" to one
another; (2) adopting an effects-based
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test, as opposed to the Corps' primary purpose test, for defining
"fill material;" (3) eliminating the waste exclusion from the Corps"
regulation; and (4) soliciting comments on whether to develop a
definition for "unsuitable fill material." A summary of comments
relating to these four issues and our responses are discussed in
section II.B of this preamble, which describes today's final rule.
In addition, comments asserted the need for the agencies to prepare
an environmental impact statement (EIS) in order to comply with the
National Environmental Policy Act; and questioned the consistency of
the April 2000 proposal with the CWA, existing judicial decisions, and
agency guidance documents. These comments are addressed in this section
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of the preamble.
With respect to the need for an EIS, many of the comments opposing
the adoption of the rule argued t~at an EIS should have been prepared,
particularly to address the impacts of eliminating the waste exclusion.
Supporters of an EIS rejected the notion that the issues will be
addressed in the individual permit situations. First, they pointed out
that many of the mining activities have historically been permitted
under the nationwide permit program where truncated environmental
review occurs and no individual NEPA analysis is undertaken. Second,
they argued that the cumulative impacts often are not appropriately
addressed in this context. As described in section III. J of this final
preamble and in the Response to Comments document, the agencies have
concluded that preparation of an EIS is not required for this rule
pursuant to NEPA. While supporters of an EIS suggest that finalizing
this rule will result in significant new discharges that previously
would not have occurred, that is not the case. Although the rule will
clarify the appropriate regulatory framework, we do not expect there to
be any significant change in the nature and scope of discharges that
will occur.
Finally, a number of comments asserted that the proposal should not
be finalized because it violated the then-existing law (e.g., CWA,
Bragg, and RII). Other comments argued that the proposal was consistent
with the CWA and current regulatory practice. We do not agree that the
proposal or today's final rule violate the CWA or any other law.
Moreover, we believe that agencies have an obligation to take whatever
steps may be necessary, including making revisions to their
regulations, to ensure that their programs are appropriately
implementing statutory mandates. As indicated, the Corps and EPA
believe that the current inconsistency between their respective
definitions of "fill material" is impeding the effective
implementation of the section 404 program. Under those circumstances,
we believe that a change in the regulatory language is justified and
that by adopting the substance of EPA's longstanding definition, we are
minimizing potential confusion and disruption to the program, while
remaining consistent with the CWA. We agree with those comments that
recognize the consistency of our action with the CWA and current
practice. As described in more detail in the Response to Comments
document and sections II. Band D of this preamble, today's final rule
clarifies the governing regulatory framework in a manner consistent
with the CWA and existing practice.
B. Discussion of the Final Rule
1. Definition of "Fill Material"
Today's final rule modifies both the EPA's and Corps' existing
definitions of "fill material" and has retained the effects-based
approach set forth in the proposal. The final rule defines "fill
material" as material placed in waters of the U.S. where the material
has the effect of either replacing any portion of a water of the United
States with dry land or changing the bottom elevation of any portion of
a water. The examples of "fill material" identified in today's rule
include rock, sand, soil, clay, plastics, construction debris,· wood
chips, overburden from mining or other excavation activities, and
materials used to create any structure or infrastructure in waters of
the U.S. The proposed rule only specifically identified rock, earth and
sand as examples, but the preamble made it clear that these were merely
illustrative. In addition, in the preamble to the proposal, we
indicated that wood chips, coal mining overburden, and similar
materials would also constitute "fill material" if they had the
effect of fill. As a result of questions raised in the comments about
the scope of the term "fill material, " we have included additional
examples in the final rule, several of which were discussed in the
proposed preamble. We believe that these additional examples will
further clarify the rule.
Although today's final rule adopts a general effects-based approach
for defining "fill material," it specifically excludes trash or
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garbage. Today's final rule does not modify any other Section 404
jurisdictional terms or alter any procedures governing the individual
or general permit processes for Section 404 authorizations,
requirements under Section 402, or the governing permit programs.
Following is a summary of the actions that the agencies have taken in
response to public comments.
a. Reconciling Agencies' Definitions
The majority of the comments from both the environmental and
industry perspectives addressing the issue of whether the agencies
should have identical definitions expressed the general view that the
agencies should have the same definitions for the key jurisdictional
terms "fill material" and "discharge of fill material." Many of the
comments also noted that the differences between the Corps' and EPA's
rules have historically caused confusion for the regulated community.
Several asserted that despite differences in the regulatory language,
some Corps Districts have been applying an effects-based test for some
time. As described in the Response to Comments document, the agencies
agree with thoee comments supporting the promulgation in both the
Corps' and EPA's regulations of a uniform definition for the terms
"fill material" and "discharge of fill material." Today's final
rule achieves this result.
b. Effects-Based Test
Most of the comments supported the proposed rule's use of an
effects-based test similar to EPA's longstanding definition for
defining "fill material" and the elimination of the "primary
purpose" test from the Corps regulations. Those disagreeing with such
an approach gave a variety of reasons including, the lack of any
demonstrated justification that eliminating the primary purpose test
from the Corps' regulation was necessary; the existence of similar
purpose tests in other statutes involving waste materials as well as in
the Section 404(b) (1) Guidelines as demonstrating that such tests need
not be unwieldy; the existence of alternative ways of addressing the
issues of concern without resorting to this, rule change; and concerns
about the inappropriate expansion of section 404 jurisdiction. As will
be explained, the agencies are not persuaded by these arguments.
First, we believe that the objective standard created by the
effects-based test will yield more consistent results in determining
what is "fill material" and will provide greater certainty in the
implementation of the program. We believe that these benefits provide
sufficient justification for today's rule change. In addition, although
similar "purpose" tests may be used under other statutes and even
under the section 404 program, this does not
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negate the difficulties we have faced in applying the primary purpose
test, as well as some confusion that has resulted from the use of the
subjective primary purpose test in the section 404 jurisdictional
context. An objective, effects-based standard also helps ensure that
discharges with similar environmental effects will be treated in a
similar manner under the regulatory program. The subjective, purpose-
based standard led in some cases to inconsistent treatment of similar
discharges, a result which hampers effective implementation of the
statute.
Moreover, we believe there is an important distinction between the
use of a purpose test here, where it determines the basic jurisdiction
of the section 404 versus the section 402 program, and its use in the
other contexts, such as in the evaluation of whether alternatives to a
discharge of dredged material are "practicable" within the meaning of
the section 404(b) (1) Guidelines. See 40 CFR 230.10(a) (2). The use of
project purpose in the latter case is appropriate because it would make
no sense to consider an alternative "practicable" if it did not
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satisfy the basic or overall purpose of the project proposed by the
applicant. The definition of fill material, on the other hand,
determines which legal requirements must be met for a discharge to be
authorized under the statute. In that circumstance, we believe it is
important to use an objective, effects-based test that ensures
consistent treatment of like discharges, and prevents uncertainty for
the regulated community as to what regulatory program applies to
particular discharges. Moreover, we disagree that alternatives other
than a rulemaking could have adequately addressed the agencies'
concerns since the facial differences in our regulations could only be
completely reconciled by revising the rules. In addition, the agencies
previously had attempted to clarify their interpretation of the rules
in a 1986 Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). Nevertheless, issues
persisted.
Finally, we disagree that the rule causes an inappropriate
expansion of section 404 jurisdiction. The CWA does not limit section
404 jurisdiction over fill material to materials meeting the primary
purpose test. The "primary purpose test" is a regulatory definition
and within the agencies province to modify as long as the modification
is consistent with the CWA. In sum, as described in the Response to
Comments document, the final rule, just as the proposal, adopts an
effects-based approach to defining fill material. We believe the
clarity and consistency created by the agencies relying on a more
objective test for defining these key jurisdictional terms will result
in more effective regulation under the CWA.
c. Elimination of Waste Exclusion
Many comments opposed the proposal to eliminate the waste exclusion
from the Corps' regulation. Some of these comments recommended that, in
addition to the effects-based test, the agencies should include a
general exclusion from the definition of "fill material" for any
discharge of "waste." These comments asserted that such an approach
provides the advantages of EPA's effects-based approach while more
effectively implementing the Corps' exclusion of waste material from
regulation under section 404. Some of the comments argued that the
proposed rule's deletion of the waste exclusion language from the
Corps' regulations violates the CWA. According to these comments, while
waste material can permissibly be covered by section 404 when it is
placed in waters for a beneficial purpose, the CWA categorically
prohibits authorizing such discharges under section 404 when their
purpose is waste disposal. These comments pointed to the decisions in
RII and Bragg to argue that all waste material is outside the scope of
section 404.
These comments do not object to, nor claim that the CWA prohibits,
issuance of a section 404 permit for waste material discharged into
waters of the u.s. under all circumstances. Where waste is discharged
for a purpose other than waste disposal (e.g., to create fast land for
development), these comments acknowledged that the Corps' issuance of a
section 404 permit in accordance with the section 404(b) (1) Guidelines
adequately protects the environment and is consistent with the CWA. On
this point, we agree. However, where the identical material--with
identical environmental effects--is discharged into waters for purposes
of waste disposal, the comments contend that issuance of a section 404
permit in accordance with the Guidelines would neither protect the
environment nor be allowed by the CWA. Here, we disagree.
Simply because a material is disposed of for purposes of waste
disposal does not, in our view, justify excluding it categorically from
the definition of fill. Some waste (e.g., mine overburden) consists of
material such as soil, rock and earth, that is similar to
"traditional" fill material used for purposes of creating fast land
for development. In addition, other kinds of waste having the effect of
fill (e.g., certain other mining wastes) can, unlike trash or garbage,
be indistinguishable either upon discharge or over time from structures
created for purposes of creating fast land. Given the similarities of
some discharges of waste to "traditional" fill, we believe that a
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categorical exclusion for waste would be over-broad. Instead, where a
waste has the effect of fill, we believe that regulation under the
section 404 program is appropriate.
This does not mean, however, that today's rule opens up waters of
the u.s. to be filled for any waste disposal purposes. As explained
previously, today's rule is generally consistent with current agency
practice and so it does not expand the types of discharges that will be
covered under section 404. The section 404(b) (1) Guidelines provide for
a demonstration that there are no less damaging alternatives to the
discharge, and that all appropriate and practicable steps have been
taken to avoid, minimize and compensate for any effects on the waters.
We recognize that, some fill material may exhibit characteristics, such
as chemical contamination, which may be of environmental concern in
certain circumstances. This is true under either a primary purpose or
effects based definition of fill material. The section 404 permitting
process, however, is expressly designed to address the entire range of
environmental concerns arising from discharges of dredged or fill
material. See 40 CFR Part 230, subparts C-G (containing comprehensive
provisions for addressing physical, chemical and biological impacts of
discharges) .
The 404(b) (1) guidelines provide a comprehensive means of
evaluating whether any discharge of fill material, regardless of its
purpose, is environmentally acceptable and therefore may be discharged
in accordance with the CWA. Where the practicable alternatives test has
been satisfied and all practicable steps have been taken both to
minimize effects on the aquatic environment and to compensate for the
loss of aquatic functions and values, we believe the section 404
permitting process is adequate to ensure protection of the aquatic
ecosystem for any pollutant that fills waters. There is no
environmental basis for contending that the sufficiency of the
permitting process to protect waters of the u.s. depends on the purpose
of the discharge.
The position reflected in some of the comments appears to be based
on the contention that Congress did not intend for waste disposal to be
a permissible purpose of discharging pollutants into waters of the u.s.
While we agree that
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Congress wanted to prevent utilization of waters as unlicensed dumping
grounds for waste material, the Act as a whole is focused primarily on
discharges of waste material, as shown by the Act's definition of
pollutant, which includes solid waste, sewage, garbage, discarded
equipment, industrial, municipal and agricultural waste. See CWA
section 502(6). While the elimination of all discharges is an important
goal of the Act (see CWA section 101(a) (1)), the Act seeks to meet that
goal not by banning discharges of waste outright, but by imposing
carefully tailored restrictions on discharges of pollutants based on
factors such as the impact of the discharge on the receiving water,
availability of treatment technologies, cost, and the availability of
alternatives to the discharge. See, e.g., CWA sections 301(b), 304(b)
(requiring discharges to meet technology-based effluent limitations
guidelines and standards); section 306(a) (1) (defining new source
performance standard to include no discharge of pollutants "where
practicable' '); section 301(b) (1) (C) (requiring dischargers to comply
with any more· stringent limitations necessary to meet water quality
standards); sections 404(b) (1) and 403(c) (1) (F) (requiring that
404(b) (1) Guidelines be based on section 403(c) criteria, which include
consideration of "other possible locations" of disposal).
Nor do we think that there is any indication that Congress intended
to exclude discharges for purposes of waste disposal entirely from
coverage under section 404. For example, section 404 applies to
"dredged material" (referred to as dredged "spoil" in the
definition of pollutant in section 502(6)), which is typically
discharged not for any beneficial purpose, but as a waste product from
a dredging operation. Moreover, section 404(a) authorizes the Corps to
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issue permits for discharges of dredged or fill material at specified
"disposal" sites. Congress' use of the word "disposal" supports the
reasonableress of our view that regulating waste materiaJ. having the
effect of fill under section 404 is consistent with the Act.
We also disagree with the interpretation of some of the comments on
the RII and Bragg decisions as mandating that the Corps retain the
current exclusion of waste disposal in the definition of fill material.
We note first that the decision of the district court in Bragg has been
vacated by the Fourth Circuit on 11th amendment grounds. Bragg v.
Robertson, 72 F. Supp. 2d 642 (S.D. W. Va. 1999), rev'd, 248 F. 3d 275
(4th Cir. 2001). In any event, both Bragg and RII applied the Corps'
then-existing definition of fill material to conclude that certain
discharges were not covered by section 404. Nothing in those decisions
suggests that the Act itself precluded the regulation of waste
materials with the effect of fill under section 404. See section II. D.
of this preamble for further discussion of the RII decision. While we
agree that trash or garbage generally should be excluded from the
definition of fill material (for the reasons explained in section
II.B.1d of this preamble), we do not agree that an exclusion for all
waste is appropriate and have not included such a provision in today's
rule. These issues are discussed in section II.B.ld of the preamble and
are addressed more fully in the Response to Comments document.
d. Trash or Garbage
The agencies have added an exclusion for trash or garbage to the
definition of "fill material" for several reasons. First, the
preamble to the proposed rule and many of the comments recognized that
trash or garbage, such as debris, junk cars, used tires, discarded
kitchen appliances, and similar materials, are not appropriately used,
as a general matter, for fill material in waters of the U.S. In
particular, we agree that the discharge of trash or garbage often
results in adverse environmental impacts to waters of the U.S. by
creating physical obstructions that alter the natural hydrology of
waters and may cause physical hazards as well as other environmental
effects. We also agree that these impacts are generally avoidable
because there are alternative clean and safe forms of fill material
that can be used to accomplish project objectives and because there are
widely available landfills and other approved facilities for disposal
of trash or garbage.
Accordingly, a party may not obtain a section 404 permit to dispose
of trash or garbage in regulated waters. Because the discharge of any
pollutant into jurisdictional waters is prohibited under CWA section
301 except in accordance with a permit issued under sections 404 or
402, section 402 would govern such discharges. For many of the reasons
identified in this preamble, such as the physical obstruction and
hazards that such materials would create in waters of the U.S., we
would emphasize that trash or garbage are unlikely to be eligible to
receive a permit under the section 402 regulatory program. We also note
that where such materials are placed in waters of the U.S. without a
permit, EPA or an approved State/Tribal agency with permitting
authority, remains the lead enforcement agency. Today's rule does not
affect the application of section 402 of the CWA to discharges of
pollutants other than fill material that may be associated with such
things as solid waste landfill structures and mine impoundments. Where
such structures release pollutants into waters of the U.S., a permit
under section 402 of the CWA is required that will ensure protection of
any downstream waters, including compliance with State water quality
standards.
While the agencies have generally excluded materials characterized
as trash or garbage from the definition of "fill material, " we agree
that there are very specific circumstances where certain types of
material that might otherwise be considered trash or garbage may be
appropriate for use in a particular project to create a structure or
infrastructure in waters of the U.S. In such situations, this material
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would be regulated as fill material. Such material would have to be
suitably cleaned up and not include constituents that would cause
significant environmental degradation. An example would be where
recycled porcelain fixtures are cleaned and placed in waters of the
u.S. to create environmentally beneficial artificial reefs. Such
material would not be considered trash or garbage and thus would not be
subject to the exclusion. The agencies believe that this is
appropriate, and even environmentally beneficial, in situations where
(I) the otherwise excluded materials are being placed in waters of the
u.s. in a manner consistent with traditional uses of fill material to
create a structure or infrastructure, (2) the material's
characteristics are suitable to the project purpose, and (3) the review
under section 404 can effectively ensure that the material will not
cause or contribute to significant environmental degradation.
We also note that as stated in the preamble to the proposal, it is
important to draw a clear distinction between solid waste discharged
directly into waters of the u.S. and sanitary solid waste landfills.
With respect to solid waste landfills, the liners, berms, and other
infrastructure that are constructed of fill materials in waters of the
u.s. are regulated under section 404 of the CWA. In the case of a
landfill that has received a section 404 permit for the placement of
berms, dikes, liners and similar activities needed to construct the
facility, the subsequent disposal of solid waste into the landfill,
while subject to regulation under the RCRA, would not be subject to
regulation under the CWA because the constructed facility is not waters
of the u.S. As with current
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practice, discharges of leachate from landfills into waters of the u.S.
would remain subject to CWA section 402. Today's final rule does not
change this general regulatory framework for landfills. See section II
D of this preamble for further discussion.
e. Unsuitable Fill Material
With respect to developing a potential definition of "unsuitable
fill material, " there was almost unanimous opposition to the
unsuitable fill concept as discussed in the preamble. Some comments
viewed it as an inadequate substitute for the elimination of the waste
exclusion. Others argued that having an unsuitable fill provision would
be a good idea but that it would need to be much broader and to
specifically include mining-related wastes. These commenters also
objected to leaving the question of whether something was "unsuitable
fill material" to the discretion of the District Engineer. Some
comments expressed concern that the definition of unsuitable fill
material focused on materials that have a potential to leach or that
have toxic constituents in toxic amounts. They argued that the
definition could result in prohibiting activities that with appropriate
permit terms and conditions potentially are allowable under section
404. They also argued that such issues should be addressed in the
context of the permitting process and should not result in the permit
application being rejected. As described in the Response to Comments
document, the agencies have not included an unsuitable fill category in
the final rule but, as discussed, the final rule does narrow the scope
of "fill material" by excluding trash or garbage.
f. Effluent Guideline Limitations and 402 Permits
In addition to the changes already discussed in this preamble,
today's final rule also deletes the exclusion contained in the proposal
for discharges covered by effluent limitation guidelines or standards
or NPDES permits. Several of the comments raised concerns that the
exclusion included in the proposed definition for discharges covered by
proposed or existing effluent limitation guidelines or standards or
NPDES permits was vague and would result in uncertainty with respect to
12of27
http://www.usace.army.millinet/functions/cw/cecwo/reg/definfi1.htm
the regulation of certain discharges. Other comments stated that it was
inappropriate for rule language to allow reliance on proposed effluent
limitation guidelines or standards before they are promulgated as a
final rule. In addition, including the language in the actual rule
could raise questions as to whether the reference to effluent
guidelines was meant to refer only to those in existence at the time
today's rule was promulgated or whether the reference was prospective.
In light of the concerns and confusion associated with the proposed
provision, we have decided to delete it from the rule. However,
although we have removed the language in question from the rule itself,
we emphasize that today's rule generally is intended to maintain our
existing approach to regulating pollutants under either section 402 or
404 of the CWA. Effluent limitation guidelines and new source
performance standards ("effluent guidelines' ') promulgated under
section 304 and 306 of the CWA establish limitations and standards for
specified wastestreams from industrial categories, and those
limitations and standards are incorporated into permits issued under
section 402 of the Act. EPA has never sought to regulate fill material
under effluent guidelines. Rather, effluent guidelines restrict
discharges of pollutants from identified wastestreams based upon the
pollutant reduction capabilities of available treatment technologies.
Recognizing that some discharges (such as suspended or settleable
solids) can have the associated effect, over time, of raising the
bottom elevat'ion of a water due to settling of waterborne pollutants,
we do not consider such pollutants to be "fill material, " and nothing
in today's rule changes that view. Nor does today's rule change any
determination we have made regarding discharges that are subject to an
effluent limitation guideline and standards, which will continue to be
regulated under section 402 of the CWA. Similarly, this rule does not
alter the manner in which water quality standards currently apply under
the section 402 or the section 404 programs.
2. Definition of "Discharge of Fill Material"
Most of the comments addressing "discharge of fill material"
supported the inclusion of items related to solid waste landfills,
although several asserted that the regulation of discharges associated
with solid waste landfills was inconsistent with the court's decision
in Resource Investments Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 151 F.3d
1162 (9th Cir. 1998). See detailed discussion in section II. D of this
final preamble. With respect to the placement of coal mining
overburden, two diametrically opposed views were reflected in the
comments. Many of the comments argued that coal overburden was
"waste" material and that allowing such discharges was a violation of
the CWA. In contrast, other comments argued that focusing on "coal
mining overburden" was confusing, because it created the impression
that the overburden or similar materials from other mining processes
may not be regulated as "discharges of fill material."
Today's final rule responds to the comments in the following ways.
First, the agencies continue to agree with those comments that
supported including the placement of material associated with
construction and maintenance of solid waste landfills and related
facilities in the discharge of fill material. For the reasons discussed
in section II. D of this final preamble and in the Response to Comments
document, we do not agree that we are precluded by the RII decision
from issuing a rule that defines "fill material" or the "discharge
of fill material" as encompassing discharges associated with the
construction of solid waste landfill infrastructures. Second, the
agencies have modified the "placement of coal mining overburden" to
read "placement of overburden, slurry, or tailings or similar mining-
related materials." The language in today's final rule will clarify
that any mining-related material that has the effect of fill when
discharged will be regulated as "fill material." We made this
clarification because it was clear from the comments that some were
reading the examples we identified as an exclusive list. The general
intent of this rule is to cover materials that have the effect of fill,
not simply to focus on anyone industrial activity. We believe that the
additional mining related examples will address the confusion reflected
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in the comments. Finally, as discussed in section II.B.1.c of this
preamble, we do not agree that the CWA contains a blanket prohibition
precluding discharges of "waste" materials in to waters of the u.s.
Instead, the Act establishes the framework for regulating discharges
into waters and we believe the section 404 program is the most
appropriate vehicle for regulating overburden and other mining-related
materials. Several other minor changes, editorial in nature, have also
been made in today's final rule.
C. Appropriate Reliance on the Environmental Reviews Conducted by Other
Federal or State Programs
As indicated, today's rule is designed to improve the effective
implementation of the section 404 program by having the Corps and EPA
adopt a single, uniform definition for these key jurisdictional terms.
We also believe
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that we can improve the effective implementation of the program by
placing greater emphasis on coordination among the Federal agencies and
with relevant State and Tribal programs. There are numerous examples of
where the agencies can effectively work together and with other State,
Tribal and Federal programs in the review of proposed projects that
involve a section 404 discharge to jointly develop information that is
relevant and reliable. Projects involving discharges to waters of the
u.S. are often subject to review under other Federal and State permit
programs, including the RCRA, the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act (SMCRA), the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA), CWA
Section 402 NPDES, and others. Examples where closer coordination may
be beneficial include the review of proposed solid waste landfills
under the CWA and RCRA, proposed highway projects under the CWA and
NEPA, proposed mining projects under the CWA and SMCRA, and proposed
coastal restoration projects under the CWA and CZMA.
As EPA and the Corps implement today's rule, we will be placing
even greater emphasis on effective coordination with other relevant
State, Tribal and Federal programs and, consistent with our legal
responsibilities, on reliance, as appropriate, on the information
developed and conclusions reached by other agencies to support the
decisions required under these programs and ours. We are confident that
this coordination will serve to make the implementation of today's rule
and, more broadly, the CWA section 404 program, more effective,
consistent and environmentally protective.
Some comments expressed concern that an effects-based approach to
the definition of "fill material" would result in a duplication of
effort among Federal programs and an increased workload for the Corps.
We believe that more effective coordination among the State, Tribal and
Federal agencies and appropriate reliance on the analyses of other
agencies will help significantly to address these concerns.
First, it is important to note that EPA and Corps regulations
encourage coordination and allow for appropriate reliance on relevant
information and analyses developed under other programs to help satisfy
section 404 program requirements. In the most effective circumstances,
the Corps is able to coordinate with other relevant State, Tribal and
Federal agencies before and during project review to identify the most
efficient and effective role for each agency and ensure mutual reliance
on information and analyses, particularly where that reliance is
consistent with individual agency expertise and experience. For'
example, for many years, subject to advice from EPA, the Corps has
relied on State determinations regarding water quality matters, as
those State determinations are reflected in State CWA section 401 water
quality certifications (see 33 CFR 320.4(d)). Such Corps reliance on
State water quality determinations will continue for discharges
associated with activities such as mining and solid waste landfills. In
regulating discharges associated with mining, close coordination with
the State, Tribal and Federal entities responsible for implementation
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of SMCRA, CWA section 401 and section 402 will enable the Corps to take
advantage of the specialized expertise of the agencies as the Corps
completes the section 404 review. Snch coordination also helps to
reduce the costs associated with project reviews, promotes consistent
and predictable decision-making, and ultimately ensures the most
effective protection for human health and the environment. EPA and the
Corps anticipate that Corps District offices will rely on State/Federal
site selection under SMCRA regarding the siting of coal mining related
discharges to the extent allowed under current law and regulations.
Similarly, the Corps will make full use of State RCRA information
regarding the siting, design and construction of solid waste landfills,
and will defer to those State decisions to the extent allowed by
current law and regulation.
Both agencies recognize, however, that the Corps is ultimately
responsible under the CWA for making the required determinations that
support each permit decision based on the Corps' independent evaluation
of the record. The Corps itself determines the extent of deference to
information generated from other programs including, for example, site
selection under SMCRA and RCRA, that is appropriate on a case-by-case
basis. Ultimately the Corps is relying on, rather than relinquishing
to, these other sources of information as a record is developed and the
Corps makes the determinations required by the Section 404 regulatory
program. For example, the Corps will make full use of State site
selection decisions under SMCRA (e.g., coal slurry impoundments) and
RCRA (e.g., solid waste landfills), but the Corps will independently
review those decisions and the State processes that generated them, to
ensure that any Corps permit decision for a discharge site will fully
comply with NEPA, the section 404(b) (1) Guidelines, and other relevant
legal requirements. The Corps and EPA believe that effective
coordination with other State and Federal agencies and the information
they develop will help the Corps continue to make more timely,
consistent and environmentally protective permit decisions.
D. The Final Rule and the Resource Investments Decision
In Resource Investments Inc v. Corps, 151 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir.
1998), the Ninth Circuit held that the Corps lacked the authority to
regulate a solid waste landfill in waters of the U.S. The court found
that: (1) Neither the solid waste itself nor the liner consisting of
layers of gravel and low-permeability soil constituted "fill
material" under Corps regulations; and (2) because of the potential
for inconsistent results if landfills were regulated under both section
404 of the CWA and Subtitle D of RCRA, requiring these facilities to be
subject solely to RCRA would "harmonize" the statutes.
We discussed this decision in the preamble to the proposed rule as
an example of some of the confusion engendered by the "primary
purpose" test. The court found in RII that the liner was not fill
material because its primary purpose was not to replace an aquatic area
with dry land or change the bottom elevation of a waterbody, "but
rather to serve as a leak detection and collection system." 151 F.3d
at 1168. We explained in the proposal that fills typically serve some
other purpose than just creating dry land or raising a water's bottom
elevation and that, if the court's reasoning were taken to its logical
conclusion, many traditional fills in waters of the U.S. would not be
subject to section 404.
Some commenters objected to our proposal not to follow the decision
in RII in this rulemaking. They criticized the proposal as an improper
attempt to "override" or "overrule" the Ninth Circuit's decision,
particularly within the Ninth Circuit where the decision is binding.
They also argued that the proposed rule failed to address the potential
for duplication and inconsistency in decision-making by State and
Federal agencies identified in RII.
In our view, these comments raise two distinct issues. The first is
whether we should follow the RII decision outside the Ninth Circuit and
cease regulating discharges associated with the construction of solid
waste landfills under section 404. The second issue is whether RII
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precludes us from
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regulating discharges associated with construction of solid waste
landfill structures within the Ninth Circuit, even after today's rule.
We address each of these issues in turn.
Regarding the first question, we note first that, after RII was
decided, we chose not to acquiesce in the decision outside the Ninth
Circuit. While we agreed that the solid waste disposal placed in a
landfill is not fill material (and such waste continues to be excluded
under today's rule), we believed that the court misapplied the primary
purpose test in the Corps' regulations, and that the court's conclusion
that RCRA supplanted CWA regulation was contrary to Congressional
intent. See Resource Investments Inc. et ale v. Corps, No. 97-35934
(Government's Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En
Banc, September 30, 1998). Thus, after the court decided RIl, the Corps
has continued to issue section 404 permits for the construction of
solid waste landfill infrastructures outside the Ninth Circuit.
After considering public comments, we continue to decline to follow
RIl outside the Ninth Circuit and have, therefore, maintained the
approach in the proposed rule to the regulation of solid waste
landfills. The revisions to the Corps' definition of fill material in
today's rule address the basis for the court's holding that the
landfill did not involve the discharge of fill material under section
404. For the reasons explained elsewhere in today's notice, we believe
that an effects-based test is the appropriate means of evaluating
whether a pollutant is "fill material" and should be regulated under
section 404 as opposed to section 402 of the CWA. The placement of
berms, liners and other infrastructure (such as roads) associated with
construction of a solid waste landfill in waters of the u.S. has the
effect of replacing water with dry land or raising the bottom elevation
of a water. Therefore, under today's rule, they constitute fill
material. Such discharges are indistinguishable from similar discharges
associated with other construction activity, which the Corps has always
regulated as fill under section 404. See 40 CFR 232.2; 33 CFR 323.2
(defining "discharge of fill material, " to include "fill that is
necessary for the construction of any structure in a water of the U.S.;
the building of any structure or impoundment requiring rock, sand, dirt
or other material for its construction; site-development fills for
recreational, industrial, commercial, residential and other uses;
causeways or road fills; * * *' '). We have amended our definition of
this term to include the "placement of fill material for construction
or maintenance of any liner, berm, or other infrastructure associated
with solid waste landfills." That amendment does not change
substantively the prior definition, but merely adds solid waste
landfills as an example to make clear that it constitutes a "discharge
of fill material." Thus, under our new regulations, discharges
associated with the creation of solid waste landfill structures clearly
constitute "fill material."
To the extent some commenters asserted that revising our regulation
was an improper attempt to "overrule" or "override" this holding in
RIl, we disagree. The court's analysis of the "fill material" in RlI
was based entirely on the Corps regulations as they existed at that
time, and not upon the interpretation of the CWA itself. Moreover, the
CWA does not define "fill material." Therefore, both the statute and
the Ninth Circuit's decision leave us the discretion to adopt a
reasonable definition consistent with the statutory scheme. We have
explained elsewhere why we believe today's definition of fill is
reasonable and appropriate under the CWA. To the extent today's rule
has the practical effect of "overriding" this aspect of the court's
decision in RIl, that is neither remarkable nor inappropriate, since it
is entirely proper for agencies to consider and, if appropriate, revise
their regulations in light of judicial interpretation of them.
For purposes of deciding whether to apply the Rll decision outside
the Ninth Circuit, we have also evaluated the second basis for the
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court's decision--that regulation solely under Subtitle D of RCRA
instead of section 404 would "harmonize" the statutes and avoid
necessary duplication. We decline to follow that holding both on legal
and policy grounds. First, we believe, notwithstanding RII, that
eliminating the CWA permitting requirement on the grounds that an
activity is regulated under RCRA is contrary to Congressional intent in
both statutes. Second, we do not agree with the court that regulation
under Subtitle D and section 404 would constitute unnecessary
duplication, in light of the distinct purposes served by these
authorities, the differing Federal roles under the two statutes, and
our clarification in today's rulemaking of our intent to give all
appropriate deference to State RCRA decision-making in the section 404
permitting process.
We first do not agree with the court's legal reasons for concluding
that regulation under Subtitle D of RCRA supplants CWA regulation. The
CWA prohibits the discharge of any pollutant int~ waters of the u.S.
without a permit under the Act. See CWA section 301(a). Even though an
activity associated with a discharge may be regulated under other
Federal or State authorities, we believe there is not any basis to
conclude that such regulation by itself makes section 301(a) of the Act
inapplicable to a discharge of a pollutant into waters of the u.S. In
effect, the court concluded that enactment of a regulatory scheme under
Subtitle D of RCRA impliedly repealed the statutory permit requirement
under the CWA. But "the intention of the legislature to repeal must be
clear and manifest." Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148,
154 (1976), and the court must conclude that the two acts are in
irreconcilable conflict or that the later act covers the whole subject
of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute. Id. The
court in RII did not, and could not, make these findings.
In fact, Congress itself made precisely the opposite findings when
it enacted RCRA. Section 1006(a) states:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to apply to (or to
authorize any State, interstate, or local authority to regulate) any
activity or substance which is subject to the [CWA] except to the
extent such application (or regulation) is not inconsistent with the
requirements of (the CWA) .
This provision precludes regulation of solid waste landfills under
Subtitle D in a manner inconsistent with the requirements of the CWA.
In our view, it is plainly "inconsistent" with the requirements of
the CWA to hold that regulation under RCRA eliminates CWA permitting
requirement altogether.
Instead, the court relied upon certain Corps regulations,
statements by Corps officials and a 1986 interagency MOA. The court
first stated that applying section 404 to solid waste landfills was
"unreasonable" because there would be "potentially inconsistent
results" where both the State and the Corps were applying the same
criteria in regulating solid waste landfills. 151 F.3d at 1169. The
court held that this "regulatory overlap is inconsistent with Corps
regulations stating that "the Corps believes that State and Federal
regulatory programs should complement rather than duplicate one
another.' " 33 CFR 320.1(a) (5). In addition, the court cited
statements by the Corps in a 1984 letter to EPA stating that EPA was in
a better position than the Corps to regulate solid waste landfills.
Finally, the court cited the 1986 MOA between the Corps and EPA.
However, none of these "authorities" purport to modify the
statutory
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permitting requirements of the CWA, nor could they. The Corps'
regulation cited by the court is simply a statement of the Corps'
policy objective of working in concert with State regulatory programs,
an important and continuing Corps objective that was discussed
previously. The Corps' letter and the MOA reflected our efforts to
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manage our programs in light of our differing definitions of fill
material, but did not speak to the CWA statutory permitting
requirement. The court also misconstrued the 1986 MOA entered into by
EPA and the Corps as indicating we intended to make the regulation of
solid waste facilities within "the sole purview of the EPA and
affected states" after EPA promulgated certain Subtitle D regulations.
151 F.3d at 1169. In fact, we stated,
EPA and Army agree that consideration given to the control of
discharges of solid waste both i~ waters of the United States and
upland should take into account the results of studies being
implemented under the 1984 Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments
(HSWA) to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), signed
into law on November 8, 1984....
Unless extended by mutual agreement, the agreement will expire
at such time as EPA has accomplished specified steps in its
implementation of RCRA, at which time the results of the study of
the adequacy of the existing Subtitle D criteria and proposed
revisions to the Subtitle D criteria for solid waste disposal
facilities, including those that may receive hazardous household
wastes and small quantity generator waste, will be known. In
addition, data resulting from actions under the interim agreement
can be considered at that time.
It should be noted that this MOA is about the regulation of solid
waste disposal, not about the construction of infrastructure, including
solid waste landfill infrastructure, that involves discharges of fill
material to waters of the U.S. We did not address in the MOA how solid
waste landfills would be regulated after EPA completed its study and
certain RCRA regulations, but said only that these developments would
"be taken into account" as we decided how to address these discharges
in the future. Thus, in addition to the inability of the agencies as a
legal matter to modify the CWA statutory permitting requirement through
an MOA, we expressly reserved any judgment about the appropriate
regulatory approach to be taken after certain actions were taken under
RCRA. The court appears to have assumed that the MOA expired after we
completed the specified steps under RCRA, and that regulatory authority
over solid waste landfills thereafter became the sole purview of RCRA.
In fact, the MOA did not expire, and it has continued to provide the
framework for regulation of solid waste landfills under section 404 of
the CWA. See Memorandum of John F. Studt, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
May 17, 1993 (stating "the subject MOA remains effective in its
entirety until further notice" and noting that this position was
coordinated with EPA) .
We conclude, therefore, that it would be contrary to the language
and intent of both the CWA and RCRA to conclude that RCRA subtitle D
supplants the CWA permitting requirement for discharges into waters of
the U.S. associated with the construction of solid waste landfills. The
different Federal roles in the permitting schemes in these statutes
supports this conclusion. Subtitle D provides that each State will
"adopt and implement a permit program or other system of prior
approval and conditions" to assure that each solid waste management
facility within the State "will comply" with criteria established by
EPA for the siting, design, construction, operation and closure of
solid waste landfills. RCRA section 4005(c) (1) (B). States are required
to submit permit programs for EPA to review and EPA is required to
"determine whether each State has developed an adequate program" to
ensure compliance with EPA's Subtitle D regulations. RCRA section
4005(c) (1) (B) and (C). However, RCRA does not grant to EPA authority to
issue permits for solid waste landfills, review State permitting
decisions or enforce Subtitle D requirements in States with approved
programs. The court in RII appeared to misunderstand EPA's authorities
under Subtitle D of RCRA when it stated that EPA would be the
permitting authority in the absence of an approved State program. See
151 F.3d 1169 ("we hold that when a proposed project affecting a
wetlands area is a solid waste landfill, the EPA (or the approved State
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program) ... will have the permit authority under RCRA.' ') (Emphasis
added); 151 F.3d at 1167 ("RCRA gives the EPA authority to issue
permits for the disposal of solid waste, but allows states to
substitute their own permit programs for the Federal program if the
State program is approved by EPA.' '). While this authority exists with
regard to disposal of hazardous waste under Subtitle C of RCRA, EPA
does not have this authority with regard to disposal of non-hazardous
solid waste under Subtitle D.
In contrast, the CWA requires either a Federal permit for
discharges of pollutants into waters of the U.S., or issuance of a
permit by a State/Tribe with an approved program, subject to EPA's
authority to object to a permit where EPA finds it fails to meet the
guidelines and requirements of the CWA. CWA sections 402(d); 404(j).
EPA also has authority under the CWA to enforce conditions in Federal
or State permits under the Act. CWA section 309.
These contrasting statutory schemes support the conclusion that
eliminating CWA authority over discharges of fill material associated
with construction of solid waste landfills would mean a significant
departure from the statutory structure created by Congress in the CWA,
a scheme which Congress expressly sought to preserve when it adopted
RCRA. See RCRA section 1006(a). This does not mean that we view the
Federal role as one of second-guessing every decision made by State
regulatory authorities under RCRA. To the contrary, both RCRA and the
CWA reflect a strong presumption in favor of State-administered
regulatory programs. As discussed elsewhere, we intend to rely on State
decision-making under RCRA to the extent allowed under current law and
regulations. However, we believe that eliminating a Federal role
entirely on these matters is neither appropriate nor consistent with
Congressional intent under RCRA or the CWA.
Thus, we decline to follow the decision in RII outside the Ninth
Circuit because we conclude there is not an adequate legal basis on
which to conclude that discharges of pollutants associated with solid
waste landfills no longer need to be authorized by a CWA permit solely
because the project receives a permit under Subtitle D of RCRA.
We nonetheless share the basic policy perspective expressed by the
court in RII about the need to avoid unnecessary duplication and
potential inconsistent application of regulatory programs under the CWA
and RCRA. In fact, RCRA expressly vests EPA with the responsibility to
"integrate all provisions of (RCRA) for purposes of administration and
enforcement and (to) avoid duplication, to the maximum extent
practicable, with the appropriate provisions of the * * * (CWA). * * *
Such integration shall be effected only to the extent that it can be
done in a manner consistent with the goals and policies of this chapter
and the CWA. * * *', RCRA section 1006(b). EPA has sought such
integration first by promulgating location restrictions for landfills
that are consistent with the criteria for issuance of section 404
permits. See 40 CFR 258.12; 230.10. Among other requirements, a
landfill may not be located in wetlands unless it is demonstrated to
the State that there
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are not less environmentally damaging practicable alternatives, the
facility will not cause significant degradation of wetlands, and that
appropriate and practicable steps have been taken to mitigate the loss
of wetlands from the facility. However, EPA never purported to
substitute Subtitle D regulation for the CWA permitting requirement, a
result that would violate both section 1006(a) and (b). Instead, the
Subtitle D RCRA regulations make clear that owners or operators of
municipal solid waste landfills "must comply with any other applicable
Federal rules, laws, regulations, or other requirements. " 40 CFR
258.3. At the time EPA promulgated this regulation, the agency
expressly noted that such requirements include those arising under the
CWA. See 56 FR 51042 (October 9, 1991).
We do not believe, however, that the Subtitle D and section 404
programs are redundant. Rather, each program has a distinct focus. The
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State RCRA permitting process addresses a much broader range of issues,
including technical operating and design criteria, ground water
monitoring, corrective action, closure and post-closure care and
financial assurances. In contrast, the section 404 process is focused
exclusively on the impacts of discharges of dredged or fill material on
the aquatic ecosystem, and ways of ensuring that those impacts are
avoided, minimized and compensated. Because of the Corps' expertise in
protecting aquatic ecosystems, we have found that State RCRA permitting
agencies often incorporate by reference the requirements of section 404
permits. (For example, the State RCRA permit for the RII landfill
required the applicant to implement the wetlands and mitigation plan to
be approved by the Corps through the 404 permit process.) We believe
that, in these and other ways, State and Federal permitting authorities
can create efficiencies by relying on each other's expertise in making
regulatory decisions.
We intend to make additional efforts to avoid unnecessary
duplication in the Federal and State permitting process. As explained
in section II. C of this final preamble, we intend that the Corps will
rely on decisions by the State RCRA authority about the siting, design
and construction of solid waste landfills in waters of the u.S. to the
extent allowed by law and regulations. Appropriate deference to State
decision-making will help avoid duplication, while still ensuring that
the Corps fulfills its responsibilities to authorize discharges of fill
material associated with solid waste landfills in accordance with CWA
requirements.
This does not mean that, in every single case, State and Federal
decision-makers will agree on whether a particular project or
configuration is environmentally acceptable. Nevertheless, instances of
disagreement have been rare. We intend to further enhance our efforts
to ensure effective coordination between State and Federal officials.
However, we do not agree with the court in RII that the only way to
avoid unnecessary duplication is to eliminate the CWA permitting
requirement altogether.
We next address commenters' assertions that the decision in RII
continues to preclude us from regulating solid waste landfills under
section 404 within the Ninth Circuit. These comments also argue that,
given the "statutory" basis for the court's decision, we cannot
change the result in the Ninth Circuit through this rulemaking.
As noted in this preamble, the court construed administrative
materials of the Corps and EPA as supporting the conclusion that the
'agencies did not intend to regulate solid waste landfills under section
404 of the CWA. In light of this agency intent, the court concluded
that subjecting landfills to regulation solely under RCRA would
"harmonize" the statutes and "give effect to each [statute] while
preserving their sense and purpose." 151 F.3d at 1169. The court found
that this harmonization "is consistent with the sense of the CWA that
discharges of solid waste materials are beyond the scope of section 404
. and avoids unnecessary duplication of Federal and State efforts
in the area of wetlands protection. " Id.
We again emphasize the distinction between "discharges of solid
waste material, " as referenced by the court and discharges of fill
material associated with the construction of infrastructure. In this
rulemaking, we have clarified that discharges having the effect of
raising the bottom elevation of a water or replacing water with dry
land, including fill used to create landfills such as liners, berms and
other infrastructure associated with solid waste landfills are
discharges of fill material subject to the section 404 program.
Therefore, we have altered the landscape as understood by the court in
RII (i.e., that these facilities were entirely outside the intended
purview of section 404). We do not agree with commenters who argued
that there was a "statutory" basis to the court's decision in the
sense that the holding of the deci.sion turned on an interpretation of
Congressional intent in the CWA or RCRA. The court did not cite any
provision of the CWA or RCRA to support its conclusions. Rather, the
court derived the "sense and purpose" of the CWA based on agency
regulations, guidance and correspondence. By clarifying the scope of
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section 404 authorities in this rulemaking, we have altered the "sense
and purpose" of the CWA underlying the court's conclusion that
regulation solely under RCRA would "harmonize" the statutes. Because
the premises before the court have changed, we do not view the court's
decision as continuing to bar the regulation under section 404 of
discharges associated with solid waste landfills within the Ninth
Circuit. At a minimum, today's rule calls into question the continuing
vitality of the court's reasoning and conclusions and, should a case be
brought within the Ninth Circuit challenging our authority to regulate
solid waste landfills, we would ask the court to address the question
anew in light of the clarification of our authorities in today's rule.
III. Administrative Requirements
A. Plain Language
In compliance with the principle in Executive Order 12866 regarding
plain language, this preamble is written using plain language. Thus,
the use of "we" in this notice refers to EPA and the Corps, and the
use of "you" refers to the reader. We have also used active voice,
short sentences, and common every day terms except for necessary
technical terms.
B. Paperwork Reduction Act
This action does not impose any new information collection burden
under the provisions of the Paperwork Production Act, 44 U.S.C. 3501 et
seq. This rule merely reconciles EPA and Corps CWA section 404
regulations defining the term "fill material" and amends our
definitions of "discharge of fill material." Thus, this action is not
subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act.
Burden means the total time, effort, or financial resources
expended by persons to generate, maintain, retain, or disclose or
provide information to or for a Federal agency. This includes the time
needed to review instructions; develop, acquire, install, and utilize
technology and systems for the purposes of collecting, validating, and
verifying information, processing and maintaining information, and
disclosing and providing information; adjust the existing ways to
comply with any previously applicable instructions and requirements;
train personnel to be able to respond to a collection of
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information; search data sources; complete and review the collection of
information; and transmit or otherwise disclose the information.
An Agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required
to respond to, a collection of information unless it displays a
currently valid OMB control number. The OMB control numbers for EPA's
regulations are displayed in 40 CFR part 9 and 48 CFR chapter 15. For
the CWA section regulatory 404 program, the current OMB approval number
for information requirements is maintained by the Corps of Engineers
(OMB approval number 0710-0003, expires December 31, 2004).
C. Executive Order 12866
Under Executive Order 12866 (58 FR 51735, October 4, 1993), EPA and
the Corps must determine whether the regulatory action is
"significant" and therefore subject to review by the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) and the requirements of the Executive
Order. The Order defines "significant regulatory action" as one that
is likely to result in a rule that may:
(1) Have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or
adversely affect in a material way the economy, a sector of the
economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public
health or safety, or State, local, or Tribal governments or
communities;
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(2) Create a serious inconsistency or otherwise interfere with an
action taken or planned by another agency;
(3) Materially alter the budgetary impact of entitlements, grants,
user fees, or loan programs or the rights and obligations of recipients
thereof; or
(4) Raise novel legal or policy issues arising out of legal
mandates, the President's priorities, or the principles set forth in
the Executive Order.
Pursuant to the terms of Executive Order 12866, it has been
determined that this rule is a "significant regulatory action" in
light of the provisions of paragraph (4) above. As such, this action
was submitted to OMB for review. Changes made in response to OMB
suggestions or recommendations will be documented in the public record.
D. Executive Order 13132
Executive Order 13132, entitled "Federalism" (64 FR 43255, August
10, 1999), requires EPA and the Corps to develop an accountable process
to ensure "meaningful and timely input by State and local officials in
the development of regulatory policies that have Federalism
implications." "Policies that have Federalism implications" is
defined in the Executive Order to include regulations that have
"substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between
the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power
and responsibilities among the various levels of government."
This final rule does not have Federalism implications. It will not
have substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship
between the national government and the States, or on the distribution
of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government,
as specified in Executive Order 13132. Currently, under the CWA, any
discharge of pollutants into waters of the u.S. requires a permit under
either section 402 or 404 of the CWA. Today's rule conforms our two
regulatory definitions of "fill material" and thereby clarifies
whether a particular discharge is subject to regulation under section
402 or Section 404. It is generally consistent with current agency
practice and does not impose new substantive requirements. Within
California, Oregon, Washington, Idaho, Wyoming, Nevada, Arizona,
Hawaii, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands, after today's rule, the
Corps will again be issuing Section 404 permits for the construction of
solid waste landfills in waters of the U.S., which the Corps had ceased
doing after the decision in RII (the decision did not affect the
permitting requirement outside these states). See section II. D. of
this preamble. However, resuming the issuance of section 404 permits
for construction of solid waste landfills in waters of the u.S. in
these areas does not have Federalism implications. None of the States
within the Ninth Circuit will incur administrative costs as a result of
today's rule, because none currently administer the section 404 program
and, in any. event, the administrative costs of permitting solid waste
landfills are minimal in the context of the overall section 404
permitting program. In addition, this change does not impose any
additional substantive obligations on State or local governments
seeking to construct solid waste landfills in waters of the u.S. since
Subtitle D of RCRA currently requires such facilities to meet
comparable conditions for receiving a section 404 permit. See section
II. D of this preamble. Finally, we do not believe that requiring any
State or local governments seeking to construct solid waste landfills
in waters of the u.S. to undergo the Section 404 permitting process
itself will have substantial direct effects on the States, on the
relationship between the national government and the States, or on the
distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of
government. Thus, Executive Order 13132 does not apply to this rule.
E. Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA), as Amended by the Small Business
Regulatory'Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (SBREFA), 5 U.S.C. 601 et
seq.
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The RFA generally requires an agency to prepare a regulatory
flexibility analysis of any rule subject to notice-and-comment
rulemaking requirements under the Ad~inistrative Procedure Act or any
other statute unless the agency certifies that the rule will not have a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
Small entities include small businesses, small organizations and small
governmental jurisdictions.
For purposes of assessing the impacts of today's rule on small
entities, a small entity is defined as : (1) A small business based on
SBA size standards; (2) a small governmental jurisdiction that is a
government of a city, county, town, school district, or special
district with a population of less than 50,OOOi and (3) a small
organization that is any not-for-profit enterprise which is
independently owned and operated and is not dominant in its field.
After considering the economic impacts of today's final rule on
small entities, we certify that this action will not have a significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. Currently,
under the CWA, any discharge of pollutants into waters of the u.S.
requires a permit under either section 402 or 404 of the CWA. Today's
rule conforms our two regulatory definitions of "fill material" and
thereby clarifies whether a particular discharge is subject to
regulation under section 402 or section 404. Today's rule is generally
consistent with current agency practice, does not impose new
substantive requirements and therefore would not have a significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
F. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA), Public
Law 104-4, establishes requirements for Federal agencies to assess the
effects of their regulatory actions on State, local, and Tribal
governments and the private sector. Under section 202 of the UMRA, the
agencies generally must prepare a written statement, including a cost-
benefit analysis, for proposed and final rules with "Federal
mandates" that may result in expenditures to State, local,
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and Tribal governments, in the aggregate, or to the private sector, of
$100 million or more in anyone year. Before promulgating an EPA or
Corps rule for which a written statement is needed, section 205 of the
UMRA generally requires the agencies to identify and consider a
reasonable number of regulatory alternatives and adopt the least
costly, most cost-effective or least burdensome alternative that
achieves the objectives of the rule. The provisions of section 205 do
not apply when they are inconsistent with applicable law. Moreover,
section 205 allows EPA and the Corps to adopt an alternative other than
the least costly, most cost-effective or least burdensome alternative
if the Administrator and Secretary of the Army publish with the final
rule an explanation why that alternative was not adopted. Before EPA or
the Corps establishes any regulatory requirements that may
significantly or uniquely affect small governments, including Tribal
governments, they must have developed under section 203 of the UMRA a
small government agency plan. The plan must provide for notifying
potentially affected small governments, enabling officials of affected
small governments to have meaningful and timely input in the
development of EPA or Corps regulatory proposals with significant
Federal intergovernmental mandates, and informing, educating, and
advising small governments on compliance with the regulatory
requirements.
We have determined that this rule does not contain a Federal
mandate that may result in expenditures of $100 million or more for
State, local, and Tribal governments, in the aggregate, or the private
sector in anyone year. Currently, under the CWA, any discharge of
pollutants into waters of the U.S. requires a permit under either
section 402 or 404 of the CWA. Today's rule conforms our two regulatory
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definitions of "fill material" and thereby clarifies whether a
particular discharge is subject to regulation under section 402 or
section 404. Today's rule is generally consistent with current agency
practice, does not impose new substantive requirements and therefore
does not contain a Federal mandate that may result in expenditures of
$100 million or more for State, local, and Tribal governments, in the
aggregate, or the private sector in anyone year. Thus, today's rule is
not subject to the requirements of sections 202 and 205 of the UMRA.
For the same reasons, we have determined that this rule contains no
regulatory requirements that might significantly or uniquely affect
small governments. Thus today's rule is not subject to the requirements
of section 203 of UMRA.
G. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act
As noted in the proposed rule, Section 12(d) of the National
Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (the NTTAA) , Public Law
104-113, section 12(d) (15 U.S.C. 272 note) directs us to use voluntary
consensus standards in our regulatory activities unless to do so would
be inconsistent with applicable law or otherwise impractical. Voluntary
consensus standards are technical standards (e.g., materials
specifications, test methods, sampling procedures, and business
practices) that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus
standards bodies. The NTTAA directs us to provide Congress, through
OMB, explanations when we decide not to use available and applicable
voluntary consensus standards.
This rule does not involve technical standards. Therefore, we did
not consider the use of any voluntary consensus standards.
H. Executive Order 13045
Executive Order 13045: ''''Protection of Children from Environmental
Health Risks and Safety Risks" (62 FR 19885, April 23, 1997) applies
to any rule that: (1) Is determined to be "economically significant"
as defined under Executive Order 12866, and (2) concerns an
environmental health or safety risk that we have reason to believe may
have a disproportionate effect on children. If the regulatory action
meets both criteria, we must evaluate the environmental health or
safety effects of the planned rule on children, and explain why the
planned regulation is preferable to other potentially effective and
reasonably feasible alternatives considered by us.
This final rule is not subject to the Executive Order because it is
not economically significant as defined in Executive Order 12866. In
addition, it does not concern an environmental or safety risk that we
have reason to believe may have a disproportionate effect on children.
I. Executive Order 13175
Executive Order 13175, entitled "Consultation and Coordination
with Indian Tribal Governments" (65 FR 67249, November 6, 2000),
requires the agencies to develop an accountable process to ensure
"meaningful and timely input by tribal officials in the development of
regulatory policies that have tribal implications." "Policies that
have tribal implications" is defined in the Executive Order to include
regulations that have "substantial direct effects on one or more
Indian tribes, on the relationship between the Federal government and
the Indian tribes, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities
between the Federal government and Indian tribes.' ,
Today's rule does not have tribal implications. It will not have
substantial direct effects on tribal governments, on the relationship
between the Federal government and the Indian tribes, or on the
distribution of power and responsibilities between the Federal
government and Indian tribes, as specified in Executive Order 13175.
Currently, under the CWA, any discharge of pollutants into waters of
the u.S. requires a permit under either section 402 or 404 of the CWA.
Today's rule conforms our two regulatory definitions of "fill
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material" and thereby clarifies whether a particular discharge is
subject to regulation under section 402 or section 404. It is generally
consistent with current agency practice and does not impose new
substantive requirements. Within California, Oregon, Washington, Idaho,
Wyoming, Nevada, Arizona, Hawaii, Guam, and the Northern Mariana
Islands, after today's rule, the Corps will again be issuing Section
404 permits for the construction of solid waste landfills in waters of
the U.S., which the Corps had ceased doing after the decision in RII
(the decision did not affect the permitting requirement outside these
states). See section II. D. of this preamble. However, resuming the
issuance of section 404 permits for construction of solid waste
landfills in waters of the U.S. in these areas does not have tribal
implications. No tribes within the Ninth Circuit will incur
administrative costs as a result of today's rule, because none
currently administer the section 404 program and, in any event, the
administrative costs of permitting solid waste landfills are minimal in
the context of the overall section 404 permitting program. In addition,
this change does not impose any additional substantive obligations on
any Tribe seeking to construct solid waste landfills in waters of the
U.S. since Subtitle D of RCRA currently requires such facilities to
meet comparable conditions for receiving a section 404 permit. See
section II.D. of this preamble. Finally, we do not believe that
requiring any tribal government seeking to construct solid waste
landfills in waters of the U.S. to undergo the Section 404 permitting
process itself will have substantial direct effects on one or more
Indian
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tribes, on the relationship between the Federal government and the
Indian tribes, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities
between the Federal government and Indian tribes. Thus, Executive Order
13175 does not apply to this rule.
J. Environmental Documentation
As required by the NEPA, the Corps prepares appropriate
environmental documentation for its activities affecting the quality of
the human environment. The Corps has prepared an environmental
assessment (EA) of the final rule. The Corps' EA ultimately concludes
that, since the adoption of this rule will not significantly affect the
quality of the human environment, the preparation and coordination of
an EIS is not required. The EA, included in the administrative record
for today's rule, explains the rationale for the Corps' conclusion.
K. Congressional Review Act
The Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. 801 et seq., as added by the
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, generally
provides that before a rule may take effect, the agency promulgating
the rule must submit a rule report, which includes a copy of the rule,
to each House of the Congress and to the Comptroller General of the
United States. We will submit a report containing this rule and other
required information to the U.S. Senate, the U.S. House of
Representatives, and the Comptroller General of the United States prior
to publication of the rule in the Federal Register. A major rule cannot
take effect until 60 days after it is published in the Federal
Register. This rule is not a "major rule" as defined by 5 U.S.C.
section 804(2). This rule will be effective June 10, 2002.
L. Executive Order 12898
Executive Order 12898 requires that, to the greatest extent
practicable and permitted by law, each Federal agency must make
achieving environmental justice part of its mission. Executive Order
12898 provides that each Federal agency conduct its programs, policies,
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and activities that substantially affect human health or the
environment in a manner that ensures that such programs, policies, and
activities do not have the effect of, excluding persons (including
populations) from participation in, denying persons (including
populations) the benefits of, or subjecting persons (including
populations) to discrimination under such programs, policies, and
activities because of their race, color, or national origin.
Today's rule is not expected to negatively impact any community,
and therefore is not expected to cause any disproportionately high and
adverse impacts to minority or low-income communities. Today's rule
relates solely to whether a particular discharge is appropriately
authorized under section 402 or section 404 of the Clean Water Act.
Moreover, the proposed allocation of authority between these programs
is generally consistent with existing agency practice.
M. Executive Order 13211
This rule is not a "significant energy action" as defined in
Executive Order 13211, "Actions Concerning Regulations That
Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use" (66 FR 28355
(May 22, 2001)) because it is not likely to have a significant adverse
effect on the supply, distribution, or use of energy. Today's rule
conforms our two regulatory definitions of "fill material" and
thereby clarifies whether a particular discharge is subject to
regulation under section 402 or section 404. Today's rule is generally
consistent with current agency practice, does not impose new
substantive requirements and therefore will not have a significant
adverse effect on the supply, distribution, or use of energy.
List of Subjects
33 CFR Part 323
Water pollution control, Waterways.
40 CFR Part 232
Environmental protection, Intergovernmental relations, Water
pollution control.
Corps of Engineers
33 CFR Chapter II
Accordingly, as set forth in the preamble 33 CFR part 323 is
amended as set forth below:
PART 323--[AMENDED]
1. The authority citation for part 323 continues to read as
follows:
Authority: 33 U.S.C. 1344.
2. Amend Sec. 323.2 as follows:
a. Paragraph (e) is revised.
b. In paragraph (f), in the second sentence: add the words "or
infrastructure" after the words "for the construction of any
structure' 'i add the word ", infrastructure," after the words
~'building of any structure' 'i remove the words "residential, and"
and add in their place the words "residential, or" i and add the words
"placement of fill material for construction or maintenance of any
liner, berm, or other infrastructure associated with solid waste
landfillsi placement of overburden, slurry, or tailings or similar
mining-related materialsi" after the words "utility linesi".
The revision reads as follows:
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Sec. 323.2 Definitions.
* * * * *
(e) (1) Except as specified in paragraph (e) (3) of this section, the
term fill material means material placed in waters of the United States
where the material has the effect of:
(i) Replacing any portion of a water of the United States with dry
land; or
(ii) Changing the bottom elevation of any portion of a water of the
United States.
(2) Examples of such fill material include, but are not limited to:
rock, sand, soil, clay, plastics, construction debris, wood chips,
overburden from mining or other excavation activities, and materials
used to create any structure or infrastructure in the waters of the
United States.
(3) The term fill material does not include trash or garbage ..
* * * * *
Dated: May 3, 2002.
Dominic Izzo,
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works),
Department of the Army.
Environmental Protection Agency
40 CFR Chapter I
Accordingly, as set forth in the preamble 40 CFR part 232 is
amended as set forth below:
PART 232--[AMENDED]
1. The authority citation for part 232 continues to read as
follows:
Authority: 33 U.S.C. 1344.
2. Amend Sec. 232.2 as follows:
a. The definition of "Fill material" is revised.
b. In the definition of "Discharge of fill material' " in
paragraph (1): add the words "or infrastructure" after the words
"for the construction of any structure"; add the word ",
infrastructure, " after the words "building of any structure' '; remove
the words "residential, and" and add in their place the words
"residential, or' '; and add the words "placement of fill material for
construction or maintenance of any liner, berm, or other infrastructure
associated with solid waste landfills; placement of overburden, slurry,
or tailings or similar mining-related materials;" after the words
"utility lines;".
The revision reads as follows:
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Sec. 232.2 Definitions.
* * * * *
Fill material. (1) Except as specified in paragraph (3) of this
definition, the term fill material means material placed in waters of
the United States where the material has the effect of:
(i) Replacing any portion of a water of the United States with dry
land; or
(ii) Changing the bottom elevation of any portion of a water of the
United States.
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(2) Examples of such fill material include, but are not limited to:
rock, sand, soil, clay, plastics, construction debris, wood chips,
overburden from mining or other excavation activities, and materials
used to create any structure or infrastructure in the waters of the
United States.
(3) The term fill material does not include trash or garbage.
* * * * *
Dated: May 3, 2002.
Christine Todd Whitman,
Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency.
[FR Doc. 02-11547 Filed 5-8-02; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3710-92-P

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
CHARLESTON DIVISION
KENTUCKIANS FOR THE
COMMONWEALTH, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:01-0770
COLONEL JOHN RIVENBURGH, Colonel,
District Engineer; ROBERT B. FLOWERS,
Lieutenant General, Chief of Engineers
and Commander of the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers; and MICHAEL D. GHEEN,
Chief of the Regulatory Branch, Operations
and Readiness Division, U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers, Huntington District,
Defendants,
and
KENTUCKY COAL ASSOCIATION,
POCAHONTAS DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, and
AEI RESOURCES, INC.,
Intervenor-Defendants
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending are cross motions for summary judgment by Plaintiff
Kentuckians for the Commonwealth, Inc. (KFTC), Defendant officers
of the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), and Intervenor-Defendants
on Count One.
The Court holds that § 404 of the Clean Water Act does not
allow filling the waters of the United States solely for waste
disposal. Agency rulemaking or permit approval that holds
otherwise is ultra vires, beyond agency authority conferred by the
Clean Water Act. Only the United States Congress can rewrite the
Act to allow fills with no purpose or use but the deposit of waste.
Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion is GRANTED and Defendants' motions
are DENIED.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Purportedly acting under the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (§ 404),
the Corps has permitted surface coal mining operations to dispose
of overburden waste from mountaintop removal coal mining by filling
hundreds of miles of streams in Appalachia. Appalachian coal
occurs in narrow seams separated by dirt and rock called
"overburden" or "spoil." In mountaintop removal mining, the
overburden is blasted with explosive charges and pushed out of way
to expose the coal seams. The overburden, which is nothing but
waste, is disposed of by creating valley fills, that is, literally,
filling the valleys with waste rock and dirt. Because mountain
streams run into the valleys, creating massive valley fills has the
inevitable effect of covering and obliterating many streams and the
lifeforms within.
In June 2000 the Huntington (West Virginia) District office of
2
the Corps! authorized Martin County Coal Corporation's (MCCC' s)
mountaintop removal coal mining proj ect in Martin County, Kentucky.
Authorized under a § 404 nationwide permit, 2 the proj ect would
create 27 valley fills, filling 6.3 miles of streams. The vast
majority of the nation's valley fills are approved in the
Huntington District by the Corps' officials who are Defendants
here. Of the 306 NWP-21 permits issued nationwide in the year
2000, 257 were issued in the Corps' Huntington District.
Kentuckians for the Commonwealth v. Rivenburgh, 204 F.R.D. 301, 305
n.3 (S.'D. W. Va. 2001). All year-2000 NWP-21 permits in the nation
impacted a total of 460,575 linear feet (approximately 87 miles) of
stream. Id. Ninety-seven percent of stream length affected, or
449,896 linear feet (approximately 85 miles), occurred in the
Huntington district under NWP-21 permits authorized here. Id.
In Count One Plaintiff complains that the primary purpose of
!The Corps' Huntington District comprises roughly half the
state of Ohio, more than half of West Virginia, portions of eastern
Kentucky and western Virginia, and a relatively small area in North
Carolina. See Kentuckians for the Commonwealth v. Rivenburgh, 204
F.R.D. 301, 305 (S.D. W. Va. 2001)(explaining Corps' district
boundaries are based on the watersheds of maj or rivers, rather than
state lines).
2Nationwide permits (NWPs) are available for activities that
"will cause only minimal adverse environmental effects when
performed separately, and will have only minimal cumulative adverse
effect on the environment." 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (e) (I). NWP-21
permits issue for activities associated with surface coal mining.
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valley fills is to dispose of waste. Under the Corps' longstanding
regulations, waste disposal is not an authorized purpose for a CWA
§ 404 permit. See 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(e). KFTC asks the Court to
find and conclude the Corps has violated § 404 of the CWA, 33
U.S .C. § 1344 , and the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5
U.S.C. § 706(2), because its actions are arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, and otherwise contrary to law.
The Corps acknowledges, as it must, that under current Corps'
regulations waste disposal cannot be permitted under § 404.
According to Defendants, this is a problem created by differences
between the Corps' and the EPA's definitions of "fill material,"
which have "admittedly resulted in confusion." (U.S. Cross Mot.
for Summ. J. at 1). For that reason, the agencies have undertaken
rulemaking "reconciling" the definitions and "clarifying" that
overburden waste may be disposed of in vall~y fills under CWA §
404. 3 (Id.) Additionally, Defendants argue the Court should defer
to the Corps' longstanding practice of approving valley fills as
"fill material" under § 404.
Both parties moved for summary judgment on these contrary
30n May 3, 2002 , while the Court had these matters under
consideration, EPA and the Corps signed for publication in the
Federal Register their final rules on fill material and its
discharge. The Court considers the proffered rule at II.D.2.
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interpretations of CWA § 404 and the Corps' authority to permit
waste disposal under the guise of discharge of fill material.
An examination of the Clean Water Act (CWA), its legislative
history, its predecessor statutes and regulations, its companion
statutes, its longstanding administrative interpretation and
judicial gloss has convinced the Court that § 404 was enacted for
the purpose and with the effect of allowing disposal of only one
type of pollutant or waste: dredged spoil. Permits for disposal
of all other pollutants into national waters are to issue under CWA
§ 402. "Fill material," as regulated under § 404, refers to
material deposited for some beneficial primary purpose: for
construction work, infrastructure, improvement and development in
waters of the United States, not waste material discharged solely
to dispose of waste. Accordingly, approval of waste disposal as
fill material under §404 is ul t;ra vires, that is , beyond the
authority of either administrative agency, the Corps or
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). To approve disposal of
waste other than dredged spoil, in particular mountaintop removal
overburden, in waters of the United States under § 404 dredge and
fill regulations rewrites the Clean Water Act. Such rewriting
exceeds the authority of administrative agencies and requires an
act of Congress.
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II. DISCUSSION
A . SUlDBlary Judgment: St:andard
Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and judgment may be rendered as a
matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c) . The parties agree there are
no issues of material fact, and the question for the Court is one
of law: interpretation of § 404 of the CWA.
B. Agency Aut:hori t:y and t:he APA
Agency power is "not the power to make law. Rather, it is
'the power to adopt regulations to carry into effect the will of
Congress as expressed by the statute. '" Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp. v. Food & Drug Admin., 153 F.3d 155 (4th Cir. 1998)(quoting
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 213-14 (1996)(quoting
Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Comm'n, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936))).
It is fundamental, even "axiomatic that an administrative agency's
power to promulgate legislative regulations is limited to the
authority delegated by Congress." Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp.,
488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988). The issue presented is whether Congress
intended to delegate to the Corps the authority to permit waste
disposal as discharge of fill material under its § 404 dredge and
fill permit program, absent a primary constructive purpose.
If a statute is silent or ambiguous on a specific question, a
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reviewing court must defer to any reasonable construction of that
statute by the administering agency. Chevron. U. S .A. v. Nat' 1 Res.
Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). The agency's
construction need not be the one the Court itself would adopt or
the one the Court feels would best implement Congressional policy.
It need only be a reasonable construction of the statutory question
at issue. Id. at 844-45.
If, however, the Court can ascertain Congress' intent on a
particular question by applying the traditional rules of statutory
construction, then it must give effect to that intent. Brown &
Williamson, 153 F.3d at 162 (citing Chevron 467 U.S. at 843 n.9).
Although the inquiry begins with the language of the statute, it
must be considered in context of the whole law, its object and
policy. See ide Congressional intent may be ascertained further
through the overall statutory scheme, legislative history, "the
history of evolving congressional regulation in the area," and
other relevant statutes. Id. (quoting Dunn v. CFTC, 519 U.S. 465
(1967)) (other citations omitted).
Official actions are ulcra vires when the official engages in
conduct that the sovereign has not authorized. Larson v. Domestic
& Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949). Because
administrative agencies have no power to act beyond authority
7
conrerred by Congress, the APA requires a court to "hold unlawrul
and set aside agency action . . . round to be . . . in excess or
statutory jurisdiction, authority , or 1imitations, or short or
statutory right." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C).
C. The Clean Waeer Ace
The obj ective or the CWA is "to restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity or the nation's
waters." 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). To that end, no pollutants may be
discharged into the waters of the United States without a CWA
permit. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1362(7) & (12). "Pollutant"
includes, in"ter alia, "dredged spoil," "solid waste," "rock, sand,
cellar dirt and industrial . . . waste discharged into water." 33
U.S.c. § 1362(6). The parties agree overburden rrom mountaintop
removal coal mining is a pollutant under the derinition and
requires a CWA permit.
Two maj or permit programs, §§ 402 and 404, authorize discharge
or pollutants into waters of the United States. 4 Id. §§ 1342,
1344. Section 402 creates the National Pollutant Discharge
4A third permit program provides ror discharge or pollutants
"under controlled conditions associated with an approved
aquaculture proj ect under Federal or State supervision." 33 U. S .C.
§ 1328 (a) . These three programs are the exclusive permitting
programs. See ide § 1342(a).
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Elimination System (NPDES), providing permits for discharge of
pollutants. Id. § 1342. Section 404 authorizes permits for
dredged or fill material. Id. § 1344. Neither "dredged material"
nor "fill material" is defined in the statute. 5
The Secretary of the Army (i. e., the Corps) issues § 404
permits for discharge of dredged or rill material at speciried
disposal sites. Id. § 1344 (a) . The EPA Administrator works with
the Secretary to develop guidelines ror· disposal sites, id. §
1344(b), and may prohibit the use or a speciried disposal site
where a discharge "will have an unacceptable adverse errect on
municipal water supplies, shellfish beds and fishery areas
(including spawning and breeding areas), wildlife, or recreational
areas. Id. § 1344(c).6 Examination of the legislative history or
5Because discharge of all pollutants requires either a § 402
permit or a § 404 dredge and fill permit, Defendants argue "fill
material" must be a "pollutant," a waste material, for which § 404
permits are available. As philosophers say, this argument begs the
question. It assumes what it wishes to prove. Section 402 only
says that "the discharge or any pollutant" must have a permit under
§ 402, "except as provided" in § 404. It does not say everything
provided ror in § 404 is pollutant disposal.
6Section 1344 (c) oversight was invoked by the Deputy
Administrator of EPA, W. Michael McCabe, with regard to the MCCC
Martin County surface coal mine permit at issue here. Arter the
Corps rerused to suspend the NWP-21 permit while EPA investigated,
McCabe elevated the issue to the civilian head or the Corps and
asked him to overrule the district office.
McCabe stated it was "incredibl[e]" that the Corps believed
the MCCC project would only cause minimal adverse environmental
(continued ... )
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the CWA, which established these central functions and
relationships in § 404, demonstrates Congress did not intend § 404
permits to apply to fill discharges solely for waste or pollutant
disposal, other than disposal of dredged spoil.
1. Legislative History of the CWA
The initial Senate version of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act (FWPCA) 7 regulated permits for discharge of all
pollutants under § 402. Section 402 (m) of the original bill
treated the discharge of dredged spoil like any other pollutant.
See S. Conf. Rep. No. 92-1236 (1972), reprinted in 1 Legislative
History of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972
(Legt. Hist.), 177.
The American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA) was
6( ... continued)
impacts and that it would qualify for an NWP-21. McCabe explained
that EPA had invoked its 404(c) veto authority only 11 times since
1972 and once in the last ten years, and that it takes this action
"in only the most serious circumstances out of an unequivocal
concern for the protection of human health and the environment."
Compl. ~ 22.
In March 2001 the Corps denied EPA's request. It said it
would review the project if MCCC began work. In August 2001 MCCC
transferred its coal mining permit to Beechfork, which began work.
After KFTC moved for a preliminary injunction, the Corps
modified Beechfork's NWP-21 permit to require compensatory
mitigation for the 33,120 feet of stream impacted by the project
and prohibit fill discharge until the mitigation plan is approved
by the Corps. KFTC then withdrew its motion. Beechfork has
informed the Corps it intends to continue mining at the site.
7Now commonly known as the "Clean Water Act."
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"extremely concerned" with this proposal. Bills Amending che
Federal Wacer Pollucion Concrol Acc and Ocher Pending Legislacion
Relacing co Wacer Pollucion Concrol: Hearing Before che Senace
Subcommiccee on Air and Wacer Pollucion ofche Commiccee on Public
Works, 92nd Cong. (Appendix Mar. 15 , 1971) (letter from Paul A.
Amundsen, Executive Director AAPA) .
[S] eaport facilities are dependent on Federal and private
channel and pierside dredging, which, in turn, would be
affected by the spoil disposal permitting procedure
contained in the subject legislation. . . . The handling
of spoil material from the dredging site to the
containment or disposal area, like [its] planning, is an
engineering function. Local conditions and the distance
the material is to be transported must be weighed on the
basis of economics. This is a thoroughly integrated
decision having a strong bearing on the overall cost of
the proj ect. We believe this function should remain with
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers as it has historically.
We respectfully point out that [additional
restrictive legislation in the dredge spoil disposal
area] would inhibit the orderly development of a national
port system which handled 559 million tons of foreign
trade in 1970 [and] will be expected to handle the
potentially vast increases in trade resulting from our
nation's new trade policies with China and with the
Soviet Union.
Id. (emphasis added). The port authority Association proposed to
except "dredged or fill material" from § 402 and add a new section,
to be numbered 404 , which maintained permitting authority for
dredged or fill material under the Secretary of Army (i.e., the
Corps), as it currently existed. Id.
In floor debate, Senator Ellender, Democrat from Louisiana,
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offered an amendment that essentially followed the AAPA proposal,
adding a new section, 404, under which the Secretary of the Army
would issue permits for the discharge of dredged materials into the
navigable waters at specified disposal sites. The Secretary would
evaluate impact on navigation and anchorage and, in cooperation
with the EPA Administrator, would determine those sites that would
not adversely affect shellfish beds, fisheries (including spawning
and breeding areas) or recreation areas. See 117 Cong. Rec. 38797
(Sen. debate, 92~ Cong., Nov. 2, 1971).
In support of the amendment Sen. Ellender explained it "simply
retains the authority of the Secretary of the Army to issue permits
for the disposal of dredged materials[, which] is essential since
the Secretary of the Army is responsible for maintaining and
improving the navigable waters of the United States." Id .
(emphasis added). Ellender described a deficiency of the current
bill: "that it treats dredged materials the same as industrial
waste" and other refuse. Id. In contrast, Sen. Ellender argued,
"The disposal of dredged material does not involve the introduction
of new pollutants; it merely moves the material from one location
to another."s Id. If the EPA effluent standards were applied to
SDespite Sen. Ellender's assurances, many other legislators
had concerns about the polluting effects of dredged spoil. While
(continued ... )
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dredged spoil disposal, Ellender argued, "90 percent of the ports
and harbors of the United States" would be closed, a
"catastrophical situation." rd.
Sen. Muskie, chief sponsor of the legislation, responded that
"mission-oriented agencies whose mission is something other than
concern for the environment simply do not adequately protect
environmental values. That is not their mission." rd. He urged
dredged spoil not be differentiated from other pollutants. A
substitute amendment agreeable to both factions was proposed, which
kept dredged spoil under § 402(m) with all other pollutants subject
to EPA approval, but also required dredged spoil disposal areas in
navigable water to be certified by the Secretary of the Army as the
only reasonable alternative and by the EPA Administrator not to
8 ( ••• continued)
recognizing the economic arguments for open water disposal of
dredged spoil, the Conference Committee reported:
[T]he Committee expects the Administrator and the
Secretary to move expeditiously to end the process of
dumping·dredged spoil in water - to limit to the greatest
extent possible the disposal of dredged spoil in the
navigable inland waters of the United States including
the Great Lakes - to identify land-based sites for the
disposal of dredged spoil and, where land-based disposal
is not feasible, to establi'sh diked areas for such
disposal.
1 Legt. Hist. 179. Consequently, while dredged spoil was excepted
from § 402, Congress never expected its water-based disposal to
continue under the CWA.
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adversely affect municipal water supplies, shellfish beds,
wildlife, fisheries or recreation areas.
Throughout these discussions, only dredged spoil was discussed
or considered as a potential exception from the general treatment
to be accorded pollutants under § 402. 9
When the Conference Committee met to reconcile the House and
Senate versions of the FWPCA bills, a major difference between the
bills related to "the issue of dredging." 1 Legt. Hist. 179. Like
the AAPA proposal and the Ellender amendment, but unlike the final
Senate version, the House bill kept regulatory authority for
dredged material disposal with the Secretary of the Army under the
existing dredge and fill permit program. The Conference Committee
adopted the House version. As the Committee reported:
The Conferees were uniquely aware of the process by
which the dredge and fill permits are presently handled
and did not wish to create a burdensome bureaucracy in
light of the fact that a system to issue permits already
existed. At the same time, the Committee did not believe
there could be any justification for permitting the
Secretary of the Army to make determination as to the
environmental implications of either the site to be
selected or the specific spoil to be disposed of in a
site. Thus, the Conferees agreed the Administrator of
the [EPA] should have the veto over the selection of the
site for dredged spoil disposal and over any specific
spoil to be disposed of in any selected site.
9"Dredged spoil" means "material that is excavated or dredged
from waters of the United States." 40 C. F .R. § 232. 2 . No one
argues mountaintop removal overburden is dredged spoil.
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Id. (emphasis added). The Conference agreement became 33 U.S.C.
§ 1344 (a) - (d) .
Throughout Congressional consideration, dredged spoil was the
single pollutant of concern. Section 404 was enacted to allow
harbor dredging and dredged spoil disposal to continue
expeditiously under the then-existing dredge and fill permit
program administered by the Corps. Examination of that permit
program, adopted by Congress as CWA § 404, shows fill permits were
never issued nor authorized for waste disposal.
2. Dredge and Fill Permits
The Corps' dredge and fill permit program to which the
Congressional Conference Committee deferred in 1972 was found at 33
C.F.R. §§ 209.120 (1972), entitled "Permits for work in navigable
waters. "10 Statutory authority for those 1972 dredge and fill
permits was provided under Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act
of 1899 (RHA), 33 U. S . C. § 403. See id . Section 10 concerns
"Obstruction of navigable waters generally; wharves; piers, etc.;
excavations and filling in. "11 Section 10 does not control waste
10Regulations related to the permit program also were codified
in the two subsections immediately following: § 209.125 Dams and
dikes across waterways and § 209. 130 Piers, dredging, etc. in
waterways.
llRHA § 10 remains in effect and reads now, as it did in 1899
and 1972:
(continued ... )
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or refuse disposal , permits for which were required and issued
under a separate section of the RHA, Section 13, commonly known as
the "Refuse Act." 33 U.S.C. § 407 (discussed below).
The Corps' 1972 dredge and fill permit regulations covered all
excavation and construction in navigable waters . For example, the
location and plans of dams and dikes across navigable waters must
be approved. Id. at § 209.120(b)(I)(a). In addition, "Plans for
wharves, piers, dolphins, booms, weirs, breakwaters, bulkheads,
jetties, or other structures, and excavation or fill in navigable
waters must be recommended by the Chief of Engineers and approved
11 ( ••• continued)
The creation of any obstruction not affirmatively
authorized by Congress, to the navigable capacity of any
of the waters of the United States is prohibited; and it
shall not be lawful to build or commence the building of
any wharf, pier, dolphin, boom, weir, breakwater,
bulkhead, jetty, or other structures in any port,
roadstead, haven, harbor, canal, navigable river, or
other water of the United States, outside established
harbor lines, or where no harbor lines have been
established, except on plans recommended by the Chief of
Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of the Army;
and it shall not be lawful to excavate or fill, or in any
manner to alter or modify the course, location,
condition, or capacity of, any port, roadstead, haven,
harbor, canal, lake, harbor or refuge, or inclosure
within the limits of any breakwater, or of the channel of
any navigable water of the United States, unless the work
has been recommended by the Chief of Engineers and
authorized by the Secretary of the Army prior to
beginning the same.
33 U.S.C. § 403 (2001) (emphasis added).
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by the Secretary of the Army." Id. at (b) (1) (b). Throughout the
dredge and fill permitting section are references to "work and
construction in navigable waters," 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(f),
"including such work and construction performed by the Corps of
Engineers in the capacity of a construction agency for other
branches and services," id., "work and structures in or over
navigable waters," 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(c)(iii), "improvements of
any navigable river," 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(e), and "structures and
improvements," 33 C.F.R. § 209. 120(d) (3) (all emphases added).
These are just examples of numerous references throughout the
section that support the conclusion the fill operations
contemplated were for work, construction, structure bUilding, and
improvement, and never for waste disposal.
Prior to the CWA, waste disposal was overseen, also by the
Corps, under the Refuse Act in a separate permit program for
discharges or deposits into navigable waters, then found at §
209.131 (1972). This program, authorized by § 13 of the RHA, 33
U. S. C. § 407, provided for permits for discharge or deposit of
"refuse matter of any kind or description whatever other than that
flowing from streets and sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid
state into any navigable water of the United States[.]" 33 C.F.R.
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§ 209.131 (quoting 33 U. S. C. § 407).12
The Refuse Act permit program for disposal of waste, refuse,
and pollutants was explicitly replaced by § 402 NPDES permits. No
Refuse Act permits were to issue after enactment of the CWA
amendments on October 18, 1972. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (a) (5).
Instead, EPA-administered NPDES permits were deemed to be permits
issued under the Refuse Act. Id. at (a)(4). Refuse Act permit
applications pending when the CWA became law were converted into
NPDES permit applications. Id. at (a)(5).
To recapitulate, prior to 1972 the Refuse Act, § 13 of the
RHA, governed waste disposal in navigable waters, while other non-
waste-related activities involving excavation and construction in
navigable waters were controlled by § 10 of the RHA. Section 10
authorized the dredge and rill permit program. The CWA perpetuated
that longstanding distinction: Section 402, which replaced the
12Although dealing with refuse disposal, § 13, like the other
sections of the RHA, was enacted for the purpose of protecting
navigation and anchorage by keeping navigable waterways free of
obstructions, and not as a general pollution control statute. See
Guthrie v. Alabama By-Products Co., 328 F. Supp. 1140, 1145-47
(N.D. Ala. 1971)(providing extensive legislative history of the
RHA); see also United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482
(1960) (holding industrial discharges reduced river channel depth
and created an obstruction within the meaning of § 13 of the RHA);
but cf., United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224
(1996) (extending § 13 violations to commercially valuable gasoline
accidentally discharged into naVigable river).
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Refuse Act permit program, regulated waste disposal. Section 404
maintained the Corps' dredge and fill permit program for excavation
and construction. While Congress recognized dredged spoil was a
form of waste and a pollutant, for reasons of economics and
administrative efficiency its disposal was excepted from § 402 and
continued to be regulated by RHA § 10 dredge and fill permits, for
which § 404 was created. With the exception of dredged spoil
disposal, dredge and fill activities permitted under § 404 involved
maintenance, construction, work, and structures, not disposal of
pollutants or waste.
3. 1977 CWA Amendments
The remainder of the current § 404 permit program became law
by amendment in 1977 during the only major Congressional revisit of
the CWA. Nothing added or discussed regarding the 1977 amendments
altered the understanding that § 404 fill material and fill
discharge activities do not include waste disposal. 13 See 1977 u. S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News. 4326-488. Instead the amendments
clarified that § 404 fills were permitted for useful purposes:
activities having the "purpose" of bringing an area of the
130ne purpose of the 1977 amendments was "to ease unnecessary
regulation and redtape" by adding general permits and exempting
certain activities not involving point source discharges, ide at
4400; see also 33 U. S. C. §§ 1334 (e), (f). State-administered
permit programs were also created. Id · § 1344 (g) - U) .
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navigable waters into a "use." 33 U.S.C. § 1334(f).
Legislators sought to except from § 404 regulation what the
Senate Report called "gray area" types of activities about which
there had been confusion whether permits were required. S. Rep.
95-370, U.S. Code Cong. Admin. News 1977 4401. A section was added
to gather those § 404 exceptions, which include, for example,
"normal farming, silviculture, and ranching," maintenance of
"existing structures such as dikes, dams, and levees," and
"temporary roads for moving mining equipment."
1344 (f) (1) (A), (B), & (D).
33 U.S.C. §
To distinguish exempt ("gray areas") from non-exempt § 404
activities, Congress added 33 U.S.C. 1344(f)(2):
Any discharge of dredged or fill material into the
navigable waters incidental to any activity having as its
purpose bringing an area of the navigable waters into a
use to which it was not previously subject, where the
flow or circulation of navigable waters may be impaired
or the reach of such waters be reduced, shall be required
to have a permit under this section.
33 U. S .C. § 1344 (f) (2) . According to Congress, the definitive
characteristic of dredge and fill discharges requiring § 404
permits is that they have a purpose for which the discharge is
undertaken, to use the land created. Consonant with the long
history of the § 404 permit program, discharge "purpose" is tied to
a "use" to which the area will be put. The purpose is not to get
20
rid of waste and dispose of pollutants. Section 404 permits
authorize discharge or rill material incident to some use or the
rilled area.
Congress clariried in 1977 that the permitted uses ror § 404
rill are useful and constructive: for the purpose of bringing an
area into a use. Waste disposal, or course, is undertaken to
dispose of waste, not to build useful land. Under the statute,
section 404 Clean Water Act permits are not available for fill
discharges for the sole purpose of waste disposal.
4. Longstanding Regulatory Interpretations
Agencies' regulations reflect an agency's own longstanding
interpretation, which should be accorded "particular deference."
North Haven Bd. of Ed. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 522 n.12 (1982).
Where agencies' interpretations are consistent with Congress's
express intent, they are entitled to "substantial dererence."
Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994).
a. Corps' regulations
The Corps' regulations governing the dredge and fill program,
found at 33 C.F.R. Pt. 323, accord precisely with the statutory,
regulatory and legislative history recounted above. The Corps'
definition of fill material was offered as a final rule in 1977.
42 Fed. Reg. 37122, 37145 (July 19, 1977); 33 C.F.R. §
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323.2(m) (1977) . Since 1977 the Corps has defined "fill material"
as:
any material used for the primary purpose of replacing an
aquatic area with dry land or of changing the bottom
elevation of a[] waterbody. The term does not include
any pollutant discharged into the water primarily to
dispose of waste. as that activity is regulated under
section 402 of the Clean Water Act.
33 C. F. R. § 323.2 (e) (2001) (emphasis added).
definition, "discharge of fill material" means:
Under the Corps'
the addition of fill material into waters of the United
States. The term generally includes, without limitation,
the following activities: Placement of fill that is
necessary for the construction of any structure in a
water of the United States; the building of any structure
or impoundment requiring rock, sand, dirt, or other
material for its construction; site-development fills for
recreational, industrial, commercial, residential, and
other uses; causeways or road fills; dams and dikes;
artificial islands; property protection and/or
reclamation devices such as riprap, groins, seawalls,
breakwaters, and revetments; beach nourishment; levees;
fill for structures such as sewage treatment facilities,
intake and outfall pipes associated with power plants and
subaqueous utility lines; and artificial reefs.
33 C.F.R. § 323.2(f) (emphasis added). Exactly as designated by
Congress, see 33 U. S. C. 1344 (f) (2), § 404 fill is material
discharged into water for construction, development, or property
protection, activities defined by their ultimate use and purpose.
Similarly reflecting the basic structure of the CWA permit
programs, waste disposal (except dredged spoil) is regulated under
§ 402.
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Since 1977 the Corps' definitions of "fill material" and
"discharge of fill material" have correctly stated the law.
b. EPA regulations
The Corps administers the § 404 dredge and fill permit
program, with environmental oversight of § 404 disposal sites from
the EPA. 14 Longstanding EPA definitions of "fill material" and
"discharge," while not identical to Corps' definitions, when
considered together, point to the same use and purpose requirement.
The EPA defines "fill material" as "any 'pollutant' which replaces
portions of the 'waters of the United States' with dry land or
which changes the bottom elevation of a water body for any
purpose." 40 C.F.R. § 232.2 (emphasis added).
Through this simple language, the EPA definition introduces a
14Defendants argue because EPA has ultimate administrative
authority to construe the CWA and in particular § 404, EPA's
definition of "fill material" governs. For the proposition of EPA
authority, they rely on an Opinion of the Attorney General finding
such authority to construe the jurisdictional term "navigable
waters" and § 404(f) of the Act. See 43 U.S. Ope Atty. Gen 197,
1979 WL 16529 (1979). The Attorney General relied on legislative
history, as discussed above, showing "hot[] debate[]" whether the
Secretary of the Army should play any role in issuing permits and
the ultimate resolution, in which the EPA Administrator retained
substantial responsibility over administration and enforcement of
§ 404. See ide at 199.
Without deciding whether EPA administrative authority extends
from jurisdictional issues through every aspect of regulation under
§ 404, the Court is willing to accept Defendants' premise arguendo.
Nonetheless, any EPA definition also must accord with the CWA and
Congressional intent.
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crucial ambiguity. Compare the statute:
Any discharge of dredged or fill material into the
navigable waters incidental to any activity having as its
purpose bringing an area of the navigable waters into a
use to which it was not previously subject, where the
flow or circulation of navigable waters may be impaired
or the reach of such waters be reduced, shall be required
to have a permit under [§ 404].
33 U. S . C. § 1344 (f) (2) . Under the statute, filling is for a
purposeful activity, to carry out some use that requires the waters
be filled. Under the EPA definition, the purpose could be
construed solely as that of the discharge. So, for example, under
the statute, one could not discharge a pollutant for the sole
purpose of waste disposal; ironically, under the EPA definition,
waste disposal could be potentially permissible.
Despite this ambiguity, which the EPA definition introduces
into an otherwise clear regulatory scheme, EPA's similarly
longstanding definition of "discharge of fill material" makes clear
the agency never before now proposed that waste disposal would be
a proper § 404 purpose for filling waters of the United States.
Historically, EPA has defined "discharge of fill material" as:
the addition of fill material into waters of the United
States. The term generally includes, without limitation,
the following activities: Placement of fill that is
necessary for the construction of any structure in a
water of the United States; the building of any structure
or impoundment requiring rock, sand, dirt, or other
material for its construction; site-development fills for
recreational, industrial, commercial, residential, and
24
other uses; causeways or road fills; dams and dikes;
artificial islands; property protection and/or
reclamation devices such as riprap, groins, seawalls,
breakwaters, and revetments; beach nourishment; levees;
fill for structures such as sewage treatment facilities,
intake and outfall pipes associated with power plants and
subaqueous utility lines; and artificial reefs.
40 C.F.R. § 232,2 (emphasis added) .15 As the EPA has said always,
until May 3, 2002, the purpose for discharging § 404 fill is the
construction or development or use for which the fill is needed,
not the purpose for which the material is discharged. Nowhere is
waste disposal cited as a proper purpose.
Agency regulations, in place virtually since the CWA's
inception, authorize § 404 permits only for fill discharges for
uses and purposes served' by the filled area. As the Corps'
regulations have made clear, waste disposal is not permitted under
§ 404. These portions of the regulations remain consistent with
Congressional intent. The EPA definition introduces an ambiguity
present nowhere else in the statutory or regulatory scheme when it
allows that fill discharges might be "for any purpose." But the
EPA's longstanding specified purposes for discharge of fill
material all have the primary purpose of placing the fill for some
use. The filling authorized is not the incidental result of waste
15The EPA definition of "discharge of fill material" is
identical to the Corps' longstanding definition of the same term.
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disposal. The agencies' longstanding regulations, with the
exception of EPA's potential permitting of § 404 discharges "for
any purpose," are consistent with Congressional intent, and are
otherwise due substantial deference, which the Court accords to
them.
5. 1986 Memorandum of Agreement on Solid Waste and RCRA
The differing "fill material" definitions from EPA and the
Corps earlier raised a similar question to that before the Court
today. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Amendments of
1984 (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901, ec seq., required steps be taken to
improve the control of solid waste. 16 Concerned whether § 402 or
§ 404 should regulate such discharges of solid waste materials into
waters of the United States for the purpose of disposal of waste,
the two agencies entered into an interim agreement, 17 Memorandum of
Agreement on Solid Waste. 51 Fed. Reg. 8871 (Mar. 14, 1986)(1986
MOA). The main focus of the arrangement was to ensure an effective
enforcement program under the CWA. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319.
Under the MOA, the agencies agreed a "discharge will normally
16RCRA explicitly excepts coal mine overburden where hazardous
wastes are involved. See 42 U.S.C. § 6905(c). The Secretary of
the Interior has exclusive responsibility in that area under the
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1201 ec
seq. Id.
17Although characterized as "interim," the MOA has not been
superseded or renounced in the decade and a half since.
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be considered to meet the [Corps'] definition of 'fill material'"
by consideration of the following factors:
a. The discharge has as its primary purpose or has as
one principle purpose of multi-purposes to replace a
portion of the waters of the United States with dry land
or to raise the bottom elevation.
b. The discharge results from activities such as road
construction or other activities where the material to be
discharged is generally identified with construction-type
activities.
c. A principal effect of the discharge is physical loss
or physical modification of waters of the United States,
including smothering of aquatic life or habitat.
d. The discharge is heterogeneous in nature and of the
type normally associated with sanitary landfill
discharges. 18
1986 MOA at B. 4 . (The list does not indicate whether it is
disj unctive or conj unctive . )
Of particular note, the first factor maintains in slightly
attenuated, but not unrecognizable form, the primary purpose test.
Section 404 fill material is discharged to create dry land or raise
the bottom elevation. Implicit is that some useful purpose is
required to justify the filling. Understandably, under the CWA,
with its purpose to maintain the integrity of the nation's waters,
18By definition, a "sanitary landfill" is a facility for solid
waste disposal which meets criteria published under section 6944.
42 U.S.C. § 6903(26). At a minimum, a sanitary landfill has "no
reasonable probability of adverse effects on health or the
environment from disposal of solid waste." Id. at § 6944.
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filling of rivers and streams cannot be undertaken simply to turn
them into dry land, that is, simply to destroy them. As "fill" has
been understood, at least since inception of the Corps' dredge and
fill permit program, filling to create dry land or elevate a bottom
must be undertaken for some constructive or useful purpose.
To the extent the MOA supports a primary purpose test for fill
material, the agreement is consonant with the statute and the
legislative and regulatory history. Additionally, the effect of
"physical loss or physical modification" of waters in the third
factor comports with Congress' concern that § 404 permits issue
"where the flow or circulation of navigable waters may be impaired
or the reach of such waters be reduced." 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(2).
As agency interpretation, consistent with Congressional intent, the
agreement is due substantial deference.
Under the 1986 MOA, however, § 404 permits are not available
for disposal of surface coal mine overburden solely for the purpose
of waste disposal. Our Court of Appeals made the same observation
concerning the 1986 MOA. The issue concerned EPA oversight of
permits for instream treatment ponds and fills for disposal of
waste associated with surface coal mining operations. West
Virginia Coal Assoc. v. Reilly, 932 F.2d 964, 1991 WL 75217 (4th
Cir. 1991) (unpublished decision aff'g 728 F. Supp. 1276) (S.D. W.
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Va. 1989).
observed,
Having examined the 1986 MOA, the Circuit Court
It is apparent from the MOA that the types of fills and
discharges at issue in this case fall under [§ 402]. The
discharge of rill material at issue here is expressly ror
the purpose of disposing of waste or spoil from mining
operations.
Id. at *4.
When overburden is dumped into valleys and streams to get rid
of it, the disposal has the effect of creating dry land, but not
the purpose. Because land creation or elevation is not a principle
purpose of overburden disposal in streams, such a discharge would
not meet the Corps' definition of "fill material" as agreed in the
MOA, nor be permittable under § 404.
Again, longstanding regulatory interpretation of both the
Corps and EPA supports the conclusion that§ 404 fill permits shall
issue only for rills with a constructive primary purpose, not waste
disposal.
6 . CWA Consistency with the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act
The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977
(SMCRA), Pub. L. 95-87 (1977) (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1238)
provides general standards ror surrace coal mining operations.
Under SMCRA, a savings clause provides nothing therein "shall be
construed as superseding, amending, modirying, or repealing the .
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· . Clean Water Act, the State laws enacted pursuant thereto, or
other Federal laws relating to preservation of water quality." 30
U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3). Accordingly, if SMCRA regulation condoned
overburden waste disposal in streams that would be inconsistent
with the CWA and it would be trumped by the CWA. SMCRA, however,
does not condone overburden waste disposal in streams. SMCRA is
consistent with the CWA. Two central features of the SMCRA scheme
support CWA protections for overburden disposal: approximate
original contour (AOC) provisions and the buffer zone rule.
Under SMCRA, surface coal mine operators are required "as a
minimum" to "restore the approximate original contour of the land. "
30 U.S.C. § 1265(b)(3). Where the volume of overburden is large
relative to the amount of coal removed, and where that volume is
increased due to the "swell factor" associated with earth removal,
not all the earth and rock removed during mining is needed to
restore AOC. See Bragg v. Robertson, 72 F. Supp.2d 642, 646 (S.D.
W. Va. 1999), affirmed in part. vacated in part on other grounds,
248 F.3d 275 (4th Cir. 2001) .19 The unneeded overburden or "excess
19The district court 0p1n10n was overruled on Eleventh
Amendment jurisdictional grounds because the remaining Defendant
Director of the West Virginia Division of Environmental Protection,
a state official, was determined to be enforcing state, not federal
law. Bragg, 248 F.3d at 296. In Bragg, our Court of Appeals did
not reach nor address any of this Court's substantive discussion of
(continued ... )
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spoil" is the waste material disposed of and deposited in valley
fills, ostensibly authorized by § 404 permits, and the subject of
this Memorandum Opinion.
Waivers to AOC requirements are available when land will be
put to "an equal or better economic or public use." 30 U.S.C. §
1265 (e) (3) (A). _ AOC waivers may be allowed for "industrial,
commercial, agricultural, residential, or public facilit[ies]
(including recreational facilities) ." 30 C. F. R. § 824.11. SMCRA' s
statutory and regulatory scheme thus assumes overburden will be
returned to the mountaintop removal site recreating AOe unless a
constructive primary purpose is designated for the site. Only
where the site will be improved for "an equal or better economic or
public use," does the statute contemplate overburden or excess
spoil placement elsewhere.
This Court previously noted the consonance between these SMCRA
presumptions and provisions of the CWA as regulated by the Corps
since 1977. Bragg, 72 F. Supp . 2d at 656 . Section 404 fill
material, under the Corps' longstanding definition, is placed for
a constructive "primary purpose." 33 C.F.R. § 232.2(e).
"Discharge of fill material" includes numerous approved uses
19 ( ••• continued)
SMCRA, AOC, the state and federal buffer zone rules, or their
interrelations with the CWA.
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including "site-development fills for recreational, industrial,
commercial, residential, and other uses." 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(f).
In SMCRA, when Congress dealt specifically with surface coal
mining overburden, it reinforced its plan that fills were
appropriate where, and only where, they were justified by some
constructive end use and purpose served by the fill itself.
Otherwise, such overburden is just waste, to be returned to the
mine site to recreate the AOC of the landscape mined. SMCRA
contains no provision authorizing disposal of overburden waste in
streams, a conclusion further supported by the buffer zone rule.
In 1977 the Office of Surface Mining (OSM) promulgated the so-
called "buffer zone rule," which provides:
No land within 100 feet of a perennial stream or an
intermittent stream[20] shall be disturbed by surface
mining activities, unless the regulatory authority
specifically authorizes surface mining activities closer
to, or through such a stream. The regulatory authority
may authorize such activities only upon finding that -
(1) Surface mining activities will not cause or
contribute to the violation of applicable State or
Federal water quality standards, and will not adversely
affect the water quantity and quality or other
2°"Intermittent stream" means "(a) a stream or reach of a
stream that drains a watershed of at least one square mile, or (b)
a stream or reach of a stream that is below the local water table
for at least some part of the year, and obtains its flow from both
surface runoff and ground water discharge."
"Perennial stream" means "a stream or part of a stream that
flows continuously during all of the calendar year as a result of
ground-water discharge or surface runoff." 30 C.F.R. § 701.5.
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environmental resources of the stream.
30 C.F.R. § 816.57 (emphasis added). Under SMCRA, the buffer zone
rule protects perennial and intermittent streams and their parts
and reaches from surface mining incursions that affect their water
quality and quantity or other environmental resources, consonant
with the Clean Water Act. See Bragg, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 649 - 52 . For
fill placement, these values are supposed to be protected by § 404
permits, which may not authorize destruction of perennial or
intermittent streams solely for waste disposal. 21 SMCRA further
supports this plan by requiring overburden waste to be returned to
the mine site unless a higher and better constructive purpose is
served by the fill.
Having considered the legislative history and statutory scheme
of the CWA, its longstanding regulatory and administrative
interpretation and its consistency with RCRA and SMCRA, the Court
is led inexorably to the conclusion § 404 of the CWA authorizes
permits for fill material only for a constructive primary purpose,
21Ephemeral streams, not protected by the buffer zone rule,
flow "only in direct response to precipitation in the immediate
watershed or in response to the melting of a cover of snow and ice,
and which has a channel bottom that is always above the local water
table." 30 C. F .R. § 701. 5 . Because the buffer zone rule does not
extend to these drainways above intermittent and perennial streams,
it suggests the regulatory scheme was intended specifically to
protect waterways without absolutely forbidding overburden disposal
on land, even though water might at times run over it.
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not solely for waste disposal. Authorization of § 404 permits for
waste disposal generally, and specifically for coal mining
overburden at mountaintop removal mines, is ulrra vires, exceeding
the statutorily granted authority of EPA or the Corps. Only
Congress can rewrite the Clean Water Act to allow otherwise.
D. Defendant:s' Argument:s in Support: of § 404 Permit:s for Valley
Fill Wast:e Disposal
Defendants counter that EPA's longstanding definition allows
§ 404 permits "for any purpose," and so authorizes coal overburden
waste disposal practices. Using the EPA definition, the Corps has
approved valley fills for overburden disposal for years. The Court
should defer to the agency's longstanding regulatory practice.
Further, if the current EPA definition is not clear enough,
rulemaking will shortly eliminate any potential confusion by
replacing the Corps' primary purpose definition with a "final
effect" version, which will expressly allow § 404 permitting of
mountaintop removal waste disposal in valley fills constructed
solely to dispose of waste. Defendants argue the new rule moots
any obj ections . 22
22Defendants also assert the Court upheld their version of §
404 when it approved a Settlement Agreement between the Corps and
West Virginia citizens in Bragg, the jurisdiction of which was
upheld on appeal. See Bragg v. Robertson, 54 F. Supp. 2d 653 (S. D.
W. Va. 1999). According to Defendants, the Settlement Agreement
(continued ... )
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1. Longstanding Regulatory Practice
The Corps and Intervenors argue § 404 permits have been issued
for valley fills designed for waste disposal for decades under the
EPA definition of fill. The same rationale is offered in the
proposals for a final rule, where the agencies lean heavily on past
practice. One benefit of the rule change, according to the
agencies, is the final rule "is generally consistent with current
agency practice." (Corps Status Report (May 6, 2002), Ex. 1, 19
(Final Rule).)
Until May 3, 2002 the Corps' definition, in complete accord
with the CWA, explicitly excluded waste disposal as a purpose for
§ 404 fills. All § 404 fills approved by the Corps solely for
waste disposal were illegal. 23
22 ( ... continued)
presumed coal mining overburden would continue to be permitted
under § 404, and this determination by the Court has precedential
effect.
Under the Settlement Agreement, which the Court reviewed and
found to be fair and reasonable, Plaintiff reserved the "right to
challenge under the APA any future Corps' CWA section 404
authorization for any valley fill in waters of the United States
that may be authorized by the Corps" after the Settlement. (Pl. 's
Mot. for Prelim. Inj., Ex. 19 ~ 16.) The Settlement Agreement left
the issue of the agencies' authority to issue § 404 permits for
valley fills open and undetermined. Under any legal analysis of
the Settlement Agreement' s preclusive effects, therefore, this
issue was explicitly left undecided and its merits undetermined.
23How the Corps came to issue § 404 permits for mountaintop
removal waste disposal in flagrant disregard of the statute and its
(continued ... )
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Until May 3, 2002 EPA defined "fill material" as "any
'pollutant' which replaces portions of the 'waters of the United
States' with dry land or which changes the bottom elevation of a
water body for any purpose." 40 C.F.R. § 232.2 (emphasis added).
As discussed above, this definition introduced a potential
ambiguity into the statutory and regulatory scheme. Under the
statute, § 404 permits are required where the fill has the purpose
of bringing an area into a new use. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(2).
The EPA definition, however, might be understood to apply to the
use or purpose, not of the fill, but of the discharge. Under that
reading, however, the regulation would be inconsistent with the
statute. It would also conflict with the EPA's own definition of
"discharge of fill material," which involved constructive,
purposeful and useful fills, not fills constructed solely for waste
disposal. Accordingly, the reading of the ambiguous EPA definition
of fill material that would allow discharges "for any purpose" is
necessarily incorrect. Section 404 fills permitted solely for
23 ( ••• continued)
own regulations is a historical question that the Court does not
have information or expertise to determine. Knowing that
mountaintop removal mines have expanded exponentially over the past
two decades, one might speculate, as the Corps' Rodney Wood
testified, the Corps didn't necessarily intend to regulate valley
fills, but "they just sort of oozed into that." (Pl. 's Mot. for
Prelim. Inj., Ex. 17, p. 23.)
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waste disposal were not legal then and are not now.
An illegal agency practice has no precedential value and is
due no deference. The fact the Corps approved § 404 permits solely
for massive waste disposal in the .past two decades, with EPA's
approval, is an admission against interest, not a mitigating
factor, much less an argument the Court should approve the
practice. Tacitly recognizing the futility of this argument, the
agencies attempted to fix the problem by changing the law, without
benefit of Congressional amendment.
2. Rulemaking: The "Final Effect"
On April 20, 2000 the Corp and EPA jointly proposed to revise
their definitions of "fill material." See 65 Fed. Reg. 21292 (Apr.
20, 2000). According to news reports, more than 17,000 comments,
most of them negative, delayed the rule's adoption. 24 On May 3rd ,
2002 while the Court was considering these matters, the agencies
signed for publication the final version of their rule.
Both agencies' proposed final rule defines "fill material" as
"material placed in waters of the United States where the material
has the effect of" either "replacing any portion of a water of the
24Summarizing the comments, the agencies acknowledge, "We
received over 17,200 comments on the proposed rule[.] Most of the
comments were form letters which opposed the rule." Final Rule at
11 (emphasis added).
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United States with dry land or changing the bottom elevation of any
portion of a water." Final Rule at 59 (emphasis added).
Consequently, the narrow use and purpose exception authorizing fill
activities under Corps' dredge and fill permits is eliminated by
administrative fiat with the stroke of a pen. Without the
necessity of legislation, and by design, surface coal interests are
assured:
With regard to proposed discharges of coal m1n1ng
overburden, we believe that the placement of such
material into waters of the U.S. has the effect of fill
and therefore, should be regulated under CWA section 404.
65 Fed. Reg. at 21295 (emphasis added).
The new rule now incorporates expansive examples:
Examples of such fill material include, but are not
limited to: rock, sand, soil, clay, plastics,
construction debris, wood chips, overburden from mining
or other excavation activities, and materials used to
create any structure or infrastructure in the waters of
the United States.
Final Rule at 59. The rule also excludes certain other materials:
"The term fill does not include trash or garbage." Id.
The agencies' new definitions of "discharge of fill material"
continue to consist of their lists of constructive uses and
purposes. Sensibly, "infrastructure" will be added wherever
"structure" appears. Almost at the end of the definition, after
"utility lines," the agencies will add this language:
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placement or rill material ror construction or
maintenance of any liner, berm or other inrrastructure
associated with solid waste landrills; [25] placement or
overburden! slurry! or tailings or similar mining-related
materials [ . ]
Final Rule at 58-9 (emphasis added). Interestingly, the only
exception to the long list or uses and purposes for fill discharges
is the new addition or mining-related waste disposal.
These new agency derinitions set rorth in the rinal rule are
fundamentally inconsistent with the CWA, its history, predecessor
statutes, longstanding regulations, and companion statutes. Under
the guise or regulatory harmony and consistency, the agencies have
taken an ambiguous interpretation, that of the EPA, seized the
unsupportable horn of the ambiguity, and now propose to make their
original error and administrative practice the law. Section 404
rill permits have always been allowed ror beneficial uses and
purposes of the fill. It is the constructive use and purpose that
justify rilling the waters or the United States.
The agencies now, however, propose in their final rule to
ignore fill use and purpose entirely. Only "rill effect" will be
considered. As a child could explain, the effect of filling things
25This language addresses another litigation-related § 404
problem involving the derinition or rill material. See Resource
Investments Inc. v . United States Army Corps or Engineers, 151 F. 3d
1162 (9~ Cir. 1998).
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is that they get full. By expunging the use and purpose doctrine
for fills and replacing it with an effect test, the agencies expand
the Corps' CWA authority. The definition is a tautology; all fills
have the effect of filling. Through this empty definition, the
agencies allow the waters of the United States to be filled,
polluted, and unavoidably destroyed, for any purpose, including
waste disposal. Pointedly, the rule is intended to and does allow
the massive filling of Appalachian streams with mine waste under
auspices of the CWA. The justification under the new definition is
no longer to foster a beneficial use and purpose. A fill is now
justified merely because it has the effect of creating a convenient
repository of waste.
The agencies' explanations that regulatory harmony and
consistency will result and regulatory practice be maintained are
disingenuous and incomplete. The Court does not rule in a vacuum.
It is aware of the immense political and economic pressures on the
agencies to continue to approve mountaintop removal coal mining
valley fills for waste disposal, and to give assurances that future
legal challenges to the practice will fail. Some may believe that
reasonably priced energy from coal requires cheap disposal of the
vast amounts of waste material created when mountaintops are
removed to get at the natural resource. For them, valley fill
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disposal is the most efficient and economical solution.
Congress did not, however, authorize cheap waste disposal when
it passed the Clean Water Act. The purpose of the Act was, and is,
to "restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of the Nation's waters." 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) . The
statutory scheme is already consistent and harmonized. The
agencies' new final rules are inconsistent with the statutory
scheme. Thus, the purported rulemaking is ul era vires: it exceeds
the agencies' statutory authority granted by th~ cwA. Only
Congress can rewrite the CWA to allow the fundamental changes
proposed by the agencies to the § 404 dredge and fill permit
program.
III. CONCLUSION
When the Clean Water Act was passed in 1972 and amended in
1977, the Army Corps' dredge and fill permit program was maintained
for political and economic reasons relating largely to port
maintenance. The program became § 404. Generally, permits for
pollutant discharge issued under § 402, the National Pollutant
Discharge and Elimination System (NPDES). After heated debate,
Congress excepted dredged spoil and allowed the dredge and fill
permit program, begun under § 10 of the Rivers and Harbor Act, to
continue under Corps' supervision, with environmental oversight
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rrom EPA. Under the § 10 program, as grandrathered in, fills were
allowable to underpin structures, support roads, protect and
improve development, that is, ror purposes or uses for which the
rill was needed. Congress never intended § 10 rills, nor § 404
rills, to be permitted solely to dispose or waste.
To read the Act otherwise presumes Congress intended the Clean
Water Act to protect the nation's waterways and the integrity or
its waters with one major exception: the Army Corps was to be given
authority to allow the waters or the United States to be filled
with pollutants and thus destroyed, even ir the sole purpose were
disposal of waste. This obviously absurd exception would turn the
"Clean Water" Act on its head and use it to authorize polluting and
destroying the nation's waters for no reason but cheap waste
disposal.
Nevertheless, ror the past twenty years, particularly in the
Huntington Corps District, § 404 permits have been issued ror
mountaintop removal overburden disposal in valley fills that have
obliterated and destroyed almost a thousand miles of streams, by
the Corps' own account. The valley rills are used solely to
dispose or the waste rock and dirt that overlies the coal. Past
§ 404 permit approvals were issued in express disregard or the
Corps' own regulations and the CWA. As such, they were illegal.
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When the illegitimate practices were revealed by court decisions in
this district, the agencies undertook to change not their behavior,
but the rules that did not support their permit process.
The agencies' final rules attempt to legalize filling the
waters of the United States' under the CWA solely for waste
disposal. The obvious perversity of this proposal forced the
agencies to suggest baseless distinctions among wastes: "trash"
and "garbage" are out; plastic, construction debris and wood chips
are in. The final rule for "discharge of fill material" highlights
that the rule change was designed simply for the benefit of the
mining industry and its employees. Only one type of waste is added
to the otherwise constructive list: "overburden, slurry, or
tailings or similar mining-related" waste are now permissible fill
in the nation's waters.
The agencies' attempt to legalize their longstanding illegal
regulatory practice must fail. The practice is contrary to law,
not because the agencies said so, although their longstanding
regulations correctly forbade it. The regulators' practice is
illegal because it is contrary to the spirit and the letter of the
Clean Water Act.
Accordingly, the Court FINDS and CONCLUDES § 404 fills may not
be permitted solely to dispose of waste. Plaintiff's motion is
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GRANTED. The motions of the Corps Defendants and Defendant-
Intervenors are DENIED. The Corps Defendants are ENJOINED from
issuing any further § 404 permits that have no primary purpose or
use but the disposal of waste. In particular, issuance of
mountaintop removal overburden valley fill permits solely for waste
disposal under § 404 is ENJOINED.
The agencies' new final rules address political, economic and
environmental concerns to effect fundamental changes in the Clean
Water Act for the benefit of one industry. However important to
the energy requirements or the economy and to employment in the
region, amendments to the Act should be considered and accomplished
in the sunlight of open Congressional debate and resolution, not
within the murk of administrative after-the-fact ratification of
questionable regulatory practices.
The Clerk is directed to send a copy of this Order to counsel
of record and publish it on the Court's website at
http://www.wvsd.uscourts.gov.
ENTER: May 8, 2002
Charles H. Haden II, Chief Judge
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National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Update
NEPA Compliance in Corps of Engineers Permitting:
"Scope of Analysis" and, Other Issues
by Timothy J. Hagerty
Frost Brown Todd LLC
Louisville, Kentucky
I. NEPA Basics
A. The Statute: The National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq.
("NEPA"), was enacted to create a framework within the Federal government for
including environmental considerations among factors ordinarily examined in the
decision-making process. The heart of NEPA is the environmental impact
statement ("EIS"), which must be prepared for all major federal actions
significantly affecting· the quality of the human environment. The EIS
requirement must be satisfied by the federal agency responsible for the proposed
action. An EIS must include a detailed statement of:
1. the environmental impact of the proposed action;
2. any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the
proposal be implemented;
3. alternatives to the proposed action;
4. the relationship between local short-tenn uses of the human environment
and the maintenance and enhancement oflong-tenn productivity; and
5. any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would
be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
42. U.S.C. 4332(2)(C).
An EIS has two primary purposes: to ensure that the federal agency makes a fully
infonned decision in light of the potential environmental consequences of its
actions, and to keep the public infonned about those consequences and allow
them an opportunity to comment on the proposed action. However, NEPA does
not mandate any particular outcome. It is a procedural statute that specifies
particular procedures that must be followed and information that must be
presented before a federal agency may make a project decision. NEPA does not
require the agency to select the environmentally preferable alternative.
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B. The CEQ NEPA Regulations: The Council on Environmental Quality ("CEQ")
adopted regulations to implement the requirements of NEPA in 1978. Those
regulations, which apply to all federal agencies, have been codified at 40 C.F.R.
parts 1500-1508. Individual federal agencies also are encouraged to develop their
own NEPA implementing regulations, and many agencies have developed either
such regulations or guidance documents to better integrate the NEPA process into
the agency's specific mission.
1. Categorical Exclusions: The CEQ regulations provide for certain
"categorical exclusions," which are categories of actions which do not
individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human
environment, and therefore do not require either an environmental
assessment or an environmental impact statement. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4.
Individual federal agencies are empowered to identify such categorical
exclusions in their specific NEPA implementing regulations.
2. Environmental Assessment: If a proposed action does not fit within a
categorical exclusion, some NEPA documentation is required. In that
case, an environmental assessment ("EA") may be prepared. An EA is a
concise document that serves to provide sufficient information to
determine whether the project will have "significant" effects on the
environment and thus requires an EIS. (Alternately, if an EIS is clearly
required, an EA need not be prepared, and the agency may proceed
directly to preparation of the EIS.) The EA must describe briefly the need
for and alternatives to the proposal, the environmental impacts of the
proposed action and alternatives, and a listing of agencies and persons
consulted. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9.
If the EA demonstrates that the agency's proposed action will not have a
significant impact on the human environment, the agency will prepare a
Finding of No Significant Impact, or "FONSI." This document presents
the reasons why the action will not have a significant impact on the
environment. The agency may proceed with the proposed action based on
the FONSI, after sufficient notice to the public. See 1501.4(e).
NB: The determination of whether an agency's proposed action will have
a significant impact on the human environment is often one of the most
contentious issues in a NEPA review. It determines whether a simple EA
will suffice, or a much more complex, costly, and time-consuming EIS
must be prepared. This issue arises frequently in the CWA Section 404
permitting context.
3. Environmental Impact Statement: An EIS must be prepared. if the
proposed action will have significant impacts on the human environment.
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· a. Contents: Major elements of an EIS include: a Statement of
Purpose and Need (the underlying purpose and need to which the
agency is responding); an Alternatives Analysis (presenting the
proposed action and a "reasonable range" of alternatives, and
comparing their environmental impacts); the Affected
Environment (i.e., the area and resources to be affected); and the
Environmental Consequences of the proposed action and
alternatives (including direct, indirect and cumulative effects on
the environment). An EIS also will include a summary, a list of
preparers, and various appendices with material related to the EIS
and its analyses. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.10-1502.19.
b. Process: An EIS is prepared in two stages. A Draft Environmental
Impact Statement ("DEIS") must be prepared first, and then
published in order to obtain comments from the public and from
governmental agencies. Following a public comment period,a
Final Environmental Impact Statement ("FEIS") is prepared. The
FEIS must respond to all comments received on the DEIS. In
response to comments received and in preparing the FEIS, the
agency may modify the alternatives, information, or analyses
contained in the DEIS. See 40 C.F.R. part 1503.
c. Record of Decision: The EIS process is completed by the agency's
publication of a Record of Decision, or "ROD." This concise
statement of the agency's decision should identify all alternatives
considered and specify the alternative(s) deemed to be
environmentally preferable. The agency should explain the
rationale for its decision concerning which alternative to
implement. The agency also must state whether all practicable
means to avoid or minimize environmental harm have been
adopted-- in the decision, and if not, why they were not. 40 C.F.R.
§ 1505.2.
4. Agency Cooperation: If more than one agency is involved in the proposed
action, a "lead agency" shall supervise the preparation of the EIS. Other
federal agencies with jurisdiction by law over all or a portion of the
project or its impacts will be "cooperating agencies." Agencies with
special expertise also may be cooperating agencies, upon the request of the
lead agency. Cooperating agencies participate in the NEPA process from
the outset, including scoping, preparing the environmental documentation,
and commenting on the EIS. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.5-1501.6.
EISs also should, to the extent possible, be prepared concurrently and in
integration with environmental analyses and studies under the Fish and
Wildlife Coordination Act (16 U.S.C. § 661 et seq.), the National Historic
Preservation Act (16 U.S.C. § 470 et seq.), the Endangered Species Act
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(16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq.), and other environmental review laws and
executive orders. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.25. EISs should include a discussion
of Environmental Justice issues, pursuant to Executive Order No. 12898.
II. Judicial Review Under NEPA
A. Private right of action: NEPA itself does not provide a private right of action for
violations of its provisions. Absent any right of action in the statute, the courts have
found that agency actions are reviewable under the judicial review provision of the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. ("APA"). Under that provision, an
agency decision may be set aside only if it is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law," or was undertaken "without
observance of procedures required by law." Id. § 706(2)(A), (D). This review standard
is narrow, and the reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency.
Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 109 S. Ct. 1851, 1861-62 (1989). The
reviewing court must determine whether the decision was based on a consideration of the
relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error ofjudgment.
B. Constitutional and statutory standing: In order to bring a NEPA challenge under theAPA,
prospective plaintiffs first must satisfy Constitutional and statutory standing
requirements. Because Article ill of the U.S. Constitution limits the role of the federal
judiciary to resolving cases and controversies, plaintiff standing is a necessary predicate
to federal court jurisdiction. Thus, any potential NEPA plaintiff must satisfy the
following Constitutional standing requirements:
1. Injury-in-fact. The injury must be concrete and particularized, rather than
conjectural or hypothetical.
2. Causation. It must be substantially probable that the challenged acts of the
defendants will cause the particularized injury of the plaintiff.
3. Redressability. The relief sought must be shown to be likely to alleviate the
particularized injury alleged by the plaintiff.
c. Final agency action and zone of interest: In addition, to bring an action under the APA, a
prospective plaintiff also must identify some "final agency action" (~, issuance of a
ROD) and must demonstrate that is claims fall within the "zone of interests'; protected by
the statute forming the basis of its claims (~, NEPA). The courts generally have found
that economic injuries are not within the zone of interests protected by NEPA. It is clear,
on the other hand, that injuries to a part of the environment that the plaintiff enjoys on a
regular basis would satisfy the zone of interests test and establish plaintiffs standing.
ill. NEPA and the Anny Corps of Engineers: Scope ofAnalysis and Other Issues
The issuance of a permit under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1344, or Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act ("RHA"), 33 U.S.C. § 403,
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constitutes a federal action subject to the requirements of NEPA, including the
preparation of an EIS if the environmental effects of the permit issuance are deemed to be
significant. The application of NEPA to the Corps' permitting program has been the
source ofconsiderable controversy and continues to raise important issues.
A. The Corps' Regulations and the "Scope of Analysis": The Anny Corps of
Engineers (the "Corps") has adopted its own NEPA implementing regulations,
which are codified at 33 C.F.R. part 325, Appendix B (hereinafter "Appendix
B"). The current Appendix B regulations were proposed by the Corps in 1984,
and went into effect in 1988. The most controversial aspect of the Appendix B
regulations is the "scope of analysis," which seeks to establish the scope of the
action subject to NEPA analysis, and thus the scope of the NEPA document, in
instances where the application for a Corps permit covers only a part of a larger
project that may have both federal and nonfederal elements. The scope of
analysis will detennine "\vhat portion of the total project \vill the Corps cover in
its EA describing the work, the range of environmental effects of that work,
alternatives to the proposed work, etc." 53 Fed. Reg. 3120,3121 (1988) (Corps
preamble to 1988 regulations).
The debate over the Corps' scope of analysis presents one of the most common
and controversial examples of what is often called the "small federal handle"
problem. The issue is at what point does federal involvement in a project
proposed by a non-federal entity (private party, state or local government, etc.)
"federalize" the entire action and subject it to the requirements of NEPA. In the
case of Corps permitting decisions, the particular issue is whether the issuance of
a Corps pennit causes the non-federal portion of a project with both federal and
non-federal elements to be included within the scope of the NEPA analysis-and
if so, how and to what extent. This issue is not simply academic. It will
determine whether the reasonable range of alternatives evaluated in the NEPA
document must include alternatives to the specific elements within Corps
jurisdiction, or alternatives to the overall project. It also often may mean the
difference between the preparation of a relatively simple EA and the preparation
of a much more costly and time-consuming EIS. For these reasons, much energy
has been expended identifying the proper scope of analysis for NEPA review of
Corps permitting decisions.
1. Pre-1988 Regulations: Before 1988, the Corps' NEPA regulations
provided that NEPA documentation prepared for permit actions should
focus "primarily on whether or not the entire project subject to the pennit
requirement could have significant effects on the environment. . .. (For
example, where a utility company is applying for a permit to construct an
outfall pipe from a proposed power plant, the EA must assess the direct
and indirect environmental effects and alternatives of the entire plant.)"
45 Fed. Reg. 56760, 56779 (Aug. 25, 1980), codified at 33 C.F.R. part
230, App. B, § 8(a) (1981).
2. Judicial Interpretation: Two federal appeals court decisions in 1980
addressed the "small federal handle" problem in the Corps pennitting
context. Those decisions indicated that the Corps could adopt a more
limited scope in the NEPA review of some pennitting decisions than
indicated in its 1980 NEPA regulations.
a. Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. Ray, 621 F.2d 269 (8th Cir.
1980): The Corps was asked to pennit a 1.25-mile river crossing
on a proposed 67-mile, nonfederal power line. The Corps' EA
focused solely on the river crossing and concluded that no
significant environmental impacts could be expected. Plaintiffs
challenged the Corps' EA, arguing that, "but for" the Corps'
pennit, the power line could not be built, and therefore, the Corps
had sufficient control over the proposal to require an
environmental analysis of the entire 67-mile po\ver line.
The Eighth Circuit analyzed the situation under both an
"enablement" (or legal control) framework and under a factual
control test. In this case, the Corps pennit was not found to be "a
legal condition precedent" to the entire nonfederal power line
project. Likewise, the court found that the Corps lacked sufficient
factual, or "veto," control over the project. The court outlined a
three-part test to detennine factual control, including
(1) the degree of discretion exercised by the agency over
the federal portion of the project;
(2) whether the federal government has given any direct
financial aid to the project; and
(3) whether the overall federal involvement with the
project is sufficient to tum essentially private action
into federal action.
621 F.2d at 272. These factors were found lacking in this case.
b. Save the Bay v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 610 F.2d 322 (5th
Cir. 1980): The Corps was asked to issue a pennit for the
construction of a 2200-foot wastewater discharge pipeline
associated with a proposed massive nonfederal titanium dioxide
manufacturing facility adjacent to Bay St. Louis, Louisiana. In its
EA, the Corps only analyzed the effects of building the outfall
pipeline, not the associated nonfederal facility. In upholding the
Corps' action, the Fifth Circuit determined that there was an
insufficient nexus between the Corps and the construction of the
nonfederal plant to make the agency a partner in that construction
and thereby "federalize" its construction. Although it explicitly
refused to adopt a "but for" test, the court nevertheless noted that
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the pipeline was not necessary to operate the plant (because
another method of discharge, not requiring a Corps permit, was
available), and therefore, the Corps lacked factual control over the
construction as well.
3. 1988 Regulations: The Corps adopted new NEPA regulations in 1988 in
response to the Winnebago and Save the Bay decisions. 53 Fed. Reg.
3120, 3121-22 (1988). However, prior to taking effect, those regulations
were the subject of a significant dispute between the Corps and EPA over
their adequacy in satisfying the Corps' NEPA responsibilities.
a. Proposal and Adoption. The Corps first proposed an amendment
to its NEPA regulations in 1984 in response to the Fifth and Eighth
Circuits' decisions. The new language proposed for Appendix B
closely tracked the rationale behind those two appeals court
decisions. However, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
determined that the proposed regulations were "unsatisfactory"
and referred the proposed amendments to CEQ, pursuant to
Section 309 of the Clean Air Act. EPA stated that the proposed
changes would adversely affect the Corps' and· EPA's NEPA
review responsibilities and their ability to prevent unacceptable
adverse effects from activities permitted under Section 404. After
an extensive public review and comment period, CEQ upheld the
Corps' proposed changes, with some modifications, as being
"within reasonable, implementing agency discretion." 52 Fed.
Reg. 22,517, 22,518-19 (1987).
The Ninth Circuit subsequently held that the Corps' Appendix B
regulations do not conflict with NEPA or the CEQ regulations, and
should be accorded judicial deference. Sylvester v. U.S. Anny
Corps of Engineers, 884 F.2d 394, 399 (9th Cir. 1989). The
Sylvester court found that "the Corps' regulations fixing the scope
of its NEPA analysis strike an acceptable balance between the
needs of the NEPA and the Corps' jurisdictional limitations." Id.
The court also stated that CEQ's approval of the Corps' regulations
was meant to "provide guidance to all who may be concerned,
including the courts." Id.
b. The Regulations: The Appendix B regulations state:
In some situations, a permit applicant may propose to
conduct a specific activity requiring a [Corps] permit .
which is merely one component of a larger project .
The district engineer should address the scope of the NEPA
document (e.g., the EA or EIS) to address the impacts of
the specific activity requiring a [Corps] permit and those
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portions of the entire project over which the district
engineer has sufficient control and responsibility to warrant
Federal review. . .. The district engineer is considered to
have control and responsibility for portions of the project
beyond the limits of Corps jurisdiction where the Federal
involvement is sufficient to tum an essentially private
action into a Federal action. These are cases where the
environmental consequences of the larger project are
essentially products of the Corps permit action.
33 C.F.R. part 325, App. B, § 7(b).
4. Judicial Interpretation: In addressing the "small federal handle" problem,
the federal courts have identified two primary ways in which nonfederal
portions of a project may become federalized and therefore subject to
NEPA review. These concepts, known generally as "legal control" and
"factual control," also are consistent with the factors identified in the
Appendix B regulations.
a. Legal Control: A project may become federalized when a federal
agency exercises sufficient "legal control" over the entire project.
The Winnebago court referred to this as "enablement," which
occurs when "federal action is a legal condition precedent to
accomplishment of an entire nonfederal project." 621 F.2d at 272.
In that case, the court held that the proposed power line had not
been federalized because the Corps' permitting authority under
Section 10 extended only to the portion of the power line located in
jurisdictional waters-not the construction of the entire power line.
The Appendix B regulations incorporate this concept in the
discussion of the "typical factors to be considered in determining
whether sufficient 'control and responsibility' exists." 33 C.F.R.
part 325, App. B, § 7(b)(2). Those factors include: "the extent to
which the entire project will be within Corps jurisdiction," and
"the extent of cumulative Federal control and responsibility." Id.
The.regulations explain:
Federal control and responsibility will include the portions
of the project beyond the limits of Corps jurisdiction where
the cumulative Federal involvement of the Corps and other
Federal agencies is sufficient to grant legal control over
such additional portions of the project. These are cases
where the environmental consequences of the additional
portions of the projects are essentially products of Federal
financing, assistance, direction, regulation, or approval . . . .
1-8
33 C.F.R. part 325, App. B, §7(b)(2)(A). The regulations also
include several examples, one of which is remarkably similar to
the facts ofWinnebago. See 33 C.F.R. part 325, App. B, §7(b)(3).
See Macht v. Skinner, 916 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Although a
state light rail project required a Section 404 permit to cross
wetlands, the Corps' ability to prevent the proposed route was
insufficient to "federalize" the project, even coupled with
additional federal funding for preliminary engineering studies and
state EISs. The Corps had jurisdiction over only 3.58 acres on a
22.5-mile-Iong project.
See also Landmark West! V. U.S. Postal Service, 840 F. Supp. 994
(S.D.N.Y. 1993), affd, 41 F.3d 1500 (2d Cir. 1994). Although
this case did not arise within the Corps permitting context,
Landmark West! provides one of the most thorough, exhaustive
treatments of this issue and provides an excellent introduction to
the "small federal handle" problem.
b. Factual Control: The courts also have indicated that a nonfederal
project may become federalized where the federal agency has
sufficient factual, or "veto," control over the nonfederal action.
Four general factors have been identified by the courts in
determining whether an agency has "veto" control over a
nonfederal project:
1. The degree of discretion exercised by the agency over the
federal portion of the project, see, e.g., Winnebago, 621
F.2d at 272 (while Corps has broad discretion in
considering environmental factors in granting permit,
discretion does not extend beyond navigable waters over
which Corps has jurisdiction);
2. Whether the federal government has given any direct
financial aid to the nonfederal project, see, e.g. t
Winnebago, 621 F.2d at 273 (no federal funding involved
in power line);
3. Whether the overall federal involvement with the project is
sufficient to tum an essentially nonfederal action into a
federal action, see, e.g., Winnebago, 621 F.2d at 273 (no
federal involvement other than Section 10 permit); and
4. Whether the nonfederal project will go forward even if the
federal action does not (known as the "but for" test), see,
~, Save the Bay, 610 F.2d 322 (entire plant was not
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"federalized," because alternative method of effluent
discharge was available which did not require Corps
permit); Sylvester v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 884
F.2d 394, 400-01 (9th Cir. 1989) (Corps lacked sufficient
control over nonfederal resort complex where resort could
have gone forward without federal wetlands permit for golf
course).
The Corps also has identified another factor in its regulations that
relates to the "factual" relationship between the federal and
nonfederal portions of a project, i.e., "whether there are aspects of
the upland facility in the immediate vicinity of the regulated
activity which affect the location and configuration of the
regulated activity." 33 C.F.R. part 325, App. B, § 7(b)(2)(ii).
c. Sylvester v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 884 F.2d 394, 400-01
(9th Cir. 1989): This Ninth Circuit decision is one of the most
significant federal court decisions on this subject following the
Corps' adoption of its 1988 NEPA regulations. Sylvester
concerned the Corps' NEPA review of a proposed resort that
included a golf course located on wetlands and a ski resort located
on adjacent uplands. In addition to upholding the Corps' NEPA
regulations as an acceptable interpretation of its NEPA obligations,
the Sylvester court held that the Corps could limit its NEPA review
to the construction of the golf course on the wetlands, even though
the golf course was part of a larger development. 884 F.2d at 401.
The court found that the golf course and the rest of the resort were
not "two links of a single chain," because "each could exist
without the other, although each would benefit from the other's
presence." Id. Sylvester is significant because it often serves as
the basis for arguing that the Corps' NEPA review should be
restricted to those areas over which it has jurisdiction.
d. Wetlands Action Network v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 222
F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2000): This is another Ninth Circuit decision
that recently addressed the scope of analysis issue. The case
involved a challenge to the Corps' decision to grant a pennit to fill
16 acres of wetlands and. to mitigate the fill by creating a 51-acre
wetlands system for a large scale mixed use development. The
Corps agreed to a division of the overall project into three phases
for permitting purposes. The Corps also limited its analysis to the
impacts resulting from the filling of the 16.1 acres of wetlands for
the first phase ofdevelopment.
The court first reiterated that it had upheld the Corps' NEPA
regulations in Sylvester, particularly with respect to the scope of
I· 10
analysis. The court also cited the federalization analysis contained
in the Sylvester decision with approval. With respect to the scope
of analysis in the present action, the court stated:
The district court's determination that the project
would not be able to proceed as planned without the
permit and the filling of the wetlands would not
occur without the project is correct. The conclusion
that the district court drew from these findings [that
the analysis should have included all of the upland
development], however, is in error. The linkage
that the district court found between the permitted
activity and the specific project planned is the type
of "interdependence" that is found in any situation
where a developer seeks to fill a wetland as part of a
large development project. If this type of
connection alone were sufficient to require a finding
that an entire project falls within the purview of the
Corps' jurisdiction, the Corps would have
jurisdiction over all such projects including those
which the Corps' regulations cite as examples of
situations in which the Corps would not have
jurisdiction over the whole project.
222 F.3d at 1116-17. The court applied the factors identified in the
Corps' NEPA regulations and concluded that the Corps' decision
to limit its review to the specific activity requiring the permit was
not arbitrary or capricious. Id. at 1117-18. (The court also found
that the Corps had not improperly "segmented" NEPA analysis of
the first phase of the project from the second and third phases,
based on the preliminary and uncertain nature of those subsequent
phases. "Neither the CEQ regulations nor our precedent support
the conclusion that the Corps was required to consider the three
phases together as cumulative actions." Id. at 1119.)
e. But see Friends of the Earth v. U.S. Army Corns of Engineers, 109
F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000): Plaintiffs brought suit to challenge
the Corps' determination that an EIS was not required for the
permitting of three casinos on the Mississippi coast. Among the
claims, the plaintiffs objected to the Corps' refusal to consider the
effects of the upland portion of the casino projects. In finding for
the plaintiffs, the court distinguished Winnebago and Save the
Bay, noting that those cases involved very different situations than
the casino permitting: "Here by contrast, the agency's jurisdiction
encompasses the heart of the development projects-the permitting
of the floating casinos themselves. All upland development results
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from and is entirely conditional on the permitted activity. Because
the 'environmental consequences of the larger project' therefore
'are essentially products of the Corps permit action,' 33 C.F.R. §
325 App. B § 7(b), the Court finds that the development here is
akin to the shipping terminal example provided by the Corps' own
regulations for which the scope of NEPA analysis was extended to
the upland development." 109 F. Supp. 2d at 40.
f. But see Stewart v. Potts, 996 F. Supp. 668 (S.D. Tex. 1998): An
applicant sought a Section 404 permit for impacts to approximately
2 acres of wetlands to construct a golf course on a 400-acre tract.
The Corps limited its scope of analysis to the impacted wetlands.
The District Court found that because the wetlands were scattered
throughout the proposed golf course site, the filling of the wetlands
and the clearing of upland forest necessary to construct the golf
course were interrelated, thereby bringing the entire project within
the Corps' NEPA analysis. The court expressly distinguished the
decisions in Winnebago, Save the Bay, and Sylvester. The court
stated that in those cases, the activities "invoking Corps
jurisdiction and NEPA, were physically, functionally, and logically
separable from the activities held not subject to NEPA analysis."
996 F. Supp. at 682. The court observed that "the two acres of
wetlands that will be directly impacted are scattered throughout the
200-acre tract .... [T]he Corps' characterization of the project as
a filling of the wetlands separate and distinct from the clearing of
the forest located on those wetlands is irrational." Id. The court
described the Corps' position as "asinine on its face, and an
impermissible abdication of a federal agency's duties under
NEPA." Id. at 682-83.
5. Causation and Assessment of Effects: While the Corps' scope of analysis
inquiry is intended to identify the scope of the work, whether federal or
nonfederal, over which the Corps' assessment of effects will occur, the
considerations of "legal" and "factual" control discussed above often
recur in determining the extent of the effects that must be disclosed in the
NEPA document once the scope of analysis has been identified. Thus,
even where the scope of analysis inquiry may have demonstrated that the
Corps lacks sufficient control and responsibility to federalize the
nonfederal portion of a project, the extent of the Corps' legal or factual
control over the nonfederal portions of the project may become an issue
again in trying to determine whether those nonfederal portions of the
project should be considered the effects (whether direct, indirect, or
cumulative) of the portion of the project included within the scope of
analysis. This analysis often will tum on notions of causation, i.e.,
whether the Corps' action (issuing a permit) is a legal or factual "cause"
of the nonfederal portions of the project. This often presents a difficult
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and confusing sense of "deja vu," as issues addressed in defining the
scope of analysis (i.e., the extent of the action or work subject to NEPA
review) are revisited in determining the scope of effects that must be
identified.
See Colorado River Indian Tribes v. Marsh, 605 F. Supp. 1425 (C.D. Cal.
1985); Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868 (1 st Cir. 1985). These cases
were cited by the EPA as support for its objections to the Corps' proposed
scope of analysis regulations in 1984. In the former case, a developer
planning a 156-acre residential and commercial development applied for a
Corps permit to stabilize an adjacent river bank, which was necessary for
the development to proceed. The court there required the private
development to be evaluated in the NEPA document as a likely occurrence
resulting from the issuance of a permit. See, generally, 605 F. Supp. at
1428-1434. The latter involved the proposed construction of a causeway
from the mainland to an island, and required the NEPA analysis to include
among the effects of permit issuance the industrial development on the
island that would be stimulated by construction of the causeway. 769 F.2d
at 877-78. As noted by the Corps in its response to EPA's objections:
These cases did not hold the Corps permits "federalized" the
unregulated private development so as to render the private action
Federal actions for NEPA purposes. Rather, among the numerous
legal problems found by each court, the cases required the Corps to
consider the private development likely to occur as a result of the
issuance of the Corps permit. Such analysis is part of an accepted
NEPA requirement to consider the environmental effects of
Federal action ....
See also Landmark West! v. U.S. Postal Service, 840 F. Supp. 994, 1010
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (skyscraper not indirect effect of Postal Service
participation in project where building would be built regardless of Postal
Service decision); Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 822 F.2d
104,121 n.27 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (impacts of siting ofprivate facility are not
"effects" ofEPA issuance ofNPDES permit)
B. Relationship Between NEPA and Section 404(b)(l) Guidelines: Difficult issues
often can arise in harmonizing the procedural requirements of NEPA with the
substantive and procedural requirements of the Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines, 40
C.F.R. part 230, which have been issued by the U.S. EPA and which are the
primary substantive environmental criteria that guide Corps permitting decisions.
1. Purpose and Alternatives: NEPA requires the identification of a proposed
action's "purpose and need," which helps to guide the identification of a
"reasonable range" of alternatives and the evaluation of how well those
alternatives satisfy the project's underlying goals. The Section 404(b)(1)
1-13
Guidelines also require the identification of "overall project purpose,"
which also serves as the basis for an analysis of alternatives, known as the
"practicable alternatives test." In the latter case, the Corps may not issue
a Section 404 permit "if there is a practicable alternative to the proposed
discharge which would have less adverse impact on the aquatic ecosystem,
so long as the alternative does not have other significant adverse
environmental consequences." 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a). An alternative is
"practicable" if it is "available and capable of being done after taking into
consideration cost, existing technology, and logistics in light of overall
project purposes." Id. at § 230.10(a)(2). Moreover, where special aquatic
sites, including wetlands, will be affected, and the activity is not "water
dependent," "practicable alternatives that do not involve special aquatic
sites are presumed to be available, unless clearly demonstrated otherwise,"
and are presumed to have less adverse impact on the aquatic ecosystem,
unless clearly demonstrated otherwise. Id. at §230.1 O(a)(3).
With respect to actions subject to NEPA, the Section 404(b)(I) Guidelines
specifically state:
[W]here the Corps of Engineers is the permitting agency, the
analysis of alternatives required for NEPA environmental
documents . . . will in most cases provide the information for the
evaluation of alternatives under these Guidelines. On occasion,
these NEPA documents may address a broader range of
alternatives than required to be considered under [the Section
404(b)(I) Guidelines] or may not have considered the alternatives
in sufficient detail to respond to the requirements of these
Guidelines. In the latter case, it may be necessary to supplement
these NEPA documents with this additional information.
40 C.F.R. § 230.10(1)(4). Thus, the range of reasonable alternatives
identified for NEPA purposes can have a significant and potentially
controlling eff~ct on the analysis of practicable alternatives under Section
404. But see Sylvester v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 882 F.2d 407,
410 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Sylvester II") ("A relationship required to be
considered in detennining reasonable and practicable alternatives need not
be of such significance as would be necessary to 'federalize' the entire
project." Thus, it is possible for an alternative not to be practicable for
Section 404 purposes, but still to be possible so as to avoid the
federalization of the entire project under NEPA.)
See also Simmons v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 120 F.3d 664
(7th Cir. 1997): The Corps issued a permit for the construction of a dam
and water reservoir to supply water to the City of Marion, Illinois, and the
Lake Egypt Water District. The Corps only evaluated alternatives for
supplying the water for the two users from a single source. The court
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concluded that the Corps had impermissibly narrowed its range of
alternatives by defining the project purpose in terms of a single source.
"To conclude that a common problem necessarily demands a common
solution defies common sense. We conclude that the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers defined an impermissibly narrow purpose for the contemplated
project. The Corps therefore failed to examine the full range of reasonable
alternatives and vitiated the EIS." 120 F.3d at 667.
2. Substance vs. Process: NEPA is a purely procedural statute. It does not
mandate any particular outcome, not even the most environmentally
preferable outcome (although that alternative must be identified in the
document). NEPA is essentially a "stop, look, and listen" statute designed
to ensure informed agency decision making and public disclosure of
environmental information. In contrast, as noted above, the Section
404(b)(1) Guidelines impose a substantive standard, which requires the
selection of the practicable alternative with the least adverse impact on the
aquatic ecosystem. See Carmel-by-the-Sea v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., 123
F.3d 1142, 1152 (9th Cir. 1997) ("[T]his scenario serves to highlight the
distinction between the National Environmental Policy Act and the Clean
Water Act: the former is procedural and is simply not as demanding as the
Clean Water Act on the issue of wetlands.") In addition, where special
aquatic sites are involved, the burden is placed on the permit applicant to
demonstrate that there are no practicable alternatives that would avoid
special aquatic sites, or that if such alternatives do exist, that they .have
more severe impacts on the aquatic ecosystem. Thus, the identification of
project purpose and alternatives is all the more important in the Section
404 context, because the identification of an alternative as "practicable"
can control the agency's ultimate decision. This has led to significant
controversy over the definition of project purpose for Section 404
permitting actions, and over whether certain alternatives are "practicable."
It also highlights the need for care in identifying project purpose and
alternatives in the NEPA context, as those decisions may have
significant effects within the Section 404 process.
3. Assessment of Effects. NEPA requires an assessment of the effects-
direct, indirect and cumulative-of an agency's proposed action on the
human environment. That assessment includes effects on a wide range of
resources, including air, water, cultural resources, animal and plant
species, human communities, etc. The sweep of NEPA is very broad. In
contrast, the Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines focus more narrowly on impacts
to the "aquatic ecosystem"-although the requirement to pick the
practicable alternative with the least adverse impact on the aquatic
ecosystem includes the following qualifier: "so long as the alternative
does not have other significant adverse environmental consequences."
The generally more narrow focus of the Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines can
create some confusion in the review of the Corps' NEPA analysis for
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permit decisions-which should contain the broader focus required by
NEPA-and its findings and decisions under Section 404-which are
generally more narrowly focused on the issues relevant under the Section
404(b)(1) Guidelines concerning the aquatic ecosystem. (The Corps' own
"public interest review" does provide a more expansive scope of review
concerning the potential effects of the Corps' permitting decisions, and is
more similar in scope to the NEPA review. See 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a).
However, the public interest review criteria are much less specific than the
standards and procedures established under Section 404(b)(1), and the
more stringent Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines tend to be the greater source
of controversy.)
C. Secondary and Cumulative Impacts Assessment: Another source of controversy
in the NEPA review of Corps permitting decisions is the assessment of secondary
and cumulative effects or impacts.
1. The Regulations
a. "Effects" include "direct effects, which are caused by the action
and occur at the same time and place," and
"Indirect effects, which are caused by the action and are later in
time or farther removed in distance, but are still reasonably
foreseeable. Indirect effects may include growth inducing effects
and other effects related to induced changes in the pattern of land
use, population density or growth rate, and related effects on air
and water and other natural systems, including ecosystems.
Effects and impacts as used in these regulations are synonymous.
Effects includes ecological . . . aesthetic, historic, cultural,
economic, social, or health, whether direct, indirect, or
cumulative."
40 C.F.R. § 1508.8 (emphasis added).
b. "Cumulative impact" is "the impact on the environment which
results from the incremental impact of the action when added to
other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions
regardless of what agency (Federal or non-Federal) or person
undertakes such other actions. Cumulative impacts can result from
individually minor but collectively significant actions taking place
over a period of time." 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (emphasis added).
2. Judicial Interpretation
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a. Preliminary Note: Disputes over the analysis of growth-inducing
and cumulative impacts often occur in the context of detennining
whether a proposed action may have a "significant impact" on the
human environment, and thus, whether an EIS must be prepared.
The goal of the proponent often is to avoid having to "take
ownership" of the effects of other actions that mayor may not
occur in the area. This issue is often particularly relevant in the
Section 404 pennitting context, where a Corps pennit often is
required for limited wetlands impacts associated with a much
larger nonfederal project, such as a residential or commercial
development. The goal of proponents nonnally will be to limit the
extent of the Corps' analysis in order to avoid the EIS requirement,
while opponents will seek a more expansive review.
b. Fritiofson v. Alexander, 772 F.2d 1225, 1245-46 (5th Cir. 1985):
Cumulative effects analysis for Corps pennit issuance must
identify "(1) the area in which effects of the proposed project will
be felt, (2) the impacts that are expected in that area from the
proposed project, (3) other actions - past, proposed, and
reasonably foreseeable-that have had or are expected to have
impacts in the same area, (4) the impacts or expected impacts from
these other actions, and (5) the overall impact that can be expected
if the individual impacts are allowed to accumulate." EA should
"consider (1) past and present actions without regard to whether
they themselves triggered NEPA responsibilities and (2) future
actions that are 'reasonably foreseeable,' even if they are not yet
proposals and may never trigger NEPA-review requirements." See
also City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Dep't of Transportation, 772
F.2d 1225, 1245 (5th Cir. 1985) (adopting Fifth Circuit's Fritiofson
analysis of cumulative impact analysis requirements).
c. Landmark West! V. U.S. Postal Service, 840 F. Supp. 994
(S.D.N.Y. 1993), affd, 41 F.3d 1500 (2d Cir. 1994) (cumulative
impact analysis considers other actions as context/background
against which incremental effect of proposed action is measured;
agency sponsoring proposed action need not "take ownership" of
environmental consequences of other actions that provide
background for proposed action); see also Coalition on Sensible
Transportation v. Dole, 826 F.2d 60, 70-71 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (It
"makes sense to consider . . . cumulative effects by incorporating
the effects of other projects into the background 'data base' of the
project at issue, rather than by restating the results of the prior
studies." In this case, the EA and FONSI were "sufficient to alert
interested members of the public to any arguable cumulative
impacts."); Piedmont Heights Civic Club v. Moreland, 637 F.2d
430, 441-42 (5th Cir. 1981) ("NEPA does not require an agency to
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e.
restate all of the environmental effects of projects presently under
consideration. Where the underlying data base includes approved
project and pending proposals, the 'statutory minima' ofNEPA has
been met.")
Friends of the Earth v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 109 F.
Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000): The court found fault with the Corps'
analysis of both indirect (or secondary) and cumulative impacts in
its EAs for three casinos on the Mississippi coast. With respect to
indirect effects, the court stated: "Even more problematic is the
Corps' total lack of analysis of growth-inducing effects of the
casino projects. . .. The Corps ... contends that it was not
required to analyze such impacts because it detennined that they
are 'highly speculative and indefinite.' On this issue, the Corps is
simply wrong. . .. The administrative record in this case firmly
establishes that increased growth in the area is the only reasonable
prediction of what will occur if the casinos are built." 109 F.
Supp. 2d at 41 (citations omitted). Compare Hoosier
Environmental Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 105 F.
Supp. 2d 953, 975-76 (S.D. Ind. 2000): "[T]he riverboat casino
project's purpose it to provide an attractive resort destination to
which people would travel on existing roads. This does not
automatically lead to the conclusion that, once there, they will
build homes, retail stores and service stations.... No facts were
presented to the [Corps] that would makes this assessment
unreasonable, nor were there any making the likelihood of
secondary development reasonably foreseeable. Thus, the [Corps']
consideration of the indirect effects of the riverboat project was not
arbitrary or capricious." With respect to cumulative impacts, the
Friends of the Earth court concluded that "while the Corps
dedicated nine or ten pages of each EA to cumulative impacts, the
discussion provides no analysis at all. All three EAs merely recite
the history of development along the Mississippi coast and then
conclude that the cumulative direct impacts 'have been minimal.'
There is no actual analysis, only that conclusory statement." 109
F. Supp. 2d at 42.
Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 674-76 (9th Cir. 1975): This is
the classic case of "growth-inducing impacts," a fonn of indirect
effect. The court held that the DOT must analyze the growth
effects of constructing a new highway interchange in an otherwise
undeveloped area. Compare Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868,
878-79 (1 st Cir. 1986) ("[A]gencies should have taken account of
the 'secondary impacts.' First, ... building the causeway [to Sears
Island] and port [on island] will lead to further development [on
island]. . .. Once Maine completes the causeway and port,
pressure to develop the rest of the island could well prove
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irreversible."); with Laguna Greenbelt, Inc. v. Dep't of
Transportation, 42 F.3d 517, 525-26 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Discussion
and documentation in the EIS, however, support the EIS's
conclusion that the tollroad will not affect the amount and pattern
of growth in Orange County." "Record shows that 98.5% of all
land in the project's 'area of benefit' is already accounted for by
either existing or committed land uses not contingent on
construction of the corridor.")
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The SWANCC Decision
On January 9, 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Solid Waste Agency of
Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps o!Engineers(HSWANCC"), 531 U.S. 159 (2001), in
which the Court held that the Corps exceeded its authority under th~ Clean Water Act ("CWA")
when it asserted jurisdiction over isolated ponds that were used as habitat by migratory birds.
The Court based its judgment on the CWA itself: holding that the Corps' regulation at "33 C.P.R.
328.3(a)(3), as clarified and applied ... pursuant to the 'Migratory Bird Rule,' 51 Fed. Reg.
41217 (1986), exceeds the authority granted to [the Corps] under § 404(a) of the CWA." This
decision, which affected the· geographic scope of the Corps' jurisdiction under Se~tion 404, will
have potentially far-reaching effects on the Corps' regulatory program-although the precise
extent of those effects is·still becoming apparent as lower courts grapple with the·irnplications of
the Court's decision.
SWANCC involved the Corps' attempt to assert jurisdiction over an abandoned sand and
gravel mining pit that over the years had developed into a successional stage forest with over 200
permanent and seasonal ponds that provided habitat to over 100 species of migratory birds.
When a consortium of Chicago-area municipalities purchased the site to use for the disposal of
baled, solid waste, the Corps regulatory asserted jurisdiction over the site based on the use'ofthe
site by migratory birds. This assertion was based OIl the so-called Migratory Bird Rule, under
which, since 1985, the Corps and EPA had maintained that ''waters of the United States"
included isolated waters that were used as habitat by migratory birds. See 51 Fed. Reg. 41206,
41217 (1986). After the Corps twice denied its permit applications, the consortium challenged
the Corps' jurisdictional authority in court.
Both the district court and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the Corps'
authority. The Seventh Circuit held that where isolated, intrastate waters were used by migratory
birds, jurisdiction was proper under both the CWA and the Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. The appeals court found that the destruction of migratory bird habitat and the
resulting decrease in migratory bird populations substantially affects interstate commerce, and
thus discharges into isolated waters that may have such an effect are regulable under the
Commerce Clause. The court also found that the Corps had interpreted the CWA to extend to
such waters and under established principles, its interpretation should be upheld because it was a
reasonable reading of the statute. The court concluded that the CWA reaches as far as the
Commerce Clause allows.
The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit, holding that the CWA itself did not
support the Gorps' ~~sertion of jurisdiction under the Migratory Bird Rule. 531 at 584. The
Court acknowledged that it had previously stated that ~'the term 'navigable' [in the statutory term
'navigable waters'] is of 'limited import' and that Congress evidenced its intent to 'regulate. at
least some waters that would not be deemed "navigable" under the classical understanding of the
term.'" Id. at 587. However, the Court proceeded to state, "But it is one thing to give a word
limited effect and quite another to give it no effect whatever.. The term 'navigable' has at least
the import of showing us what Congress had in mind as its authority for enacting the CWA: its
traditional jurisdiction over waters that were or had been navigable in fact or which could
reasonably be made so." Id. at 587-88.
Under traditional Chevron analysis, the Corps asked the Court to defer to its
administrative interpretation because the Corps alleged that. the statute was ambiguous.
However, the Court found that statute to be cle_ar on._ its face, and deference to the agency was
.unnecessary. Moreover, the court added that, even if the statute were ambiguous, it would not
defer to the Corps:
Where an administrative interpretation of a statute invokes the outer limit~
of Congress' power,we. expect a clear indica~ion that Congress intended
that result. . . .' This concern is heightened where the administrative
. interpretation alters the federal-state framework by permitting federal
encroachment upon.traditional state power .... Permitting [the Corps] to
claim federal jurisdiction over ponds and mudflats falling, within the
'Migratory Bird Rule' would result in a significant impingement of the
States' traditional and primary power over land and water use.
Id. at 588.
The Court also expressed concern about the constitutional issues raised by the ·Corps'
position, but refused to resolve them. Instead, the Court cited the proposition that "where .an.
otherwise acceptable ~onstruction of'a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the
Court will construe ,tl}e statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly
contrary to the intent of Congress." Id. After expressing doubt about whether the commerce
power extended as far as the Corps claimed, the Court concluded: "We thus read the statute as
written to avoid the significant constitutional and federalism questions raised by respondents'
interpretation,and therefore reject the request for administrative deference." Id. at 589. The.
Court therefore held that the Corps lacks jurisdiction over nonnavigable, isolated, .. intrastate
waters, as clarified and applied pursuant to the Migratory Bird Rule. ~.
On January 19, 2001, shortly after the Court's decision, the Corps and EPA issued a joint
legal interpretation of SWANCC, in which they took a very narrow view of its effect on their
jurisdiction. They noted that the holding was limited to a finding that the Migratory Bird Rule,
as applied to nonnavigable, isolated, intrastate waters on the consortium'$ site, exceeded the
Corps' authority under the CWA. They stated that the Court did not strike down the underlying
regulation or any other part of the Corps' definition of "waters of the United States." They
advised field staff not to rely on the Migratory Bird Rule as the sole basis for asserting
jurisdiction, but that they should continue to assert jurisdiction to the full extent of their authority
under the statute and regulations for all waters other than nonnavigable, isolated, intrastate
waters. The agencies also. emphasized that traditionally navigable waters, interstate waters, their
tributaries, and wetlands adjacent to each continued to be subject to Corps regulation, consistent
with previous Court precedent. Although waters fonnerly subject to Corps jurisdiction pursuant
to the Migratory Bird Rule are no longer jurisdictional, all other waters covered by 33 C.F.R. §
328.3(a)(3) which have a different interstate commerce connection are to be examined on a case-
by-case basis by agency legal counsel. Finally, the agencies cited to prior Supreme Court and
lower court decisions that have broadly upheld CWA jurisdictional authority.
Selected Post-SWANCC Decisions
Headwaters, In~..v. .Talent Irrigation. District, 243 F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 2001): Citizen group
sued irrigation district .alleging violation ofCWA based on application of aquatic herbicide to
irrigation canals without obtaining discharge permit under Section 402 of·theCWA. District
court ruled that irrigation canals were ''waters of the United States" under the CWA, but no
pennit was required because the label on the herbicide approved by EPA under federal
pesticide law did not require such a pennit. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that
pesticide appro~al and labeling under federal law does not preclude need for a pennit under
the CWA. The Ninth Circuit also concluded that the irrigation.canals, which exchange water
with a number ofnatural streams and at least one lake, were ''waters of the United States,"·as
the district court had found..The Ninth Circuit distinguished SWANCC, explaining·that the
irrigation canals were not "isolated." "Because the canals receive water from natural streams .
and lakes, and divert waters to streams and creeks, they are. connected as tributaries to other
'waters.ofthe United States.'" 243 F.3d at 533. The fact that the canals were isolated from
natural streams· by gates during the application of herbicide did not change the court's
conclusion. The court noted that leaks had occurred, and in any event, the canals were tied to
"waters of the United States" at some times, comparing them to jurisdictional tributaries that
flow only intennittently. Id. at 534.
Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 250 F.3d 264.(5th Cir. 2001): Ranch owner sued oil and gas
company operating on the ranch under a lease, alleging that the .company had discharged oil
into a stream and its tributaries.in violation of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 ("OPA?'). The
Fifth Circuit upheld ·the district court's rejection of the ranch owner's. claim. The Fifth
Circuit noted .. that Congress generally intended ''waters of the United States" to be
synonymous under the CWA and the OPA. The· court then. confinned· the long~standing
conclusion that the tenn "waters of the United States" does not include "groundwater," and
therefore, those statutes do not regulate discharges to groundwater. With respect to surface
water, the court concluded that "a body of water is protected under the Act only if it is
actually navigable or is adjacent to an open body of navigable water." 250 F.3d at 270. The
court noted that in this case the creek and its tributaries were intermittent streams that only
infrequently contained running water, and that some of the time, the flow of water· in the
creek is entirely underground. Id. In conclusion, the court stated: "[T]here is nothing in the
record that could convince a reasonable trier of fact that either Big Creek or any of the
unnamed other intermittent creeks on the ranch are sufficiently linked to an open body of
navigable water as to qualify for protection under the OPA." Id. at 271.
United States v. ·Lamplight Equestrian Center, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3694 (N.D. 111., Mar.
8, 2002): In this district court ca~e, a landowner did not obtain a permit to build a small road
across a wetland on his property. The government brought a civil enforcement action against
the landowner. The court ruled in the government's favor, rejecting the landowner's claim
that the Corps lacked jurisdiction. The court concluded that the landowner had conceded
facts sufficient to establish a "significant nexus" between the wetland and truly navigable
water. A drainage ditch carried water away from the wetland .to' 'a tributary of Brewster
Creek, 'which then drained to the Fox River, which is navigable. The court also found that
the surface flow was in an unbroken line to the tributary, even though the drainage ditch ends
50 fee~ away from a drainage swale leading to the tributary. The court noted that water need
not flow in an unbroken line at all times, but that an intennittent flow would be sufficient to
establish a connection to n~vigable water. Addressing the issue ofwhat is to be considered a
"contiguous" .wetland, the court noted that. "adjacent," which is used in the Corps" definition
of "contiguous," means "being.·in actual ·contact [or] touching along a boundary or at a
point." "By virtue of the path of water, whether it be.a delta, a meandering swale, or a
drainage connection, the wetlands come into actual contact with' the': tributary of Brewster
Creek," and thus ar~ jurisdictional.
• United States v. Buday, 138 F.Supp. 2d 1282 (D. Mont. 2001): Landowner pled guiltyto
violating the CWA as a result of.filling wetlands to create berms· along Fred· Burr Creek,
which subsequently washed out, resulting. in the deposition of dirt and debris downstream.
Shortly after pleading guilty, the landowner learned of the SWANCC 'decision and moved to
withdraw his plea. The court denied the motion. There was no dispute about whether the
wetlands were adjacent to Fred Burr Creek. The question the' court addressed was whether
that creek was a water of the United States subject to Corps jurisdiction under the CWA.
Although the creek itself was not navigable-in-fact, it flowed into Flint Creek, which in tum
flowed into the Clark Fork River, which became navigable-in-fact· about 190 miles
downstream from the location of the wetland fill. Despite this long distance, the court noted
that case law on "tributaries" clearly established that waters like Fred Burr Creek were
subject to CWA jurisdiction. The court stated that ''just as wetlands adjacent to navigable
waters fall under the Act, tributaries that are distant from but connected to navigable waters
are ecologic~llycapable ofundennining the quality ofnavigable waters." 138 F. Supp. 2d at
1291. "Therefore, Congress must have intended to reach them." Id. at 1291-92~· .
United States v. Rapanos, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3957 (E.D. Mich., Feb. 21,2002):
Landowner was convicted of violating CWA for filling wetlands on his property. The
landowner appealed, ultimately petitioning for Supreme Court review. After SWANCC, the
Court remanded for reconsideration. The district court vacated the conviction on remand and
dismissed the case. The court ruled that a wetland with a "surface hydrological connection"
through a ditch and a creek to a.river that becomes navigable about 20 miles·distant is not a
"water of the United States" under the CWA. The court cited Congress' intent to assert
jurisdiction over waters that traditionally "were or had been' navigable in fact or which
reasonably could be so made." The court stated, "In other words, the plain text of the statute
mandates that navigable waters must be impacted by [the landowner's] activities." In this
case, the government was unable to prove that the land containing the wetlands, which was
roughly twenty miles from the nearest body of navigable water, had any effect on navigable
waters.
Other cases:
United States v. Newdunn Assqciates, Nos. 2:01cv508 and 4:01cv86 (E.D. Va., Mar. 8,
2002): Corps does not have jurisdiction over wetland that had had its hydrological
.connection with navigable waters severed by construction ofa road.
Colvin v. United States, 181 F. Supp. 2d 1050 (C.D. Cal. 2001): Salton Sea (in' California) is
a water of the United States. Sea isa popular destination for out-of-state and foreign tourists
who fish, ski, hunt, etc.; and it ebbs and flows with the tide. ''Under most any meaning of the
tenn, the Salton Sea is a body of 'navigable water' ...." .
United States v. Interstate General, 152 F. Supp. '2d 843 (D. Mass. 2001): Where defendant
was convicted of filling wetlands regulated by Corps under regulatory subsections other than
the one invalidated by the Supreme Court, and under a theory that those wetlands were
adjacent to or abutting tributaries impacting navigable waters, SWANCC' did not require
conviction to be reversed.
Laguna Gatuna, Inc. v. United States, 50 Fed. Cl. 336 (2001): EPA· had issued cease-and-
desist order to stop disposal of brine into isolated playa lake in New Mexico. After
SWANCC, EPA voluntarily withdrew order for lack ofjurisdiction over playa lake.
Brace v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 649 (2002): Court denied U.S~ summary judgment
motion. More facts needed to detennine whether sufficient nexus between property and
navigable water. "Should the facts indicate that the 30 acres are not connected to an
interstate water in any manner, then the' Supreme Court's ruling in SWANCC renders the
issue of whether a. taking occurred moot, as the Anny Corps qf pngineers no longer has
authority to regulate ...."
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Introduction
[T]he object of spurious interpretations is to make, unmake, or remake, and not
merely to discover. It puts a meaning into the text as a juggler puts coins, or what
not, into a dummy's hair, to be pulled forth presently with an air of discovery. It
is essentially a legislative, not a judicial process, ....1
In skewering the Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Mead Corp. ,2
Justice Scalia's rhetoric is exceptional. He derides the decision as "one of the most significant
opinions ever rendered by the Court dealing with the judicial review ofadministrative action. Its
consequences will be enormous, and almost uniformly bad."3 Although Justice Scalia objects to
Mead's new and uncertain limits on the applicability of the Chevron doctrine,4 this article will
*Dorothy Salmon Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. J.D. 1984,
University of Pennsylvania; B.A. 1978, Williams College. I wish to thank my colleague, John
Rogers, for discussing the subject of this article with me and for providing very helpful
comments on a previous draft. Any errors are my own.
IRoscoe Pound, Spurious Interpretation, 7 Colum. L. Rev. 379, 382 (1907).
2121 S. Ct. 2164 (2001).
3Id. at 2189 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also ide at 2177 ("Today's opinion makes an
avulsive change in judicial review of federal administrative action.").
4See Chevron U.S.A. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). In Chevron, the Court established
the following two-step analysis of the legality of an agency's legal interpretation:
.When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it administers,
it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of
Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency,
must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however,
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focus instead on Mead's use of a method of interpretation that imputes a clear intent to Congress
and authorizes courts to discern statutory meaning without strong deference··to an agency's expert
and political interpretation of the statute.
The article begins by briefly describing the interpretive regime defined by Chevron. That
regime found in statutory ambiguity an implied delegation of lawmaking power to agencies. The
article then discusses how Mead changes that default rule to one that delegates principal
interpretive lawmaking power to courts in the absence of affirmative evidence of congressional
intent to delegate that power to agencies. This shift resulted from an interpretive method that
spuriously imputed intent to Congress. Although the Mead Court purported to accept the rule of
deference dictated by Congress, the Court itself was the source of the imputed intent. The article
concludes by discussing how Mead's interpretive approach is similar to the approach in an
important and growing line ofRehnquist Court decisions that loads the interpretive dice in favor
of results not clearly intended by Congress and thereby arrogates to itself lawmaking power
better exercised by the legislature or the agency.
Chevron's Interpretive Regime: Ambiguity and Implied Delegation
to Agencies as the Default Rule
Judges identify and promote their political values when they adopt and apply particular
methods and canons of statutory interpretation.5 Moreover, the consistent use of canons of
construction should enable all actors in the process of lawmaking - legislatures, agencies, and
courts - to adjust their conduct in ways that will make the law more transparent, determinate and
the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at
issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as
would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if
the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the· question
for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction
of the statute.
467 U.S. at 842-44.
5See Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict 168-69 (1996) ("People
trying to choose an interpretive method must decide how to allocate power among various groups
and institutions - indeed, allocating power is what the choice of an interpretive method does.");
ide at 174 ("a system of legal interpretation is inevitably a function of decisions that are, broadly
speaking, political in character."); John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Statutory
Formalism, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 685, 691-92 (1999) ("Selecting an interpretive methodology thus
involves inevitable choices about the institutional allocation ofpower. If courts give strong
deference to agencies' interpretations of the statutes they administer, that arrangement shifts law
elaboration authority away from judges and toward the executive. If courts reject the authority of
legislative history, they shift power away from committees and bill sponsors and toward agencies
and courts. If courts start from an assumption of strong legislative supremacy in statutory cases,
they define themselves as subordinates of the legislature." (footnotes omitted)).
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predictable.6
The canon ofconstruction identified in Chevron7has played a critical role in defining the
relative roles of legislature, agency, and court in developing the content ofpublic law. The canon
clearly recognizes the primacy of the legislature by holding that "unambiguously expressed"
congressional intent determines the content of law and "must [be] give[n] effect."8 When a
statute is ambiguous, however, Chevron located lawmaking primacy in the agency, whose
interpretation of law must be upheld by a court unless it is unreasonable.9
The default rule of Chevron, therefore, is that Congress has delegated to the agency the
authority to resolve any statutory ambiguity because, relative to the court, the agency is in a
preferred position to make the unresolved policy decision. lo This default rule applies regardless
6Professor Eskridge has argued that consistent application of the canons of construction
"might constitute an interpretive regime that both restrains judges and enables the citizenry to
predict how those judges will apply ambiguous as well as clear statutes. Not least important,
such an interpretive regime could serve democracy values ... as legislators and their staffs could
predict how different proposed statutory language would be applied." William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Norms, Empiricism,and Canons in Statutory Interpretation, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 671, 679 (1999)
(footnote omitted). See also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as
Equilibrium, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 26, 86 (1994) ("canons are designed, as we believe and the Court
maintains they are, to create a predictable interpretive regime").
7This canon is presented at supra note 4.
8467 U.S. at 842-44.
9Decisions rejecting agency interpretations under the second part of the Chevron analysis
are quite rare. The Court, however, has recently held that an agency had acted unreasonably in
construing an ambiguous statute. See Whitman v. American Trucking Ass 'ns., 121 S. Ct. 903,
918 (2001) ("The statute is in our view ambiguous concerning the manner in which Subpart 1
and Subpart 2 interact with regard to revised ozone standards, and we would defer to the EPA's
reasonable resolution of that ambiguity. We cannot defer, however, to the interpretation the
EPA has given." (citations omitted)).
lOSee, e.g., Thomas E. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 Geo. L.J.
833, 861 (2001) (footnotes omitted), where the authors stated that:
One reason for preferring agency interpretations, which is alluded to by
Chevron itself, is that agencies are more politically accountable than are courts.
Choosing between two or more permissible interpretations of a statute is a
political act, involving the exercise of discretion in channeling the coercive
powers of the state in one direction rather than another. A robust deference
doctrine therefore helps minimize the occasions in which courts are tempted to
employ statutory interpretation to impose their policy preferences on a public to
which they are not accountable.
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ofwhether the delegation to the agency was intended or unintended: II the delegation is a
consequence of the statute's ambiguity. Chevron's assignment of lawmaking power was based
on the Court's view that the agency is appropriately responsive to political judgment and
Congress would be assumed to have intended agency decisionmaking, rather than judicial
decisionmaking, when implementation of a statute necessitated a determinate statutory
meaning. 12
lIThe Court made this point explicitly in Chevron, when it stated that:
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express
delegation ofauthority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute
by regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless
they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. Sometimes the
legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than
explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a
statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an
agency.
467 U.S. at _. See also ide at _ ("Perhaps [Congress] consciously desired the Administrator
to strike the balance at this level, thinking that those with great expertise and charged with
responsibility for administering the provision would be in a better position to do so; perhaps it
simply did not consider the question at this level; and perhaps Congress was unable to forge a
coalition on either side of the question, and those on each side decided to take their chances with
the scheme devised by the agency. For judicial purposes, it matters not which of these things
occurred.").
12See ide at _, where the Court stated that:
Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political
branch of the Government. Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing
political interests, but not on the basis of the judges' personal policy preferences.
In contrast, an agency to which Congress has delegated policymaking
responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the
incumbent administration's views ofwise policy to inform its judgments. While
agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it
is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such
policy choices -- resolving the competing interests which Congress itself either
inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency
charged with the administration of the statute in light ofeveryday realities. When
a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly
conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency's policy, rather than
whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge
must fail. In such a case, federal judges -- who have no constituency -- have a
duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do. The
responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the
struggle between competing views of the public interest are not judicial ones:
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In sum, Chevron's interpretive regime defined a background rule that yielded agencies
significant lawmaking power in the absence of unambiguously expressed legislative intent.
Mead and the Imputation ofLegislative Intent:
A Narrowed Scope for Chevron Deference
The Court's decision in Mead redefines the default rule for determining when the
Chevron interpretive regime will apply.I3 The redefinition is accomplished by the Court's
imputation of legislative intent. The Court concludes that statutory silence regarding delegation
to the agency of implied decisionmaking authority means that Congress intended that an agency
is not to be accorded Chevron deference in its interpretive decisions. Chevron, of course, had
indicated that the same rule of deference should apply regardless of whether the delegation is
express or implied. 14 Indeed, in accounting for Chevron's significance, commentators have
focused on how Chevron worked a "fundamental" shift in administrative law by eliminating the
distinction in degrees of deference drawn in earlier Supreme Court decisions between exercises
of expressly or impliedly delegated authority. IS
"Our Constitution vests such responsibilities in the political branches." TVA v.
Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978)....
13The limits on the scope of Chevron deference newly defined by Mead were not wholly
surprising given the Court's decision the previous term in Christensen v. Harris County, 120 S.
Ct. 1655 (2000). There, the Court indicated that the scope of Chevron's applicability was
uncertain, but failed to identify a rationale for the inapplicability of Chevron, relying instead on
ipse dixit to reject the agency's request for deference:
we confront an interpretation contained in an opinion letter, not one arrived at after, for
example, a formal adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking. Interpretations such
as those in opinion letters -- like interpretations contained in policy statements, agency
manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law -- do not warrant
Chevron-style deference. Instead, interpretations contained in formats such as opinion
letters are "entitled to respect" under our decision in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S.
134, 140 (1944), but only to the extent that those interpretations have the "power to
persuade," ibid.
Id. at __. Only Justice Souter, the author of the Court's opinion in Mead appeared to foretell
Mead's analytic approach: Justice Souter concurred in Christensen, stating that Chevron
deference would have followed if the agency's decision had been adopted through informal
rulemaking. Id. at __. In that form, the agency decision would have met both of the Mead .
requirements that are identified and discussed infra.
14See supra note _ and accompanying text.
ISSee Merrill & Hickman, supra note _, at 833-34 (footnotes omitted), in which the
authors stated that:
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Justice Souter's decision in Mead twice alludes to the distinction in types of delegations
the legal significance ofwhich had been eliminated by Chevron and thereby indicates that full,
Chevron-type deference will continue to apply in aI.1Y case of an express delegation. He first
signals this result when he offers a narrowed restatement of the rule of Chevron deference,
focusing on express delegations:
When Congress has "explicitly left a gap for an agency to fill, there is an
express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of
the statute by regulation," and any ensuing regulation is binding in the courts
unless procedurally defective, arbitrary or capricious in substance, or manifestly
contrary to the statute. 16
Justice Souter provides a second indication when he presents his argument regarding the
background expectation of congressional intent about judicial deference, which focuses only on
instances of implied delegation. 17
Chevron expanded the sphere of mandatory deference through one simple shift in
doctrine: It posited that courts have a duty to defer to reasonable agency
interpretations not only when Congress expressly delegates interpretative
authority to an agency, but also when Congress is silent or leaves ambiguity in a
statute that an agency is charged with administering. The Court in Chevron
blandly referred to such gaps and ambiguities as "implied" delegations of
interpretative authority and treated these implied delegations as equivalent to
express delegations. Chevron's equation of gaps and ambiguities with express
delegations turned the doctrine ofmandatory deference, formerly an isolated
pocket of administrative law doctrine, into a ubiquitous formula governing
court-agency relations. With this one small doctrinal shift, the Court effected a
fundamental transformation in the relationship between courts and agencies under
administrative law.
See also Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations ofLaw, 1989 Duke
L.J. 511, _ (reaching similar conclusion about Chevron's change in the law of deference).
16121 S. Ct. at 2171 (citations and footnote omitted).
17See id. at 2172 (citations omitted), where the Court states that:
This Court in Chevron recognized that Congress not only engages in express
delegation of specific interpretive authority, but that "[s]ometimes the legislative
delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit." Congress, that is,
may not have expressly delegated authority or responsibility to implement a
particular provision or fill a particular gap. Yet it can still be apparent from the
agency's generally conferred authority and other statutory circumstances that
Congress would expect the agency to be able to. speak with the force of law when
it addresses ambiguity in the statute or fills a space in the enacted law, even one
about which "Congress did not actually have an intent" as to a particular result. ..
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It is in these cases of implied delegation that the Mead Court limits the applicability of
Chevron deference. Such deference will be accorded to agency decisions only when a court
concludes that Congress "expect[ed]" Chevron-type deference based on "statutory
circumstances":
it can still be apparent from the agency's generally conferred authority and other
statutory circumstances that Congress would expect the agency to be able to speak
with the force of law when it addresses ambiguity in the statute or fills a space in
the enacted law, even one about which "Congress did not actually have an intent"
as to a particular result. When circumstances implying such an expectation exist,
a reviewing court has no business rejecting an agency's exercise of its generally
conferred authority to resolve a particular statutory ambiguity simply because the
agency's chosen resolution seems unwise, but is obliged to accept the agency's
position ifCongress has not previously spoken to the point at issue and the
agency's interpretation is reasonable ....18
This reading of congressional intent is actually more elaborate than it might appear, because the
Court's reference to "an agency's exercise of its generally conferred authority" carries a particular
meaning. This meaning, expressed in the Court's statement of its holding, implicates the
procedures employed by the agency in reaching the decision at issue. In the Court's view,
Congress should be understood to have intended Chevron review in instances of an implied
delegation only when the agency has been delegated relevant decisionmaking authority and
reached its decision through a decisionmaking process that gives the decision procedural
legitimacy.19
The interpretive default rule defined by Mead is striking in two respects. First, the
Court's position that it is simply and properly following the intent of the legislature rings hollow:
on its face, the imputation of intent is too far reaching and the interpretive result is spurious.20
18Id. (citations omitted).
19The Court's holding was as follows:
We hold that administrative implementation of a particular statutory provision
qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority
to the agency generally to make 11lles carrying the force of law, and that the
agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that
authority. Delegation of such authority may be shown in a variety ofways, as by
an agency's power to engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking,
or by some other indication of a comparable congressional intent.
Id. at 2171.
20See Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the
Making and Application of Law 1194-95 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, eds.,
1994), where the authors stated that:
[The principle of institutional settlement], obviously forbids a court to substitute
its own ideas for what the legislature has duly enacted. What the legislature has
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·Can we reasonably believe that Congress irttended that varied levels of deference should be
accorded to administrative decisions on the basis of the indeterminate, inconsistent, and
ambiguous factors weighed by the Court in deciding that Congress did not intend to accord
Chevron deference to the Customs Service in its customs rulings? The factors considered by the
Court range from delegation of rulemaking authority, to the regime ofjudicial review of Customs
classifications, to the agency's practice in issuing its classifications, to the number of such
classifications.21
Second, the Mead rule fundamentally shifts the default rule from one in which
congressional silence related to an implied delegation yielded Chevron deference to the agency to
one in which congressional silence results in a delegation of lawmaking primacy to the courts,
which are to give an agency interpretation only as much deference as it has power to persuade the
court. At least two flaws of this redefined presumption ofnondelegation to agencies are
apparent. First, by establishing a new background rule for understanding legislative action, Mead
has shifted the context for understanding congressional action. The retroactive application of this
new interpretive regime to statutes enacted prior to the Court's decision in Mead can only be
understood to unsettle the expectations of the legislature, assuming that they understand the
background presumptions at all.22
thus enacted should not be frustrated or defeated. What it has not thus enacted
should be declared to be law, if at all, only upon the court's independent
responsibility and not upon a pretense of legislative responsibility.
See also Frank E. Horack Jr., The Disintegration of Statutory Construction, 24 Ind. L.J. 335, 345
(1949) ("Numerous other rules ofpresumption [in statutory construction] serve the function of
shifting policy determination from the legislature to the court.").
21 See 121 S. Ct. at 2174-75. Justice Scalia has argued that it was the difficulty ofmaking
just this sort of conclusion about legislative intent regarding implied delegations to agencies that
had led to the broad application of the Chevron standard in the first place. See Antonin Scalia,
supra note _, at _ ("Chevron, however, if it is to be believed, replaced this statute-by-statute
evaluation (which was assuredly a font ofuncertainty and litigation) with an across-the-board
presumption that, in the case of ambiguity, agency discretion is meant.").
Two courts have applied this Mead test and, after considering the various factors
suggestive of congressional intent determined that Congress intended Chevron deference to
apply. See Federal Election Comm'n v. National Rifle Ass'n ofAm., 254 F.3d 173,186 (D.C.
Cir. 2001); Fontana v. Caldera, 160 F. Supp. 2d 122, 128 (D.D.C. 2001).
22The Court's shifting background 'rules for understanding the meaning of congressional
action have led to Professors Eskridge and Frickey criticism of the Court's '''bait and switch'"
approach to statutory interpretation:
[Two recent] decisions surely came as a surprise to Congress. Indeed, there is a "bait and
switch" feature to [these] cases ...: when Congress enacted the statutes in question, the
constitutionality of the state-infringing provisions was clear and Congress could not have
anticipated the Gregory rule; nor could a reasonable observer have predicted the
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More significantly, Mead is flawed because its presumptive implied delegation of
interpretive authority to courts rather than agencies will mean that statutory law will be more
often decided by courts, than by democratically responsive decisionmakers. When applicable,
broad Chevron deference is, of course, only triggered when Congress itselfhas not dictated a
particular statutory meaning. The problematic effect ofMead is that when a statute is ambiguous
and accordingly in need of interpretation to determine the content of law, the court rather than the
'more democratically responsive agency will have ultimate decisionmaking power. Justice Scalia
argues, moreover, that Mead's rule of deference will result in ossification of statutory law,
because once a court exercising the primary lawmaking authority recognized by Mead determines
the meaning ofa statute, that meaning can be changed only·by amendment of the statute.23 To
the extent Justice Souter's intent-based scope of Chevron-doctrine applicability can avoid this
problem,24 the Court's attribution of congressional intent becomes even less believable. It seems
fanciful that Congress would have intended that different standards ofjudicial review would
apply, and the statute would have different meanings, based on the procedures pursued by the
agency at the time it defined its interpretation of the statute.25
In sum, the Court's interpretive tum in Mead can be seen only as spurious interpretation
because the Court's analysis goes so far in imputing intent to Congress that the whole enterprise'
can only be seen as fictitious. There was, to be sure, fiction in defining the default rule in
Chevron. The imputation of intent accomplished by the Chevron doctrine is far less
expansion of Gregory in [the second case]. When the Court's practice induces Congress
to behave in a certain way and the Court then switches the rules, Congress justifiably
feels taken.
Eskridge and Frickey, supra note _, at 85 (footnote omitted). The Court's regime of Chevron
deference would have been understood by Congress to apply since 1984. The Court's analysis in
Mead included consideration of the intent of statutory amendments enacted in 1993. See 121 S.
Ct. at 2169 & 2175.
23See Mead, 121 S. Ct. at 2181-83.
24Recall that Justice Souter was the only Justice in Christensen (discussed supra at note
~ to express the opinion that the agency there might be able to have a court approve its
interpretation of the statute if it proceeded by notice-and-comment rulemaking, rather than by an
informal letter. 120 S. Ct. at __ (Souter, J., concurring) ("I join the opinion of the Court on the
assumption that it does not foreclose a reading of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 that
allows the Secretary of Labor to issue regulations limiting forced use.").
25Cf. Mead Corp., 121 S. Ct. at 2180 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Is it likely--or indeed even
plausible--that Congress meant, when such an agency chooses rulemaking, to accord the
administrators of that agency, and their successors, the flexibility of interpreting the ambiguous
statute now one way, and later another; but, when such an agency chooses case-by-case
administration, to eliminate all future agency discretion by having that same ambiguity resolved
authoritatively (and forever) by the courts?").
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objectionable for two reasons. First, the imputation of intent accepted a delegation to agencies
rather than to the courts for the primary authority to resolve a statute's ambiguities. Chevron was
accordingly not self-serving in its understanding of congressional intent. Second, the legal actor
to whom lawmaking authority is attributed by Chevron is the politically accountable
decisionmaker, rather than the nonpolitically responsive courts.26
Mead and Presumptive Statutory Meaning
In assessing the significance ofMead's imputation of legislative intent, one should not
understand the case as an exceptional effort to rein in the scope of application of the Chevron
doctrine. Rather, the case is yet another important example of the Rehnquist Court's
unwillingness to conclude that a statute's meaning is ambiguous, due to the Court's own
imputation of clear meaning or intent. Considered in this light, the case shows that the Court is
continuing a decisive move away from deference to agency interpretations based on a spurious
claim of yielding to clear statutory meaning or legislative intent.27
26Cf. Frank E. Horack Jr., The Disintegration of Statutory Construction, 24 Ind. L.J. 335,
342 (1949), in which the author makes the following comments about rules ofpresumptive
meaning of statutes:
[Rules of interpretation in the nature ofpresumption] are fictional rules of
interpretation and frequently lead to results exactly opposite those which
legislatures intend. At best they are judicial standards requiring a particular form
of legislative expression. As such, they are within limits defensible. Every
system of government depends upon the ability of society to require of its people
certain formalities as prerequisite to legal consequence. It is not too much to
require this of the agencies of government as well. Formalities, however, become
intolerable when they no longer reflect the normal expectations of the society for
which they were constructed. . . .
27Understood in this light, Justice Scalia's cri de coeur regarding Mead's fundamental
shift in administrative law, see supra note _ and accompanying text, can only be understood as
disingenuous. Because Justice Scalia typically concludes that a statute has a clear meaning,
relying when necessary on the imputation of statutory meaning, see infra notes _-_ and
accompanying text (discussing Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in American Trucking
Ass 'ns.), he is less likely to get to the second step of the Chevron analysis - the step at which
strong deference is present. See supra note _. This point has been well stated in a recent article:
Justice Scalia has taken the position that it is appropriate for courts to take policy
considerations into account as part of the ordinary tools of statutory construction
deployed at step one. The upshot of this position is that Justice Scalia invokes
Chevron more consistently than other Justices, but also ends up deferring to
agency views less than other Justices. In Justice Scalia's hands, Chevron has the
paradoxical result of diluting, rather than strengthening, the practice of deference
to executive understandings of law.
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Two other decisions by the Court during its 2000 Term provide important examples of
how the Court has come to restrain administrative discretion by constraining the scope of
statutory ambiguity through rules ofpresumption. In Solid Waste Agency ofNorthern Cook
County (SWANCC) v. United States Army Corps ofEngineers,28 the Supreme Court held that,
when it enacted the Clean Water Act,29 Congress did not delegate to the Corps of Engineers the
authority to regulate the filling of "other waters.,,30 The Corps supported the legality of its view
of the Act's jurisdictional scope by its claim that the statute was ambiguous in defining its
jurisdictional reach and that the Court therefore had to defer to the Corps' regulation under
Chevron. 31 The Court held, however, that the meaning of the statute's text was plainly contrary
to the Corps' position and that even an ambiguous text would not have resulted in deference on
this question.32 The Court held that the Corps could not rely upon an inferential delegation of
discretionary power to the agency, but instead had to show clear statutory authority for its
exercise ofjurisdiction.33 For the Rehnquist Court, therefore, statutory ambiguity was no longer
Merrill & Hickman, supra note _, at 860 (footnotes omitted). Indeed, Justice Scalia has made
much the same comment about his application of Chevron deference. See Scalia, supra note _,
at _ ("One who finds more often (as I do) that the meaning of a statute is apparent from its text
and from its relationship with other laws, thereby finds less often that the triggering requirement
for Chevron deference exists. It is thus relatively rare that Chevron will.require me to accept an
interpretation which, though reasonable, I would not personally adopt.").
28 121 S. Ct. 675 (2001). This case is discussed in detail in Michael P. Healy,
Textualism's Limits on the Administrative State: Of Isolated Waters, Barking Dogs, and
Chevron, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,928 (2001).
2933 U.S.C. §§1251-1387.
30See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3).
31See 121 S. Ct. at 683. Indeed, the Court itselfhad found the definition of"navigable
waters" to be ambiguous in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121
(1985), and had deferred to the Corps' exercise of regulatory jurisdiction over wetlands adjacent
to navigable waters. See id. at 131.
32The Court accordingly assumed the applicability of Chevron and then explained why, in
its view, Chevron deference was'unwarranted. Because the "Migratory Bird Rule" was an
interpretation of the statute that had not been adopted following notice and comment rulemaking,
see 121 S.Ct. at 678, the Court might have held that Chevron deference was inapplicable.
33The Court stated that:
These are significant constitutional questions raised by respondents' application of
their regulations, and yet we find nothing approaching a clear statement from
Congress that it intended § 404(a) to reach an abandoned sand and gravel pit such
as we have here. Permitting respondents to claim federal jurisdiction over ponds
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the sufficient basis for the Corps' assertion of regulatory authority that it had been in Riverside
Bayview Homes. The Court's demand for a clear statement of regulatory authority in the Clean
Water Act is quite important because it responds to a request for Chevron deference with a rule
of construction that shifts the burden to the Corps to come forward with an express delegation of
authority from Congress to support its jurisdiction, rather than mere ambiguity.34 "The Court's
use of this clear statement rule gave the Court license both to ignore strong evidence of
legislative intent and purpose supporting the exercise ofjurisdiction over 'other waters' and to
trump the Corps' long-standing interpretation of the Clean Water Act.,,35
Another recent decision similarly limiting the scope of statutory ambiguity is Whitman v.
and mudflats falling within the "Migratory Bird Rule" would result in a significant
impingement of the States' traditional and primary power over land and water use.
See, e.g., Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation, 513 U.S. 30,44
(1994) ("[R]egulation of land use [is] a function traditionally performed by local
governments"). Rather than expressing a desire to readjust the federal-state
balance in this manner, Congress chose to "recognize, preserve, and protect the
primary responsibilities and rights of States ... to plan the development and use ...
ofland and water resources ...." 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b). We thus read the statute as
written to avoid the significant constitutional and federalism questions raised by
respondents' interpretation, and therefore reject the request for administrative
deference.
Id. at 683-84 (footnote omitted).
341n a recent article, I describe how this clear statement rule can be traced to two
important, recent cases rejecting agency calls for Chevron deference. In both MCl
Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994), and
Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 120 S. Ct. 1291 (2000), "the Court
employed a similar clear statement rule requiring the expressly affirmative grant of regulatory
authority to foreclose the Corps' exercise of nontraditional regulatory jurisdiction." Healy, supra
note _, at __.
351d. As I argued in that article:
Such an activist use of a clear statement rule is contrary to the spirit of Chevron,
which recognized that administrative agencies were better placed than courts to
make political decisions arising in the implementation of statutes. The Court
should not be devising rules of construction that enable courts to declare
particularized implementation decisions unlawful because they were not
authorized in sufficiently clear terms. Such rules effectively limit the scope of
Chevron deference.
Id. In this respect, the default rule defined by Justice Souter in Mead does not seem as
objectionable as SWANCC's clear statement rule, because Justice Souter would be expected to
consider evidence of legislative intent beyond the statute's text in deciding whether Congress
intended Chevron deference to apply.
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American Truclang Ass 'ns. 36 There, Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, concluded that the
Clean Air Act ("CAA") barred the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") from considering
costs in defining the National Ambient Air Quality Standards ("NAAQS"): "The text of §
109(b), interpreted in its statutory and historical context and with appreciation for its importance
to the CAA as a whole, unambiguously bars cost considerations from the NAAQS-setting
process, and thus ends the matter for us as well as the EPA."37 The Court's decision that the
statute was unambiguous followed from its application of clear statement rules similar to the one
applied in SWANCC. The Court initially stated that, before it would recognize that the statute
authorized the EPA to consider costs in defining the NAAQS, "respondents must show a textual
commitment of authority to the EPA to consider costs [and] that textual commitment must be a
clear one.,,38 In the Court's colorful view, "Congress ... does not alter the fundamental details of
a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions -- it does not, one might say, hide
elephants in mouseholes."39 Later, the Court again declined to conclude that the Clean Air Act's
language was ambiguous in determining whether EPA had authority to consider costs: "we find it
implausible that Congress would give to the EPA through these modest words the power to
determine whether implementation costs should moderate national air quality standards."40 In the
Court's view, Congress could be understood to have delegated in the Clean Air Act particular
aspects of administrative discretion to the EPA only if there had been an explicit and clear
36121 S. Ct. 903 (2001).
37Id. at
38Id. at 909.
39Id. at 909-10 (citing MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone &
Telegraph Co., 512 U.S. 218,231 (1994) & FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,_
U.s. _, 159-60). The Court, of course, decides itself whether an elephant is present and
whether a mousehole is its hiding place.
4°Id. at 910 (citation omitted). The Court continued to express its opinion that only
clearly stated text, rather than an ambiguous one, could be read as a delegation to EPA of
discretion to consider costs:
Even if we were to concede those premises, we still would not conclude that one
of the unenumerated factors that the agency can consider in developing and
applying the criteria is cost of implementation. That factor is both so indirectly
related to public health and so full ofpotential for canceling the conclusions
drawn from direct health effects that it would surely have been expressly
mentioned in §§ 108 and 109 had Congress meant it to be considered. Yet while
those provisions describe in detail how the health effects ofpollutants in the
ambient air are to be calculated and given effect, see § 108(a)(2), they say not a
word about costs.
Id.
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delegation, rather than statutory ambiguity. This more exacting default rule, of course, turned on
the Court's own view that, in the particular statutory context, Congress can be expected to have
spoken clearly to accomplish the delegation.
Notably, Justice Breyer disagreed with this aspect of the Court's decision. He rejected
the Court's use ofpresumptions in giving a clear meaning to the statutory text and urged instead
that, in the absence of a statute that clearly bars an agency's consideration of costs, the agency
should have discretion to consider costs in implementing the statute:
In order better to achieve regulatory goals--for example, to allocate resources so
that they save more lives or produce a cleaner environment--regulators must often
take account of all of a proposed regulation's adverse effects, at least where those
adverse effects clearly threaten serious and disproportionate public harm. Hence,
I believe that, other things being equal, we should read silences or ambiguities in
the language of regulatory statutes as permitting, not forbidding, this type of
rational regulation.41
Justice Breyer, however, considered the CAA's "legislative history and alternative sources of
statutory flexibility" and, relying on these additional indicia of expressed congressional intent,
came to the same conclusion as the majority: that, in enacting the Clean Air Act, Congress
clearly intended to bar the EPA from considering costs in defining the NAAQS.42 Under Justice
Breyer's approach, the agency would have the decisionmaking authority regarding the
consideration of the costs of regulations when there was no clear evidence of congressional intent
to bar its consideration of that factor.
In sum, through its application of rules of interpretation, the Supreme Court has placed
important limitations on the domain of statutory ambiguity. Mead takes that same approach and
thereby limits the scope of application of the Chevron doctrine.
Conclusion
To be sure, Mead is important for the limits that it imposes on the applicability of
Chevron deference. The case is also important because it continues the provocative use by the
Rehnquist Court of an interpretive regime that imputes a clear intent to Congress and identifies a
meaning of the statute with a limited consideration of the agency's expert and political
interpretation.
411d. at __ (Breyer, J., concurring).
421d. at
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, Hypothetical # 1
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Mega Law Firm ("Mega") was hired by Will B. Against in January 2001 to prepare
Articles of Incorporation for Clear Skies, Inc., a corporation being organized to sell medical
products for treatment of eye disorders, and a lease of warehouse property by Will B. Against to
Clear Skies, Inc. Will B. Against is the incorporater and an officer and director of Clear Skies,
Inc. Mega informs Will B. Against that Mega's representation is of Clear Skies, Inc., not Will B.
Against in his individual capacity. Mega does not perform any legal services for Will B. Against
in his individual capacity. Following ~e filing of the Articles ofIncoq)oration and the execution
of the lease on March 1, 2001, Mega performs no further legal services for Clear Skies, Inc.
Belching Smokestacks, Inc. is a manufacturer that is a major source of air pollutants and
subject to a Title V operating pennit. A draft Title V pennit is prepared by the Kentucky
Division for Air Quality and public notice ofthe draft permit is given on May 1, 2001.
Will B. Against sees the public notice in the newspaper, and opposes the issuance of a
Title V permit to Belching Smokestacks, since his mansion and horse fann are located in an area
that is down wind from the Belching Smokestacks facility. Will B. Against contacts the
corporate attorney at Mega who prepared the Articles of Incorporation and lease for Clear Skies,
Inc., and asks whether Mega would represent Will B. Against to oppose the issuance of the Title
V pennit to Belching Smokestacks.
The corporate attorney makes inquiry to the environmental group within Mega to
detennine whether the environmental group would undertake a representation in opposition to
issuance of the pennit to Belching Smokestacks. The corporate attorney is infonned that as a
matter of policy, Mega will not represent a person opposing the issuance of an environmental
pennit because of the potential for establishing a legal position that might be inconsistent with
K- 3
positions taken on behalf of other clients in similar pennitting matters. The corporate attorney
for Mega then infonns Will B. Against that Mega will not accept the representation because of
this policy.
Will B. Against then hires another law finn to file a Petition for Hearing on his behalf in
opposition to the issuance of a pennit to Belching Smokestacks. Belching Smokestacks then
retains Mega to represent its interests in the administrative hearing.
Upon learning of the representation by Mega of Belching Smokestacks, Will B. Against
infonns Mega that it has a conflict o( interest, and demands that Mega withdraw from further
representation ofBelching Smokestacks.
QUESTIONS AND ISSUES
Under these facts, is Mega required to withdraw from its representation of Belching
Smokestacks?
Is Will B. Against a client ofMega? Refer to SCR 3.130 (1.13) Organization as Client.
Is Mega required to withdraw because Will B. Against is an officer and/or director of
Clear Skies, Inc.? Refer to SCR 3.130 (1.13).
Is Clear Skies, Inc. a current or fonner client of Mega? Refer to SCR 3.130 (1.7)
Conflict of Interest: General Rule, which prohibits representation of a client if
representation of that client will be directly adverse. to another client, and prohibits
representation if the representation of that client may be materially limited by the
lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person. (Undivided loyalty test.)
Refer also to SCR 3.130 (1.9) Conflict of Interest: Fonner Client, which prohibits
representation of another person in the same or substantially related matter in which that
person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the fonner client. (Substantial
relationship test.)
Is Mega required to withdraw ifMega is currently providing legal services to Clear Skies,
Inc., but the services are limited to representation concerning labor-employment issues,
and do not include environmental representation? Refer to SCR 3.130 (1.7). Refer also to
SCR 3.130(1.2). Is Mega required to withdraw if Clear Skies, Inc. is a party to the
Petition for Hearing?
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Is Mega required to withdraw if Mega represented Will B. Against in his individual
capacity by preparing a Will and Estate Plan for Mr. Against, but that work ceased prior
to Mega's engagement by Belching Smokestacks? Refer to SCR 3.130 (1.9).
Is Mega required to withdraw ifMega is currently providing legal services to Mr. Against
concerning a real estate matter, that is unrelated to the property used by Belching
Smokestacks? Refer to SCR 3.130 (1.7). Refer also to SCR 3.130(1.2).
Is Mega required to withdraw if Will B. Against discussed the reasons for his opposition
to the Belching Smokestakes pennit in his discussions with the corporate attorney of
Mega? What if the discussion involved confidential information?
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You are a member of a medium sized firm that has a varied practice including property·
acquisitions for major construction.
A large corporation, Erebus Motor International (Erebus) is looking for a site to build a
plant making environmentally friendly vehicles that use passive electric energy to boost gas
mileage. It has become good PR, and a boost for the stock price, for an international
corporation to have an environmentally friendly and a family friendly image. Erebus always
provides on site day care. .The plant would create 300 good-paying jobs for your community
and is highly sought after by other states as well. The corporation, in support of their image as a
'green' corporation, is looking for a tract of land that has no existing environmental issues. Your
finn has been contacted about representing the Erebus in acquiring suitable land, which will put
you in the position to have frequent contacts with high ranking members of your state
government.
As part of your negotiations, your firm disclosed to Erebus that .one or more of the
properties in which they may be interested may be owned by persons or corporations that are
current or former clients ofyour finn.
-Can your firm represent Erebus in its efforts to acqUIre the
property it needs?
For the past decade, your most reliable client has been Reddy N. Able. Reddy is always
in some kind of litigation and those fees can be counted on every month to pay the rent. Reddy
is a good old boy who doesn't always take your advice, but who always pays his bill on time.
Reddy is the only son of Tuff N. Able, a venerable businessman, mover and shaker.
Reddy works with the various family businesses and is viewed as his father's heir apparent, but
there is no paperwork that defines his role. Technically the businesses are Tuff N. Able d/b/a
Able Unlimited. Tuffs health has been declining steadily and Reddy is preparing to inherit most
ofa substantial estate including several large tracts ofreal estate.
The largest piece of real estate was also the location of an engine overhaul and machine
shop (The Shop) that Tuff ran for forty years that specialized in overhauling engines, especially
engines used in pipelines. Tuff used the strongestdegreasers he could find. His favorite was
"Gunk-off', which "did the job" for Tuft: but which has now been determined to be a dense non
aqueous phase liquid (DNAPL), which tends to sink through soil into groundwater.
. Tuff always poured the dirty solvents out behind the shed. If there were more than ten
gallons of the stuff, Tuff would put it in an old tank on the back of a pick-up truck he had and
drive off: He never said where he went, but Reddy knows about a sunken area on the back of
the property that could take large amounts of liquid one day and be empty the next morning. Just
before his latest illness, Tuff had some grading work done around the sunken area at the back of
the property, brought in fill dirt to cover the surface and planted grass.
Your finn has accepted Erebus' offer of employment and Erebus has identified the Able
Unlimited property as a key part of the tract of land it will need in order to build in your
community.
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-Are there additional disclosures you need to make to Erebus?·
-Is there a disclosure you need to make to Reddy?
You have disclosed to Erebus your prior representation of Reddy and Able Unlimited.
Reddy has decided he wants to go into stock car racing and wants his dad's land to be
bought by Erebus. Reddy knows how they are about being a 'green' corporation and wants
something to show them that the land is fine. You have talked to Reddy before about doing an
environmental audit and he wants to look the property over himself and report that there are no
problems, since the land looks fine. He wants you to advise him on preparing the audit and look
it over when it is done.
-Can you represent Reddy?
You referred Reddy to a lawyer who rents space from your firm and has use of the finns
secretarial staff and library for a set fee per month. -The referral is on a limited basis for review
of Reddy's environmental audit and you know this lawyer cannot try to steal Reddy's business
from you because he will not risk his rent/secretary/library deal with your firm. Reddy has done
his investigation which consisted of Reddy having walked around the property and not seeing
anything bad. Reddy drafted the report himself and it says the property is fine. The report also
discussed the sunken area at the back of the property and states that it was fully remediated by
Tuff: Reddy gave a copy to Erebus and filed a copy with the referral lawyer. Since you were
his lawyer for so long, Reddy dropped off a copy of the report that your secretary put in his file.
In the meantime, Erebus has made quiet offers to the owners of the property it needs including an
offer to Tuff for The Shop property.
-Can you continue to represent Erebus?
Tuff has passed away and Reddy has come in to talk about the estate. While you are
talking, Reddy tells you that, over the course of the thirty years he worked with his dad, he went
with Tuff on the tanker truck about half a dozen times and every time Tuff dumped the used
liquid into the sunken area at the back ofthe property.
-Do you owe any duty to Erebus?
-Can you continue to represent Reddy in the administration of
Tuffs estate.
Those darned environmental bureaucrats say they have found a problem with· the
groundwater in your area due to DNAPLs and are doing a regional assessment for facilities that
used Gunk-off and similar degreasers. The-pointy headed bureaucrats (PHB) want to identify all
facilities that used Gunk-off and identify all possible areas that might be considered solid waste
management units (SWMUs) or areas of concern (AGes) for immediate soil removal and
groundwater remediation. Your local newspaper, pesky pinko yellowsheet (pPY) is trailing after
the PHBs and writing big stories about _contamination killing children based on a new study that
shows small amounts of the primary constituent in Gunk-off to cause brain damage in children
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under the age of 12 when ingested, particularly in water. All it takes to set off the PPY is for the
PHBs to seem interested in a piece of property. . One of the PHBs has started asking Reddy's
employees about how the shop operated and how they disposed of their spent solvents. The
employee didn't know what they meant, but they are likely to be back. One story about
contamination will scare off Erebus due to their concern with their 'green' image. The PHBs
have talked to Erebus which has offered to show its files to the PHBs including Reddy's
environmental audit.
-Does Reddy still have an environmental audit privilege?
-Do you owe a duty to Erebus?
-Do you owe a duty to the PHBs?
-Anything you believe you should do?
Right before Erebus announced that it was planning to build a new plant, Reddy found
an old 200 gallon tank half buried out behind the shed. Reddy wanted the tank taken out and
found that it contained about 75 gallons of stuff that smelled like Gunk-off along with some
water. Reddy had the liquid pumped out, excavated a small portion of the sunken area, dumped
the liquid there and replaced the soil and vegetation.
Erebus has since put options on the land ~d published its plant plan. Erebus is relying,
in part, on the environmental audit provided by Reddy. The on-site day care center will be some
distance from the plant and will use well water. The old sunken area will be part of the
playground for the children.
-Do you owe a duty to Erebus?
-Are there instructions you should give to Reddy?
-Do you owe a duty to the PHBs?
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